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Abstract 
Embodied  theories  propose  that  understanding  meaning  in  language  requires  the 
mental simulation of entities being referred to. These mental simulations would make 
use of the same modality-specific systems involved in perceiving and acting upon 
such entities in the world, grounding language in the real world. However, embodied 
theories  are  currently  underspecified  in  terms  of  how  much  information  from  an 
event  is  contained  in  mental  simulations,  and  what  features  of  experience  are 
included.  
The  thesis  addresses  comprehension  of  language  that  describes  speed  of  events. 
Investigating  speed  allows  embodied  theories  to  be  extended  to  a  more  complex 
feature  of  events.  Further,  speed  is  a  fine-grained  feature  and  thus  testing  an 
embodied theory of speed will reveal whether or not mental simulations include the 
fine  details  of  real-world  experience.  Within  the  thesis  four  main  methods  of 
investigation were used, assessing simulation of speed with different types of speed 
language  under  different  conditions:  behavioural  testing  combining  speed  in 
language  with  speed  in  perception  and  action,  eye-tracking  investigating  whether 
eye-movements to a visual scene are affected by speed in sentences, a psychophysics 
paradigm assessing whether speed in language affects visual perception processes, 
and finally, as a crucial test of embodiment, whether or not Parkinson’s patients, who 
have difficulty moving speedily, also have problems with comprehension of speed 
language. 
The  main  findings  of  the  thesis  are  that:  (1)  speed,  a  fine-grained  and  abstract 
dimension,  is  simulated  during  comprehension,  (2)  simulations  are  dynamic  and 
context-dependent, and (3) simulations of speed are specific to biological motion and 
can encode specific effectors used in an action.  
These results help to specify current embodied theories in terms of what the nature of 
simulations  are  and  what  factors  they  are  sensitive  to,  in  addition  to  broadly  
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providing support for the sharing of cognitive/neural processes between language, 
action and perception. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Understanding  the  meaning  of  words  and  sentences  is  crucial  to  our  ability  to 
function in the world.  To do so we must reliably map the arbitrary form of a spoken 
or  written  word  to  the  corresponding  concept  whether  it  is  present  in  the 
environment,  tangible  or  merely  imagined  (Meteyard,  Cuadrado,  Bahrami,  and 
Vigliocco 2012, p.2). These mappings are combined to form a wider representation 
in  the  case  of  sentences.  This  thesis  addresses  how  humans  manage  to  do  this, 
specifically  focusing  on  concepts  related  to  speed.  In  this  introductory  chapter  I 
describe two main approaches to understanding meaning in language (also referred to 
as  ‘semantics’):  symbolic  and  embodied  theories.  Symbolic  theories  typically 
describe meaning in terms of abstract holistic symbols (words). Current versions, 
distributional  semantic  theories,  assume  that  semantic  representations  arise  from 
language use: out of the statistical patterns that exist amongst words in a language. 
These theories focus only upon linguistic data, using statistical techniques to describe 
words’ meanings in terms of their distributions across different linguistic contexts 
(e.g.  Burgess  &  Lund,  1997;  Landauer  &  Dumais  1997;  Griffiths,  Steyvers  & 
Tenenbaum,  2007).  Embodied  theories,  current  versions  of  featural  theories  of 
semantics,  instead  propose  that  understanding  the  meaning  of  words  requires  the 
mental simulation of entities being referred to (e.g. Barsalou, 1999a; Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). These mental simulations make use of 
the same modality-specific systems involved in perceiving and acting upon entities in 
the world, such as perception and action systems. Thus they ground language in the 
real world and move away from abstract, symbolic representations of word meaning. 
The  investigation  presented  in  this  thesis  addresses  the  comprehension  of  speed 
language from an embodied perspective, thus the latter part of the chapter describes 
embodied theories in more detail. 
To begin the chapter, I will introduce the ‘symbolic versus embodied’ debate from a 
general cognitive science perspective, later moving on to discuss how each approach 
can be used to describe semantic representation and processing more specifically.  
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1.1  The overarching debate: symbolic vs. embodied approaches to cognitive 
science 
1.1.1  Symbolic cognition 
During the cognitive revolution around the middle of the twentieth century, much of 
the work in cognitive science adopted a symbol processing view that neglected the 
role  of  perception  (e.g.  Newell  &  Simon,  1961;  Fodor,  1975).  Here,  cognition 
proceeds via algorithmic processes on symbolic representations. This has since been 
the  ‘standard’  view  of  cognitive  science  until  recently.  The  ‘cognition-as-symbol 
manipulation’ framework was highly influenced by major developments outside of 
cognitive science such as logic, statistics and computer science, themselves heavily 
influenced by the development of the computer in the 1950s and 1960s (Barsalou, 
1999a). Symbolic approaches (e.g. Newell & Simon, 1961; Fodor, 1975) focus on 
the architecture of a system, the processes that operate on symbols within a system 
and how the symbols are related to each other, rather than the content of the symbols, 
which are thought to be the same regardless of what they are symbolizing. Cognitive 
processes and perceptual processes here are completely separate systems operating 
using  separate  principles.  For  symbols  to  represent  referents,  sensory  and  motor 
information  taken  from  perceptual  input  must  be  transduced  into  a  different 
representational format, containing no perceptual information (see Figure 1-1a). 
The symbols postulated in such approaches are abstract, amodal and arbitrary: they 
are empty of content, bear no relationship to the perceptual states they are transduced 
from and there is no systematic link between a particular symbol and its referent. 
Consider the number “4” as an analogy. There is no intuitive reason for the numeral 
“4” to be used to refer to the concept “four”, and it could just as easily have been 
referred to using “5” or any other numeral. Cognitive processing is thought to arise 
from the manipulation of such arbitrary symbols within the system.  
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For the standard cognitive scientist, the study of cognition involves an analysis of the 
computational  processes  occurring  within  the  black  box  of  the  mind  only:  the 
boundaries of cognition are drawn at the points of interface with the world (Shapiro, 
2011, p. 26). Even at the later part of the twentieth century this was the predominant 
view: “[t]he central focus of psychology concerns the information processing that 
intervenes between sensory inputs and motor outputs” (Holyoak, 1999). 
1.1.1.1  Problems for the symbolic view 
Despite the popularity of these approaches they face many problems. First, there is 
little  evidence  that  abstract  symbols  exist.  Similarly,  there  is  no  satisfactory 
description  or  evidence  of  the  transduction  process;  a  fully  developed  theory  is 
missing. Anderson (1978) argues that symbolic views are too powerful since they 
can  explain  all  phenomena  post-hoc,  but  conversely,  do  not  make  any  a  priori 
predictions. They are therefore unfalsifiable and not parsimonious.  
A  major  argument  against  symbolic  views,  which  embodied  theories  particularly 
build upon, has been described as the ‘symbol-grounding problem' (Harnard, 1990). 
If  cognition  works  via  the  manipulation  of  abstract  symbols,  which  contain  no 
information  related  to  their  referent  in  the  world,  then  how  does  understanding 
proceed? This problem is well explicated in the famous thought experiment “the 
Chinese room” (Searle, 1984). In the Chinese room, an individual that is completely 
ignorant to the Chinese language receives messages written in Chinese posted into 
the room. It is their job to post the correct response to this message, in Chinese, out 
of the room. Of course, the individual has no idea what the message says or how to 
respond because they do not know any Chinese, but they have been given a large 
book containing instructions of how to correctly manipulate the incoming Chinese 
symbols to form the correct combination of Chinese symbols to send back out of the 
room. To an outsider, they simply see a message being sent into the room and a 
correct response being sent out of the room. Thus the person inside the room has the 
ability to correctly process the Chinese symbols and produce the correct output, but 
could you say that this person understands the meaning of the symbols and their  
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message? This is precisely the type of operations proposed in traditional cognitive 
approaches. 
 
Figure 1-1. Amodal vs. perceptual symbols. Taken from Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey and Wilson 
(2003) (a) In amodal symbol systems neural representations from vision are transduced into an 
amodal representation such as a frame, semantic network or feature list. These amodal 
representations are used during word understanding. (b) In perceptual symbol systems neural 
representations from vision are partially captured by conjunctive neurons, which are later 
activated during word comprehension to re-enact the earlier state. 
1.1.2   Embodiment 
Embodied cognition is largely seen as a reaction to this ‘standard’ cognitive science 
approach as viewing cognition as the manipulation of symbols, and instead views 
cognition as the manipulation of sensory and motor information, extracted from real-
world  experience.  Embodied  cognition  emphasizes  the  role  of  the  body  and  the 
environment  in  cognitive  processes:  cognition  emerges  from  interaction  with  the 
environment (Thelen, Schoner, Scheier & Smith, 2001). Theories of embodiment 
vary in terms of specific details, but in general all types of embodiment reject the 
standard view that meaning is wholly composed of abstract symbols.  
Although work on embodied theories has been very prolific over the past ten years or 
so, it is to some extent still better seen as a “research program rather than a well- 
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defined theory” (Shapiro, 2011, p.2). Shapiro (2011, p.2) points out that embodied 
approaches still have “roughly defined theoretical commitments” and few “uniform 
methodological  practices”.  Since  embodiment  at  present  appears  to  be  “poorly 
unified” (Shapiro, p.3, 2011) it may be more helpful for separate approaches to be 
differentiated rather than for all to sit under the same term. In response to the large 
amount of diversity in the claims made by embodied theorists Wilson (2002) sees it 
important to distinguish six different versions of embodiment. Table 1-1 outlines 
these six different versions.   
In comparison to symbolic theories, strengths of embodied approaches are that they 
account for the fact that cognition takes place in specific environments for specific 
purposes and can be influenced by objects within that environment. Cognition is no 
longer hidden within the black box of the mind but extends out into the body and its 
environment.  By  assigning  a  role  to  the  body  and  its  interactions  with  the 
environment,  embodied  theories  solve  the  ‘grounding  problem’  (Harnard,  1990), 
linking the processes that make up cognition with physical referents in the world. 
1.2  The symbolic vs. embodied debate applied to semantic representations 
Before describing symbolic and embodied theories from a semantic view, I will first 
highlight some key issues that need to be considered in relation to all theories of 
meaning in language. The first addresses how conceptual information is related to 
semantic information. Various theories differ in how separable, if at all, the two 
types of information are. The second issue focuses on how words from different 
domains are related to each other, specifically whether theories posit the structure or 
the content of semantic representation as important factors in determining different 
domains. 
1.2.1   How is conceptual information linked to semantic information? 
The fundamental goal of language is to talk about and refer to things in the world 
such as objects, events and feelings. Thus, there must be a strong mapping between 
conceptual knowledge (the knowledge used to categorize and understand the world)  
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and language. Since people begin life exploring and learning about the world, with 
language  developing  later,  conceptual  knowledge  ultimately  develops  before 
language. 
One important issue then is how words are related to conceptual knowledge. Should 
word meanings and concepts be considered interchangeable? If not, what type of 
mapping should be posited between the two? The way this relationship is described 
has many important implications, for example, to what extent there is translation 
equivalency across languages or how the language a person speaks affects the way 
they think (e.g. Boroditsky, 2001). There must exist at least a tight mapping between 
concepts  and  words:  it  is  now  clear  that  information  beyond  word  meaning  is 
activated when understanding words, such as motor information (Hauk, Johnsrude 
and Pulvermüller, 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Because of this tight link, research 
into word meaning must ultimately tap into conceptual knowledge as well. Thus, one 
may question the need to distinguish between the two. 
One  argument  for  conceptual  knowledge  and  word  meaning  to  be  thought  of 
interchangeably  is  that  many  robust  phenomena  have  been  found  to  affect  both 
concepts  and  word  meaning.  If  the  same  factors  affect  them  and  they  behave 
similarly,  then  they  must  be  closely  linked,  if  not  interchangeable.  For  example, 
feature  type,  feature  correlations  and  distinguishing  features  have  been  shown  to 
explain both category-specific deficits in categorization of concepts (McRae & Cree, 
2002; McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kemper & 
Seidenberg,  1997)  and  semantic  priming  effects  for  words  (McRae  &  Boisvert, 
1998).  Because  characteristics  of  conceptual  features  seem  to  have  comparable 
effects it would be parsimonious to consider conceptual representations the same as 
word meaning. 
However, there are reasons to suggest that there is not a one-to-one mapping between 
the two. First, it may be obvious that there are far more concepts than words. Murphy 
(2002) points out how there are often well-known actions or situations that are not 
lexicalized, such as “the actions of two people maneuvering for one armrest in a  
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movie theatre or airplane seat” (Hall, 1984). Conversely, one can express the same 
meaning  differently  in  different  languages  or  even  in  the  same  language  (take 
synonyms such as “buy” and “purchase” for example) and one word can be used to 
refer to multiple related meanings (i.e. polysemy) and so refers to a set of concepts 
instead of a single concept.  
The relationship between words in a single language and concepts is therefore not so 
straightforward. This matter is further complicated when looking at cross-linguistic 
differences in the way that conceptual knowledge and linguistic representations are 
linked. It is generally assumed in cognitive psychology that the conceptual structure 
of humans is constant across all cultures and that there is a close correspondence 
between conceptual structure and the semantic structure present in languages. Yet 
despite this, there appear to be many differences across languages in terms of how 
conceptual information is mapped onto linguistic structures. For instance, although 
both English speakers and Italian speakers use different words to denote the two 
body parts “foot” and “leg”, Japanese speakers use the same word “ashi” to describe 
both. One could hardly argue that conceptually, Japanese speakers do not know the 
difference between one’s foot and one’s leg.  
The idea that different semantic structures could lead to differences in conceptual 
structure is referred to as the “linguistic relativity hypothesis” (Whorf, 1956). The 
strongest  version  of  this  hypothesis  proposes  a  strict  mapping:  any  semantic 
differences  determine  differences  in  conceptual  representation.  Weaker  versions 
instead  posit  that  linguistic  differences  can  affect  or  shape  conceptual 
representations, and specifically during verbal tasks (e.g. “thinking for speaking”, 
Slobin 1996). For example, a wealth of research has shown that differences in the 
way that colour is lexicalised affects the way that colours are perceived (Gilbert, 
Regier, Kay & Ivry, 2006) and categorized (Kay & Kempton, 1984) but only for 
tasks that require verbal processes. That cross-linguistic variation is only observed, 
or at least is stronger, in verbal tasks, not for cognition more generally, suggests that 
word meaning and conceptual meaning can be distinct.   
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The  existence  of  concepts  without  corresponding  words,  the  ways  that  different 
languages carve up conceptual space into lexical forms, and the observation that 
language-specific  effects  on  meaning  are  limited  to  tasks  in  which  language  is 
employed,  all  point  toward  a  distinction  between  conceptual  and  semantic 
representations. Thus, word meanings and conceptual meaning should be thought of 
separately. Allowing for an intermediate level that binds conceptual information with 
linguistic  information,  such  as  syntax  and  phonology,  into  a  lexical  semantic 
representation, as in the FUSS model (Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, 2004), 
can account for the differences observed across languages. 
1.2.2  Are words from different domains represented in the same way? 
The vast majority of research investigating meaning in language has focused on the 
study  of  concrete  nouns.  The  past  decade  has  seen  increasing  research  into  the 
representation of actions and a beginning of interest in the representation of abstract 
concepts. Across these domains, a critical question is whether the same overarching 
principles can be used, or whether, instead organisational principles must differ.  
A fundamental difference between objects and actions is that objects can be thought 
of in isolation, as discrete entities, but actions are more complex, describing relations 
among  multiple  participants  (Vigliocco,  Vinson,  Druks,  Barber  &  Cappa,  2011). 
Connected to this are temporal differences: actions tend to be dynamic and have a 
particular duration, objects on the other hand are stable and tend to have long-term 
states. Related to the temporal domain is motion: compared to objects that are static, 
action  occurs  through  time  and  space  and  must  involve  some  representation  of 
motion (Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer & Chatterjee, 2002).  
Because of the stable nature of objects, the meanings of nouns tend to be relatively 
fixed.  The  meanings  of  verbs  however  are  less  constrained  and  often  more 
polysemous.  For  example,  in  Wordnet  3.0  (Princeton  University, 
http://wordnet.princeton.edul),  a  large  online  lexical  database,  verbs  are  given  an 
average polysemy value of 2.17 whereas nouns are given 1.24. This means that on  
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average, verbs have more senses associated with their meaning than do nouns. For 
example, the verb “take” could be used to describe many different acts such as a 
physical action resulting in some change of state: “take an apple from the bowl”; an 
action resulting in no change: “take a look”; or even something more abstract like an 
event of a certain duration “take a break”.  
These differences could underscore different representational principles for object-
nouns and action-verbs, however, they do not necessarily preclude a semantic system 
in which objects and actions are represented in the same manner and differences in 
organisation come about because of differences in the content of the representations. 
An example of such a system is described by Vigliocco et al (2004) in their statistical 
model: the FUSS model. The model assumes two levels to semantic representation: 
one containing conceptual information and one lexico-semantic information. Word 
meanings  are  grounded  in  conceptual  feature  representations  by  combining 
conceptual features with other linguistic information such as syntax and phonology. 
Lexico-semantic space is organized according to featural properties, such as shared 
and correlated features. Importantly, the representations for action words and objects 
are  modelled  in  the  same  lexico-semantic  space,  using  the  same  computational 
principles. Differences between the two word types emerge from differences in the 
featural  properties  of  the  two  domains,  without  requiring  different  principles  of 
organisation. 
Moving from comparing the domains of concrete objects and actions to comparing 
concrete to abstract words, here there is a much stronger case for assuming different 
content  as  well  as  different  organisational  principles.  It  is  well  established  that 
processing  abstract  words  takes  longer  than  processing  concrete  words  (the 
“concreteness  effect”).  A  long-standing  account  of  the  concreteness  effect  comes 
from Paivio’s dual coding theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986, 2007). Under this view two 
separate systems contribute to word meaning: a word-based system and an image-
based  system.  Whereas  concrete  words  use  both  word-based  and  image-based 
information (with greater reliance on the latter), abstract words rely solely on word-
based information. The concreteness effect would occur because concrete words use  
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two  systems  instead  of  one.  Thus,  concrete  words  would  have  richer  semantic 
representations and they would be represented in a qualitatively different way than 
abstract words.  
Alternative  views,  however,  do  not  require  multiple  representational  systems  to 
account  for  the  concreteness  effect,  such  as  the  context  availability  theory 
(Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983).  Under this view, advantages for concrete over 
abstract words come from differences in associations between words and previous 
knowledge  (i.e.,  differences  in  the  number  of  links,  rather  than  the  content  of 
representation  or  organisational  criteria),  with  abstract  concepts  being  associated 
with a much more limited amount of context. Thus, the concreteness effect would 
result from the availability of sufficient context for processing concrete concepts in 
most language situations, but a deficient context for the processing of abstract words 
(Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). 
More recently, differences between concrete and abstract concepts and words have 
been  discussed  in  terms  of  metaphorical  extension  (Boroditsky,  2000;  Lakoff  & 
Johnson,  1980,  1999)  according  to  which  abstract  concepts  would  be  learnt  and 
understood in terms of the concrete domains to which they extend (e.g. the mind as a 
container).  Such  an  account  would  assume  different  organisational  principles  for 
concrete  and  abstract  knowledge.  Kousta,  Vigliocco,  Vinson,  Andrews  and  Del 
Campo (2011) have provided yet a different account for how abstract concepts and 
words  are  represented,  based  on  the  dual  coding  view  proposed  by  Paivio  but 
differing in how the content of abstract and concrete meaning is defined. In this view 
there  are  two  classes  of  information  that  contribute  to  conceptual  representation: 
experiential  and  linguistic  information,  and  the  differences  between  concrete  and 
abstract word meanings arise due to different proportions and types of information 
for  each:  a  preponderance  of  sensorimotor  information  underlying  concrete  word 
meanings  and  a  preponderance  of  affective  and  linguistic  information  underlying 
abstract word meanings (Kousta, et al 2011).  
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Thus, to summarise, theories of meaning in language make assumptions concerning 
whether  and  how  different  domains  of  knowledge  are  represented  within  the 
semantic system. These assumptions can differ greatly varying from a single, unitary 
semantic system to a much more fractionated system, where different principles of 
organisation are specified for different word types. However, there exists no strong 
evidence for assuming different principles, and hence, following the argument of 
parsimony, I assume a unitary system based on the same principles across domains. 
Instead of different organisational principles, differences across domains come about 
due to differences in content, namely differences in the extent to which a given type 
of content is most important for a given domain (e.g. sensorimotor information for 
the concrete domain and emotion and linguistic information for the abstract domain 
(Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews & Kousta, 2009)). 
1.3  The Theoretical Debate 
Following from the description in section 1.1., I will now consider how the two 
broad  approaches  view  semantic  representation:  symbolic/holistic  approaches  and 
embodied/featural approaches. 
1.3.1  Symbolic/Holistic & distributional theories 
1.3.1.1   Holistic theories  
Holistic theories take a non-decompositional, relational view: the meaning of words 
can  only  be  evaluated  as  a  whole,  in  terms  of  relations  between  other  words  or 
entities, rather than being decomposed into smaller components. Words take their 
meaning from their relationships with other words, for example by associative links. 
In early versions of these theories, meaning was described in semantic networks (e.g. 
Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975) where a word was denoted by a single node 
in a network and its meaning by connections between other nodes.  In Quillian’s 
(1968)  network  model  for  example,  a  concept’s  properties  are  represented  by 
labelled  relational  links  with  other  concepts,  and  these  links  are  described  by 
‘criterialities’ that determine how important each property is to that concept. The full  
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meaning of a concept arises out of the whole network, beginning from the concept 
node, which has no content of its own.  
Semantic  similarity  effects,  such  as  semantic  priming,  are  explained  by  holistic 
approaches (e.g. Quillian, 1967) in terms of spreading activation from an activated 
node (such as the prime or distractor word) to other concepts by connections existing 
between nodes. Response time in experimental tasks would be driven by the time it 
takes for a node to reach an activation threshold. Thus words that are semantically 
related  will  be  closer  together  in  the  semantic  space  than  semantically  unrelated 
words and so activation spreads more quickly from the prime to the target word. One 
problem that exists for holistic explanations of semantic relatedness is that semantic 
effects can be graded. For example, in the neuropsychological literature, damage to 
semantic areas does not result in all or nothing deficits, but rather graded category-
specific deficits, which can be more easily accounted for with featural theories (e.g. 
Vinson,  Vigliocco,  Cappa  &  Siri,  2003).    Incorporating  ‘criterialities’  in  holistic 
models allows for effects of gradation, however a criticism remains that there are too 
many degrees of freedom given the different possible types of links and weightings 
(Johnson-Laird, Herrmann & Chaffin, 1984) 
In some holistic models, differences between object-nouns and action-verbs have 
been modelled in terms of different relational links (e.g. Graesser, Hopkinson & 
Schmid, 1987; Huttenlocher & Lui, 1979). In Wordnet (Miller & Fellbaum, 1991) 
this is represented on a large scale with four distinct networks representing nouns, 
verbs, adjectives and adverbs. Nouns can be linked via relations such as hyponymy 
(i.e. belonging to a particular class: “dog” is a hyponym of “animal”) and meronymy 
(i.e. being a part of a whole: “mouth” is a part of “face”). These relations are not as 
dominant for verbs, which instead tend to be linked by relations such as troponymy 
(i.e. being a particular manner of another verb: “crawling” to “go/move”), entailment 
(i.e.  a  necessary  requirement  of  an  action:  “snoring”  entails  “sleeping”)  and 
antonymy  (i.e.  meaning  the  opposite:  “coming”  is  the  opposite  of  “going”).  The 
representation of abstract words in Wordnet is no different to more concrete words of  
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the  same  grammatical  class,  although  abstract  words  tend  to  occur  in  shallower 
hierarchies (i.e. fewer superordinate terms; Changizi, 2008) 
1.3.1.2  Distributional theories 
Distributional theories are concerned with statistical patterns in language itself, for 
example in different types of texts or documents. The meaning of a word is described 
by its distribution across the language environment. Distributional approaches assign 
no  role  to  sensory  and  motor  information,  using  only  information  present  in  the 
linguistic data.  
Dominant  distributional  approaches  developed  within  cognitive  science  are  latent 
semantic  analysis  (LSA,  Landauer  &  Dumais,  1997),  hyperspace  analogue  to 
language (HAL, Lund & Burgess, 1996) and more recently Griffiths et al’s (Griffiths 
& Steyvers, 2002, 2003; Griffiths et al., 2007) topic model. All of these approaches 
use large samples of text, evaluating properties of the contexts in which a word 
appears in order to estimate its relationship to other words. For example, Landauer 
and Dumais (1997) took encyclopaedic text as the source corpus for analysis, and 
different articles in that encyclopaedia as separate contexts, under the assumption 
that  related  words  will  tend  to  co-occur  in  the  same  contexts.  For  each  word 
occurring in the corpus they counted its occurrence in each of the contexts. LSA is 
the transformation of this sparse, high-dimensionality space of word occurrences into 
lower dimensionality. In contrast, HAL (Lund & Burgess, 1996) considers a word's 
context  not  in  terms  of  separate  documents  but  by  local  lexical  context, 
characterising  a  word  in  terms  of  neighbouring  words.  Topic  model,  like  LSA, 
considers words in terms of the contexts from which they are sampled, but differs in 
assumptions: contexts themselves have been sampled from a distribution of latent 
topics, each of which is represented as a probability distribution over words (e.g. 
Griffiths et al., 2007).  
These  models  have  successfully  simulated  semantic  effects  such  as  semantic 
similarity in semantic priming tasks. LSA has been shown to successfully simulate a  
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number of human cognitive behaviours. For example, simulated scores on a standard 
vocabulary test have been shown to overlap with human scores and simulations can 
mimic human word sorting behaviour (Landauer, Foltz & Laham 1998). Thus, there 
is  a  strong  correspondence  between  model  performance  and  human  behaviour 
suggesting that this technique can capture aspects of the representation of meaning as 
demonstrated in behavioural language tasks. If symbolic theories can successfully 
approximate human language comprehension then they should be considered valid 
models  of  human  language  processing,  reflecting  processes  analogous  to  human 
language processing, to some extent (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). 
Despite the power of distributional models in simulating human behaviour, some 
have argued that the statistical patterns that exist in language co-occurrences are 
merely epiphenomenal and in fact have no role to play in semantic representation 
(Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). That language-based models do not take into account 
the wealth of information available from other sources of meaning, such as bodily 
sensations, perceptions and introspections, as embodied theories do, is a fundamental 
criticism.  Additionally,  other  types  of  information  present  in  the  text  such  as 
syntactic  and  morphological  relations  are  typically  ignored.  But,  LSA  has  been 
described  as  a  method  for  analyzing  the  “verbal  outcomes  of  all  these  juicy 
processes” (Landauer et al., 1998, p. 261) and thus provides a close approximation to 
the important knowledge underlying lexical meaning. Glenberg & Robertson (2000) 
are not convinced and argue “the computational manipulation of abstract symbols 
merely produces more abstract symbols, not meaning” (p. 19). Further, these models 
cannot account for the wealth of behavioural and neuroscientific evidence for the 
embodied framework, which links language to the brain’s sensory-motor systems 
(reviewed in Chapter 2). One can use the famous “Chinese room” example (Searle, 
1980; section 1.1.1) to highlight the importance of this argument. 
1.3.1.3  Holistic theories and the key issues 
Regarding the relationship between words and concepts, a strict one-to-one mapping 
is  proposed  between  conceptual  representations  and  lexical  representations.  Each  
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lexical concept is equal to a single, abstract representation in the conceptual system. 
This means that the conceptual system must contain representations of all concepts 
that  are  lexicalized  in  all  languages.  And  so,  any  lexical  differences  that  appear 
cross-linguistically must be due to conceptual differences. In order to defend the 
universality  of  conceptual  structure,  one  must  assume  that  not  all  concepts  are 
lexicalized in each language (see Vigliocco & Filipovic, 2004). 
Relations between different word types here are not pre-specified and instead the 
same principles are used for all word types (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Burgess & 
Lund, 1997). Differences between word types such as noun-verb differences and 
concrete-abstract differences are captured in the relationships that result from these 
statistical models, patterns that exist in the text itself. Thus, distributional models 
have no problem defining all domains, as long as they are represented in the source 
texts. 
1.3.2  Featural and embodied theories 
Embodiment  places  emphasis  on  sensorimotor  features  as  building  blocks  of 
meaning. This emphasis is shared with featural theories according to which a word’s 
meaning  is  seen  as  decomposable  into  a  set  of  defining  features  (e.g.  Collins  & 
Quillian,  1969;  Rosch  &  Mervis,  1975).  Sets  of  conceptual  features  are  bound 
together to form a lexical representation of the word’s meaning. For example, the 
meaning  of  chair  could  be  defined  by  features  including  <has  legs>,  <made  of 
wood> and <is sat on>.  
Featural  properties  of  different  word  categories  have  been  modelled  to  explain 
category-specific deficits in different forms of brain damage and to shed light on the 
organisation of the semantic system (Farah & McClelland 1991; Gonnerman et al., 
1997; Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen & Seidenberg, 1998; McCrae & Cree, 2002). 
By looking at the proportion of perceptual (e.g. <has fur>) and functional (e.g. <cuts 
food>)  features  for  the  categories  of  artifacts  and  natural  kinds,  Farah  and 
McClelland (1991) described the topographic organisation of semantic memory in  
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terms  of  modality  rather  than  category.  In  their  connectionist  model,  damage  to 
perceptual features only caused a selective deficit for processing of natural kinds, 
whereas conversely, damage to functional features only caused a selective deficit to 
the processing of artifacts. Thus, what was once seen as a category-specific deficit 
emerged  as  a  result  of  damage  to  specific  feature  types,  suggesting  that  the 
organisation  of  semantic  memory  is  in  terms  of  sensorimotor  features  and  not 
categories (Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Plaut & Shallice, 1991).  
Featural theories describe semantic similarity between words in terms of featural 
properties such as featural correlations and featural overlap (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 
1974;  McRae  &  Boisvert,  1998).    The  role  of  feature  correlations  and  featural 
overlap in semantic similarity has been supported by a range of behavioural tasks 
(e.g. Rosch & Mervis, 1975; McCrae & Boisvert, 1998). In an attribute-listing study 
for  example,  Rosch  and  Mervis  (1975)  showed  that  members  of  a  category  are 
considered most prototypical of that category if they share more features with other 
members of the same category and fewer features in common with other categories.  
Featural theories have been applied to explain differences between words referring to 
objects (nouns) and words referring to events (primarily verbs referring to actions). 
The difference in how concrete nouns and verbs are represented in the semantic 
system is defined in terms of types of features and associations between features. The 
meanings of nouns are more differentiated, with dense associations between features 
and properties (Tyler, Russell, Fadili & Moss, 2001) across many different sensory 
domains (Damasio & Tranel, 1993). Looking at speaker-generated feature norms, 
Vinson  and  Vigliocco  (2002)  reported  that  objects  tend  to  have  more  specific 
features  referring  to  narrow  semantic  fields  whereas  verbs  typically  consist  of 
features that can apply to a wider set of semantic fields and that have less sensory 
associations.  These  differences  have  been  invoked  to  account  for  patients  who 
selectively suffered in their ability to retrieve and produce nouns and those, who 
instead, had more problems with verbs (see Vigliocco, Vinson, Druks, Barber & 
Cappa, 2011).  However, these theories do not extend to account for differences 
between concrete and abstract words, limiting their focus on more concrete words.   
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Featural theories usually focus on concepts, not words (although concepts and words 
are  then  often  implicitly  or  explicitly  assumed  as  the  same).  There  are  theories, 
however,  that  assume  a  separate  semantic  level  where  features  are  bound  into  a 
lexico-semantic  representation  (Vigliocco,  et  al  2004),  and  other  neurological 
theories that hypothesize “convergence zones” in the brain where information from 
multiple  modalities  is  integrated  (Damasio,  1989;  Simmons  &  Barsalou,  2003).  
These convergence zones have been argued as necessary to explain why sometimes 
category-specific  deficits  are  limited  to  words  and  appear  to  spare  conceptual 
knowledge (e.g., Cappa, Frugoni, Pasquali, Perani & Zorat, 1998). 
Embodied  theories  build  upon  these  earlier  accounts  and  research  that  provides 
support  for  featural  representations  is  also  necessarily  compatible  with  embodied 
views.  For example, semantic priming based on overlapping features (McRae & 
Boisvert, 1998) could be explained by overlap in activation of the same sensorimotor 
area (e.g. Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2003) 
1.3.2.1  Embodiment 
Embodied  approaches  posit  that  understanding  the  meaning  of  words  involves 
engagement  of  the  systems  used  in  perception,  action  and  introspection  (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999a; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kousta et 
al., 2011). This approach focuses on the content of semantic representations rather 
than organization. Embodied theorists argue against amodal models of semantics that 
are said to be missing the vital link between meaning in language and experience in 
the world. In others words, it is unclear how the meaning of a word is understood if 
language is simply made up of arbitrary symbols that have no link to referents or 
experiences in the world (Harnad, 1990).  Under embodied views, to understand the 
meaning of a word one uses the brain’s sensorimotor systems in a similar way to how 
one actually experiences that concept. Thus instead of transducing information from 
experience  into  abstract  symbols,  the  experience  itself  is,  in  a  way,  recreated 
(Barsalou,  1999a).  Hence  sensory  and  motor  information  form  the  content  of 
semantic representation (Meteyard et al., 2012). For example, to understand the word  
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‘cat’ one would simulate perceiving the shape and colour of a cat, how they move, 
what sounds they make and what types of actions we make towards them.  
It is primarily the sixth version of embodiment proposed by Wilson (2002; Table 1-
1), that 'offline cognition is body-based', that the present thesis adopts to address the 
topic of meaning in language. This view postulates that aspects of cognition involve 
priming  the  motor  system,  without  any  form  of  overt  movement.  That  is,  many 
cognitive activities including mental imagery, working memory, episodic memory, 
implicit  memory,  reasoning  and  problem  solving,  and  here,  language  processing, 
make use of covert motor programs. Mental structures that evolved primarily to be 
used  for  perception  and  action  are  thought  to  be  ‘co-opted’  and  used  offline  in 
cognition,  without  the  need  for  any  physical  input  or  output.  The  use  of  these 
sensorimotor systems in offline cognition is referred to as ‘simulation’.  In order to 
represent information from the world, we run simulations using these sensorimotor 
resources. 
Theories  of  embodiment  vary  in  terms  of  how  strongly  they  define  the  role  of 
sensorimotor systems in meaning. In terms of the continuum (from disembodied to 
fully-embodied)  developed  for  semantic  theories  by  Meteyard  and  colleagues 
(Meteyard et al., 2012, see Figure 1-2) distributional approaches could be considered 
to  be  on  the  extreme  ‘disembodied’  end  of  the  continuum,  assigning  no  role  to 
sensory  and  motor  information  (e.g.  Landauer  &  Dumais,  1997;  Griffiths  et  al., 
2007).  Weak  embodiment  assumes  that  semantic  representations  are  partly 
instantiated  by  sensory  and  motor  information  and  this  information  does  have  a 
representational role, but some degree of abstraction still takes place (e.g. Barsalou, 
1999a; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Pulvermüller, 1999, Simmons & Barsalou, 2003; 
Tyler & Moss, 2001; Vigliocco et al., 2004). Areas adjacent to primary sensory and 
motor areas are involved in semantic representation and are reciprocally linked to 
primary areas, so that semantic processing can affect activation in these areas and 
vice  versa.  Finally,  from  a  strong  embodiment  perspective,  semantic  processing 
necessarily activates sensory and motor information and is completely dependent 
upon it (e.g. Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Zwaan, 2003).  
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Here,  semantic  processing  takes  place  within  primary  sensorimotor  areas  and 
precisely  the  same  systems  are  used  for  semantic  processing  and  sensorimotor 
processing. Views at the extreme end of the continuum are unlikely explanations: 
semantic  representation  is  neither  fully  symbolic  nor  fully  simulated. 
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Figure 1-2. A continuum of embodiment. Adapted from Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami and 
Vigliocco (2012). 
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A fully symbolic theory is problematic because there is no link between language 
and information in the world, which raises the grounding problem (Harnard, 1990). 
Based on the number of behavioural experiments looking at the interaction between 
language  and  sensorimotor  processes,  as  well  as  the  neuroscientific  evidence  for 
sensory and motor activations during semantic processing (as covered in Chapter 2), 
it is clear that sensorimotor systems do play a role in semantic processing. Strong 
embodiment is also seen as an unsatisfactory account: some degree of abstraction 
must take place in order to extract and combine features into the correct conceptual 
conjunctions.  An account in line with weak embodiment seems most appropriate, 
where sensorimotor information plays an integral, representational role in semantic 
representation but there is some level of abstraction, that could be a convergence 
zone or collection of convergence zones (e.g. Damasio & Damasio, 1994), where 
relevant information is linked and combined into a lexico-semantic representation. 
 
41 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
-
1
.
 
S
i
x
 
v
i
e
w
s
 
o
f
 
E
m
b
o
d
i
e
d
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
(
W
i
l
s
o
n
,
 
2
0
1
2
)
.
V
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
C
r
i
t
i
c
i
s
m
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
s
i
t
u
a
t
e
d
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
t
a
k
e
 
p
l
a
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
 
o
f
 
o
n
 
g
o
i
n
g
 
t
a
s
k
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
a
l
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
u
a
l
 
i
n
p
u
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
t
o
r
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
s
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
 
 
O
f
f
l
i
n
e
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
r
e
m
e
m
b
e
r
i
n
g
,
 
i
s
 
i
g
n
o
r
e
d
.
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
o
f
f
l
i
n
e
 
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
i
s
 
f
u
n
d
a
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
t
o
 
h
u
m
a
n
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
t
i
m
e
 
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
d
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
r
e
a
l
-
t
i
m
e
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
.
 
T
i
m
e
 
p
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
 
s
h
a
p
e
s
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
M
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
k
e
s
 
p
l
a
c
e
s
 
o
f
f
l
i
n
e
:
 
t
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
,
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
p
l
a
n
n
i
n
g
.
 
W
e
 
o
f
f
l
o
a
d
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
k
 
o
n
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
f
f
l
o
a
d
i
n
g
 
o
n
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
s
.
 
E
x
a
m
p
l
e
:
 
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
o
n
 
o
n
e
’
s
 
f
i
n
g
e
r
s
 
 
H
a
v
i
n
g
 
a
 
c
a
u
s
a
l
 
r
o
l
e
 
i
n
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
T
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
p
a
r
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
v
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
T
h
e
 
m
i
n
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
d
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
s
h
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
u
n
i
f
i
e
d
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
 
 
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
T
h
e
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
s
e
r
v
e
 
a
d
a
p
t
i
v
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
a
r
e
 
m
a
n
y
 
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
e
.
g
.
 
w
a
t
c
h
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
u
n
s
e
t
,
 
r
e
a
d
i
n
g
.
 
A
 
w
e
a
k
e
r
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
e
:
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
o
f
t
e
n
 
f
o
r
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
n
 
a
 
m
o
r
e
 
i
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
,
 
f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
p
h
i
s
t
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
m
a
n
n
e
r
.
 
C
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
b
o
d
y
-
b
a
s
e
d
 
M
e
n
t
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
p
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
‘
c
o
-
o
p
t
e
d
’
 
a
n
d
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
o
f
f
l
i
n
e
 
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
,
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
n
e
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
o
r
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
 
  
  42 
 
1.3.2.2  Embodied theories and the key issues 
Do embodied theories make a distinction between word meaning and conceptual 
knowledge? In terms of the continuum of embodied theories described above, as one 
moves further from abstract/symbolic theories to strong versions of embodiment, the 
content of semantic representation includes gradually more sensorimotor information 
(Meteyard et al., 2012), blurring the distinction between semantics and conceptual 
information. For example, those theories defined as ‘weak embodiment’ still posit 
some  degree  of  abstraction  from  sensorimotor  information,  such  as  convergence 
zones  (Damasio,  1989;  Simmons  &  Barsalou,  2003),  as  described  above.  Strong 
embodiment on the other hand sees semantics as directly dependent on sensory and 
motor  systems,  thus  does  not  make  a  distinction  between  word  meaning  and 
conceptual knowledge. 
With regards to the representation of different semantic classes, since word meanings 
are thought to produce similar activation patterns to the representation of the real-
world objects or actions described in the language, different types of words will 
necessarily  have  different  patterns  of  activation.  Differences  in  the  semantic 
representation of objects and actions have clearly been demonstrated (see Chapter 2 
for a full review of embodied findings).  Neural differences in the processing of 
object-nouns  and  action-verbs  have  been  shown  both  with  neuropsychology 
(Damasio  &  Tranel,  1993;  Warrington  &  McCarthy,  1987),  and  imaging  data 
(Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs & Ungerlieder, 1995; Pulvermüller, Lutzenberger 
& Preissl, 1999; Kable et al., 2002; Vigliocco, Warren, Siri, Arciuli, Scott & Wise, 
2006).  Here,  it  has  generally  been  found  that  processing  object-nouns  involves 
activation  of  posterior  sensory  cortices  while  processing  of  action-verbs  involves 
activation of fronto-parietal motor areas.  
Traditionally, it has been argued that embodied theories have problems explaining 
how  abstract  concepts  are  represented.  Abstract  words  pose  a  special  problem 
because their content is not strongly perceptual or motoric, and as such, it is often 
argued that their meaning can only be represented in an abstract propositional form 
(e.g. Noppeney & Price, 2004). There are now, however, a number of hypotheses on  
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how  abstract  concepts  can  be  embodied.  One  hypothesis  is  that  the  meaning  of 
abstract  words  is  understood  through  metaphorical  mappings.  For  example, 
comprehending a word like ‘argue’ could involve the activation of a vertical spatial 
metaphor  (Richardson,  Spivey,  McRae  &  Barsalou,  2003),  or  one  could 
conceptualize the mind as a container (Dove, 2009) because it holds information. 
Metaphor allows an abstract representation to be based on an extension of a more 
concrete  experience-based  concept  that  is  grounded  in  perception  and  action. 
However, one can still think of many aspects of abstract knowledge that could not be 
accounted for by metaphor (Meteyard, et al 2012), such as scientific technical jargon 
(but see Glenberg (2011, p. 15) for a description of how even this can be embodied 
via metaphor). It is questionable whether metaphorical mappings really could be the 
foundation of learning and representation of abstract concepts or rather just provide a 
structure for concepts already in existence (Barsalou, 1999a). 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that the difference between concrete and abstract 
words arises because of the number and type of simulations for each word type, in a 
similar vein to looking at differences in context (c.f. the context availability theory, 
Schwananflugel & Shoben 1983). The meaning of abstract words would be based on 
a wider range of simulations than concrete words, and tend to focus more on social, 
introspective  and  affective  information  than  perceptual  and  motor  (Barsalou  & 
Wiemer-Hasting, 2005; Connell & Lynott, 2012a). Differences arise between the two 
word  types  because  the  type  of  information  and  situations  relevant  for  abstract 
meaning is more difficult to access. Kousta et al. (2011) and Vigliocco et al. (2009) 
have described the difference between abstract and concrete concepts as arising out 
of  the  ecological  statistical  preponderance  of  sensorimotor  features  in  concrete 
concepts  compared  to  the  statistical  preponderance  of  linguistic  and  especially 
affective  associations  for  abstract  concepts.  Despite  these  attempts,  there  remain 
abstract aspects of language that are still difficult to explain. For example, there are 
many more abstract and schematic elements of language, such as morpho-syntactic 
markers (Meteyard et al., 2012), which are not easily accounted for.  
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1.3.3  Integrated models 
Despite the apparent divide between embodied and distributional theories, these two 
types of information can be integrated to form a more general model of semantic 
representation.  The  symbol  interdependency  theory  (Louwerse,  2007)  describes 
meaning as composed of symbols that are dependent on other symbols and symbols 
that are dependent on embodied experiences. Here symbols are built upon embodied 
representations,  but  although  they  are  grounded,  language  comprehension  can 
proceed simply via interrelations amongst other symbols in some situations. That is, 
not every single word encountered is grounded, but their meaning can be inferred 
from relations to other symbols that have been. 
Vigliocco  et  al.  (2009)  describe  language  as  another  vital  source  of  information, 
along  with  experiential  information,  from  which  semantic  representations  can  be 
learnt.  Statistical distributions of words within texts provide important information 
about meaning that can be integrated with sensorimotor experience. For example, a 
child could learn the meaning of the word dog via experience with dogs’ perceptual 
features: having four legs, barking etc., as well as language experience of hearing 
“dog”:  it  tends  to  occur  with  words  such  as  pet  and  animals.  Combining  both 
distributions of information allows linguistic information to ‘hook up’ to the world, 
thus grounding it.  
Modern  computational  work  is  also  beginning  to  model  semantic  meaning  by 
integrating experiential and linguistic information. It has been shown that models 
that combine both types of distributional data perform better in simulating semantic 
effects than either distributions alone (Andrews, Vigliocco & Vinson 2009). The 
underlying principles employed in distributional models can also be applied to other 
domains of experience, not simply linguistic data. John and Jones (2012) proposed a 
model integrating both perceptual information (in the form of feature norms) and 
statistical information from language. Here, a word’s full meaning is denoted by the 
concatenation of perceptual and linguistic vectors.  
There are some potential shortcomings to current integrated models. Since concrete 
feature norms are generated by speakers verbally and via introspection, using them  
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as  ‘embodied  information’  means  there  are  possible  sensorimotor  and  affective 
aspects of experiential information that may not be included, suggesting that the 
findings  cannot  be  generalized  to  all  word  types.  However,  other  methods  for 
appropriately modelling experiential information are being explored. Recent methods 
are  beginning  to  combine  information  from  computer  vision  with  text  in 
distributional models; models including visual information outperform distributional 
models  based  on  text  only,  at  least  when  vision  is  relevant  to  words'  meanings 
(Bruni,  Baroni,  Uijlings  &  Sebe,  2012a;  Bruni,  Boleda,  Baroni  &  Tran,  2012b). 
Future  work  will  need  to  make  use  of  more  sophisticated  types  of  perceptual 
information,  as  well  as  incorporating  other  aspects  of  bodily  experience  such  as 
action and emotion. 
1.4  Theories and hypotheses of embodied language processing 
This  section  presents  some  of  the  most  dominant  theories  and  hypotheses  of 
embodiment, summarizing the assumptions of each approach. 
1.4.1  Perceptual Symbol Systems 
Barsalou (1999a) proposes that meaning is constructed from ‘perceptual symbols’ 
(see  Figure  1-1b).  Unlike  the  symbols  of  traditional  amodal  theories,  perceptual 
symbols are modal and analogical. Concepts are represented in similar systems to 
those  of  their  real-world  referents  and  in  a  multimodal  manner:  across  sensory 
modalities, proprioception and introspection. A perceptual symbol is a record of a 
neural representation underlying a perceptual state in the sensorimotor areas of the 
brain. These representations were extracted from experience via selective attention 
and then stored in long-term memory to symbolically stand for referents. Perceptual 
symbols do not represent the entire brain state of a particular experience but rather 
schematic details: a componential rather than holistic representation (Pecher et al., 
2003).  They  are  also  referred  to  as  ‘partially-executed  simulations’  (Glenberg  & 
Gallese, 2011), partial because attention is selective (Wassenburgh & Zwaan, 2010).  
Perceptual  symbols  are  dynamic:  since  they  are  based  on  associative  patterns  of 
neurons  their  reinstatement  will  not  necessarily  be  the  same  each  time.  Thus 
perceptual symbols for concepts are not seen as strict, generic representations but 
rather vary as and when necessary in reference to a particular context.  
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Related perceptual symbols are organized into a simulator that allows the cognitive 
system to construct a simulation of an entity or event in its absence.  Simulators are 
similar to mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983): they are used for simulations of 
specific types of entities and events. A simulator contains two levels to its structure. 
The first is an underlying frame that integrates perceptual symbols across category 
instances.  The  second  level  contains  an  infinite  set  of  simulations  that  can  be 
constructed from the frame. Once a simulator is established in memory, it helps to 
identify category members on subsequent occasions. 
1.4.2  The Immersed Experiencer Framework  
Zwaan  (2003)  describes  a  framework  for  language  comprehension  where 
comprehension involves experiential mental simulation. Here mental simulation is 
described as the situating of “oneself in events outside of the here and now” (Zwaan 
& Kaschak, 2009) and in comprehension involves the “vicarious experiencing of the 
events being described” (Zwaan & Kaschak, 2009). Mental simulation involves very 
similar processes as those involved in actually carrying out an action. Simulations 
gradually evolve over time in the same way that events do. The comprehender is thus 
“immersed” in the described event and experiences objects and events as if really 
there.  Using  past  experiences  in  the  world,  mental  simulation  allows  one  to 
understand how events unfold.   
The Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) proposes three component processes of 
language comprehension: activation, construal and integration. Activation occurs at 
the word level where single words activate experiential information based of the 
word’s referent via functional webs (Pulvermüller, 1999). Construal takes place at 
the level of clauses where functional webs are ‘articulated’ via constraint-satisfaction 
mechanisms and integrated into a mental simulation of an event. Finally experiential 
information  is  integrated  to  form  a  coherent  meaning  at  the  discourse  level. 
Integration follows the constraints of human experience and is influenced by factors 
such as predictability and overlap with the existing mental simulation. 
Construals contain components consistent with real world experience including time, 
perspective,  orientation  and  distance  and  are  dynamic.  In  line  with  Barsalou’s  
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(1999a) perceptual symbol systems, construals exist in a schematic form. Aspects of 
the sentence or supporting context may highlight certain aspects of the situation, but 
features that are not necessary for comprehension are not activated. As in real-world 
perception,  the  amount  of  information  attended  to  is  constrained  by  attentional 
capacity. 
The  IEF  allows  for  context  sensitivity.  Without  context,  single  words  activate 
overlapping  functional  webs,  but  the  diffuseness  of  activation  is  decreased  with 
increasing constraints from context, such as frequency or recency of experience with 
the referent or constraints from previous sentence context. The depth of a simulation 
in language comprehension depends on both the comprehender’s own experience in 
the world and their language comprehension skill.  
1.4.3  The Indexical Hypothesis 
The Indexical Hypothesis (IH) proposes that meaning in language is grounded in 
bodily action (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999). Three steps are outlined to describe 
how language is understood in specific contexts. Firstly, language is mapped onto 
entities in the environment or onto perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999a) contained 
in memory. Affordances are then derived from activated representations, facilitating 
preparation for action. These affordances are then combined or meshed together to 
produce a simulation of the event, a coherent pattern of action (Kaschak & Glenberg, 
2000) and thus successful comprehension of a sentence (if the affordances can be 
successfully  meshed).  Meshing  is  constrained  both  by  the  biological/physical 
properties of the objects involved and by the syntax of the sentence. For example, 
compare the three sentences below: 
1. The man hung his coat on the chair 
2. The man hung his wardrobe on the chair 
3. The man hung his coat on the vacuum 
All three sentences are grammatical, but the meaning of (2) is impossible because the 
affordances of the objects cannot be meshed. (3) may at first appear odd, but this is  
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due to the novelty of the action that is described. It is only when simulating the 
affordances of the objects described that the action becomes perfectly sensible: the 
shape of the vacuum allows the coat to be hung upon it. 
1.4.4  Language as Situated Simulation (LASS) 
Barsalou,  Santos,  Simmons  &  Wilson  (2008)  propose  the  Language  as  Situated 
Simulation account (LASS) where language processing is described as requiring two 
processes;  an  early  activation  of  linguistic  representations,  such  as  statistical 
associations,  taking  place  in  language  areas  of  the  brain  and  a  later  situated 
simulation involving sensorimotor systems. Linguistic representations are activated 
earlier due to their similarity with the incoming stimuli. Sometimes this activation is 
enough  for  tasks  that  require  shallow  and  superficial  processing.  Linguistic 
representations are used as pointers to the associated semantic information in the 
form of simulations. Thus, the simulation process begins soon after the linguistic 
representations have peaked. 
Evidence for the timing of linguistic activations and situated simulations can been 
found in property generation tasks (e.g. Santos, Chaigneau, Simmons, & Barsalou, 
2011). These tasks involve participants naming as many properties of an object in a 
certain time. From the LASS framework, it would be expected that properties would 
initially be taken from the linguistic system (such as word associations) and later 
properties  would  reflect  the  simulation  process  (such  as  physical  characteristics).  
This  is  exactly  the  pattern  of  results  that  has  been  found  (Santos  et  al.,  2011). 
Additional evidence was found using fMRI comparing brain activations between a 
property  generation  task,  a  word  association  task  and  a  situation  generation  task 
(Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008). Activations in the first 7.5 
seconds of the property generation task were found to most similar to activations in 
the word association task (a linguistic task) and activations in the later half were 
more similar to situation generation task (requiring simulation). 
1.4.5  Body specificity hypothesis   
To test the proposal that the meaning of words is grounded in one’s perceptual and 
motor experiences, as predicted by all embodied theories, we can look at how people  
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with  different  bodies  think.  Embodied  theories  predict  that  those  with  different 
bodies should develop different concepts. This prediction is clearly specified in the 
‘body  specificity  hypothesis’  (Casasanto,  2009).  Since  the  body  is  a  constant 
presence  in  all  experience  it  should  strongly  influence  the  nature  of  the 
representations formed.  The body constrains the way people perceive and act in the 
environment (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt, Stefanucci & Proffitt, 2009), thus the type of 
experience  the  body  leads  one  to  have  has  strong  implications  for  the  nature  of 
mental  simulations  during  action  language  processing.  This  ‘body  relativity’  is 
analogous to linguistic relativity effects described in section 2.1. That is, in a similar 
way to how people who speak different languages think differently about the world 
in predictable ways, so do people with different bodies think differently about the 
world in predictable ways.  
There are now many studies providing support for the body-specificity hypothesis. 
For  example,  when  told  to  imagine  the  hand  or  to  read  action  words  describing 
actions normally performed with the dominant hand differences in motor activity are 
observed  between  left  and  right-handers  (Willems,  Toni,  Hagoort  &  Casasanto, 
2009; Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto, 2010). This suggests that word meanings do 
not have a fixed representation across individuals but rather vary based on the type of 
real world experience that individual has. The body specificity hypothesis has also 
been offered to explain comprehension of more abstract language, such as emotional 
valence. In order to understand the abstract concept of valence people ground the 
meaning of valenced words in the more concrete domain of space (Casasanto, 2009). 
Typically people tend to assign “good things” to the “right” side of space and “bad 
things” to the “left” side of space.  The body specificity hypothesis explains this 
effect in terms of handedness. Right-handers more easily interact with the right side 
of  space  than  the  left,  which  is  instead  clumsier.  In  fact,  left-handers  show  the 
reverse valence mappings, with “left” more positive than “right” (Casasanto, 2009). 
Body-specific findings suggest that people tend to understand action language in 
terms of their own actions, using their own bodies, rather than the bodies of others. 
The  default  perspective  in  action  language  comprehension  therefore  may  be 
egocentric, based on one’s own experience, not a generalization to action in others.  
  50 
Simulation of others’ action is likely to occur when the sentence context specifically 
focuses on a particular agent or context. 
1.5  Assessing embodiment 
1.5.1  How is language embodied? 
An important question that is often raised in relation to embodied theories regards 
development.  How  is  it  that  sensory  and  motor  patterns  come  to  stand  for  the 
meaning  of  words  and  sentences?  Pulvermüller  (1999)  describes  how  a  larger 
associative network of brain areas becomes implicated in language processing due to 
functional links created between cortical language areas and sensory and motor areas 
during language acquisition. Adopting a Hebbian perspective (Hebb, 1949), language 
has the possibility of recruiting neurons in different cortical areas as part of a larger, 
distributed  functional  unit  via  associative  learning.  Such  functional  units  (or  cell 
assemblies)  form  during  word  learning,  when  a  word  and  its  referent  are 
experienced.  For example, if a word frequently co-occurs with a particular visual 
stimulus, then strong connections will be made in the cortex between neurons in 
visual  areas  and  neurons  in  language  areas  (Neininger  &  Pulvermüller,  2001). 
Subsequently, once a word is encountered, neurons associated with the word form 
activate at the same time as those from other modalities associated with the meaning 
of the word, for example, the perception of the object being referred to, information 
about how to use the object (affordances) or how one feels in the situation. Recurrent 
activation of the particular neurons result in a higher-order assembly to be utilized in 
future  occurrences  of  the  word  in  question.  Once  a  higher-order  assembly  is 
established between the neurons related to the word form and those related to the 
perception of and actions towards the word’s referent, a phonological signal will be 
sufficient  to  activate  the  whole  assembly.  The  cortex  has  been  described  as  “a 
storehouse  of  words  and  their  meanings  bound  together  by  distributed  neuronal 
systems  with  specific  topographies”  (Pulvermüller,  Hauk,  Nikulin  &  Ilmoniemi, 
2005, p. 797). 
Along similar lines Glenberg and Gallese’s (2012) theory of action-based language 
adopts existing theories of action control (Wolpert, Doya & Kowato, 200; Haruno, 
Wolpert  &  Kowato,  2003)  and  describes  language  learning,  comprehension  and  
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production as the link between speech controllers, action controllers and predictors. 
Here a controller (also referred to as a backward or inverse model) computes motor 
commands,  and  a  predictor  (also  referred  to  as  a  simulator  or  forward  model) 
predicts the sensory and motor effects of any actions. Word learning occurs when 
attention is drawn to a particular object and its action controllers are activated, and 
simultaneously the child’s speech controllers are activated when the parent names 
the object. Meaning is learned by connecting the activated action controller with the 
activated  speech  controller.  This  theory  predicts  that  children  should  learn  the 
meaning of verbs more proficiently if they have first learned their corresponding 
actions.  Support  for  this  account  of  learning  comes  from  the  MacArthur  Child 
Developmental Inventory data (Angrave & Glenberg, 2007), showing that children’s 
development of speech occurs in lockstep with the development of actions, although 
speech is typically around a year delayed. When comprehending language, speech 
controllers  are  activated  as  a  form  of  covert  imitation,  which  in  turn  activates 
corresponding  action  controllers  for  the  meaning  of  the  words.    Following  this, 
forward  models  are  generated  via  predictors  and  the  perceptual  or  motor 
consequences of the action controllers are anticipated. This is simulation.  
Why  is  language  embodied?  It  is  likely  that  mental  simulation  during  language 
comprehension occurs to serve an important function. Barsalou (1999b) proposes 
that simulation likely developed to support situated action. Using language, one can 
control the simulations of others and induce intended action and perceptual states 
that  can  lead  to  social  coordination.  Furthermore,  the  purpose  of  language  is  to 
prepare oneself for future actions (Barsalou, 1999b), such as actions on objects or 
interactions with others. Therefore, mental simulation is well suited to prepare one 
for action because simulations occur in the same format as real-world perception and 
action.  This  is  also  in  line  with  Glenberg  and  Gallese’s  theory  of  action  based 
language (2011). 
1.5.2  Criticisms of embodiment and further questions 
Critics  have  argued  that  perceptual  and  motor  simulation  may  simply  be  an 
epiphenomenal effect and may be the result of spreading activation from amodal 
representations  to  perceptual  areas  via  indirect,  associative  routes  due  to  the  
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correlation between the two (Dove, 2009; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Mahon and 
Caramazza  (2008),  for  example,  argue  that  the  existing  behavioural  and 
neuroscientific evidence (presented in Chapter 2) can be explained by unembodied 
theories: theories that describe semantic information as independent to sensory and 
motor information. The observed interactions could come about via an indirect route, 
for example, semantic information may engage working memory systems which in 
turn  recruit  sensory  motor  systems  (Meteyard  et  al.,  2012,  p.3)  Or  motor  cortex 
activations may be the result of motor imagery instead of simulations. In terms of 
this hypothesis, one might expect to observe bilateral effects for brain activations 
opposed to the typically observed left-lateralized activations (Oliveri, Finocchiaro, 
Shapiro, Ganitano, Caramazza & Pascual-Leone, 2004). On the other hand, motor 
imagery might show a bias towards the left motor cortex since most subjects are 
likely  to  use  their  right  hand  to  perform  the  type  of  actions  described  by  the 
experimental stimuli 
A commonly raised question about embodied simulation is its necessity. Do we need 
simulation in order to understand language or is it an epiphenomenal effect (Mahon 
& Caramazza, 2008), with activation in sensorimotor areas simply being the result of 
spreading activation between dissociable systems? Looking carefully at the temporal 
dynamics of the interaction between language and the sensorimotor systems could 
address  questions  of  epiphenomenalism.    If  language  comprehension  necessarily 
recruits sensorimotor systems, then such effects should be observed very early on in 
processing (Pavan & Baggio, 2012). 
Related to this is the issue of depth of processing. It is unclear whether simulation 
occurs  under  all  circumstances  in  all  language  tasks.    Simulation  may  not  be 
necessary for shallow language tasks, where a good-enough representation could be 
inferred  simply  from  the  linguistic  data  alone,  using  statistical  relations  existent 
between words (Barsalou et al, 2008; Louwerse, 2011). Embodied simulations could 
instead be reserved for deeper levels of processing. 
It is clear that to move forward, embodied theories now need to further investigate 
the different mechanisms that underlie the wealth of empirical data and formulate a 
clear  and  precise  description  of  the  specific  nature  of  these  processes  and  their  
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temporal properties. In the next chapter I thoroughly discuss research evidence for 
embodied  theories  and  attempt  to  address  some  of  the  issues  raised  in  this  final 
section. 
1.6  Chapter Summary 
The  fundamental  goal  of  communication  is  to  understand  meaning.  This  chapter 
discusses  how  meaning  in  language  is  represented.  There  are  two  dominant 
approaches in cognitive science to how meaning is represented in the mind: symbolic 
theories that posit meaning is composed of abstract, arbitrary and amodal symbols, 
and embodied theories that posit meaning is composed of sensorimotor information. 
Recently, cognitive science has begun to reject symbolic theories because they face 
the grounding problem: meaning retrieval is impossible if symbols are not linked to 
the  world.  By  assigning  a  role  to  sensorimotor  processing,  embodied  cognition 
solves this problem. 
Taking a symbolic perspective, distributional theories of semantics (evolved from 
holistic models (e.g. Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975)) describe meaning in 
terms of statistical relations between words and assign no role for sensory and motor 
information (e.g. Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Lund & Burgess, 1996; Griffiths & 
Steyvers,  2002,  2003;  Griffiths  et  al.,  2007).  These  models  face  the  grounding 
problem;  however  recent  models  combining  distributional  and  experiential 
information perform better in modelling semantic behaviour than either distributional 
or experiential information alone (Andrews et al., 2009). 
Embodied  approaches  to  semantics  (evolving  from  featural  models)  describe 
language  processing  as  involving  simulation  in  the  brain’s  perception  and  action 
systems (e.g. Barsalou, 1999a; Glenberg & Robertson, 1999; Zwaan, 2003). The link 
between words and sensorimotor information develops throughout the lifespan via 
Hebbian learning mechanisms (Pulvermüller, 1999) and is thought to be in service of 
situated action (Barsalou, 1999b). Embodied theories of language processing have 
been well supported, with many experiments showing recruitment of sensorimotor 
systems  during  language  comprehension  (as  summarized  in  the  next  chapter). 
However, critics argue that embodied activations can be explained by non-embodied  
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processes,  such  as  spreading  activation  or  mental  imagery  (e.g.  Mahon  & 
Caramazza,  2008).  Within  Chapter  2,  I  describe  evidence  for  embodiment  while 
addressing these issues.  
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
2.1  Aims 
This chapter presents a detailed literature review of experimental findings within the 
embodied  literature  across  several  different  experimental  methods:  behavioural, 
functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI),  electroencephalography  (EEG), 
transcranial  magnetic  stimulation  (TMS)  and  patient  data,  with  each  serving  a 
particular  methodological  advantage  in  terms  of  testing  embodied  theories.  Each 
section in this chapter describes a particular research methodology and attempts to 
address  some  fundamental  issues  existent  in  embodied  theories.  Behavioural  and 
fMRI are the most dominant methods applied in this field and will be covered in 
greater depth. Although EEG, TMS and patient data receive less attention here, the 
evidence they provide is critical to embodied theories. There has been a wealth of 
studies  providing  evidence  for  mental  simulation  but  now  research  needs  to  go 
beyond  simply  demonstrating  interactions  between  language  and  sensorimotor 
processes to further describe the nature and the details of the mechanisms involved. 
Based on this, within this chapter I outline four issues that I view as fundamental in 
embodied research and present a literature review of studies in embodiment with 
reference to them. Below I briefly describe each issue. 
2.1.1  Features 
What aspects of our experience in the world do we simulate when we understand 
language? I will give an overview of different semantic domains that have been 
investigated in embodiment and provide evidence for simulation of different features 
of objects or events. Most existing research focuses on concrete objects and their 
features (for example, object shape (Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002)), but there is 
growing evidence for the embodiment of abstract concepts (e.g. Kousta et al 2011). 
Abstract  language  poses  a  special  problem  for  embodied  theories  because  their 
content is not strongly perceptual or motoric, and as such, it is often argued that their 
meaning can only be represented in abstract propositional form. It is thus unclear 
whether simulations in the service of language reflect the full range of experience 
that people have in the world, or instead if they focus on only salient aspects or 
schematized versions of the world.  
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2.1.2  Specificity 
Related  to  features  that  are  included  in  a  simulation  is  the  nature  and  detail  of 
simulations. It is unclear how specific mental simulations are. Simulations may be 
broad,  general  representations  with  experiential  information  schematic  and 
abstracted (Barsalou, 1999a; Zwaan 2003). However experiments have shown that 
simulations can be specific in terms of the features that are included, for example, 
information about the specific effector used in action simulations (Hauk et al., 2004). 
As with defining the types of features represented in simulations, this evidence helps 
to understand how closely simulations mirror our real-world experience and at what 
grain information is represented. 
2.1.3  Mental simulations are post-comprehension mental images, and other 
criticisms 
Critics  of  embodiment  often  propose  that  the  simulations  observed  across 
experiments  are  not  evidence  for  the  involvement  of  sensorimotor  systems  in 
comprehension but instead reflect mental imagery processes or post-comprehension 
process that are not critical to understanding (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). I will 
discuss  evidence  in  support  of  a  simulation  account  and  not  a  mental  imagery 
account.  This evidence includes information about the time course of simulations: if 
simulations are automatically recruited during comprehension then effects should be 
seen early (e.g. Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grother & Hoenig, 2008).  
2.1.4  Context 
There is growing discussion about how the involvement of simulation in language 
comprehension is dependent on contextual factors and may not be necessary in all 
language contexts (Zwaan, 2014). Investigating the role of context in simulation can 
help reconcile conflicting results in the literature. Simulations have been shown to be 
flexible  and  hence  more-  or  less-recruited  dependent  on  environmental  factors, 
linguistic  factors  or  cognitive  factors  (Lebois,  Wilson-Mendenhall  &  Barsalou, 
2014).  
In sum, there are four main issues in embodied research that need to be addressed in 
order  to  provide  an  accurate  description  of  the  simulation  process  and  how  it  is  
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recruited in different contexts. Below I present a review of current findings within 
the embodied literature and how these findings related to these four fundamental 
issues. 
2.2  Behavioural evidence 
Behavioural  evidence  demonstrates  sensorimotor  involvement  in  language 
processing typically through interactions between semantic content of words and real 
sensory stimuli. By combining language that describes actions or perceptual features 
with real action or perceptual tasks, one can assess whether language processing 
shares resources with perception and actions systems. If both tasks recruit similar 
processing systems, then their combination should affect processing in some way. 
Interference between language and action may occur due to competition for common 
resources  (Boulenger,  Silber,  Roy,  Paulignan,  Jeannerod  &  Nazir,  2008)  or 
facilitation could occur due to preactivation of critical regions (Connell & Lynott, 
2014).  This  basic  idea  has  been  adopted  across  many  experiments  investigating 
mental simulation for different types of language. 
2.2.1  Action language 
Action  language  has  been  the  most  thoroughly  investigated  language  type  with 
experiments  looking  at  the  effect  that  actions  have  on  the  processing  of  action 
language and conversely, how action language can affect action production. 
Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) describe a phenomenon known as the action-sentence 
compatibility effect (ACE). In the ACE paradigm, participants read sentences that 
describe actions towards or away from the body (e.g. “Open/Close the drawer) and 
have to decide whether the sentence makes sense by responding with a specially 
constructed button box that requires action either towards or away from the body. 
For some subjects, the “yes” button is close to the body, for others it is away from 
the  body.  The  typical  “ACE”  effect  is  that  participants  are  faster  to  decide  that 
sentences make sense when the direction of their own response is compatible with 
the direction of movement described in the sentence. For example, faster responses 
are found in judging the sentence “Close the drawer” when responses were made 
with  movement  away  from  the  body  compared  to  towards  the  body.  Thus,  
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understanding the sentence involves, at least to some extent, the same processes as 
those used in making the physical action of closing the drawer. 
Action  effects  have  also  been  found  for  object  nouns  whose  referent  requires 
particular actions towards them. Processing words that denote manipulable objects 
that  typically  evoke  actions  towards  or  away  from  the  body  (e.g.  a  key  requires 
movement  away  from  the  body,  towards  a  door,  and  a  cup  requires  movement 
towards the body, towards the mouth) was facilitated when an action was planned in 
the  same  direction  as  the  object’s  typical  movement  (Rueschemeyer,  Pfeiffer  & 
Bekkering, 2010).  
Reading  adjectives  has  been  shown  to  affect  online  movement  kinematics 
(Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Glover & Dixon, 2002). Glover & Dixon (2002) had 
participants  reach  and  grasp  objects  of  three  different  sizes  that  were  labelled 
“LARGE” and “SMALL” (regardless of the true object size) whilst their movements 
were  tracked  with  an  overhead  infrared  video  camera.  Participants  were  told  to 
ignore the word labels. Semantic effects of the words were found early on during the 
movement, with larger grip apertures to objects labelled with the word “LARGE” 
than objects labelled with the word “SMALL”, with the difference decreasing over 
the course of the movement. The same effect on grip aperture has been found using 
word  labels  for  large  (“APPLE”)  and  small  (“GRAPE”)  objects  (Glover, 
Rosenbaum,  Graham  &  Dixon,  2008).  The  words  automatically  activate  the 
affordances of the meaning of the words even though they were not helpful to the 
task  (in  a  similar  way  to  the  automatic  colour  activation  of  colour  words  in  the 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)). 
Action  simulations  include  information  about  the  specific  body  parts  used  in  an 
action. By manipulating how responses were made in a go/no-go experiment with 
action-related  sentences,  Buccino,  Riggio,  Melli,  Binkofski,  Gallese  &  Rizzolatti 
(2005)  revealed  the  effector-specificity  of  motor  involvement  in  sentence 
comprehension. Participants listened to sentences describing abstract actions, actions 
performed with the feet or actions performed with the hands and had to make a 
response when the sentence described a concrete action. Participants were instructed 
to respond either with their hand or with their foot. Response times in the task were  
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found  to  increase  when  the  motor  response  (hand  or  foot)  matched  the  effector 
involved in the action described in the sentence. When listening to the sentences 
participants  recruited  the  motor  cortex  in  an  effector-specific  manner  which 
subsequently interfered with the their motor response. 
2.2.2  Perceptual language 
Research conducted by Zwaan et al (e.g. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, Zwaan et al, 
2002, Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley & Aveyard, 2004) has shown that during language 
comprehension, one creates a simulation of an event or entity that includes specific 
information about its visual features.  For example, readers represent the fact that a 
nail has a different orientation if it is being hammered into the ground rather than 
into the wall (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001) and that an eagle would be viewed with its 
wings outstretched if it was flying in the sky compared to sitting in its nest (Zwaan et 
al., 2002). In both experiments, readers read sentences that described objects in a 
particular location, with the location implicitly modifying either the shape or the 
orientation of the described object. After reading each sentence participants saw a 
picture and had to respond as to whether or not the picture was mentioned in the 
sentence. Results showed that responses to the picture were faster when the shape or 
orientation of the object in the picture matched that of the object described in the 
sentence, compared to when they did not, even though these features were never 
explicitly mentioned in the sentence. The readers had built a mental representation of 
the situation described by incorporating experiential information about the objects’ 
visual features from their existing knowledge and experience with real-life entities 
with the current linguistic information. 
Similar  evidence  has  shown  that  spatial  features  are  activated  during  mental 
simulation. Zwaan & Yaxley (2003) found that single words, without any sentence 
context, could activate spatial information related to their referent object. Participants 
were presented with words displayed in a spatially iconic configuration (for example 
‘attic’ above ‘basement’) or a spatially non-iconic configuration (‘basement’ above 
‘attic’)  and  were  asked  to  make  semantic-relatedness  judgements  (i.e.  “are  these 
words semantically related?”). Participants were faster to make a semantic judgment 
about the word pairs when they were in an iconic (spatially congruent) configuration  
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than a non-iconic (spatially incongruent) configuration. That is, they were faster to 
make judgments when the words were in the same spatial configuration as they are in 
the world. This suggests that reading the words activated the spatial features of the 
objects and hence facilitated responses when the spatial location of the words on the 
screen  matched  them.  When  the  word  pairs  were  presented  horizontally,  no 
differences were found, ruling out any explanation of the results based on word order 
(but see Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008, described in Section 2.5). 
During  comprehension  of  motion  sentences,  dynamic  simulations  are  generated. 
Comprehenders simulate motion during language comprehension via some of the 
same mechanisms involved in visual perception of motion. Not only is motion in 
general simulated, but also more specifically, comprehension is sensitive to direction 
of motion. Kaschak, Zwaan, Averyard and Yaxley (2006) found that participants 
were slower to respond to a sentence describing motion in a certain direction when a 
concurrent visual stimulus displayed motion in the same direction as that described 
in the sentence.  The direction of motion was not explicitly stated but was apparent 
upon  simulating  the  meaning  of  the  described  action,  for  example  “The  car 
approached you” and “The car left you in the dust”.  This effect was present during a 
sentence sensibility task and a more shallow grammaticality judgment task. Thus, the 
sentence produced visual simulations of motion even when the task did not require 
deep levels of comprehension. Similarly, Zwaan et al. (2004) presented participants 
with sentences describing objects moving towards or away from the body (e.g. “Tom 
threw the ball to you” vs.  “You threw the ball to Tom”)  and  then  asked  them  to 
respond to an image onscreen. Responses were much faster when the size of the 
object on screen matched the relative size it would be if the object was moving in the 
same direction as that implied in the sentence (e.g. a ball coming towards you would 
appear larger than one which had been thrown away from you). Both studies suggest 
that perceptual motion is simulated during language comprehension.  
Studies have show that comprehending language describing upward or downward 
motion affects visual perception processes (Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2007; 
Pavan, Skujevskis & Baggio, 2013; Francken, Kok, Hagoort & de Lange, 2014). For 
example, Meteyard et al. (2007) looked closely at the relationship between language  
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processing  and  visual  perception  using  psychophysics  (see  Chapter  6  for  further 
discussion).  Whilst  listening  to  motion  verbs,  participants  performed  a  motion-
judgment task in which they had to indicate whether they saw motion or not in a 
visual stimulus containing random dot kinematograms. At threshold levels of visible 
motion  it  was  found  that  motion  detection  improved  when  heard  motion  verbs 
described motion in the same direction as that of the visual motion. For example, 
visual  discrimination  of  upwards-moving  dots  was  hindered  when  processing 
downward direction verbs (e.g. “dive”) compared to verbs with the same direction 
(e.g. “rise”). Conversely, it has been shown that lexical decision to direction verbs is 
hindered when participants concurrently perceive motion of a matching direction at 
near  threshold  levels  (Meteyard,  Zokaei,  Bahrami  and  Vigliocco,  2008).  The 
relationship  between  language  processing  and  visual  perception  is  therefore 
bidirectional. 
2.2.3  Simulation over imagery 
To determine whether interactions between action language and actions is due to 
mental simulation or due to more explicit mental imagery, Boulenger et al (2008) 
presented  participants  with  action  words  that  were  displayed  too  quickly  to  be 
consciously  perceived  (i.e.  they  were  presented  subliminally)  during  movement 
preparation. Because the words were not consciously perceived they could not have 
led  to  mental  motor  imagery.  Visual  cues  were  presented  to  indicate  when  a 
participant should prepare a motor act and when they should perform the motor act 
(reaching  and  grasping  an  object).  Action  words  and  concrete  words  were 
subliminally  presented  between  these  two  visual  cues  and  movement  kinematics 
were recorded. Wrist acceleration peaks were reduced in the action verb condition 
compared  to  the  concrete  noun  condition.  Thus  action  words  interfere  with 
movement  preparation  compared  to  concrete  words  even  when  they  are  not 
consciously perceived, supporting a simulation and not mental imagery view. 
2.2.4  Direction of effects 
Within the behavioural findings, some studies have found facilitation of responses 
when features of a perceptual or action stimulus match that of the linguistic stimuli, 
but other studies find interference. Both results are seen as support for embodied  
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theories: the two types of stimuli are interacting, suggesting that they share processes 
at some level, but defining the factors that lead to these differences will provide 
further understanding of the simulation process. For example, Glenberg and Kaschak 
(2002)  found  that  semantic  judgments  were  faster  when  direction  of  a  physical 
response matched the direction described in the language (facilitation). However, 
Kaschak et al. (2006) found responses were slower when the direction of motion of 
an  auditory  stimulus  matched  the  direction  described  in  language  (interference). 
Certain properties of the stimuli and details of their presentation could explain the 
opposing results. The dynamics of the interaction effects could be influenced by the 
match in modality of the presented linguistic and perceptual stimuli: Kaschak et al. 
(2006) presented linguistic stimuli visually and motion stimuli auditorily and found 
interference effects, however, the effect reversed when both stimuli were presented 
auditorily.  Timing  of  stimulus  presentation  could  also  be  a  crucial  factor  in 
determining the direction of interaction effects: Boulenger, Roy, Paulignan, Deprez, 
Jeannerod and Nazir (2006) found interference effects when verb processing and a 
reaching movement were concurrent, but found facilitation effects when the same 
processes  occurred  consecutively.  Interference  is  likely  to  occur  when  the  two 
stimulus  types  are  presented  simultaneously  because  the  necessary  cognitive 
resources are not available to perform both tasks at the same time, but facilitation can 
occur when there is a delay in presentation because priming is more likely to occur 
(Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock & Narayanan, 2007). Another account of the differences 
in the direction of effects when a perceptual stimulus is combined with linguistic 
stimuli  is  in  terms  of  perceptual  attention  (Connell  &  Lynott,  2012b):  when  the 
perceptual stimulus occupies attention it can lead to interference when there are few 
attentional resources available to aid in simulation, alternatively if the perceptual 
stimulus merely directs attention, but leaves resources available for simulation, it can 
lead to facilitation. Further tests of the mechanisms underlying these effects need to 
be further explored. In their current form, embodied theories are unable to make 
clear predictions, in terms of both simulation of perception and action, as to whether 
an experiment will lead to facilitation or interference and there are likely to be many 
factors at play.  
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2.2.5  Contextual factors 
Research has revealed many factors that may affect the occurrence and nature of 
simulations during comprehension. One factor that may modulate sensory and motor 
activation is the depth of processing in comprehension. Shallow and deep processing 
differ in terms of how much semantic information is recruited. Shallow processing 
has  been  described  as  underspecified  and  incomplete  and  deep  processing  as 
specified  and  complete  (Louwerse  &  Jeuniaux,  2008).  Following  the  method  of 
Zwaan & Yaxley (2003), as described in Section 2.2, Louwerse & Jeuniaux (2008) 
manipulated  both  iconicity  (whether  they  presented  in  a  spatially  congruent  or 
incongruent configuration) and semanticity (word associations) of word pairs. Word 
association measures were taken from LSA (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; described in 
Chapter  1,  Section  3.1.1)  and  items  were  divided  into  high  and  low  association 
groups (i.e. word pairs that are highly associated with each other and word pairs that 
are  not).  These  measures  reflect  statistical  patterns  existent  in  text  and  no 
information about semantic content of words (see Chapter 1 Section 3.1.1). They 
found  that  in  a  ‘deep’  semantic  task  (semantic  judgment)  both  iconicity  and 
semanticity predicted response times, but for a more shallow task (lexical decision) 
only semanticity predicted differences. The authors argue that there is no doubt that 
language is embodied, but that embodiment is not “always necessary to language 
comprehension” (p. 1317). Instead, language processing can proceed via mechanisms 
that are simply “good enough” (Ferreira, Ferraro & Bailey, 2002). Strong versions of 
embodiment  advocate  that  simulation  is  fundamental  to  comprehension,  meaning 
that  simulation  a  necessary  part  of  the  comprehension  process,  but  Louwerse  & 
Jeuniaux (2008) define fundamental as “synonymous with deep-rooted” (p.1). 
Bergen et al. (2007) argue that mental simulations develop when the meanings of 
single  words  are  integrated  into  a  larger  sentence  structure  and  not  for  lexical 
associations  of  words  alone.  Using  an  object  categorization  task  they  found  that 
sentences describing events that were up- or down- related interfered with object 
categorization when the object occurred in the same part of the visual field as that in 
the sentence. Importantly this interference was only observed when up or down-
related  nouns  (e.g.  The  cellar  flooded  and  The  ceiling  cracked)  and  upward  or 
downward motion (e.g. The cork rocketed and The glass fell) were described in the  
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sentence, but not for metaphorical motion (e.g. The market sank and The amount 
rose) or abstract verbs (e.g. The ratio lessened and The fees expanded). The authors 
concluded  that  spatial  simulations  of  motion  are  used  for  sentences  about  literal 
upward or downward motion but not for non-literal sentences that include words 
with  upward  and  downward  associations.  That  is,  simply  presented  a  word  with 
upward  or  downward  associations  is  not  enough  for  a  simulation  of  upward  or 
downward motion to develop. Other studies however suggest that motor simulation 
does  occur  even  in  sentences  where  an  action  verb  has  a  non-literal  meaning 
(Boulenger, Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2009) 
Grammar has also been shown to have a modulatory effect on mental simulations. 
Bergen and Wheeler (2010) adopted the ACE paradigm (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; 
described in Section 2.1) using sentences describing hand motions and manipulated 
meaning by modifying grammatical aspect so that the sentence described either an 
on-going action or a completed action (e.g. Chris is patting the cat versus Chris 
patted the cat).  The  typical  ACE  effect  (facilitation  of  responses  for  conditions 
where the direction of response matched direction described in the sentence) was 
observed for progressive sentences but not for perfect sentences. In line with the 
sentence  meaning,  motor  simulations  occurred  for  continuing  action  but  not  for 
actions described as completed. Thus, grammatical aspect serves to modulate how 
the mental simulations elicited by the content words in a sentence are enacted. 
Similarly  Anderson,  Matlock,  Fausey  &  Spivey  (2008)  found  that  manipulating 
simple  morphological  information  could  change  the  duration  and  pattern  of  a 
simulated event. Participants’ task was to place a character in the appropriate place in 
a scene according to the sentence. It was found that the character was placed closer 
to the beginning of a to-be-used path and had longer mouse movement durations in 
completing the task when they heard a sentence with a past progressive (e.g. “Tom 
was jogging to the woods and then stretched when he got there”) than a simple past 
tense (e.g. “Tom jogged to the woods and then stretched when he got there”). Thus, 
grammatical aspect influenced how the event was simulated; with a past progressive 
the event was seen as on going in comparison to a simple past tense where the event 
was seen as completed.  
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Thus, there are several factors that affect whether or not evidence of simulation is 
observed in behavioural measures. These include cognitive factors, such as depth of 
processing  as  well  as  linguistic  factors  such  as  grammatical  and  morphological 
information. Researchers are beginning to see the necessity of explicating the factors 
involved and ascertaining their significance (e.g. Zwaan, 2014; Lebois et al., 2014). 
2.3  Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
If modality-specific areas of the brain are recruited during mental simulation then 
they should be activated during language processing. One of the best methodologies 
for  testing  these  claims  is  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI).  fMRI 
allows one to look at the change in blood oxygen levels (BOLD) in the brain whilst 
completing cognitive tasks within a scanner. By carefully designing experimental 
conditions  (such  as  listening  to  words  from  a  particular  semantic  category)  and 
appropriate control conditions (such as listening to words from a different semantic 
category), areas of the brain involved in the task of interest can be localized via a 
process of subtraction. There are now numerous studies showing modality-specific 
activations  during  language  comprehension,  as  summarized  below  (see  Figure  1, 
taken  from  Binder  &  Desai  (2011)  for  visual  depiction  of  modality-specific 
activations during comprehension). However, it should be noted that using fMRI 
only  provides  a  correlational  measure  and  thus  one  cannot  establish  whether 
simulations are necessary using this method.  
2.3.1  Action language 
As with behavioural work, the majority of fMRI studies focuses on action words. 
There are now many fMRI studies showing activation of the motor and premotor 
cortex for single action words, such as kick and pick (Hauk et al 2004, Kemmerer, 
Castillo, Talavage, Patterson & Wiley, 2008), action phrases like grasping the pen 
(Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti & Iacoboni, 2006), action sentences like I bite an 
apple (Tettamanti et al 2005, Boulenger et al., 2009) and longer discourse (Kurby & 
Zacks, 2013). Motor activation has also been observed for non-literal meanings of 
sentences. Boulenger et al.(2009) found somatotopic motor activation for idiomatic 
sentences  such  as  Pablo  kicked  the  habit,  suggesting  that  even  when  the  true 
meaning of the sentence does not involve action, the action related to the meaning of  
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the words is still activated. This however is in opposition to the study discussed 
earlier (Bergen et al., 2002) where spatial simulations were observed for the literal 
meaning of words but not for non-literal meanings, as well as evidence described 
below  (Section  3.5)  that  did  not  find  motor  activation  for  motor  verbs  used  in 
idiomatic sentences (Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, Pulvermüller  & Tyler, 2006). 
Action simulations have also been observed for words that do not describe actions 
themselves but objects that typically require particular actions (Chao and Martin, 
2000;  Saccuman,  Cappa,  Bates,  Arevalo,  Della  Rosa,  Danna  &  Perani,  2006; 
Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindermann, Willems & Bekkering, 2010b). For example, 
Chao and Martin (2000) observed left ventral premotor and left posterior parietal 
activations,  areas  that  store  information  about  motor-based  properties,  when 
participants named tools, suggesting that part of the meaning of those tools includes 
the associated actions that one would perform with them.  
2.3.2  Perceptual language 
Studies have described activations for perceptual features of objects including visual 
(Pulvermüller  &  Hauk  2006,  Simmons,  Ramjee,  Beauchamp,  McRae,  Martin  & 
Barsalou, 2007; van Dam, Rueschemeyer & Bekkering, 2010), auditory (Kiefer et 
al.,  2008)  and  olfactory-gustatory  features  (Gonzalez,  Barros-Loscertales, 
Pulvermüller, Meseguer, Belloch & Avilia, 2006). Pulvermüller and Hauk (2006) 
found  colour-related  words  (e.g.  brown,  blonde)  preferentially  activated  anterior 
parahippocampal  gyrus,  an  area  typically  involved  in  colour  categorization  of 
objects. Kiefer et al. (2008) found that words with auditory associations activated 
regions within the auditory association cortex (left posterior superior temporal gyrus 
and  middle  temporal  gyrus),  areas  that  were  active  when  listening  to  real  world 
sounds in a second task. Moreover, activation to the words was linearly modulated 
by the relevance of their acoustic factors as rated by a separate set of participants. 
Words have also been shown to activate smell and taste regions, perceptual features 
that are perhaps less salient or less dominant in our everyday experiences: during a 
single  day  we  notice  and  orientate  ourselves  around  more  visual  and  auditory 
features, e.g. looking where something is, listening to somebody speak (see Chapter 
5 which explores multimodality), rather than through one’s sense of smell or taste.  
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Gonzalez  et  a.l  (2006)  found  that  silently  reading  words  with  strong  ratings  of 
associated  odour  (e.g.  cinnamon,  garlic)  activated  the  primary  olfactory  cortex 
compared  to  neutral  words.  Similarly,  Barros-Loscertales  et  al.  (2012)  found 
activations in primary and secondary gustatory regions for words with strong taste 
associations (e.g. salt, honey). 
Motion simulations during language comprehension have been demonstrated with 
fMRI. Activations to motion language have been found in the motion sensitive area 
V5, which is involved in the visual analysis of motion. Saygin, McCullough, Alac, 
and  Emmorey  (2010)  found  V5  activation  to  both  motion  and  fictive  motion 
sentences  compared  to  static  sentences  in  a  semantic  sensibility  judgment  task. 
Rueschemeyer,  Glenberg,  Kaschak,  Mueller  &  Friederici  (2010a)  also  found  V5 
activation for motion sentences (motion described as moving in all directions except 
motion away from the observer) using a semantic anomaly detection task. That V5 
activations  were  not  observed  for  motion  described  as  moving  away  from  the 
observer suggests that motion simulations might occur only for motion relevant to 
the self (see Chapter 5 for similar discussion). There is however other studies that 
fail to find V5 activations to motion language (see Gennari, 2012 for review), but 
rather observe posterior middle temporal gyrus (PMTG) activations. PMTG is an 
area anterior to V5 and thought to include more schematic motion representations or 
more general action and event structure knowledge (Gennari, 2012). For example, 
Kable et al. (2002) found V5 and PMTG activations to images of objects in motion, 
but found only PMTG activations to motion words. Using a similarity judgment task, 
Bedny,  Caramazza,  Grossman,  Pascual-Leneone  and  Saxe  (2008)  found  no  V5 
activation but found differences between nouns and verbs in the PMTG. Such results 
suggest that motion simulations created in language comprehension do not include 
the specificity found in actual visual perception (Gennari, 2012). Bedny, Caramazza, 
Pascual-Leneone and Saxe (2012) found there was no difference in performance on a 
semantic similarity task to action verbs between blind and sighted individuals and 
that the functional profile and location of activation to these words did not differ 
between the groups.  This seems to suggest that visual information is not critical to 
action verb meaning. In addition the left middle temporal gyrus was activated more 
to all verb types compared to nouns, suggesting that it may contain abstract verb  
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representations rather than visual motion information. If visual information is not 
crucially  recruited  during  the  processing  of  visual  language,  then  this  would  be 
evidence  against  embodiment  and  could  mean  that  previous  effects  were 
epiphenomenal. However, psychophysical evidence for the recruitment of low-level 
visual processes in motion language does exist (Meteyard et al. 2008), as discussed 
above in Section 2.2. Further, it should be noted that a lack of support for embodied 
simulation  should  not  be  seen  as  support  for  amodal  representations  of  meaning 
(Lebois et al., 2014). In addition, as discussed throughout this chapter, embodied 
effects are dynamic and context-dependent and these findings may simply reflect 
this. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. A neuroanatomical depiction of modality-specific regions recruited in language 
comprehension. Taken from Binder & Desai (2011) 
2.3.3  Specificity 
Activations in modality-specific regions can reflect very specific aspects of meaning. 
Activations in the motor system can be modulated by specific kinematics associated 
with the word. Areas more active to action words than abstract words showed a 
graded  effect  of  activity  based  on  action  specificity,  with  more  specific  actions 
having greater activation (van Dam et al., 2010). For example, to wipe has a more  
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specific  motor  plan  than  to  clean.  Action  activations  are  also  somatotopic  (or 
effector-specific), with activations to words describing actions with specific effectors 
following the somatotopic organization of the motor cortex for real-world actions 
with specific effectors (Hauk et al., 2004). For example, activations to the word “to 
kick” activate similar regions of the motor cortex to those involved in producing a 
leg movement. Rueschemeyer et al (2010b) further investigated motor activations to 
object words by looking at the specific way that objects can be manipulated. Objects 
that need to be picked up to be used e.g. cup, pen (manipulable objects) activated 
frontoparietal sensorimotor areas more than objects that need to be picked up to be 
moved e.g. bookend, clock (volumetric objects). 
Motor  simulations  are  also  sensitive  to  ‘body-specificity’  (Casasanto,  2009;  see 
Chapter 1 section 1.4.5.). That is, the type of bodily experience the comprehender 
themselves  has.  Willems  et  al.  (2010)  found  that  right-handers  activated  the  left 
premotor cortex in response to action words, whereas left-handers activated the right 
premotor cortex in response to the same words. It has also been shown that athletic 
experience can affect comprehension of language about action. Activations within 
the premotor cortex to language describing actions performed during ice hockey (e.g. 
The hockey player held on to the puck) were shown to be greater for participants that 
were  experienced  ice  hockey  players  compared  to  novices  (Beilock,  Lyons, 
Mattarella-Micke,  Nusbaum  &  Small,  2008;  Lyons,  Mattarella-Micke,  Cieslak, 
Nusbaum, Small & Beilock, 2010) but no differences between ice hockey players 
and novices were observed for language about non-expert actions performed every 
day. Differences even existed between those with experience simply of watching ice 
hockey and those that were ice-hockey novices. This is strong evidence that semantic 
representations are built from people’s sensorimotor experience: the comprehenders 
simulate the meaning of an action in a way that they would typically perform that 
action. 
2.3.4  Simulation over imagery 
Alternative explanations for brain activations observed during language processing 
are that they reflect explicit mental imagery processes rather than implicit mental 
simulations. At first blush the two processes appear difficult to tease apart. Mental  
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simulation could be an unconscious version of mental imagery, or both could belong 
to a continuum that varies in richness of detail, with mental simulation being a more 
schematic version of mental imagery (Willems et al., 2009). Data from Willems et al 
(2010) suggest that mental imagery and mental simulation are two distinct processes. 
Participants either made lexical decisions to action words or were asked to actively 
imagine the word’s corresponding action with their eyes closed. Both tasks led to 
activation within motor areas but the specific areas differed between the two tasks 
with no areas of overlap, suggesting that they are separate processes. The authors 
speculate that the distinction reflects the different functions of mental imagery and 
mental simulation. Mental simulation during language processing serves a predictive 
function:  simulations  are  ‘pre-enactments’,  preparing  for  future  actions  be  it  a 
physical response or a linguistic response. Mental imagery instead is a reflective 
process involving an effortful recollection of previous experiences. 
To investigate whether sensorimotor activations during word comprehension reflect 
meaning or mental imagery, Hauk, Davis, Kherif and Pulvermüller (2008) looked at 
the effect of word frequency on category-specific activations. Word frequency is a 
lexical feature and as such should have no effect on mental imagery processes. For 
example, there should be no difference in mental effort needed to form a mental 
image  of  synonyms  that  differ  in  word  frequency,  such  as  ‘baby’  and  ‘infant’. 
Moreover,  research  has  shown  that  word  frequency  plays  a  role  in  early  word 
recognition processes (e.g. Allen, Smith, Lien, Grabbe & Murphy, 2005), and word 
frequency effects have been observed with EEG within 200 ms of stimulus onset 
(e.g.  Hauk  &  Pulvermüller,  2004),  much  earlier  than  mental  imagery  would  be 
observed.  Word  frequency  was  negatively  correlated  with  activation  in  the  left 
fusiform gyrus for visually related words and in the left middle temporal gyrus for 
action related words. Since word frequency reflects lexico-semantic processes, this is 
evidence in support of sensorimotor activations in meaning and not mental imagery: 
there  is  no  explanation  for  why  word  frequency  would  correlate  with  mental 
imagery. It is important to note however that activations to motor-related words that 
correlated with word frequency were found in the left middle temporal gyrus and not 
within the motor cortex, as might be predicted based on previous results (e.g. Hauk 
et  al.  2004).  The  middle  temporal  gyrus  is  thought  to  be  involved  in  action  
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observation (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006) and knowledge of biological motion (Martin, 
Wiggs,  Ungerleider  &  Haxby,  1996).  It  is  possible  then  that  the  simulations  for 
motor-related  words  are  perceptual  rather  than  motoric  (i.e.  simulations  of  the 
perception of a motor event and not participation in that event). However, the motor-
related items used in the study were rated on ‘general action-related aspects’ and 
which could have led to large variability in terms of activation between items making 
it difficult to detect effects in motor areas.  
Further  support  for  simulation  over  motor  imagery  is  found  in  Revill,  Aslin, 
Tanenhaus and Bavelier (2008). Activations occurred in motion sensitive regions 
during  presentation  of  non-motion  words  that  had  motion  cohort  competitors. 
Participants were trained in an artificial language in which cohort pairs differed only 
in  their  final  syllable  (e.g.  biduko goti vs.  biduka goti). Semantic  similarity  was 
manipulated and words could refer to either change of motion or change of direction. 
Activation in regions of interest within MT/V5 was higher when a word’s cohort 
competitor was a motion word compared to when it was a non-motion word. That is, 
the  semantics  of  a  cohort  competitor  affected  levels  of  activation  during  the 
temporarily ambiguous period of word recognition.  Activation of cohort competitors 
is thought to be an unconscious process so it is unlikely that such activations are due 
to conscious imagery of the competitor. 
2.3.5  Context effects 
A common question about the activations observed during comprehension is whether 
they  reflect  simulations  of  the  meanings  of  individual  words,  or,  in  the  case  of 
sentences,  simulation  of  a  full  event  (e.g.  Raposo  et  al.,  2009).    Reading  single 
words,  phrases  or  sentences  is  unlikely  to  capture  processes  involved  in  global 
coherence  building  or  maintenance  (Kurby  &  Zacks,  2013)  that  are  required  in 
reading longer discourse. There is evidence that activations observed during sentence 
comprehension  reflect  an  overall  simulation  of  the  described  event,  or  situation 
model, and not simply activations to the single words in a sentence.  Boulenger et al. 
(2009) found stronger somatotopic effects in a late time window that occurred after 
sentence  offset  reflecting  sentence  level  processing  instead  of  single  word  
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processing,  compared  to  an  earlier  time  window,  thought  to  reflect  single  word 
processing.   
As suggested in Section 2.5, the amount of sensory and motor activation may depend 
on  the  depth  of  semantic  processing  that  occurs,  so  we  may  expect  there  to  be 
differences  in  simulation  between  single  words,  sentences  and  narratives. 
Simulations  may  be  more  likely  for  narratives  since  they  are  closer  to  mental 
imagery (Meteyard et al, 2012). One study has investigated patterns of activation to 
motor, visual and auditory events as described in larger discourse (Kurby & Zacks, 
2013): short narratives from a fictional book. Clauses within the text were normed by 
a separate set of participants and coded by the authors as to whether they elicited 
auditory  imagery  (descriptions  about  sound,  for  example  “They  sighed”),  visual 
imagery (descriptions of visual scenes e.g. “Susan stood leaning against a nearby 
tree”) or motor imagery (descriptions of action e.g. “she ambled over behind them”).  
Results  found  that  clauses  with  high  auditory  imagery  activated  areas  within 
secondary auditory cortex and clauses that implied high motor imagery activated 
secondary somatosensory and premotor cortex. No increased activations were found 
to  high  visual  imagery,  but  this  may  reflect  the  concurrent  visual  demands  of 
reading,  or  alternatively  that  visual  imagery  remained  quite  consistent  across  all 
clause  types  (c.f.  dominance  of  visual  experience  in  Chapter  5).  This  type  of 
evidence is crucial to embodied theories as it shows that activations can be observed 
with more naturalistic language stimuli that have not been specifically designed for 
an  experiment  with  the  aim  of  encouraging  certain  types  of  modality-specific 
activations. In addition, the larger discourse was read in a more natural manner: the 
participants could simply read the paragraphs and comprehend with no larger reading 
goal, building an overall event representation instead of having task demands such as 
explicit judgments about the stimuli, that may encourage sensorimotor activations. 
The study included an additional condition in which clauses were presented in a 
scrambled manner. Activations were stronger in the coherent narrative condition than 
the scrambled condition suggesting that mental simulations increase with a coherent 
mental model. Although this may seem to be at odds with evidence elsewhere where 
activations  have  been  observed  with  single  words  and  short  phrases  that  are  not  
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presented in sentences or narratives, here the emphasis is on coherence. Single words 
and phrases are not incoherent. 
Inconsistency within the imaging literature leads one to question whether mental 
simulations  are  fixed,  static  representations  or  instead  are  dynamic  and  flexible. 
Rueschemeyer, Brass and Friederici (2007) failed to observe action activations to 
complex verbs that included a motor stem compared to complex verbs that were built 
on abstract stems. For example, no difference was observed between words such as 
begriefen (to comprehend), which is built upon the stem griefen (to grasp), and a 
word such as bedenken (to think), which does not have a motor stem. Raposo et al. 
(2009) found activation for single motor verbs and for action sentences but did not 
find activation for motor verbs in idiomatic phrases (e.g. kick the bucket) (but see 
Boulenger  et  al.  2009,  section  3.1).  These  studies  suggest  that  sensorimotor 
activations depend upon both the morphological context and the sentence context of 
the  word,  and  are  therefore  flexible  and  context-dependent  rather  than  fixed  and 
automatic. This view is incompatible with traditional perspectives on semantics that 
assume  (often  implicitly)  that  concepts  are  represented  as  situational  invariant, 
having conceptual stability (Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, Herrnberger & Kiefer, 2008) 
Both Rueschemeyer et al. (2007) and Raposo et al. (2009) used stimuli for which the 
motor component was not a critical part of the intended meaning. van Dam, van 
Dijk, Bekkering & Ruseschemeyer (2012) therefore investigated whether flexibility 
in embodied representations can be observed when the motor component is crucial to 
meaning,  by  manipulating  the  context  in  which  a  word  appeared.  Participants 
listened to words that had strong action and colour associations (e.g. tennis ball, 
boxing glove) while completing a go/no-go task in which they had to respond to 
either words denoting objects associated with the colour green or to words associated 
with  actions  involving  the  foot.  Results  showed  that  motor  areas  were  activated 
strongly when the task required thinking about action properties, but not when it 
required thinking about colour properties. In a similar vein, Hoenig et al. (2008) 
found  that  modality-specific  features  are  dynamically  recruited  depending  on 
contextual constraints and relevance to the concept. Activations within modality-
specific areas increased when participants had to decide whether a non-dominant  
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attribute (e.g. elongated for knife) matched a target word compared to when they 
judged whether a dominant attribute (e.g. to cut for knife) matched the target word. 
Less accessible attributes lead to the highest activity because they are not a part of 
the dominant, core meaning of the concept. 
Proponents  of  more  disembodied  views  may  present  the  lack  of  consistency  in 
activations as a problem for embodied theories. Yet carefully assessing the contexts 
in which activations are observed and those in which they are not provides evidence 
for the flexibility of simulations. This flexibility is extremely intuitive. See Figure 2 
taken from Hoenig et al. (2008) depicting how modality-specifically features are 
recruited dynamically dependent on task. 
 
Figure 2-2. Flexibility in modality-specific activations. Taken from Hoenig et al. (2008). A 
depiction of how modality-specific regions (visual, motion, and motor) could be recruited 
dynamically depending on task context. The size of the ovals represents the contribution of the 
modality-specific regions under two different task contexts.  
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Using fMRI has provided evidence that brain regions involved in perception and 
action are activated during comprehension of language describing perception and 
action. Further, studies have revealed that these activations can be quite specific in 
terms of the effectors used in the action (Hauk et al. 2004), the types of actions 
described (van Dam et al., 2010) and the bodily experiences of the comprehender. As 
with behavioural studies, the activations observed across studies vary with context 
including depth of processing (Kurby & Zacks, 2013) and task specifics (van Dam et 
al 2011), and these effects need to be clearly defined and predictable (Zwaan, 2014). 
Much support for embodied theories comes from fMRI data, however it does not 
provide  support  for  a  crucial  role  of  perception  and  action  systems  in  meaning 
because the data are correlational and therefore support using other methodologies is 
required. 
2.4  Electroencephalography (EEG) 
One way to determine whether embodied effects are due to mental simulation or to 
mental imagery is to look at the time course of the effects. Embodied simulations are 
thought to be fast and automatic whereas mental imagery is more of a slow and 
deliberate process (Hauk et al., 2008). Importantly, if mental simulations are critical 
to  understanding  then  they  should  take  place  within  the  time  window  of  typical 
semantic processing. Using electroencephalography (EEG) one can measure event-
related potentials (ERPs) online, providing important time course information related 
to cognitive processes. ERPs are electric potentials that reflect brain activity, time-
locked to an event.  
EEG has been used to demonstrate differences between word types at very early 
onsets.  Kiefer et al. (2008) found an early onset of ERP activity within the left 
posterior superior temporal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus (around 150ms after 
word  onset)  when  participants  made  lexical  decisions  to  words  with  auditory 
associations,  suggesting  that  access  to  auditory  information  during  word 
comprehension  is  rapid.  Hoenig  et  al.  (2008)  found  ERPs  reflecting  interactions 
between word category (artificial vs. natural objects) and attribute verification type  
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(visual vs. action-related) that were observed as rapidly as 116msec after word onset, 
reflecting early access to relevant visual and action features. 
Action specificity is also an early effect. Hauk, Shtyrov and Pulvermüller (2008) 
monitored brain activity in fronto-central areas using EEG while participants silently 
read face-, arm- and leg-related actions. They specifically focused on the time range 
of 210-230ms, which was the time in which fronto-central areas became active. This 
time period reflects lexico-semantic access. Later periods (after 300ms) are thought 
to  reflect  post-lexical  processes  such  as  context  integration.  Results  showed  a 
significant  word  type  by  topography  interaction.  Left  frontal  areas  had  more 
activation  to  face  words  than  legs  words,  whereas  central  sites  showed  more 
activation to leg words than to face words. Arm words had more activation than face 
words  at  the  right  central  and  right  frontal  sites  and  face  words  activated  left 
prefrontal  areas  more  than  arm  words.  Thus,  significant  differences  between 
categories of actions were demonstrated from around 220ms after stimulus onset 
within regions involved in actual movements and observation of movements. 
Aravena,  Hurtado,  Riveros,  Cardona,  Manes  and  Ibáñez  (2010)  were  the  first  to 
provide	 ﾠ evidence  of  the  ‘bidirectional  hypothesis’  with  what  they  call  a  ‘neural 
signature of the action-sentence compatibility effect’. The bidirectional hypothesis 
proposes that comprehension of action language and motor processes share the same 
neural  resources  with  mutual  facilitation.  That  is,  motor  processes  can  effect 
language  processing  and  conversely,  language  processing  can  effect  motor 
processing. This is important to show that motor activation during comprehension is 
not simply an epiphenomenal effect or imagery effect occurring after comprehension 
and  to  demonstrate  what  they  define  as  a  “genuine  and  ongoing  brain  motor-
language  interaction”  (Aravena  et  al.,  2010).  Participants  listened  to  sentences 
describing actions using an open hand, closed hand or no action at all and indicated 
once they had understood the sentence. To respond, participants had to either press a 
button with an open hand or a closed hand making the characteristics of the response 
compatible  or  incompatible  (or  neutral)  with  that  described  in  the  sentence.  The 
incompatible  group  exhibited  an  N400-like  response  (most  often  found  with 
semantic anomalies) around Cz (the centre of the scalp), indicating a possible effect  
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of  the  incompatible  action  response  on  sentence  processing.  For  the  compatible 
group,  an  enhanced  re-afferent  potential  (RAP)  was  found.  RAP  is  an  index  of 
movement-related sensory feedback to primary sensory-motor cortex, suggesting that 
information  from  the  sentence  facilitated  the  action  response.    Additionally, 
enhanced motor potential (MP) amplitude was found for compatible sentences. MP 
has been associated with speed and precision of movement and this increase again 
suggests facilitation from the compatible sentence context. Overall the results show 
an effect in the motor-to-semantics direction (N400) and in the semantics-to-motor 
direction (MP and RAP). 
Boulenger  et  al.  (2008)  used  EEG  to  investigate  whether  subliminally  presented 
words affect motor planning. They focused on readiness potential (RP) which is a 
well-known indicator of motor preparedness, thought to arise from premotor and 
primary motor areas. Participants were subliminally presented with action words and 
concrete words while preparing for a reach and grasp movement. EEG recordings 
showed  a  significant  reduction  in  RP  amplitude  for  action  words  compared  to 
concrete nouns following presentation of the masked word. Therefore, unconsciously 
processing action words during movement preparation had a stronger effect on motor 
processes than when unconsciously processing concrete words, and this difference 
occurred very soon after word onset. This is evidence that action activations are 
automatic and not produced by explicit processes. 
Thus, EEG investigations have provided evidence that sensorimotor activations are 
very  early  and  do  not  occur  post-comprehension.  Despite  the  high  temporal 
resolution,  EEG  does  not  provide  source  localization  with  millimetre  precision. 
Stronger evidence for the involvement of particular regions in meaning processing 
would come from the combination of ERP studies that have high temporal resolution 
with methods such as fMRI that have high spatial resolution (Hauk et al., 2008). 
2.5  TMS 
Despite the supporting evidence collected so far, some critics might argue that since 
methodologies such as fMRI are provide correlational evidence, results could still be 
explained  by  ‘disembodied  theories’  where  the  observed  patterns  are  due  to  
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spreading  activation  between  language  areas  and  sensorimotor  areas  (Mahon  & 
Caramazza,  2008).  This  view  suggests  that  sensorimotor  activation  found  in  all 
experiments  could  be  merely  epiphenomenal  and  not  play  a  functional  role  in 
language comprehension. 
Evidence is needed to tell us whether particular brain regions are critical to language 
comprehension  or  merely  coactivated  with  it.  Transcranial  magnetic  stimulation 
(TMS) is a method that can address this issue. TMS is a non-invasive technique with 
reasonable spatial resolution that when applied can temporarily alter the neuronal 
activity  at  specific  locations  in  the  brain  and  can  thus  assess  a  causal  role  for 
sensorimotor regions in language comprehension. 
2.5.1  Modulating neural activity 
After applying TMS to regions of interest one can look at the effect this stimulation 
has on comprehending or producing words or sentences of a specific category. If 
semantic processing is affected by the disruption of the corresponding sensory and 
motor  areas  then  the  affected  areas  must  be  a  necessary  part  of  semantic 
representation,  and  not  epiphenomenal.  This  technique  is  often  referred  to  as  a 
reversible or virtual lesion (Tremblay, Sato & Small, 2012). These ‘virtual’ lesions 
can be more revealing than real lesions because they are induced at precise locations 
at a fine spatial grain and are not affected by other factors (such as brain plasticity) 
that can co-occur with real lesions (Tremblay, Sato & Small, 2012). 
Pulvermüller,  Hauk,  Nikulin  and  Ilmoniemi  (2005)  delivered  single  pulse  TMS 
below motor threshold (i.e. below the threshold needed to produce actual movement) 
to hand and leg areas of the motor cortex while participants completed a lexical 
decision task on hand and leg action words. Participants had to decide whether a 
presented word was a real word or not and responded via a quick lip movement, 
recorded  with  EMG  electrodes  to  avoid  any  interference  between  a  hand  action 
response and the meaning of the word. An interaction between stimulation site and 
word type was observed with faster responses to arm words than legs words with 
TMS to arm areas and faster responses to leg words than arm words with TMS to leg 
areas. No difference between word types was observed when TMS was delivered to  
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the right hemisphere (the non-language dominant hemisphere) or when sham TMS 
was  delivered.  The  authors  suggest  that  facilitation  was  observed  due  to  the 
asynchrony between the onset of the word and the TMS pulse. TMS was delivered 
150ms after word onset, thought to roughly correspond to the time at which meaning 
information is accessed (Sereno & Rayner, 2003). This timing is comparable to the 
effect of semantically related words in semantic priming experiments. 
Cattaneo, Devlin, Salvini, Vecchi and Slivanto (2010) used rTMS (repetitive TMS) 
to the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) to disrupt semantic priming. rTMS produces 
longer  lasting-lasting  effects  than  single-pulse  TMS  and  modulates  cortical 
excitability to either improve or impair performance on cognitive tasks. Participants 
were primed with the word “animal” or “tool” before seeing another word from 
either  category  and  decided  whether  it  was  a  tool  or  an  animal.  Typically, 
participants responded faster on congruent than incongruent trials: faster when the 
category of the second word matched the word they were primed with than when it 
did not. However, when rTMS was delivered to the PMv this priming effect was 
reduced, but only for tools. Using a similar paradigm but matching short sentences 
with words that were similar or not in meaning, Tremblay et al. (2012) found that 
rTMS  to  the  PMv  removed  the  priming  effect  for  sentences  describing  manual, 
object-oriented  actions,  but  not  for  sentences  describing  visual  properties  of 
manipulable objects. TMS also removed differences in accuracy between congruent 
and incongruent trials for sentences describing manual actions as well as shifting 
sensitivity  (d’)  and  response  bias.  Thus,  the  PMv  plays  a  crucial  role  in 
understanding tool words and sentences about manual actions. However, this task did 
require an explicit judgment to be made and so some form of post-lexical imagery 
cannot be ruled out. 
rTMS has also been used to test the Body Specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009; 
see Chapter 1 section 1.4.5.) that proposes that mental simulations during action 
language  processing  should  be  different  for  different  bodies  (Willems,  Labruna, 
D’Esposito, Ivry & Casasanto, 2010). rTMS was applied to the premotor area of the 
dominant hand during a task in which participants had to distinguish between verbs 
and  pseudowords.  Task  performance  was  significantly  reduced  during  rTMS  for  
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manual action verbs but not non-manual action verbs.  This corroborates the finding 
that  premotor  cortex  activation  to  action  words  differs  according  to  handedness 
(Willems et al., 2010). 
It is important to note than although we do see effects of virtual lesions, participants 
are still able to correctly respond to the words and sentences (Tremblay et al., 2012). 
There are many other aspects of features that make up the meaning of a word or a 
sentence that comprehension can still rely on (i.e. meaning is multimodal). Thus the 
effected regions are a crucial part of the comprehension process but may be utilized 
more  in  some  situations  than  others  (e.g.  to  reduce  ambiguity)  (Tremblay  et  al., 
2012).  
2.5.2  Measuring neural activity 
TMS can be used to modulate neural activity and to measure neural activity in the 
motor cortex.  By recording the size of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) from the 
periphery muscles one can measure the excitability of the motor cortex. Oliveri et al. 
(2004) applied paired-pulse TMS to the hand area of the motor cortex and found that 
action-related words led to a greater activity in the motor cortex than non-action 
words.  Interestingly,  this  facilitation  was  independent  of  grammatical  class:  both 
action verbs (e.g. to throw) and nouns referring to manipulable objects (e.g. the key) 
led to facilitation compared to non-action related verbs (e.g. to belong) and nouns 
(e.g. the cloud). Moreover, this facilitation was observed for a task that was designed 
to minimize activation of the meaning of words by focusing on word morphology 
only: participants were instructed via symbols to produce either the singular or plural 
version of presented word. Similar studies using this method have shown effector-
specificity in the motor cortex for hand and foot related sentences (Buccino et al., 
2005)  as  well  as  abstract  action  sentences  (Glenberg,  Sato,  Cattaneo,  Riggio, 
Palumbo & Buccino, 2008). 
Gough, Campione and Buccino (2013) further investigated the specificity of motor 
cortex involvement in word meaning by looking at effects at the level of specific 
muscles. They applied TMS to parts of the primary motor cortex that control the 
extensor communis digitorum (EC) and the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) muscles  
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150ms after participants were presented with words. The EC muscle is involved in 
avoidance, releasing movements of the hand and the FDI muscle is used for approach 
and grasping actions of the hand.  The words could be adjectives describing object 
properties relevant for approach behaviour and manipulation (positive), such as soft, 
or relevant for avoidance behaviour and releasing actions (negative), such as filthy. 
An interaction between adjective type and stimulation site was found, driven by a 
significant  difference  between  MEPs  recorded  at  the  EC  and  FDI  muscles  for 
negative  adjectives:  MEPs  at  the  EC  muscle  decreased  and  MEPs  at  the  FDI 
increased relative to baseline. When the adjective implied an action that involved a 
specific muscle, MEPs at that muscle site decreased, suggesting interference between 
TMS and language processing. This is seen as strong evidence for embodied theories 
that cannot be explained by amodal theories, or ‘secondary embodiment’ (Mahon & 
Caramazza,  2008)  for  two  reasons.  First,  since  the  adjectives  were  presented  in 
isolation the results are hard to explain in terms of motor planning or motor imagery. 
Second, TMS was applied 150ms after word onset, which is too fast to affect post-
comprehension associative processes.  
By applying TMS directly to areas hypothesized to play a role in mental simulation 
evidence  for  their  necessity  has  been  provided.  Further,  TMS  has  been  used  to 
measure  brain  activity  showing  that  language  can  increase  excitability  in 
sensorimotor  regions.  In  sum,  this  methodology  has  provided  evidence  against  a 
view of sensorimotor simulation as epiphenomenal and instead shown that it is a 
crucial part of comprehension. 
2.6  Patient Data 
As with TMS data, direct evidence against the view that simulations reflect mental 
imagery and are not crucial to comprehension, comes from studies in which deficits 
in motor or sensory processing result in a selective deficit in language processing of 
the  same  category.  If  the  sensorimotor  systems  play  a  critical  role  in  semantic 
representation, then damage to these areas should disrupt semantic processing of the 
same word types. Testing comprehension in patients with damage to sensory and 
motor areas therefore provides a crucial test for embodied theories. A completely 
disembodied  approach  would  predict  no  effect  of  such  damage  on  any  type  of  
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language  comprehension  because  language,  perception  and  action  are  separate 
systems. 
Most  existing  research  of  this  nature  has  looked  at  patients  with  impairments  in 
planning and executing actions, for example patients with lesions to areas of the 
brain involved in motor production (e.g. Neininger & Pulvermüller, 2003), patients 
with  motor  neuron  disease  (e.g.  Bak,  O’Donovan,  Xuereb,  Boniface  &  Hodges, 
2001) and patients with Parkinson’s disease (e.g. Boulenger, Mechtouff, Thobois, 
Broussolle, Jeannerod & Nazir, 2008; Fernandino, Conant, Binder, Blindauer, Hiner, 
Spangler & Desai, 2012).  
Bak et al. (2001) investigated language comprehension and production in patients 
with  motor  neurone  disease  (MND),  a  disease  that  predominantly  affects  motor 
functions.  Comprehension and production of verbs was found to be significantly 
more impaired than nouns for MND patients but not for healthy controls or patients 
with  Alzheimer’s  disease  (AD)  who  have  both  semantic  and  syntactic  language 
impairments.  This selective deficit in the MND patients suggests that the processes 
underlying  verb  representation  is  strongly  related  to  those  of  the  motor  systems. 
Grossman, Anderson, Khan, Avants, Elman and McCluskey (2008) found that the 
degree of cortical atrophy in motor and premotor areas correlated with performance 
on action-verb judgments. In a similar vein, Boulenger et al. (2008) examined the 
effect  of  Parkinson’s  disease  (PD)  on  the  processing  of  action  words  relative  to 
concrete nouns. Using a masked priming paradigm, it was found that priming effects 
for action verbs varied as a function of Levodopa uptake. Levodopa restores the 
function of the basal ganglia, improving the motor impairment in PD. When patients 
were off treatment (i.e. most severe motor impairment), no priming effect was found 
for action verbs, although there was an effect for concrete nouns. This is evidence 
that  processing  action  words  depends  on  the  integrity  of  the  motor  system.  It  is 
important to note that overall performance on the lexical decision element of the task 
did not differ between verbs and nouns, only the priming effects. The subtle deficit 
might suggest that the role of the motor cortex in action word processing is relatively 
small.   
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Many  studies  with  patients  have  not  explicitly  distinguished  between  nouns  and 
verbs, and actions and objects so it is unclear whether the results reflect a problem 
with conceptual knowledge or grammatical knowledge (Oliveri et al. 2004). Both 
studies  above  used  action  verbs  and  concrete  nouns,  thereby  confounding 
grammatical class with semantic category. Fernandino, et al. (2012) removed this 
confound by testing Parkinson’s patients and age-matched healthy controls on action 
verb and abstract verb processing. They found that compared to healthy controls, 
patients performed much worse with action verbs than abstract verbs, indicating that 
Parkinson’s disease leads to problems with processing action language rather than 
problems  processing  verbs.  In  addition,  two  tasks  were  used,  testing  action 
comprehension  at  early  automatic  stages  (lexical  decision)  and  under  explicit 
semantic processing (semantic similarity judgments). Differences between patients 
and controls were observed with both tasks, suggesting that the effect of the motor 
system  occurs  both  during  shallow,  automatic  tasks  and  deeper  more  controlled 
tasks. 
Overall, the results of the above studies seem to falsify a ‘disembodied’ hypothesis 
that allows no interaction between language and perceptual and motor systems. The 
studies also seem to suggest that neither can we accept a strong form of embodiment 
which would predict an ‘all or nothing’ contribution of motor processes. That is, 
patients’ comprehension of the problematic semantic classes is not completely lost, 
but rather hindered. It remains an open question as to the nature of action concepts in 
patients with compromised motor systems or brain lesions. However, one should also 
keep in mind that the meaning of a word contains information from more than one 
modality and as such, deficits in only the motor component would not make word 
recognition impossible. For example, the word “kick” is likely to contain visual and 
auditory information about what it is like to perceive oneself or others kicking, not 
simply motoric representations. The involvement on different sensorimotor domains 
in simulations is explored in Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis. 
The type of task adopted is important in these investigations. It is questionable as to 
whether a task that does not depend on deep semantic analysis would be sensitive to 
conceptual deficits. Some argue that lexical decision tasks do not in fact involve  
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semantic analysis and is therefore not the best tool to investigate comprehension 
difficulties  (Mahon  &  Caramazza,  2008).    More  sensitive  tasks  such  as  lexical 
decision with priming (Boulenger et al. 2008, Fernandino et al. 2012), or tasks that 
require  more  explicit  semantic  analysis  such  as  semantic  similarity  judgments 
(Fernandino et al. 2012), may be necessary. 
2.7  Summary 
There  is  now  a  broad  literature  providing  evidence  for  the  simulation  of  many 
semantic  features  across  different  methodologies.  Behavioural  experiments  that 
combine language with sensorimotor stimuli or tasks, as well as fMRI experiments 
that  measure  BOLD  response  during  word  and  sentence  presentation  have  found 
evidence  for  the  simulation  of  action,  visual,  auditory,  gustatory  and  olfactory 
features. At present, evidence exists for simulations when processing both words and 
sentences, yet a comparison between the nature of the two types of simulations has 
not been completed. Some initial evidence suggests that the temporal dynamics of 
the simulations may differ (Boulenger, et al., 2009). 
The simulations used in comprehension are not basic, schematic reenactments of 
experience, but are detailed and include a high level of specificity. Simulations are 
specific to the effector used in an action (Hauk et al., 2004), the muscles used in an 
action (Buccino et al, 2005; Gough et al., 2013), specificity of an action (van Dam et 
al., 2010) and the body and personal experience of the comprehender (Cassasanto, 
2009). 
Against  critical  views,  research  has  provided  strong  evidence  that  activations 
observed  across  experiments  are  due  to  mental  simulations  that  are  critical  to 
comprehension  and  not  the  result  of  post-comprehension  mental  imagery. 
Simulations have been shown to occur early (Kiefer et al., 2008; Hauk et al., 2008; 
Gough et al., 2013), even for language not consciously perceived (Boulenger et al., 
2008),  they  are  sensitive  to  lexical  frequency  (Hauk  et  al.,  2008)  and  cohort 
competitors (Revill et al., 2008) and have been shown to occur in separate brain 
areas  to  mental  imagery  (Willems  et  al.,  2010).  In  addition,  the  disruption  of 
sensorimotor regions with TMS (Pulvermüller et al., 2005; Cattaneo et al., 2010;  
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Cappa  et  al,  2002)  or  through  degenerative  disorders  (Neininger  &  Pulvermüller 
2003;  Bak  et  al.,  2001;  Boulenger  et  al.,  2008;  Fernandino  et  al.,  2012)  causes 
problems with the comprehension of language about similar sensorimotor features. 
In line with Barsalou, simulations are not fixed but appear to be flexible. Simulations 
are sensitive to factors such as depth of processing (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008), 
grammar  (Bergen  &  Wheeler,  2010)  and  literality  (Rueschemeyer  et  al.,  2007; 
Raposo et al., 2009), task (van Dam et al., 2012). 
This  chapter  has  provided  a  comprehensive  review  of  research  investigating 
embodied language processing and highlighted some key features in this evidence. 
This chapter serves at the foundations for the next chapter that specifically discusses 
the  domain  of  investigation  in  this  thesis  and  outlines  the  questions  to  be 
investigated. 
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Chapter 3  The Present Thesis 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  investigate  how  meaning  in  language  is  understood, 
specifically how language about speed is understood. I approach this topic from an 
embodied language framework, which posits that language comprehension involves 
the activation of relevant sensorimotor information and therefore uses some of the 
same neural systems as perception and action (as described in Chapters 1 and 2). In 
this chapter I introduce the topic of speed in language as well as time and space in 
language  (which  are  components  of  speed)  in  order  to  demonstrate  how  such 
domains can be simulated and introduce some relevant experimental paradigms. I 
then describe the putative neural mechanisms involved in perception of speed and in 
producing speeded actions that will be implicated in the mental simulation of speed. 
Finally I introduce the content of each experimental chapter and what the results can 
reveal about the mental simulation of speed. 
Previous research has provided support for embodiment of a number of features of 
action and perception, in addition to initial evidence for more abstract domains, as 
covered in Chapters 1 and 2. Speed is particularly interesting in this framework for 
several reasons. First, it integrates the dimensions of space and time, thus making it a 
more complex feature than those investigated so far. Speed is also a fine-grained 
dimension  of  an  event.  For  example,  when  perceiving  a  motion  event,  one  may 
simply perceive and encode that an object or agent is moving, and not automatically 
represent  its  speed  (unless  speed  becomes  relevant,  such  as  when  a  car  is 
approaching you). Speed may be even less relevant in language comprehension. For 
example to understand that an agent moved to a particular destination or along a 
particular route, one does not require a representation of the manner in which the 
motion  event  occurred  for  the  fundamental  meaning  of  the  sentence  to  be 
understood. From research evidence so far it is unclear how much information from 
an  event  is  contained  in  mental  simulations  (Sanford,  2008),  what  features  are 
included in a simulation or at what grain information is represented. Since language 
comprehension is often time-pressured and occurs in noisy environments it could be 
the case that only salient features of objects or events are included, such as object 
shape, and not more fine-grained features that we experience in our daily interactions 
with  the  world.    Since  speed  is  a  fine-grained  dimension,  it  may  not  be  salient  
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enough, or important enough, to be a necessary component of mental simulations. 
For example, to understand that “John went to the shop”, one may only need to 
simulate that there is an agent, a destination and a motion act, but not the manner, 
distance or duration of the motion event. The Immersed Experiencer Framework 
(Zwaan, 2003) and Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (Barsalou, 1999a) propose 
that mental simulations are schematic and do not contain all aspects of an event. Like 
real-world perception, attentional constraints limit how much information is attended 
to (e.g. Simons & Levin, 1997). Despite this schematicity, embodied theories still 
allow  for  finer  grained  distinctions  in  meaning  than  amodal  theories  do  (e.g. 
Stanfield  &  Zwaan  (2001):  orientation,  Winter  &  Bergen  (2012):  distance). 
However,  it  is  still  unclear  at  what  grain  information  is  represented  in  mental 
simulations and how closely they correspond to real world experience. Investigating 
the  mental  simulation  of  speed  in  language  can  therefore  help  to  address  these 
questions. 
Before  describing  the  specific  research  questions  of  the  thesis,  I  will  briefly 
summarize what is known so far about the contribution of perception and action 
systems to the comprehension of language about space, time (components of speed) 
and  speed.  This  will  introduce  ways  in  which  less  tangible  domains  can  be 
investigated: the types of questions that can be asked and the experimental paradigms 
that can address them, providing a foundation for the experimental chapters to come. 
I will then briefly discuss how speed in perception and action is represented in the 
brain, which will point to potential systems recruited in the simulation of speed. 
3.1  Time, space and speed in language 
Time, space and speed are domains that are relatively abstract in comparison to other 
domains such as colour and texture. We do not directly perceive them but infer them 
via other referents. Time needs a person to experience it, or it can be measured using 
a clock, but it does not exist without them. Space needs land or buildings or people 
for it to be defined. And speed needs the motion of an object. However, although we 
cannot really point to them, photograph them, or hold them, we do experience them 
all the time and we can measure them.  
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These domains are integral to our everyday lives and necessary in communication. 
Our entire day is organized around time: we are aware of what time we get out of 
bed, how long the work commute is, when our first meeting is and how long it will 
last.  Time  is  always  on  our  mind  and  thus  always  present  in  our  topics  of 
communication. Space is just as important: we need to know where we left the car 
keys,  how  far  the  walk  to  the  venue  is  or  from  what  platform  the  train  leaves. 
Moreover, space is often described in language to direct other people to locations and 
objects and is thus very often mentioned in sentences. Speed may be less salient in 
our daily activities than space and time but still important in our interactions: for 
example, we might perceive that the train is pulling into the station extremely slowly, 
we might have to run to work quickly or cannot cross the road because a car is 
driving too fast. 
The significance of each domain in our daily interactions suggests that they are often 
discussed in language and therefore their meaning needs to be salient and understood 
correctly. The successful comprehension of language about time, space and speed is 
particularly  critical  since  the  tracking  of  these  domains  can  have  important 
consequences (e.g. being late, walking into a large object or crossing a road in time).  
Time is by far the most abstract of the three domains. Unlike speed and space, time 
cannot be directly perceived with the senses, so it is difficult to predict how it can be 
embodied in our perceptual systems during language comprehension. One way for 
time to be embodied is through metaphor (Boroditsky, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980, 1999). Time can be grounded in our perceptions of space and motion. These 
metaphors are extremely prevalent in our everyday talk of time. Examples include 
‘The  afternoon  raced  by’,  ‘Ski  season  is  approaching’,  ‘She  has  a  bright  future 
ahead of her’ (Nunez & Cooperrider, 2013). Sell and Kaschak (2011) tested whether 
time shifts in comprehension are represented spatially. Participants read sentences 
that described past and future events and had to make sensibility judgments (does the 
sentence make sense?). They responded by either moving towards or away from the 
body to press a button, or by pressing buttons that were towards or away from the 
body without moving. Responses to sentences describing future events were faster 
when participants had to respond away from the body compared to towards the body,  
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and vice versa for sentences describing the past, but only when moving to give the 
response and only for long time shifts (e.g. a month). Thus, the concept of time is 
grounded in the simulation of motion towards and away from the body. 
Evidence  shows  that  temporal  information  is  represented  during  discourse 
comprehension in the construction of a situation model (simulation) of the described 
event  (Zwaan,  1996;  Anderson,  Garrod  &  Sanford,  1983).  Zwaan  (1996) 
manipulated the chronological distance between two described events to be short or 
long (e.g. a moment later vs. an hour later). Sentence reading time was found to be 
longer for greater narrative time shifts. Moreover, information from a previous event 
was more difficult to access when it was followed by a shift in time compared to 
when it was not. This suggests that the representations of the two events in memory 
are more strongly connected when they are not separated by a time shift.  
Anderson et al. (2008) found that manipulating simple morphological information 
could change the duration of a simulated event. Participants’ task was to place a 
character in the appropriate place in a scene according to the meaning of a presented 
sentence. Participants placed the character closer to the beginning of a to-be-used 
path and had longer mouse movement durations in completing the task when they 
heard a sentence with a past progressive (e.g. “Tom was jogging to the woods and 
then stretched when he got there”) than a simple past tense (e.g. “Tom jogged to the 
woods and then stretched when he got there”). Thus, grammatical aspect influenced 
how the event was simulated; with a past progressive the event was seen as on going 
in comparison to a simple past tense where the event was seen as completed. Since 
the event was construed as on going the simulation was longer. 
It is now well-accepted that language drives attention to spaces in the world, thus 
meaning in language must be grounded in our spatial representations of the world. 
Spatial language is thought to activate perceptual simulations that reflect the typical 
relations  between  objects  (Coventry,  Lynott,  Cangelosi,  Monrouxe,  Joyce  & 
Richardson,  2010).  Early  studies  demonstrated  that  eye-movements  towards 
reference objects are time-locked to incoming linguistic information (e.g. Allopenna, 
Magnuson & Tanenhaus, 1998). Features of motion can also be part of the perceptual 
simulations occurring during comprehension of spatial language. For example, it has  
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been  shown  that  when  mapping  a  spatial  expression  to  a  visual  scene,  eye 
movements  reflect  motion  characteristics  if  the  described  spatial  configuration 
suggests motion: when viewing an image of a cereal box over a breakfast bowl and 
hearing a sentence such as “The box is above the bowl”, participants spend more time 
looking at an area of the scene consistent with the direction in which the cereal will 
fall  from  the  box  (Coventry  et  al  2010).  Spatial  information  in  language  directs 
attention to relevant spaces even in the absence of a visual scene: Spivey & Geng 
(2000) found that when participants listened to narratives describing movement in a 
certain direction, eye gaze was focused more on the corresponding area of a blank 
screen. 
Spatial  information  is  also  activated  in  single  word  comprehension  (Zwaan  & 
Yaxley, 2003; Estes, Verges & Barsalou, 2008; Dudschig, Lachmair, de la Vega, de 
Filippis & Kaup, 2012). Zwaan & Yaxley (2003) found participants were faster to 
decide if two words were related if they were displayed in a spatial configuration that 
matched how the referents would appear in the world (for example ‘attic’ above 
‘basement’)  compared  to  the  opposite  configuration  (‘basement’  above  ‘attic’). 
Reading the words activated the spatial features of the objects and hence facilitated 
responses when the spatial location of the words on the screen matched them. When 
the word pairs were presented horizontally, no differences were found, ruling out any 
explanation  of  the  results  based  on  word  order.  Dudschig  et  al.  (2012)  similarly 
presented participants with nouns that did not explicitly convey spatial information 
in their meaning but whose referents are typically found to be high or low in the 
environment  (e.g.  cloud  vs.  shoe).  Four  seconds  after  word  presentation  a  visual 
target (a filled white box) was presented above or below the central fixation and 
participants had to detect its presence. Target detection was significantly faster when 
the location of the target matched the location of the referent’s typical location (e.g. 
target presented above fixation after the word cloud). Thus, although the word was 
irrelevant  to  the  task,  its  spatial  meaning  affected  attention  on  the  vertical  axis.  
Although spatial features of a word’s referent have been shown to facilitate target 
detection,  elsewhere  they  have  hindered  target  identification  (Estes  et  al.,  2008). 
Estes et al. (2008) similarly presented nouns denoting objects with typical locations 
in the centre of the screen followed by a target above or below fixation, but instead  
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of simply detecting the target participants were required to identify whether it was 
the letter X or O. Now performance on the task was worse when the referent of a 
word’s typical location matched the location of the target. The words oriented spatial 
attention, as before, but now the perceptual simulations generated for the words’ 
referents  interfered  with  the  identification  of  the  target  letter.  Thus  activation  of 
spatial features from single words may assist or hinder a subsequent perceptual task 
depending upon whether the task requires detection or identification. 
Speed has so far been fairly neglected in the investigation of embodiment, however a 
small number of studies exist that suggest that speed information is simulated during 
comprehension.  Fecica  &  O’Neill  (2010)  investigated  the  simulation  of  speed  in 
short narratives. Children listened to narratives one sentence at a time by pressing a 
mouse button. The narratives described the journey of a young boy to his aunt’s 
house. Critically, the duration of the journey was manipulated by introducing the 
character  as  taking  his  journey  either  by  walking  (slow  motion)  or  by  car  (fast 
motion).    Children  were  found  to  take  significantly  longer  understanding  the 
sentences  when  the  character  was  described  as  walking  compared  to  driving. 
Additionally,  when  a  psychological  factor  of  the  characters  was  manipulated, 
processing times were longer when the character was described as being less eager to 
take the journey compared to when they were eager (e.g. going to the dentist opposed 
to  buying  ice-cream).  Thus  comprehenders  are  able  to  use  knowledge  about  the 
duration of events based on speed information inferred from the method of transport 
or motivation of the character, and take longer to simulate events that are typically 
slower. Related, Anderson, Matlock & Spivey (2010) found that the described terrain 
of a character’s journey (hard or easy) affected the duration of a simulation. After to 
listening  to  sentences  describing  a  journey  (e.g.  “The road to the university was 
rocky and bumpy” vs. “The road to the university was level and clear”), participants 
had to place a character in a corresponding visual scene and their mouse movements 
were tracked. Duration of mouse movements was found to be longer when the terrain 
of the journey was described as hard compared to easy (but only for past progressive 
sentences) reflecting how real-world movement would be slowed by difficult terrain.  
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3.1.1   Summary 
This brief summary of work investigating time, space and speed in language has 
demonstrated  how  less  tangible  domains  can  be  investigated  from  a  simulation 
perspective. Simple reading or processing time can be used to assess the duration of 
mental simulations (Anderson et al., 1983; Zwaan, 1996; Fecica & O’Neill, 2010), 
which should differ between events of different speeds. Measuring eye-movements 
during comprehension allows the tracking of spatial and motion features that are 
simulated  (Allopenna  et  al.,  1998;  Coventry  et  al.,  2010),  both  of  which  are 
necessary in the simulation of speed.  Another method of assessing simulation is by 
combining sensorimotor processing (e.g. action or spatial information) with language 
about the same sensorimotor information (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003; Sell & Kaschak, 
2011).  If  simulation  takes  place  in  systems  of  the  brain  used  in  sensorimotor 
processing then the combination should affect language comprehension. Moreover, 
the  effect  should  be  bidirectional,  with  language  affecting  judgments  in  other 
domains  (Estes  et  al.,  2008;  Dudschig  et  al.,  2012)  including  target  detection 
(Duschig et al., 2012) and identification (Estes et al., 2008). 
3.2  Speed in the brain 
In order to investigate the representation of speed in language, it is important to 
consider how speed of motion and action is processed in the brain so that we can 
predict the mechanisms used in speed simulations during comprehension. Speed can 
be defined and processed in two fundamental but different ways. The speed of an 
object in motion can be perceived and the speed of one’s own motor movement can 
be planned and executed (as well as perceived). One process involves perception and 
the other motor planning.  
A large distributed network of neurons in the cortex is involved in the processing of 
a moving stimulus. In comparison to the encoding of direction of motion in the 
visual  cortex,  much  less  is  known  about  the  encoding  of  speed.  However,  the 
mechanisms  underlying  both  are  thought  to  be  quite  similar  (Watamanivik  & 
Duchan, 1991). Neurons encoding speed fire maximally for a stimulus at optimal 
speeds and speed is inferred by converting the response of a large population of  
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neurons into a population code (Priebe & Lisberger, 2004). Firing rates to motion far 
from the optimal speed are significantly diminished (Maunsell & Essen, 1983). 
There  have  been  reports  of  speed  processing  in  a  number  of  areas  of  the  visual 
cortex. Research into visual processing in the macaque suggests that 25% to 61% of 
cells in area MT are tuned for speed (Perrone & Thiele, 2001, Priebe, Cassanello & 
Lisberger,  2003).    Recent  research  suggests  that  the  human  MT/V5  is  similarly 
composed of a majority of speed-tuned neurons, as is V1, but to a lesser extent 
(although  this  has  not  been  reported  consistently).  In  an  fMRI  study,  Lingnau, 
Ashida,  Wall  and  Smith  (2009)  presented  participants  with  drifting  sine  wave 
gratings dominated either by speed or temporal frequency and investigated whether 
responses  weakened  with  repetition.  Results  suggested  dominance  for  speed 
encoding in all visual areas but with weaker effects in earlier areas. A similar result 
has been found using single pulse TMS (Matthews, Luber, Qian & Lisanty, 2001). 
Whilst  subjects  made  speed  and  direction  judgments  they  were  stimulated  both 
medially and laterally to disrupt areas V1 and the hMT+/V5, respectively. Speed 
discrimination was significantly affected at both stimulation sites but more so for the 
medial location (V1). Using rTMS, McKeefry, Burton, Vakrou, Barret and Moorland 
(2008) similarly found the stimulation of hMT+/V5, as well as V3A, to disrupt speed 
processing but found no effects when stimulating V1.  It has been suggested that 
speed  tuning  is  first  generated  in  V1  with  later  feedforward  connections  to  MT 
(Priebe & Lisberger, 2004), however McKeefry et al. (2008) proposes that V1 may 
not crucially contribute to speed processing and motion signals may bypass V1 via 
the  lateral  geniculate  nucleus  (LGN)  directly  to  MT.  Studies  with  patients  have 
shown that deficits in the perception of speed of moving objects (akinetopsia) occur 
with lesions in area hMT+/V5 (Barton, 2011), and transient akinetopsia has been 
demonstrated  with  TMS  of  area  hMT+/V5  (Beckers  &  Homberg,  1992).  In 
comparison to the other studies described however, these studies measure deficits 
according  to  subjective  experience,  rather  than  psychophysical  measurements. 
Processing speed in the auditory cortex, although less well understood is thought to 
mirror that of the visual cortex. For example, in the primary auditory cortex of the 
cat, it has been shown that half of the cells are tuned for speed (Poirier, Jianng, 
Lepore & Guillemot, 1997).  
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The  cerebellum  has  been  shown  to  be  involved  in  the  control  of  speed  of  limb 
movements  (Roitman,  Pasalar,  Johnson  &  Ebner,  2005).  More  specifically,  the 
cerebellum represents the timing between successive events (Ivry & Spencer, 2004). 
Patients  with  lesions  to  the  cerebellum  have  difficulty  with  the  timing  of  motor 
events but are less impaired with smooth and continuous movement (Ivry & Spencer, 
2004). The timing mechanism of the cerebellum is thought to extend beyond motor 
events to perception as well: patients with damage to the cerebellum are impaired in 
making velocity judgments but not position judgments about a visual stimulus (Ivry 
& Diener, 1991). The supplementary motor area (SMA) is also involved in motor 
activity with patients with bilateral SMA lesions experiencing akinesia and difficulty 
with spontaneous movement. Further, stimulation of the SMA results in the urge to 
move and firing rates of neurons in the SMA are inversely correlated with speed of 
hand movements (firing rate decreases as speed increases) (Tankus, Yeshurun, Flash 
& Fried, 2009).  The basal ganglia may similarly be important for the timing of 
movement,  as  suggested  by  patients  with  Parkinson’s  disease  (PD).  PD  is  a 
neurodegenerative disease cause by a deficiency in the dopaminergic pathway from 
the  basal  ganglia  leading  to  reduced  activation  in  brain  areas  involved  in  motor 
planning and execution. PD patients are characterized by a range of motor problems 
including bradykinesia (slowness of movement) and rigidity.  
To summarize, a large part of the visual cortex is tuned to process speed of motion, 
although some discrepancies between studies exist in terms of whether this includes 
early  stages  of  processing  (e.g.  McKeefry  et  al.,  2008).  It  is  assumed  that  the 
processing of visual speed is mirrored in the auditory cortex for auditory speed. In 
terms of producing fast and slow movements, the cerebellum and basal ganglia are 
likely to be critical, both having roles in timing information, and the SMA plays an 
important part in producing movements at different speeds. 
The  work  described  in  this  thesis  aims  to  test  whether  understanding  speed  in 
language involves similar processes to understanding speed in the world and occurs 
via  mental  simulation.  When  comprehending  language  describing  perceptual  or 
motor aspects of speed, I expect that parts of the systems described above will be 
recruited  in  service  of  comprehension.  My  experiments  test  the  proposed  link  
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between speed in language and speed in action and perception and attempt to reveal 
the  underlying  mechanisms  and  the  nature  of  this  relationship  by  combining 
language about speed with various conditions in which speed of action or perceptual 
stimuli is manipulated.  
3.3  Description of experimental chapters 
The  following  experimental  chapters  set  out  to  find  evidence  for  the  mental 
simulation of speed in the comprehension of language that describes speed.  Using 
different linguistic types (i.e. words and sentences) I can test to what extent the 
presence and nature of speed simulations differs for different linguistic contexts. For 
example, Bergen et al. (2007) argue that mental simulations develop only when the 
meanings of single words are integrated into a larger sentence structure and not for 
lexical associations of words alone.  However, other studies (reviewed in Chapter 2) 
have  shown  that  interactions  between  language  and  perception/action  can  be 
observed  when  processing  single  words  as  well.  In  addition,  using  a  range  of 
experimental paradigms and testing different subject populations provides a thorough 
investigation of the simulation of speed in language and the potential to define any 
factors (such as contextual factors) that influence the simulation of speed. Note that 
throughout the investigation, I will be using the term ‘simulation’ synonymously 
with  all  types  of  modality-specific  activations.  Some  researchers  may  be  of  the 
opinion  that  ‘simulation’  only  applies  to  the  meaning  of  events  (i.e.  evoked  by 
sentences)  where  activations  from  individual  referents  of  words  are  integrated 
together.  Activations  to  single  words  could  be  more  appropriately  considered  as 
partial  simulations.  Here,  the  term  ‘simulation’  refers  to  all  modality-specific 
activations in response to linguistic stimuli.  Below I describe each experimental 
chapter including a summary of the paradigms used and the fundamental research 
aims. 
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3.3.1  The influence of perceptual processing on speed word comprehension 
(Chapter 4) 
 
If understanding words about speed requires the use of systems involved in real-
world  perception  of  speed,  then  combining  speed  words  with  speed  perception 
should affect processing of those words to some extent. Based on this prediction, the 
experiments  in  this  chapter  combine  perceptual  speed  of  different  modalities 
(auditory and visual) with a task on speed word comprehension (lexical decision 
task). These experiments investigate whether speed simulation can be found in single 
word comprehension, without any sentence context. In addition, by using perceptual 
stimuli of different modalities I can assess to what extent mental simulations for 
speed are multimodal, reflecting the importance of those modalities in real world 
perception.  Further,  I  manipulate  the  modality  in  which  the  verbal  stimuli  are 
presented: as spoken or written words.  With this manipulation I can test whether the 
modality of perceptual stimulus and the modality of the linguistic stimulus affect the 
nature of mental simulations. Finally, by using perceptual speed stimuli that are more 
or less related to real-world sounds (for example, abstract sounds like white noise, or 
real-world  sounds  like  footsteps)  I  can  test  whether  speed  simulations  include 
information about specific agents in motion or if instead whether speed information 
is abstracted away from an agent. 
3.3.2  The influence of speed words on perceptual processing (Chapter 5) 
If the combination of perceptual speed and speed words affects comprehension of 
speed words, then the converse should also be true: comprehending speed words 
should  affect  the  perception  of  speed.  To  investigate  the  two-way  relationship 
between  speed  word  processing  and  processing  perceptual  speed,  this  chapter 
investigates whether listening to speed verbs affects how visual speed is perceived. 
Using a psychophysical task I test the effect of listening to fast and slow speed words 
on psychophysical measures of speed discrimination for visual stimuli moving at 
different  speeds.  Participants  listened  to  spoken  speed  words  while  completing  a 
visual speed discrimination task in which they judged whether moving sine wave 
gratings  were  moving  faster  or  slower  than  a  standard  moving  grating.  Speed  
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discrimination threshold (how easy it is to discriminate between different speeds), 
point of subject equality (perceived speed of the standard) and reaction time were 
measured. Effects of speed words on measures of speed discrimination threshold 
would suggest that the interaction between speed in language and speed in visual 
perception is occurring at low levels of perception. If instead effects are observed in 
point of subjective equality, the interaction would take place at levels of bias. By 
using this psychophysical paradigm I can test the boundaries of embodied effects for 
speed language, assessing at what level of perception speed simulations occur. 
3.3.3  The influence of speeded actions and perceptual speed on 
comprehending sentences about fast and slow events (Chapter 6) 
The experiments in this chapter follow the rationale of those of Chapter 4 and test 
whether  sensorimotor  speed  can  affect  comprehension,  focusing  now  on 
comprehension of sentences about speed. The first experiment manipulates auditory 
speed and the second manipulates speed of action. By adding a motor component to 
the investigation  I assess whether moving quickly or slowly affects responses to 
sentences  about  fast  and  slow  motion.  Further,  the  sentences  used  here  assess 
simulations  for  sentences  about  both  fast  and  slow  full-body  actions  as  well  as 
sentences about fast and slow actions performed with the hands. This means I can 
test the specificity of the effect of perceptual speed and speed of action on sentence 
comprehension (i.e. whether or not the simulation includes information about the 
effectors used in the actions). This chapter also adds to the investigation by assessing 
speed in both verbs and adverbs. Verbs and adverbs occur at different points in a 
sentence  which  means  that  speed  information  is  accessed  at  different  points:  for 
verbs,  speed  is  tied  to  the  action  in  the  same  word,  however  for  adverbs,  speed 
information is separate to and comes before the verb of action. Thus, the nature of 
speed simulations when speed is encoded in a verb versus an adverb may differ. 
3.3.4  Eye movements and the mental simulation of speed in sentences 
(Chapter 7) 
This chapter investigates the mental simulation of speed in sentences that describe 
fast and slow motion with verbs and adverbs, by measuring eye movements during 
comprehension. Spoken sentences were presented to participants whilst they viewed 
a  visual  scene  that  contained  agents  and  destinations  that  were  described  in  a  
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sentence.  Eye-movements  towards  these  visual  images  were  measured  during 
sentence  processing.  This  paradigm  allows  mental  simulation  to  be  monitored  in 
real-time  and  in  a  more  natural  language  setting  than  the  previous  sentence 
experiments described in Chapter 6. That is, mental simulation is not measured using 
an  additional  task  or  judgment  about  the  sentences  nor  by  combining  sentence 
processing  with  other  stimuli  in  order  to  produce  interference/facilitation: 
participants simply comprehend the sentences naturally. Further, by manipulating the 
speaking rate of the presented sentences (fast or slow), and components of the visual 
scene  (whether  or  not  distractor  destinations  are  present),  I  assess  the  effect  of 
context on speed simulation.  
3.3.5  Is speed processing in language affected by deficits in the motor system? 
(Chapter 8) 
A crucial test of an embodied theory of speed is to test whether individuals with 
impairments  in  processing  speed  or  who  have  movement  disorders  also  have 
difficulty  understanding  speed  in  language.    This  final  chapter  investigates  the 
comprehension  of  speed  language  in  patients  diagnosed  with  Parkinson’s  disease 
(PD). Experiments use a range of language related to speed, including speed verbs 
and adverbs, as well as abstract verbs and adverbs, and address comprehension of 
speed language at various depths of processing (lexical decision, sentence sensibility 
judgments and semantic similarity judgments). Patients’ performance is compared 
with control subjects. Based on the patients’ motor deficits, the embodied approach 
would  predict  that  they  would  have  more  difficulty  processing  all  action  verbs 
relative  to  abstract  verbs  and  more  difficulty  processing  words  that  describe  fast 
speed  compared  to  words  that  describe  slow  speed,  because  they  have  greatest 
difficulty in moving quickly. There should be no difference between word types for 
control participants. A disembodied approach would predict no such differences. 
3.3.6  Summary of chapters 
The  research  questions  outlined  above  enable  a  full  investigation  of  the  mental 
simulation of speed during comprehension. Throughout the chapters, the issues in 
embodied  research  that  were  raised  in  Chapter  2  (features,  specificity,  mental 
imagery versus mental simulation, and context) are addressed. By investigating the  
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simulation  of  speed  I  am  exploring  a  fairly  neglected  feature  in  terms  of 
embodiment, a feature that is more fine-grained than most in the literature.  Looking 
at  speed  also  sheds  light  on  the  question  of  specificity  in  simulations:  speed 
information  is  not  crucial  to  understand  an  event  such  as  an  agent  moving  to  a 
destination, but for a simulation to accurately reflect real-world experience it should 
include this level of detail. Within the chapters I also explore speeded actions with 
both  the  whole  body  and  with  only  the  hands/arms  and  test  whether  or  not  the 
difference  in  effector  is  encoded  in  the  simulation  of  speed.  I  also  manipulate  a 
variety of contexts, including linguistic type, match in modality of perceptual and 
verbal  stimuli,  components  of  a  supporting  visual  scene  and  speaking  rate  of 
presented sentences, and assess how these manipulations affect the nature of any 
observed simulations. I also add to the debate between mental imagery and mental 
simulation by using eye-tracking and a task that does not require explicit judgments 
about  the  linguistic  stimuli  (and  therefore  unlikely  to  produce  imagery  effects). 
Finally, by testing comprehension of speed in language in PD, I assess whether or 
not speed simulation of actions is critical to comprehension of speed language. 
3.4  Conclusion 
The main aims of the experimental work in this thesis have been discussed and the 
planned experiments described. Overall, the work in this thesis adds to embodied 
investigations  by  addressing  a  more  fine-grained  feature  of  events,  exploring  the 
specificity  of  speed  simulations,  assessing  the  effect  of  a  number  of  contextual 
factors on speed simulation and finally, providing a crucial test of the embodiment of 
speed  by  assessing  comprehension  of  speed  in  language  in  patients  with  PD. 
Evidence from language about time and space suggest that speed simulations can be 
observed  in  reaction  times  for  comprehension  tasks  and  target  detection  and 
identification tasks as well as in eye-movements that are observed during sentence 
comprehension.  I have briefly summarized evidence for the neural systems involved 
in the perception of speed and production of speeded actions. Parts of these systems 
should therefore be recruited in the simulation of speed. The remaining chapters of 
the thesis focus on the experimental investigation.  
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Chapter 4  Perceptual speed and lexical decision 
In this chapter I test the embodiment of speed in single speed verbs.  I chose to 
investigate speed verbs that denote fast or slow full-body movements (e.g. dash, 
amble) using an experimental paradigm that combines speeded perceptual stimuli 
(fast and slow) with a task that assesses comprehension of single words: a lexical 
decision task. In this task, participants are presented with single words and nonwords 
and have to decide if they are real words or not. Lexical decision is sensitive to a 
number of semantic variables including number of senses, imageability and body-
object interaction (Yap, Pexman, Wellsby, Hargreaves & Huff, 2012) and should 
therefore be sensitive enough to reveal speed simulations. Further, this task does not 
require explicit access to the semantic variable of interest (i.e. speed) in order for a 
response to be made. That is, the judgments that participants make do not relate to 
speed  or  motion.  This  point  is  important  to  show  that  mental  simulation  is  an 
automatic component of natural comprehension, rather than the result of conscious 
mental imagery or task-specific strategies (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). 
Participants were presented with a fast or slow perceptual stimulus followed by a 
word  or  nonword  to  which  they  had  to  respond.  If  understanding  speed  verbs 
requires  processes  shared  with  speed  perception,  then  presenting  speed  words 
immediately  after  speeded  perceptual  stimuli  should  affect  responses.  If  the 
mechanisms used to process the perceptual stimuli are active at the same time as, or 
immediately  before  they  are  required  to  process  the  words  then  there  are  two 
possibilities. First, since activation is currently devoted to processing the perceptual 
stimuli then there may be few resources available to process the words. The lack of 
resources would lead to deficient word processing (interference between perception 
and  comprehension).  Alternatively,  the  active  or  partially  active  state  of  the 
perceptual  regions  may  boost  processing  of  the  word,  leading  to  faster  word 
responses (facilitation).  
Similar paradigms have been used elsewhere for direction language (Meteyard et al., 
2008, Kaschak, Madden, Therriault, Yaxley, Aveyard, Blanchard & Zwaan, 2005;  
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Kaschak et al., 2006). Response time for lexical decisions to direction verbs was 
hindered  when  participants  concurrently  perceived  visual  motion  of  a  matching 
direction at near threshold levels (Meteyard et al., 2008), suggesting processes used 
in visual direction perception and direction verb comprehension overlap. Kaschak et 
al. (2005) describe a set of studies in which participants read or listened to sentences 
that described motion in a particular direction at the same time as viewing a dynamic 
visual  display  or  hearing  a  directional  motion  stimulus  (moving  white  noise). 
Facilitation effects were found for congruent conditions (the direction of the visual 
stimulus and the sentence matched) when the modality of the perceptual stimulus and 
the modality of sentence presentation matched. When the two modalities did not 
match responses were slower for congruent items. One account of the existence of 
both facilitation and interference effects is in terms of perceptual attention (Connell 
& Lynott, 2012b). Since the perceptual and attentional systems are strongly related, 
the amount of attention recruited by a perceptual stimulus is thought to influence the 
perceptual simulation process. For example, if visual attention is strongly occupied 
by a moving visual stimulus then there will be few attentional resources available for 
a visual simulation, leading to an interference effect. On the other hand, if a visual 
stimulus merely directed visual attention but did not continue to occupy it, it would 
lead  to  a  facilitation  of  the  simulation.  According  to  an  attentional  explanation 
(Connell  &  Lynott,  2012b),  in  the  present  studies,  facilitation  effects  would  be 
predicted  because  the  perceptual  stimuli  occur  before  the  linguistic  stimuli,  and 
therefore would not occupy attention during simulation. 
As well as testing the simulation of speed in single words, the experiments here have 
two further aims regarding the perceptual modalities used in speed simulations and 
the importance of the modality of presentation in the task, as described below. 
4.1  Multimodal simulation 
If  understanding  words  activates  sensorimotor  information  gained  through 
experience, then a single word should produce activations across multiple modalities 
such as visual, auditory and action features, because these modalities work together  
     
 
102 
continually  through  everyday  experience.  Real-world  perception  involves  the 
integration  of  multiple  sources  of  sensory  information  (Burr  &  Alais,  2006)  and 
mental  simulation  can  re-enact  any  perceptual  aspects  of  experience  distributed 
throughout modality specific areas of the brain (Barsalou, 1999a).  For example, the 
experience of the concept car is likely to include the visual experience of seeing a car 
drive along a road from different perspectives, the auditory experience of hearing a 
car driving (e.g. engine revving, horn beeping) and the action of steering the wheel or 
pressing on the clutch. The concept could include less prominent modalities like 
olfaction, such as the smell of petrol or the smell of the inside of the car, and tactile 
information like a rush of air as a car drives past. Since speed in the real world is 
experienced in multiple modalities, mental simulations of speed should also involve 
multiple modalities. Previous work addressing mental simulation tends to focus on a 
single modality within one experiment (e.g. Meteyard et al., 2008) and the literature 
appears to focus heavily on the visual modality. One study tested the multimodality 
of simulations in sentences using a sentence-picture matching task and a sentence-
sound matching task and found that simulations of spatial distance could be both 
visual and auditory (Winter & Bergen, 2012). For example, participants were faster 
to respond to a picture of a small milk bottle than a large milk bottle after reading the 
sentence “You are looking at the milk bottle across the supermarket” and faster to 
respond to a loud noise than a quiet noise after reading the sentence “Right next to 
you someone fires a handgun”.  However, the sentences only highlighted a visual or 
auditory  feature,  rather  than  using  a  single  sentence  to  address  the  role  of  both 
modalities. Thus a further aim of the work in this chapter is to explore how single 
words produce activations in multiple modalities. This question tests whether mental 
simulations  reflect  real-world  experience  to  the  same  level  of  detail.  Here  no 
particular  modality  of  word  meaning  is  highlighted  because  participants  are 
presented with a single word with no sentence context.  
I chose to investigate speed in the visual and auditory modalities because they are 
simple to produce in an experimental setting and intuitively appear to be the most 
important modalities in real-world speed perception. There may be differences in  
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how visual and auditory information contribute to the meaning of speed words based 
on the preponderance of each modality in real-world experience. For example, the 
meaning of a word like tree is likely to be highly dominated by the visual modality 
because it is typically the only way that we interact with trees (unless we climb them, 
cut them etc.).  Perceptual dominance has been shown to be an important predictor of 
word processing (Connell & Lynott, 2012a). It is possible that the meaning of most 
words  is  dominated  by  visual  information  since  we  live  in  a  visually  rich 
environment (Connell & Lynott, 2014). This is reflected in language itself, which 
encodes more visual distinctions than auditory: an analysis of noun concepts found 
eight  times  as  many  visually  dominant  concepts  as  auditorily  dominant  concepts 
(Lynott  &  Connell,  2013).  Looking  to  research  in  perception  there  are  many 
examples of visual dominance over other modalities (Colavita, 1974). When two 
modalities are in conflict, visual information dominates (Gibson, 1933). Well-known 
effects  of  this  include  the  ventriloquism  effect  (Howard  &  Templeton,  1966)  in 
which  speech  sounds  are  attributed  to  a  different  spatial  location  that  contains  a 
moving puppet, and the McGurk effect (McGurk & Donald, 1976) where mouth 
shape of a speaker affects what sounds are heard. These effects are explained by 
greater  spatial  acuity  for  vision  than  audition.  There  are  exceptions  though,  for 
example,  although  vision  dominates  for  spatial  discrimination  audition  has  been 
shown  to  dominate  for  temporal  estimates  (Recanzone,  2003)  due  to  its  greater 
temporal acuity. Since speed includes both spatial and temporal information it is 
possible that vision and audition are recruited to a similar extent in its representation. 
4.2  The role of perceptual and verbal modality 
Another aim of the experiments in this chapter is to test whether the modality of 
perceptual stimulus and the modality of the linguistic stimulus affect the nature of 
mental simulations. Connell & Lynott (2014) found that for words presented visually 
in a lexical decision task and reading-aloud task, processing of words with strong 
visual  associations  (e.g.  cloudy)  was  facilitated,  because  visual  attention  was 
engaged. Words with strong auditory associations (e.g. noisy) were facilitated only 
for the reading-aloud task, which engaged auditory attention (in addition to visual  
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attention).  The  type  of  perceptual  attention  engaged  by  the  task  interacted  with 
perceptual information in the meaning of a word, affecting how efficiently the word 
was processed. In the present case, via a similar process of perceptual preactivation 
(Connel  &  Lynott,  2014),  the  type  of  attention  directed  to  the  perceptual  speed 
stimulus and the speed words might affect the mental simulation of speed. Directing 
attention to the visual modality through a visual speed stimulus may facilitate the 
processing of visual words. This match in modality would lead to greater overlap of 
activation from the perceptual stimulus and the speed word than when the modalities 
mismatch, possibly leading to greater interaction between the two stimuli. It could be 
predicted then that an interaction between perceptual speed and word speed will be 
observed  only  when  the  two  modalities  match,  but  not  when  they  mismatch.  Or 
alternatively,  the  direction  of  interaction  will  differ  between  matching  and 
mismatching modality, as in Kaschak et al. (2005) (see section 2.2.4 for a discussion 
about direction of effects). 
To  summarize,  the  following  experiments  investigate  the  simulation  of  speed  in 
single speed verbs. By combining perceptual speed with speed words in a lexical 
decision task one can assess whether comprehension of speed verbs shares resources 
with  real-world  speed  perception.  This  paradigm  will  reveal  any  behavioural 
consequences of interactions at the neural level. Both the modality of the perceptual 
stimuli and the modality of the word stimuli are manipulated in order to test firstly 
whether and to what extent speed simulations are multimodal and secondly, whether 
the  modality  of  word  presentation  interacts  with  the  modality  of  the  perceptual 
stimulus. An embodied account of the comprehension of speed in language predicts 
an  interaction  between  speed  of  perceptual  stimulus  and  word  speed  such  that 
response time will be different when the speeds match compared to when they do not 
match.  Research  suggests  this  interaction  may  differ  depending  on  the  match  in 
modality between perceptual and verbal stimuli (Connell & Lynott, 2014). Finally, if 
perceptual  modalities  differentially  contribute  to  real-world  perception  of  speed, 
differences in the nature of the interaction when using perceptual stimuli of different 
modalities  (visual or auditory) could be expected.  
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4.3  Experiment 4-1: No perceptual stimuli 
Before testing the interaction of perceptual speed with speed words, I ran a simple 
lexical decision task, presenting speed verbs alone. This was to ascertain whether 
there were any inherent differences in processing fast and slow verbs, establishing a 
baseline for the further experiments. If to understand the meaning of speed verbs 
involves mental simulation, then response time to slow verbs may be slower than 
response  time  to  fast  words,  because  slow  action  takes  longer  to  unfold.  No 
differences in accuracy would be expected. 
4.3.1  Method 
4.3.1.1  Participants 
30
1 participants (17 female)
2 were recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool 
to take part in the experiment. 4 participants were removed for having low overall 
accuracy (<80%). 
4.3.1.2  Material 
4.3.1.2.1  Norming 
70  verbs  of  motion  were  chosen  to  be  included  in  the  norming  study  based  on 
experimenter intuition and using an online dictionary and thesaurus. 20 participants 
conducted the norming task after completing an unrelated norming task for another 
experimenter,  in  a  testing  booth  (demographics  for  these  participants  were 
misplaced, however the participants were taken from the UCL participant pool, of 
which the majority are university students). The norming task was located online in 
the  form  of  a  Google  survey.  Two  versions  of  the  survey  were  created  with  a 
different  random  order  of  items.  Participants  viewed  verbs  in  past  tense  form, 
(because I also intended to use them in the sentences of the experiments in Chapter 
8) and were instructed to rate their speed with the following instructions: 
                                                 
1	 ﾠAcross experiments in this chapter, we decided upon the number of participants based on the lexical 
decision task conducted by Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami and Vigliocco (2008). However, since the data 
was sometimes collected as part of a lab class, this number was occasionally higher. 
2 Due to researcher error, information about participants’ age was lost. However all subjects in this  
chapter were taken from the UCL subject pool or were UCL students so are of a similar demographic.  
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“Please judge how fast you think the actions implied by the verbs below are. Please 
imagine that all verbs are in the form "the X verb to the Y" e.g. "The man moved to 
the car". Please rate a verb as "7" if you think it is very fast, and please rate a verb 
"1" if you think it is very slow. Use the values in between for other speeds. Please 
leave a question blank if you are unsure of the meaning of the verb.” 
Participants viewed a horizontal 7-point scale with “Very slow” written on the left 
side and “Very fast” written on the right side. Responses were made using the mouse 
by clicking a circle beneath a rating. 
Verbs were classified as “fast” if both the mean and mode rating was greater than or 
equal to 5, and verbs were labelled as “slow” if both the mean and mode rating was 
less than or equal to 3. All remaining verbs were classified as “neutral”. This led to 
23  verbs  being  classified  as  “slow”,  22  classified  as  “fast”  and  25  classified  as 
“neutral”. From this classification, 16 fast and 16 slow verbs were chosen (see Table 
Appendix 1-1 and 1-2). Verbs that suggested movement in a direction other than 
horizontal (e.g. plunged), verbs that denoted motion specific to a type of animal (e.g. 
flew)  or  verbs  that  denoted  motion  in  water  (e.g.  drifted)  were  removed  from 
selection. The two sets of fast and slow verbs could not be matched and significantly 
differed in log frequency HAL (taken from the English Lexicon Project) (t (30) = 
3.1, p < .01) and in number of letters (t (30) = 3.33, p < .01) (means displayed in 
table 4-1). I therefore decided to regress out such variables within the analyses using 
linear mixed effects models (LME). 
Table 4-1. Mean log frequency HAL and length for fast and slow verbs 
Verb Type  Mean Log Frequency  Mean Length 
Slow  3.36 (SD = 2.88)  6.06 (SD = 1.34) 
Fast  6.39 (SD = 2.64)  7.44 (SD = .97) 
 
An additional 32 words were used as filler words that were neutral words with no 
suggestion of motion (e.g. desk). 64 nonwords were formed using ARC Nonword  
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Database (Rastle, Harrington & Coltheart, 2002). All nonwords were 3-7 letters in 
length, orthographically legal and pronounceable 
4.3.1.3  Procedure 
The experiment was presented in E-prime. Visual presentation of the item appeared 
in the centre of the screen. The item remained on screen until a participant made a 
response. Participants were instructed to press ‘j’ on the keyboard if they saw a real 
English word and ‘f’ if they saw a nonword.  The experiment contained two blocks 
with each word presented once in each block. Participants could choose to to take a 
break between blocks. Within each block word presentation was randomized. The 
whole experiment took around 20 minutes to complete. 
4.3.2  Results 
Individual trials were removed if response time was less than 250ms, greater than 
3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the participant’s mean response time (3% of the data). 
For response time analysis, only correct trials were used. 
Since  the  experimental  items  were  not  matched  on  relevant  psycholinguistic 
variables response time and accuracy were analyzed using an LME with subjects and 
items  as  crossed  random  effects,  partialling  out  word  frequency  (log  frequency 
HAL), word length and neighbourhood size of each word, taken from the English 
Lexicon  Project  (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/)
3 .  Markov  chain  Monte  Carlo 
approximation was used in all analyses to estimate p values. No main effect of word 
speed was found for response time (β = .01, t =. 20, p =. 84) or accuracy (β = .02, z = 
.06, p = .95). Without controlling for these variables statistically there would be a 
significant difference in both response time (t (25) = 3.61, p <. 001) and accuracy (t 
(25) = 4.94, p <. 001). Average response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 
4-1. 
                                                 
3 All following analyses of responses to visual words in this chapter are analysed using the same 
LME. Analyses with auditory words do not include number of orthographic neighbours as a covariate 
and include spoken duration (in ms) instead of word length.  
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Figure 4-1. Model predicted response time and accuracy in Experiment 4-1 (visual words), after 
controlling for word length, word frequency and number of orthographic neighbours. Error 
bars reflect 1 standard error. 
 
4.3.3  Discussion  
Results showed no difference between response time to fast and slow words. From a 
simulation perspective slower responses to slow verbs than fast verbs could have 
been predicted if simulations reflect real-world events, because slow motion takes 
longer  to  unfold  than  fast  motion.  It  is  possible  however,  that  differences  in  the 
duration of a simulation would not be evident for single words since they contain 
little information without context.  Differences may be observed if verbs were placed 
in a sentence including specific agents. Further, the simulation of speed in single 
words  may  only  be  detectable  by  combining  speed  in  perception  with  the  speed 
words,  as  in  the  experiments  below.  Experiment  4-1  has  set  a  baseline  for  the 
following  experiments  such  that  any  differences  observed  between  fast  and  slow 
verbs must be due to the interaction with perceptual speed. 
4.4  Experiment 4-2: Visual speed (horizontal) and visual words 
In Experiment 4-2 participants were presented with a fast or slow visual stimulus 
before being presented with a visual word. The visual stimulus was a horizontal line  
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moving rightwards across the centre of the screen at either a fast or slow speed. The 
line began at the left edge of the screen and increased in length until the centre of the 
screen.  This  stimulus  was  intended  to  produce  a  horizontal  portrayal  of  speeded 
motion  most  similar  to  the  everyday  experience  of  motion  perception  (i.e.  we 
typically perceive moving objects, such as cars, as moving horizontally across our 
visual field). 
4.4.1  Method 
4.4.1.1  Participants 
40 participants (28 female) took part in the experiment either as part of a laboratory 
demonstration class or were recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool and 
took part for payment (mean age = 21.73, SD = 4.5). 
4.4.1.2  Material 
Items were identical to those used in Experiment 4-1 and the perceptual stimulus was 
a horizontally moving black line drawn online during the experiment. 
4.4.1.3  Procedure 
The experiment program was created using Cogent in Matlab and presented on a 
standard CRT monitor. On each trial, a black line moved horizontally across the 
centre of the screen. The line began at the left side of the screen and increased in 
length, rightwards, to the centre of the screen. The line would move at either a fast or 
slow speed (hereby referred to as fast prime or slow prime). The slow prime was 
drawn at a rate of 8 pixels per screen refresh and the fast prime was drawn at a rate of 
24 pixels per screen refresh. When the line reached halfway across the screen it 
stopped  and  a  word  was  presented  in  the  centre  of  the  screen  (see  Figure  4-2). 
Participants had to decide whether the item was a real word or not and responded 
with the keyboard (‘j’ if it was a real English word, ‘f’ if it was a non-word). Each 
item appeared twice, once with each speed of line and presented in separate blocks. 
Within each block items were presented randomly. Both accuracy and response times 
were recorded.  
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4.4.2  Results 
Five  items  were  removed  from  analysis  for  having  low  overall  accuracy  (<80%: 
traipse, plod, dally, trudge, saunter). Individual trials were removed if response time 
was less than 250ms, greater than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the participant’s 
mean response time (2% of the data). For response time analysis, only correct trials 
were used. 
Mean response time and accuracy for the four conditions are displayed in Figure 4-3. 
No effect of word type was found, no effect of prime and no interaction (ts < 1). 
There was a main effect of prime speed in accuracy (β = .24, z = 2.14, p = .03), no 
effect of word speed (β = -.02, z = .84, p = .4) and a marginally significant interaction 
between word speed and prime speed (β = .22, z = 1.88, p =. 06). The marginal 
interaction was followed up with simple effects LMEs, finding a significant effect of 
prime speed for fast words (β = .41, z = 2.07, p = .04) but not for slow words (β = 
.05, z = .31, p = .76). Responses for fast words were less accurate with fast lines than 
with slow lines. 
 
Figure 4-2. Example of display used in Experiment 4-2.  
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Figure 4-3. LME predicted means for response time and accuracy in Experiment 4-2 (visual 
speed (horizontal) and visual words). 
4.4.3  Discussion  
Using  a  horizontal  moving  speed  prime  I  did  not  find  the  predicted  interaction 
between prime speed and verb speed in response time. I did however find a marginal 
interaction in accuracy suggesting that participants make more mistakes when both 
the word and prime are fast. Although I did not predict an effect in accuracy, this 
result  would  support  embodied  theories:  activations  caused  by  the  fast  moving 
stimulus interfered with processing of the fast words, which led to mistakes. But, 
note that the interaction did not meet conventional levels of statistical significance (p 
>  0.05).  One  reason  for  the  lack  of  an  effect  in  response  time  could  be  that 
participants’ attention was too focused on the centre of the screen in anticipation of 
the upcoming item that they did not sufficiently process the visual speed stimulus. To 
test this explanation I decided to introduce a perceptual speed manipulation in the 
auditory domain. If speed sounds were played through headphones while participants 
completed a visual lexical decision task, the sounds would be difficult to ignore. 
4.5  Experiment 4-3: Auditory speed (beeps) and visual words 
Experiment 4-3 investigated the effect of a speeded auditory stimulus on speed verb 
comprehension.  Fast  and  slow  auditory  stimuli  were  presented  to  participants  
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through headphones before they viewed the visual item on screen. The stimulus in 
this  experiment  was  intended  to  be  an  auditory  resemblance  of  the  visual  speed 
stimulus in Experiment 4-2 with sounds moving horizontally at a fast or slow speed. 
If  simulations  of  speed  include  auditory  information,  I  would  expect  to  find  an 
interaction between word speed and auditory speed. Although I did not find an effect 
in response time in Experiment 4-2, the use of an auditory stimulus may be more 
successful because auditory attention is not taxed by the task. 
4.5.1  Method 
4.5.1.1  Participants 
30 participants (16 female) were recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool 
and took part in the experiment for payment (mean age = 27.48, SD = 11.5). 
4.5.1.2  Material 
Auditory speed stimuli were created using the auditory software Audacity.  Beeps 
were presented as moving from left ear to right ear (i.e. horizontally) by using the 
pan  feature,  which  manipulates  the  percentage  of  sound  played  to  each  ear.  In 
addition the time between each beep was manipulated to be shorter or longer to 
create a fast or slow stimulus respectively. There was a pause of 50ms between each 
beep in the fast condition and a pause of 1000ms in the slow condition. Full stimulus 
duration was 3000ms. Based on these parameters, the slow stimulus appeared to 
move only halfway between the left and right ear, whilst the fast stimulus moved 
from the left ear to the right ear and back to the left ear. Using a horizontal moving 
stimulus a trade-off between distance and time had to be made. I chose to match each 
stimulus on duration to be coherent across experiments. 
4.5.1.3  Procedure 
The experiment was presented in E-prime. On each trial a fixation-cross appeared in 
the  centre  of  the  screen  followed  by  the  auditory  stimuli  presented  through 
headphones. After 3 seconds the sound stopped and the item appeared in the centre 
of the screen. All other experimental details are identical to Experiment 4-2.  
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4.5.2  Results 
Six  items  were  removed  from  analysis  for  having  low  overall  accuracy  (<80%: 
traipse,  plod,  dally,  dawdle,  trudge,  saunter).  Individual  trials  were  removed  if 
response time was less than 250ms, greater than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the 
participant’s mean response time (4% of the data). For response time analysis, only 
correct trials were used. 
Average response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-4. Results showed a 
significant main effect of auditory speed (β = -.07, t = 3.18, p <. 001) with response 
times faster following slow beeps than fast beeps. There was no effect of verb speed 
(β = -.02, t = .749, p =. 45) and no interaction between beep speed and verb speed (β 
= .01, t = .552, p = .58).  
For accuracy, there was no effect of beep speed (β = -.13, z = .49, p = .62), no effect 
of word speed (β = -.09,z = .28, p= .78) and no interaction between the two (β = .01, 
z = .07, p = .94).  
 
Figure 4-4. LME predicted response time and accuracy in Experiment 4-3 (auditory speed 
(beeps) and visual words).   
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4.5.3  Discussion  
Experiment 4-3 found a main effect of auditory speed only, in which responses were 
faster following slow beeps than fast beeps.  It is likely that the pattern of slow beeps 
was more predictable that fast beeps and hence responses were facilitated. The fact 
that no interaction was observed suggests either that auditory speed is not recruited 
as  part  of  the  comprehension  of  speed  verbs,  or  alternatively  that  the  auditory 
stimulus did not create fast and slow auditory speed to sufficiently affect processing 
of the speed words. 
Both Experiment 4-2 and 4-3 failed to find an interaction between perceptual speed 
and word speed. Before concluding that visual and auditory information is not crucial 
to  the  comprehension  of  speed  words,  some  methodological  aspects  need  to  be 
addressed. There are details about the perceptual stimuli that could be improved. For 
Experiment 4-2, the moving line stopped in the same position at the same time for 
each  prime  and  the  word  subsequently  appeared  making  the  stimulus  and  word 
presentation  very  predictable.  Thus,  by  focusing  on  the  centre  of  the  screen,  the 
moving line could be ignored. It is possible then that the motion stimulus was not 
sufficiently  processed  and  participants  simply  fixated  the  centre  of  the  screen  in 
anticipation of the upcoming word. For Experiment 4-3, the gaps between the beeps 
were unnatural: auditory speed in the real world is often a continuous sound (e.g. 
imagine the sound of a car speeding along a motorway). Additionally, the motion 
created  by  both  the  visual  and  auditory  stimulus  (i.e.  of  someone/something 
independent of an observer moving horizontally) may not have implied the same type 
of movement as that implied by the verbs: a sense of personal movement or self-
relevance may have been necessary. Experiments 4-4 & 4-5 therefore used a visual 
and auditory stimulus that created a sense of motion, similar to vection, inducing 
motion more relevant to the self. 
4.6  Experiment 4-4: Visual speed (vection) and visual words 
Experiment 4-4 attempted to create a more self-relevant visual speed stimulus. On 
each trial two lines moved out from the centre of the screen continually at either a  
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fast or slow speed (fast vs. slow prime).  This display induced the feeling of moving 
forwards either quickly or slowly.  
4.6.1  Method 
4.6.1.1  Participants 
32 participants (18 female) were recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool 
and took part in the experiment for payment (mean age = 25.84, SD = 6.43). Seven 
participants were removed from analysis for having slow overall response time to 
correct experimental trials (> 1200 ms). 
4.6.1.2  Procedure 
The experiment was run in Matlab. Participants were seated in a central position in 
front of the monitor. Each trial began with two lines moving outwards from the 
centre of the screen in a grid-like display (see Figure 4-5). Lines moved quickly or 
slowly: slow lines had two cycles and fast lines had six cycles. 
4After 3 seconds the 
line movement stopped and the item appeared in the centre of the screen, within the 
static grid. All other experimental details are identical to Experiment 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-5. Example of display used in Experiment 4-4 and 4-6. 
                                                 
4	 ﾠThe visual stimulus was designed by second year mini-project student Joanna Evershed  
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4.6.2  Results 
Two items were removed from analysis for having low overall accuracy (< 80%: 
dally and traipse). Individual trials were removed if response time was less than 
250ms, greater than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the participant’s mean response 
time (8% of the data). For response time analysis, only correct trials were used. 
Average response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-6. A significant effect 
of prime was found (β = .002, t = 1.96, p = .05) in response time with slow moving 
lines leading to slower mean response times than fast moving lines. There was no 
effect of word type (β = -.01, t = 1.25, p = .2) but there was a significant interaction 
between  word  type  and  prime  speed  (β  =  .06,  t  =  2.87,  p  <  .001).  Planned 
comparisons revealed that for fast words response time was faster with fast lines than 
with slow lines (β = .06, t = 2.05, p = .04), and for slow words responses were faster 
with slow lines than fast lines (β = .07, t = 2.03, p = .04). There was no effect of 
word type (β = .17, z = 1.07, p =. 29), no effect of prime speed (β = .38, z = .9, p = 
.37) and no interaction (β = -.11, z =. 66, p = .5) in accuracy scores. 
4.6.3  Discussion  
Using a visual speed stimulus that portrayed movement in perspective as though an 
observer was moving forwards, an interaction between visual speed and word speed 
was found in response time. Responses were significantly faster when the speed of 
the visual stimulus matched the speed of the verb. This suggests that comprehending 
speed verbs shares processes with the visual perception of speed. When these areas 
were preactivated by the visual stimulus they facilitated processing of subsequent 
words with the same speed. The following experiment investigates whether a similar 
effect can be observed for auditory speed.  
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Figure 4-6. LME predicted means for response time and accuracy in Experiment 4-4 (visual 
speed (vection) and visual words).  
4.7  Experiment 4-5: Auditory speed (white noise) and visual words 
Mirroring Experiment 4-4, Experiment 4-5 used an auditory stimulus that presented 
motion  more  relevant  to  the  observer:  motion  moving  towards  rather  than 
horizontally. 
4.7.1  Method 
4.7.1.1  Participants 
67  participants  (56  female)  took  part  in  the  experiment  as  part  of  a  first  year 
psychology lab class (mean age = 18.6, SD = 0.86). Two participants were removed 
from analysis for having slow average response time to correct experimental trials 
(>2SD from group mean). 
4.7.1.2  Material 
An auditory stimulus was taken from Kaschak et al.’s (2005) “towards” condition. 
This was white noise producing the sound of motion towards the listener. The sound 
file was edited in Audacity using the ‘Change Tempo’ effect to create a fast and slow  
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version of the sound. This option changes the speed of the sound without changing 
pitch. 
4.7.1.3  Procedure 
Participants  listened  to  fast  or  slow  moving  white  noise  for  3  seconds  through 
headphones before being presented with the stimulus in the centre of the screen. All 
other experimental details were identical to Experiment 4-2. 
4.7.2  Results 
Seven items were removed from analysis for having low overall accuracy (<80%: 
amble, dally, dawdle, plod, saunter, traipse, trudge). Individual trials were removed 
if response time was less than 250ms, greater than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the 
participant’s mean response time (3% of the data). For response time analysis, only 
correct trials were used. 
Mean response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-7.  A significant effect of 
auditory speed was found in response time (β = .06, t = 2.78, p < .01) with faster 
response times following slow sounds than fast sounds. There was no effect of word 
speed (β = .02, t = 1.3, p = .19) and no interaction between word speed and prime 
speed (β = .01, t = .81, p = .42). No effect of word speed (β = -.1, z = .33, p = .75), no 
effect of auditory speed (β = .07, z = 1.3, p = .19) and no significant interaction (β = 
.16, z = 1.62, p = .1) were found in accuracy.  
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Figure 4-7. LME predicted means for response time Experiment 4-5 (auditory speed (white 
noise) and visual words).  
4.7.3  Discussion  
Experiment 4-5 found a significant effect of auditory speed with slow sounds leading 
to faster reaction times than fast sounds. As with Experiment 4-3, this may have been 
because the end of the slow sound was more predictable than the fast sound. No 
interaction between auditory speed and word speed was found, which suggests that 
the white noise did not create a sense of motion comparable to the visual stimulus 
used  in  Experiment  4-4,  or  that  auditory  motion  is  not  simulated  in  speed  verb 
comprehension.  Alternatively,  an  effect  of  auditory  speed  may  not  have  been 
observed  because  the  words  were  presented  visually  and  not  auditorily.  This 
mismatch in modality may have reduced the overlap between perceptual speed and 
word speed. The following experiment begins to address the question of match in 
modality between perceptual stimulus and word. 
4.8  Experiment 4-6: Visual speed (vection) and auditory words 
An interaction was found when speed was manipulated visually (Experiment 4-4) but 
not when speed was manipulated auditorily (Experiment 4-5). In both studies the 
speed  words  were  presented  visually  which  meant  that  modalities  of  perceptual 
stimuli and verbal stimuli matched in Experiment 4-4 but not in Experiment 4-5. The  
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interaction between perceptual speed and word speed may be a unimodal effect and 
not crossmodal, meaning that perceptual stimuli can only affect words presented in 
the same modality. Hence the null result in Experiment 4-5 may have been due to 
modality mismatch. I sought to test this hypothesis by rerunning both experiments 
using auditory presentation of speed words. If simulations are unimodal then I would 
predict an interaction between perceptual speed and word speed with the auditory 
speed stimulus but not the visual speed stimulus. 
4.8.1  Method 
4.8.1.1  Participants 
 30 participants (average age 25.17 (SD = 11.18)) of which 18 were female were 
recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool and paid for their participation. 
Three subjects were removed due to low overall accuracy (< 80%).  
4.8.1.2  Material  
The same visual stimulus from Experiment 4-4 was used. The same set of items was 
used but an auditory version was recorded in Audacity by a native English speaker. 
4.8.1.3  Procedure 
As in previous experiments, the visual stimulus was presented for three seconds and 
then the word was played through headphones. Participants could respond at any 
point after word onset. All other details were identical to Experiment 4-2. 
4.8.2  Results 
Four  items  were  removed  for  overall  low  accuracy  (<80%:  bolt,  crawl,  dawdle, 
hurry). Individual trials were removed if response time was less than 250ms, greater 
than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the participant’s mean response time (3% of the 
data). For response time analysis, only correct trials were used. 
Mean response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-8. There was no effect of 
word speed (β = .04, t = .78, p = .44), no effect of visual speed (β = .01, t = .35, p =  
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.72) and no interaction between word type and prime speed (β = .01, t = .49, p = .63) 
in response time.  For accuracy, a significant effect of visual speed was found (β = 
.30, z = 2.02, p = .04) such that responses were less accurate following fast lines 
compared to slow lines, but there was no effect of word speed (β = .55, z = 0.82, p = 
.42) and no significant interaction (β = -.22, z = 1.55, p = .12). Thus the interaction 
observed in Experiment 4-4 was not replicated suggesting that match in modality is 
an important factor. 
 
Figure 4-8. LME predicted means for response time and accuracy Experiment 4-6 (visual speed 
(vection) and auditory words).  
4.9  Experiment 4-7: Auditory speed (white noise) and auditory words 
This experiment replicated Experiment 4-5 but used auditory instead of visual words 
in  order  to  test  whether  a  match  in  modality  of  perceptual  and  verbal  stimuli  is 
important. 
4.9.1  Method 
4.9.1.1  Participants 
45 participants (21 female) were recruited from the UCL psychology subject pool 
(average age 25.87 (SD = 10.15)) and paid for their participation. Five subjects were 
removed due to low overall accuracy (< 80%).   
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4.9.1.2  Procedure 
The experimental procedure was identical to Experiment 4-5, presenting fast and 
slow white noise through headphones for three seconds, except that experimental 
items were presented auditorily through headphones. Each item was presented at the 
offset of the speed stimuli. 
4.9.2  Results 
Five  items  were  removed  for  overall  low  accuracy  (<  80%:  bolt,  dally,  dawdle, 
hurry, saunter). Individual trials were removed if response time was less than 250ms, 
greater than 3000ms or outside 2.5 SD of the participant’s mean response time (11% 
of the data). For response time analysis, only correct trials were used. 
Mean response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-9.  There was no effect 
of word type (β = .10, t = 1.66, p = .1), no effect of auditory speed (β = -.03, t = .55, 
p = .58) and no interaction between word type and prime speed (β = .01, t = .78, p = 
.44) in response time. For accuracy no effect or word type was found (β = .04, z = 
.078, p = .94), no effect of visual speed (β = .03, z = .18, p = .86) and no significant 
interaction (β = .05, z = .62, p = .54). 
 
Figure 4-9. LME predicted response time and accuracy in Experiment 5-7 (auditory speed 
(white noise) and auditory words).   
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4.9.3  Discussion Experiment 4-6 and 4-7 
Experiment 4-6 failed to replicate the interaction found in Experiment 4-4 with the 
same visual stimulus, and again in Experiment 4-7, the auditory stimulus failed to 
produce an interaction. The lack of effect in Experiment 4-6 (visual vection and 
auditory words) may be due to the mismatch in modality of perceptual stimuli and 
verbal  stimuli,  as  discussed  earlier.  Or  alternatively,  since  the  task  required 
participants to use auditory attention to respond to the words, it is possible that they 
did not process the moving visual stimulus at all but simply listened to the words and 
looked towards the keyboard in order to respond. This explanation cannot be applied 
to  Experiment  4-7  (auditory  white  noise  and  auditory  words)  because  both  the 
perceptual  stimulus  and  the  words  were  presented  in  the  same  modality,  so  the 
participants  must  have  processed  the  stimulus.  One  problem  with  the  auditory 
stimulus is that white noise is an abstract sound and cannot be applied to a particular 
object or movement. In fact, unless you were told that it is a motion sound it may 
have been unidentifiable. In Experiment 4-7, some participants were asked how they 
would describe the sounds and few used the word “motion”. One person described it 
as sounding like the sea. It is therefore possible that the auditory “motion” stimulus is 
insufficient to create motion similar to that implied by the verbs. As a final step in 
this investigation, I decided to use an auditory stimulus that clearly implied human 
speeded motion: fast and slow footsteps. 
4.10  Experiment 4-8: Auditory speed (footsteps) and auditory words 
Footstep  sounds  have  been  shown  to  successfully  imply  speed  in  other  studies 
(Brunye, Mahoney & Taylor, 2010). Brunye et al. (2010) found that fast footsteps 
sped up reading time compared to slow footsteps for route descriptions (ground-level 
perspective) but not survey descriptions (aerial overview perspective). Further, fast 
footsteps led participants to estimate larger distances between described landmarks 
compared  to  slow  footsteps.  This  is  thought  to  be  because  readers’  estimates  of 
distance were based on how quickly they simulated motion through an environment, 
which was affected by speed information present in the footsteps. This effect was not 
found for metronome pulses.   
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If  footsteps  sounds  do  successfully  imply  fast  and  slow  motion  then  I  expect  a 
similar  interaction  to  be  observed  as  that  of  Experiment  4-4  (visual  vection  and 
visual words): faster reaction times when speed of footsteps matches speed of verbs 
compared to when speed of footsteps do not match speed of verbs. 
4.10.1  Method 
4.10.1.1 Participants 
52 subjects (average age = 23.33, SD=6.79, 34 females) were recruited from the 
UCL psychology subject pool and paid for their participation. Four were removed for 
having  average  accuracy  less  than  80%,  and  one  was  removed  for  slow  average 
response time (>1400ms (longer cutoff due to words being presented auditorily)).  
4.10.1.2 Material 
The sounds of fast and slow footsteps were taken from an online sound database 
(www.freesound.org). The sounds of footsteps implied either walking or running on 
gravel. The slow stimulus contained five footsteps and the fast stimulus contained 10 
footsteps, within three seconds. 
4.10.1.3 Procedure 
Participants listened to fast or slow footsteps for three seconds before items were 
presented auditorily. 
4.10.1.4 Procedure 
The  procedure  was  identical  to  previous  experiments  except  that  during  the 
instruction  phase  participants  were  told  that  they  would  hear  the  “sound  of 
footsteps”.  Participants were informed to reduce ambiguity in identification of the 
sound  (although  they  clearly  reflected  a  human  walking  or  running).  Giving  the 
participants this information did not compromise the study or alert participants to the 
study aims since speed was not mentioned and they were not informed of any link 
between the sound and the task.  
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4.10.2  Results 
Three items were removed from analysis for having low overall accuracy (< 80% 
dawdle, dally and traipse).  Individual trials were removed if response time was less 
than  250ms,  greater  than  3000ms  or  outside  2.5  SD  of  the  participant’s  mean 
response time (4% of the data). For response time analysis, only correct trials were 
used. 
Mean response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-10. For response time 
there was no main effect of footstep speed (β = .01, t = 1.16, p = .25) and no effect of 
word speed (β = .03, t < 1). There was however a significant interaction between 
word  speed  and  prime  speed  (β  =  .03,  t  =  2.12,  p  =  .03).  Planned  comparisons 
revealed that there was a marginal effect of footstep speed for slow words (β = .04, t 
= 1.98, p = .06), with responses slower with slow footsteps than fast footsteps, but no 
effect of footsteps for fast words (β = -.02, t = 1.14, p = .28), although there was a 
trend in the opposite direction to that for slow words. A significant effect of word 
speed on accuracy was found (β = .53, z = 4, p <. 001), with accuracy lower for slow 
words than fast words, but no effect of footsteps speed was found (β = .14, z =1.26, p 
= 0.21) and no interaction (β = .003, z = .64, p = .52). 
 
Figure 4-10. LME predicted response time and accuracy Experiment 4-8 (auditory speed 
(footsteps) and auditory words).   
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4.11  Experiment 4-9: Auditory speed (footsteps) and visual words 
This experiment replicated Experiment 4-8 except that words were presented visually 
instead of auditorily in order to test whether the interaction between perceptual speed 
and word speed was dependent on match in modality. 
4.11.1  Method 
4.11.1.1 Participants 
44 subjects (average age 21.95, SD = 4.1, 32 female) were recruited from the UCL 
psychology subject pool and paid for participation). One subject was removed for 
slow average reaction time (>3SD overall mean of subjects). 
4.11.1.2 Material and Procedure 
The material and procedure were identical to Experiment 4-8 except that words were 
presented visually at the offset of the auditory stimuli. 
4.11.2  Results 
Four items were removed from analysis due to low accuracy (< 80%: dawdle, plod, 
trudge and traipse).  
Mean response time and accuracy are displayed in Figure 4-11. There was no main 
effect of footstep speed (β = .03, t = 1.4, p = .16), no effect of word speed (β = .03, t 
= .62, p = .54) and no interaction between word speed and prime speed (β = .003, t = 
.2, p = .84) in response time. For accuracy no effect of word speed was found, no 
effect of footsteps speed and no interaction (zs < 1).  
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Figure 4-11. LME predicted response time and accuracy Experiment 4-9 (auditory speed 
(footsteps) and visual words). Discussion Experiments 4-8 and 4-9 
The sound of footsteps produced a significant interaction between perceptual speed 
and word speed when words were presented auditorily (i.e. there was a match in 
modality). Responses were slower when the speed of footsteps matched the speed of 
verb. This pattern is opposite to that observed in Experiment 4-4 (visual vection and 
visual words) where responses were faster when the speed of moving lines matched 
the speed of verbs. Experiment 4-8 provides evidence for auditory simulation during 
comprehension  of  speed  verbs.  Finding  a  significant  interaction  using  footstep 
sounds suggests that the simulations used to understand speed words are not general, 
abstract simulations of speed, but are specific to simulations of the body in motion 
because  an  abstract  auditory  motion  stimulus  did  not  interact  with  word  speed 
(Experiments 4-3, 4-5 & 4-7). The sound of footsteps implied an agent in motion, 
which  matched  the  types  of  movements  described  in  the  verbs.  Further,  the 
interaction was only observed when verbal and perceptual stimuli were presented in 
the same modality. These findings are discussed further in the General Discussion 
below. 
4.12  General Discussion 
In this chapter I used a lexical decision paradigm combining speed verbs with visual 
or  auditory  perceptual  stimuli  that  portrayed  fast  and  slow  motion.  Results  from 
reaction  times  showed  that  verb  speed  and  perceptual  speed  interacted  when  the  
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perceptual stimulus was either visual lines moving outwards in perspective or the 
sound  of  footsteps  (results  summarized  in  Table  4-2).  These  stimuli  specifically 
emphasized motion of the body in comparison to the other perceptual stimuli used 
that  evoked  more  abstract  motion  depictions.  The  interaction  was  only  observed 
when the modality of the perceptual stimuli and word stimuli matched (i.e. visual 
vection  and  visual  words,  auditory  footsteps  and  auditory  words).  Moreover,  the 
nature of the interaction differed between auditory and visual modalities. When the 
perceptual and word stimuli were visual (Experiment 4-4) a facilitation effect was 
observed, with response times faster when the speed of perceptual stimuli matched 
the speed of verb. Conversely, when the perceptual and word stimuli were auditory 
(Experiment 4-8), an interference effect was observed: response time was slower 
when speed of perceptual stimuli matched speed of verb. It is important to note that 
when  the  speed  verbs  were  presented  without  a  preceding  perceptual  stimulus 
(Experiment 4-1) there was no difference in response time between fast and slow 
verbs and so any differences observed in the following experiments must be due to 
interactions with the speeded perceptual stimuli. Below I address each of the three 
interesting findings to emerge from this chapter that describe when these effects were 
observed (relevance of body and modality match) and what the interactions looked 
like (difference between modality). 
  
 
 
 
 
129 
T
a
b
l
e
 
4
-
2
.
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
 
4
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
P
e
r
c
e
p
t
u
a
l
 
m
o
d
a
l
i
t
y
 
P
e
r
c
e
p
t
u
a
l
 
s
t
i
m
u
l
u
s
 
V
e
r
b
a
l
 
m
o
d
a
l
i
t
y
 
M
o
d
a
l
i
t
y
 
m
a
t
c
h
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
 
1
 
n
/
a
 
n
/
a
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
n
/
a
 
n
/
s
 
2
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
 
l
i
n
e
s
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
 
3
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l
 
b
e
e
p
s
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
i
s
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
 
4
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
l
i
n
e
s
 
(
v
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
a
t
c
h
 
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
n
 
R
T
 
5
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
w
h
i
t
e
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
i
s
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
 
6
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
o
v
i
n
g
 
l
i
n
e
s
 
(
v
e
c
t
i
o
n
)
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
m
i
s
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
 
7
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
w
h
i
t
e
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
i
s
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
 
8
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
f
o
o
t
s
t
e
p
s
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
m
a
t
c
h
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
n
 
R
T
 
9
 
a
u
d
i
t
o
r
y
 
f
o
o
t
s
t
e
p
s
 
v
i
s
u
a
l
 
m
i
s
m
a
t
c
h
 
n
/
s
  
     
 
130 
 
4.12.1  When are speed simulations observed? 
Results  suggest  that  there  are  two  factors  that  play  a  role  in  whether  or  not  an 
interaction between perceptual speed and word speed will be observed. The first 
factor  is  whether  or  not  the  perceptual  stimulus  reflects  real  biological  motion 
compared  to  abstract  motion  and  the  second  factor  is  whether  the  modality  of 
perceptual stimulus and the modality of the words match or not. Below I discuss 
these factors and some potential explanations for them. 
4.12.1.1 The role of the body 
The results suggest an important role of the body in speed simulations. Interactions 
between speed of perceptual stimuli and speed of words were not observed when the 
perceptual stimuli were abstract depictions of speed and did not imply an agent. 
Instead interactions were found when the perceptual stimuli involved the body: the 
visual stimulus in Experiments 4-4 was a display that created a sense of forward 
motion in the participant and the auditory stimulus in Experiments 4-8 was the sound 
of actual human movement. In comparison, the horizontal moving line (Experiment 
4-2), moving beeps (Experiment 4-3) and white noise stimuli (Experiment 4-5 and 4-
7) were very removed from human motion events. In fact, one participant described 
the white noise stimuli as sounding like “the sea”.  Below I propose two potential 
explanations  for  this  “body  relevance”  effect  that  are  not  necessarily  mutually 
exclusive.  
4.12.1.1.1 Simulations of speed are specific to biological motion 
The  first  possible  explanation  is  that  simulations  for  speed  verbs  include 
representations of fast and slow motion specifically performed with the body, or 
specifically biological motion, and not a general speed simulation abstracted away 
from  an  agent.  In  this  case,  real  perceptual  speed  will  affect  speed  verb 
comprehension  only  when  that  perceptual  speed  is  depicted  via  human  motion 
because  this  matches  the  nature  of  the  action  described  by  the  word.  Although 
elsewhere effects of an abstract visual stimulus on lexical decisions has been found  
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(Meteyard et al., 2009), this was not for verbs that described actions specifically 
performed  with  the  body  but  verbs  that  could  also  be  applied  to  non-biological 
entities. For example, the words rise and fall could describe movement of a balloon 
and a rock, and these may be more dominant meanings than a man rising from his 
chair or a child falling from a swing. The items used in the present experiments 
strongly refer to actions performed with a human body, whereas the Meteyard et al. 
(2009)  items  are  likely  to  involve  motion  representations  abstracted  away  from 
specific  entities,  and  thereby  possibly  involve  motion  simulations  that  are  more 
abstract and schematic. 
4.12.1.1.2 Simulations of speed involve action preparation 
A second explanation for why interactions were only observed with body-relevant 
stimuli  is  that  they  may  only  occur  when  the  perceptual  stimuli  forces  the 
comprehender  into  a  state  of  movement  or  movement  preparation.  The  visual 
stimulus of Experiment 4-4 produced an illusion of real physical movement (vection) 
and  the  sound  of  footsteps  could  have  primed  full  body  movements  either  via 
auditory  mirror  neurons  which  discharge  when  listening  to  sounds  produced  by 
actions (Kohler, Keysers, Umiltà, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 2002) or because 
they signalled incoming threat (or both). This view implies that simulations have an 
egocentric perspective. Simulating the self in motion is in line with the proposal that 
people understand action verbs as describing actions they would perform with their 
own body rather that a general representation of how other people use their bodies 
(Casasanto, 2014). Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) found that a motion sensitive area of 
the brain (middle temporal (MT) area) was activated by sentences describing motion 
towards a participant but not sentences describing motion away from the participant, 
reflecting the importance of self-relevance in simulation. They also found activated 
regions along the cortical midline, part of a network involved in the guidance of 
visual  attention  and  change  of  behaviour  when  under  threat.  Self-relevance  may 
therefore lead to action preparation in response to incoming stimuli. Further, action 
sounds are crucial for signalling socially dangerous or unpleasant events (Aglioti & 
Pazzaglia, 2010) and the sound of footsteps may signal a threat. From an ecological  
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perspective,  prioritizing  such  sounds  serves  as  an  advantage  to  survival  if 
approaching sounds signal a threat to safety. It is possible then that the footsteps 
have a biological and emotional significance that increases arousal. Note that the 
footsteps here were not approaching or receding but were at a constant distance from 
the  perceiver,  sounding  more  like  the  footsteps  of  the  listener  themselves  than 
another person. Thus the listeners may have attributed the sound of footsteps to their 
own movements rather than the sounds increasing their level of alertness and arousal, 
either way leading to a state of action preparation. 
These two hypotheses (speed simulations are specific to biological motion and speed 
simulations involve action preparation) may implicate different neural loci for speed 
simulation. The first hypothesis suggests that speed simulations occur in motion-
specific regions, such as MT (see Gennari, 2012 for discussion), or regions specific 
to  processing  biological  motion,  for  example  posterior  superior  temporal  sulcus 
(Grossman, Donelly, Price, Mogan, Pickens, Neighbor & Blake, 2000; Grossman, 
Battelli  &  Pascual-Leone,  2005).  If  comprehending  speed  in  language  involves 
action preparation then simulations are likely to occur in regions of the motor or 
premotor  cortex  that  have  been  shown  to  be  involved  in  action  planning  and 
execution (Hauk et al., 2004). It is possible that speed simulation occurs within both 
motion processing and motor regions depending on the context or situation described 
in  the  language  (for  example  emphasizing  action  observation  versus  action 
participation). 
If humans are sensitive to approaching sounds then it seems odd that the white noise 
stimuli  failed  to  affect  word  comprehension  since  the  sound  moved  towards  the 
participant. But, there are clear separate neural systems for action-related sounds and 
non-action related sounds (Pizzamiglio, Aprile, Spitoni, Pitzalis, Bates, D’Amico & 
Di Russo, 2005) and action sounds are more important and perceptually prioritized in 
threat monitoring. Since white noise is a non-action-related sound it would not be 
perceived as relevant to the self.  
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4.12.1.1.3 Role of the body: conclusion 
For an interaction between perceptual speed and word speed to be observed, the 
perceptual stimulus needs to be relevant to the body in some way. This could mean 
that speed simulations reflect biological motion specifically and not abstract motion, 
or  that  speed  simulations  occur  in  motor  processing  regions,  possibly  with  an 
egocentric perspective. Based on the present experiments it is not clear which of the 
two explain the present data, or whether both play a role. It is also likely that the 
contribution of biological motion simulation and action simulation to speed word 
comprehension  differs  depending  on  task  and  context  (e.g.  a  sentence  context 
emphasizing whether speed refers to a separate agent or the comprehender). 
4.12.1.2 Match in modality 
The observed interactions between perceptual speed and word speed were only found 
when the modality of perceptual stimulus and verbal stimulus matched.  Below I 
discuss two possible explanations for this finding: whether the perceptual stimulus 
and word can be integrated and the deployment of perceptual attention. 
4.12.1.2.1 Integratibility 
One view that may account for the finding that interactions are only observed when 
perceptual and verbal stimuli match in modality is Kaschak at al’s (2005) notion of 
integratability.  They  argue  that  a  mismatch  advantage  is  more  likely  when  a 
perceptual stimulus cannot easily be integrated into a simulation. For example, in 
Kaschak  et  al.  (2005)  responses  to  sentences  were  slower  when  the  direction  of 
motion  of  a  visual  stimulus  matched  the  direction  of  motion  described  in  the 
sentence  than  when  they  did  not  match.  The  authors  argue  that  responses  were 
slowed  when  the  directions  matched  because  the  simple  black  and  white  images 
could not be integrated into the simulation of events in the sentence (i.e. of real-
world objects in motion).  In the present data, when the perceptual stimulus and word 
were  presented  in  different  modalities  then  they  may  have  become  two  distinct 
events meaning that the perceptual stimulus could not be integrated into the word 
meaning. This explanation is not sufficient however because elsewhere effects of  
     
 
134 
perceptual stimuli on words and effects of words on perceptual stimuli have been 
found when using stimuli of different modalities (e.g. Kaschak et al., 2005; Brunye 
et  al.,  2010).  Further,  the  idea  that  two  stimuli  (perceptual  stimulus  and  word 
stimulus) cannot be integrated into an event because they are of a different modality 
goes  against  what  we  know  about  action  representations.  Alaerts,  Swinnen  and 
Wenderoth (2009) showed that action representations are multimodal. Using TMS, 
excitability of the motor cortex was found to increase to congruent auditory and 
visual  stimuli  compared  to  stimuli  in  a  single  modality.  A  crucial  factor  in  the 
integration  of  multiple  modalities  however  is  likely  to  be  temporal  overlap.  For 
example, Brunye et al. (2010) presented footsteps (auditory) at the same time as 
participants read passages (visual) and found effects of footstep speed on reading 
time.  In  the  experiments  here,  the  perceptual  stimulus  was  presented  before  the 
verbal stimulus, possibly reducing the likelihood of integration. If they had been 
presented  simultaneously,  results  for  Experiment  4-6  and  4-9  may  have  looked 
similar to the experiments in which modalities matched. 
4.12.1.2.2 Perceptual attention 
One account of the importance of modality match could be in terms of perceptual 
attention.  Connell  &  Lynott  (2014)  found  responses  to  words  with  strong  visual 
meanings (e.g. cloudy) were facilitated in a lexical decision task and naming task 
where words were presented visually and words with strong auditory meanings (e.g. 
noisy) were facilitated in the naming task that involved an auditory representation of 
a word. This shows that attention can be differentially deployed to the visual and 
auditory modality and this can have consequences for processing. Although vision 
and audition are thought to have separate attentional resources (Treisman & Davies, 
1973;  Burr  &  Alais,  2006)  it  has  been  shown  that  selectively  attending  to  one 
modality  reduces  the  efficiency  of  processing  stimuli  in  an  unattended  modality 
(Spence,  Nicholls  &  Driver,  2001)  and  decreases  activation  in  modality-specific 
areas  (Kawashima,  O’Sullican  &  Rolans,  1995).  In  the  current  experiments 
perceptual attention may be directed to the modality in which the word is presented 
as this is the most efficient strategy to respond quickly to the word. The consequence  
     
 
135 
of attending preferentially in one modality could be that attention and perception in 
other modalities is reduced. Thus for visual vection with auditory words (Experiment 
4-8), attention was directed to auditory information as the participant was listening 
for the word. This results in the visual stimulus being insufficiently processed (and 
vice versa for auditory footsteps and visual words).  This account does not claim that 
the  perceptual  stimulus  was  not  processed  at  all,  but  rather  was  not  sufficiently 
processed  for  the  speed  information  to  affect  the  comprehension  of  the  word. 
Although other studies have found crossmodal effects, speed is possibly a subtler 
dimension  of  motion  (compare  to  direction  for  example)  and  may  require  more 
attention to be fully processed.  
4.12.1.2.3 Match in modality: conclusion 
It seems most likely that an account in terms of perceptual attention can explain the 
lack of interaction when modalities did not match. Participants selectively directed 
their  attention  to  the  modality  in  which  the  words  were  presented  in,  thereby 
reducing efficiency of perception in other modalities (Kawashima et al. 1995; Spence 
et al. 2001). This perceptual effect is likely to be stronger because the perceptual 
stimuli  and  word  stimuli  were  presented  consecutively  and  not  simultaneously, 
thereby making it easier to ignore the irrelevant modality. Based on this explanation I 
cannot conclude that speed simulations are specific to the modality of presentation 
(e.g. that only visual simulations are produced when words are presented visually) 
because  it  seems  possible  that  speed  stimuli  in  other  modalities  would  lead  to 
interactions if the experimental conditions were different: for example, if perceptual 
stimuli and words were presented simultaneously, or if there were a secondary task 
that required perceptual attention to be divided across modalities. 
4.12.2  What do speed simulations look like? 
Facilitation of responses was found (match effect) for visual stimuli but interference 
(mismatch effect) was found for auditory stimuli. Below I discuss four speculative 
explanations  for  these  differences  in  modality:  integratability  between  perceptual 
stimulus  and  word  meaning,  negativity/threat  of  the  footsteps  sounds,  overlap  in  
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features of perceptual stimuli and word meaning and perceptual dominance in speed 
words. 
4.12.2.1 Integratability 
Kaschak  et  al’s  (2005)  idea  of  integratability,  as  explained  in  section  4.12.1.2.1, 
could be used to try to explain why the direction of interaction differed between 
visual  and  auditory  stimuli:  one  kind  of  perceptual  stimulus  may  be  more 
integratable with the meaning of the word leading to facilitation, but the other might 
be  less  integratable  leading  to  inference.  An  account  of  integratability  could  be 
applied to the null effects observed in this chapter (Experiments 4-2, 4-3, 4-5 and 4-
7). The motion produced by these visual and auditory stimuli could not be integrated 
into the simulation of the speed verb because they were simple, abstract depictions of 
motion and were perceived as separate, unrelated events to the speed verbs. Visual 
vection and the sound of footsteps could be integrated into the simulation of speed 
verbs because they both produced experiences that are consistent with the real-world 
experience of the meaning of those verbs. This idea can explain the null effects but it 
does  not  explain  the  difference  between  facilitation  and  interference  across 
experiments 4-4 and 4-8 because both perceptual stimuli are integratable into the 
speed event. In fact, footsteps are more integratable than vection because they are 
sounds taken from the real world, but in Experiment 4-8 this resulted in interference. 
4.12.2.2 Footsteps as negative stimuli 
There  may  be  something  specific  about  the  auditory  stimuli  used  that  led  to 
interference as compared to the visual stimuli that led to facilitation. As described in 
the  previous  section,  the  sound  of  footsteps  may  have  a  particular  emotional  or 
biological significance in alerting danger. This state of alertness or arousal could lead 
to  avoidant  behaviour  to  protect  oneself  from  harm.  Thus  the  interference  effect 
observed for Experiment 4-8 with auditory stimuli could be a result of this avoidance 
behaviour. When verb speed matched footstep speed, the salience of the event may 
have  increased  and  responses  were  slowed  due  to  avoidance  of  danger  inducing 
stimuli.  A  similar  effect  has  been  found  for  abstract  emotional  words  (Vinson,  
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Anderson, Ratoff, Bahrami & Vigliocco, 2011): positive, negative and neutral words 
were presented preconsciously using interocular suppression and participants were 
instructed to respond whether the presented word appeared above or below fixation 
when  they  became  aware  of  it.  They  found  that  negative  abstract  words  were 
significantly slower to emerge into consciousness than positive and neutral abstract 
verbs. An alternative explanation to avoidance is automatic vigilance (e.g. Estes & 
Adelman, 2008) whereby a slow response reflects a prolonged evaluation of negative 
stimuli. Evaluating a stimulus that appears negative is more beneficial to survival 
than  avoidance,  which  could  lead  a  fatal  outcome.  Either  due  to  avoidance  or 
vigilance, responses to auditory words following footsteps of a matching speed were 
slowed down. 
4.12.2.3 Feature overlap 
An alternative explanation for the difference between visual and auditory stimuli is 
in  terms  of  feature  overlap,  rather  than  due  to  modality  differences  specifically.  
Consider the matching conditions in Experiment 4-8: the auditory footsteps matched 
each word both in terms of speed and in terms of the effector used in the described 
action.  That  is,  to  run or  to  saunter  involves  the  use  of  feet,  and  hence  would 
produce the sound of footsteps. For Experiment 4-4, although the visual stimulus 
created a sense of motion, it was not specific to full-body actions such as running. In 
fact, it was more similar to the type of motion a person experiences when in a car or 
on a train. Therefore, the visual stimulus of Experiment 4-4 matched the meaning of 
the verbs only in terms of speed and not specific features of motion such as the 
effector.  When the perceptual and verbal stimuli matched in multiple features (i.e. 
speed  and  effector)  as  in  Experiment  4-8,  interference  was  more  likely  to  occur 
because more resources were taxed; more resources were engaged in processing the 
perceptual stimulus so less were available for word comprehension. When only one 
feature was shared (i.e. just speed) facilitation was found because the partial overlap 
acted as a ‘head start’ to the processing of the word (note that although the speed of 
perceptual stimulus did match for the more abstract speed stimuli, since this speed 
was abstract and not biological or self-relevant then it most likely did not overlap  
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with  speed  of  the  words).  One  can  also  appeal  to  Connell  and  Lynott’s  (2012b) 
account of attentional modulation. Although one may predict that both the visual 
stimuli and the auditory stimuli are comparable in terms of recruitment of perceptual 
attention, because they occur before word presentation, the account also describes 
attentional modulation at a feature-specific level. That is, the auditory stimulus will 
recruit a greater proportion of the attentional resources required for simulation than 
the visual stimulus because it shares more features.  In Chapter 6 I further explore 
this hypothesis with sentences. 
4.12.2.4 Perceptual Dominance 
Finally,  an  account  in  terms  of  the  dominance  of  perceptual  modality  could  be 
plausible.  The  meaning  of  speed  words  may  be  strongly  visual,  with  auditory 
information less salient. As in Connell & Lynott (2014) where responses to visual 
words were facilitated if the word’s meaning was strongly visual, here if speed words 
are strongly visual responses to them may have been facilitated if preceded by a 
matching visual depiction of speed. When a speed word was preceded by a matching 
auditory speed stimulus, responses may have been slowed since the auditory speed 
needed to be converted into a visual depiction for a match to occur. This idea is in 
line  with  findings  that  show  that  switching  between  modalities  when  making 
perceptual judgments leads to processing costs (Pecher et al., 2003).  
4.12.2.5 Modality differences: conclusion 
An explanation in terms of feature overlap seems to be the most plausible. Modality 
is unlikely to explain the differences since previous experiments have found both 
facilitation and interference effects using auditory perceptual stimuli (Kaschak et al. 
2005).  An  ecological  avoidance  or  vigilance  account  is  similarly  not  convincing 
since the footsteps were not particularly threatening sounding and did not appear to 
approach  the  listener,  however  it  might  be  possible  that  the  footsteps  sounds 
increased  arousal.  Additionally,  although  world  experience  is  generally  visually 
dominant, there is no clear evidence that speed perception is. Since speed involves 
spatial (more efficiently processed with vision e.g. Howard & Templeton, 1966) and  
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temporal (more efficiently processed with audition (Recanzone, 2003)) dimensions I 
am  not  convinced  by  a  visual  dominance  explanation.  Kaschak’s  (2005) 
intergratability account also fails to sufficiently account for the findings since I find 
an  interference  effect  for  the  perceptual  stimulus  that  is  intuitively  the  most 
integratable (footsteps) into the described event. 
4.13  Chapter conclusion 
Using a lexical decision paradigm in which presentation of fast and slow verbs was 
preceded by presentation of a speeded perceptual stimulus I found an interaction 
between perceptual speed and word speed conditional on two factors: first, whether 
the perceptual stimulus was relevant to biological motion and second, whether the 
modality of perceptual and verbal stimuli matched. I propose that mental simulations 
for speed verbs involve biological motion processes and action preparation. This 
suggests that they are specific to the full meaning of the verbs (i.e. of an agent 
moving) instead of a more schematic speed depiction that is abstracted away from 
agents.  The  results  also  imply  crucial  factors  that  should  be  considered  in  an 
experimental paradigm designed to assess simulation: timing of stimuli presentation 
and attentional demands. These findings could also be interpreted as suggesting a 
strong role of context in mental simulations: there is likely to be many environmental 
and attentional factors that play a role in the extent to which simulations develop in 
service of language comprehension.  
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Chapter 5  Do speed verbs affect speed discrimination? 
This chapter continues the investigation of speed verbs and the contribution of visual 
speed perception to comprehension. As described in Chapter 2, demonstrations of 
embodiment include the effect of visual stimuli on comprehension of words and 
sentences  that  describe  visual  features  (e.g.  Dudschig,  Souman  &  Kaup,  2013; 
Meteyard  et  al.,  2008;  Kaschak  et  al.,  2005).  If  understanding  visual  language 
requires  simulations  in  visual  areas  of  the  brain,  then  processing  visual  stimuli 
should affect how visual language is comprehended, because both processes involve 
the same systems. I provided evidence for this effect with speed language in Chapter 
4 whereby visual lines moving at a fast or slow speed affected comprehension of fast 
and slow verbs. 
The proposal that we understand meaning by activating the brain’s sensory systems 
also leads to the converse prediction that processing language about visual features 
will affect visual perception processes, or more specifically here, that processing 
language  about  speed  will  affect  speed  perception  processes  (the  ‘bidirectional 
hypothesis’ (Aravena et al. (2011)). There is growing evidence for this reciprocal 
relationship between language and visual perception. Research conducted by Zwaan 
et al (e.g. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, Zwaan et al., 2002, Zwaan et al., 2004) using 
cross modal priming shows that simulations of sentence meaning include specific 
information about visual features that affects responses to pictures. Participants read 
sentences that described objects in a particular location, with the location implicitly 
modifying either the shape or the orientation of the described object, and then had to 
respond as to whether or not a presented picture was mentioned in the sentence. 
Picture  responses  were  faster  when  the  shape  or  orientation  of  the  object  in  the 
picture matched that of the object described in the sentence, compared to when they 
did not, even though these features were never explicitly mentioned in the sentence.   
As  reviewed  in  Chapter  2,  further  evidence  for  the  effect  of  language  on  visual 
processing can be found in imaging studies, showing that visual language activates 
visual processing areas of the brain (e.g. Pulvermüller & Hauk 2006; Simmons et al.  
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2007; Martin et al. 1995; van Dam et al. 2010). Despite the popularity of fMRI for 
the localization of cognitive functions, some have argued that the spatial resolution 
of fMRI does not allow one to define whether the regions activated are the same as 
those used in actual visual perception, or instead neighbouring regions that could 
have computationally distinct capabilities (Dils & Boroditsky, 2010). Further, from 
these  activations  language  processing  cannot  be  disentangled  from  imagery 
processes (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). 
An issue with many existing behavioural investigations in language and perception 
interactions is that they may not demonstrate an automatic effect of language on 
perception but instead occur via a more explicit, inferential process taking place after 
the meaning of the linguistic stimuli has been retrieved (see section 1.5.2, Chapter 1). 
This second process could easily be explained by a disembodied, modular theory of 
semantics in which semantics and perception are independent systems that do not 
interact  during  online  processes  (e.g.  Mahon  &  Caramazza,  2008).  In  the  cross-
modal  priming  studies  of  Zwaan  and  colleagues  (e.g.  Stanfield  &  Zwaan,  2001, 
Zwaan et al., 2002, Zwaan et al., 2004), participants judge whether a picture matches 
the object described in a sentence, explicitly linking language with the visual percept. 
This task also involves other processes such as object recognition and short-term 
memory. It is possible then that these effects occur at later, higher-order processing 
stages, rather than in low-level visual perception areas, but this paradigm cannot 
distinguish between these different stages. Furthermore, using response time as a 
measure  does  not  guarantee  that  the  correct  process  is  being  measured  because 
response time encompasses all stages of processes in a decision (Meteyard et al., 
2007). Participants may (implicitly or explicitly) generate task based expectations 
that lead to facilitation/interference effects such as those observed in previous studies 
that  could  affect  low-level  visual  processes.  This  would  be  evidence  for  a  close 
relationship  between  language  comprehension  and  non-linguistic  tasks,  but  not 
evidence for embodied activations (Meteyard et al., 2007) including views falling 
within both the weak and strong end of the embodied continuum (Meteyard et al., 
2012; see section 1.3.2.1. Chapter 1 and Figure 1-2). The question remains then  
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whether the “high level” process of language comprehension can affect “low-level” 
perceptual processes that are putatively more rapid.  
Preliminary evidence suggests that language comprehension effects in other semantic 
domains do engage low-level perceptual mechanisms. Using a similar crossmodal 
paradigm to Zwaan and colleagues (e.g. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, Zwaan et al., 
2002,  Zwaan  et  al.,  2004),  Hirschfeld,  Zwitserhood  and  Dobel  (2011)  had 
participants read sentences and decide whether a presented picture was described in 
the sentence or not. The picture was either mentioned or not (e.g. the ranger saw the 
duck in the lake) and could be of matching or different shape (e.g. sitting duck versus 
flying duck). Using MEG, modulations in the response of occipital regions were 
found to reflect mismatch in object shape between pictures and sentences, as early as 
120ms  after  picture  onset.  Thus,  top-down  semantic  information  affected  visual 
processing at early stages.  
Using  methods  and  measures  from  visual  perception  research,  such  as  signal 
detection  theory  or  discrimination  thresholds,  can  aid  in  drawing  the  boundary 
conditions of these embodied effects. These methods allow the visual processes that 
are engaged in language comprehension to be better defined by providing measures 
of perceptual performance that separate perceptual sensitivity from bias. Sensitivity 
is a measure of low-level perception describing one’s ability to separate perceptual 
signal from noise. Bias instead reflects one’s internal response criteria and is shown 
to be more susceptible to high-level influences (e.g. Morgan, Dillenburger, Raphael 
& Solomon, 2012). 
Signal detection theory has been used in the embodied framework to address whether 
words referring to upwards and downwards motion affect visual direction perception 
(Meteyard et al., 2007; Pavan et al., 2013; Francken et al., 2014). Meteyard et al. 
(2007)  used  a  threshold  motion  detection  task  in  which  participants  indicated 
whether  they  saw  motion  or  not  in  a  visual  stimulus  containing  random  dot 
kinematograms  (RDKs)  whilst  passively  listening  to  motion  verbs.  At  threshold 
levels  of  visible  motion  it  was  found  that  low-level  visual  motion  detection,  as  
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measured  by  perceptual  sensitivity  (d’),  decreased  when  heard  motion  verbs 
described motion in the same direction as that of the visual motion.  Furthermore, 
measures of internal bias (or criterion (C)) were found to be lower for congruent 
stimuli than incongruent stimuli.  This lower criterion suggests that participants were 
more liberal in deciding that coherent motion was present when words and direction 
of motion were congruent. Differences in decision criteria could be explained by 
modular theories (Fodor, 1983), where language and perception systems are separate, 
domain-specific systems. A modular theory would permit semantic and perceptual 
information to interact at later processing stages once a word is understood, but these 
theories could not account for effects in measures of sensitivity. Pavan et al. (2013) 
sought to further test the interaction found in Meteyard et al. (2007) in order to rule 
out  any  modular  explanations.  Using  a  modified  version  of  the  task  in  which 
participants had to decide whether they perceived upwards or downwards motion in 
random dot kinematograms (rather than coherent versus random motion), Pavan et 
al. (2013) parametrically varied the onset of the visual stimuli to be simultaneous 
with the presentation of the auditory word (0 ms) or 150, 450 or 1000 ms after word 
presentation. Results showed that direction discrimination sensitivity was higher for 
congruent  stimuli  compared  to  incongruent  stimuli  and  that  this  difference  was 
largest when the visual stimuli occurred 450 ms after word onset, the time at which 
semantic information from the word would be available. These results suggest that 
there are top-down influences from semantics to processes involved with motion 
perception. However, Francken et al. (2014) failed to find effects of visual language 
on perceptual sensitivity but instead found effects on criterion and response time 
measures. Further, using fMRI they localised the interaction of language and vision 
to the left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG), an area in the typical language network 
thought to be involved in integration of modality-specific information and lexical 
retrieval,  rather  than  areas  implicated  in  motion  perception  (e.g.  hMT+).  This 
suggests that embodied effects are happening at the semantic and not the perceptual 
level. One reason for the discrepancies between studies could be temporal details of 
presentation: both Meteyard et al. (2007) and Pavan et al. (2013) presented words 
and motion stimuli simultaneously, but Francken et al. (2014) presented a single  
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word before each motion stimulus. Thus, the temporal overlap between language and 
perception may be a crucial factor. 
Here  I  assess  whether  low-level  language-vision  interactions  generalize  across 
domains to speed words. I use a standard psychophysical methodology to test the 
prediction that listening to speed words will affect visual discrimination of speed. 
The  prediction  is  that  when  hearing  words  that  describe  a  certain  speed  visual 
regions activated maximally at fast or slow speeds will be activated and subsequently 
affect  performance  on  the  speed  discrimination  task.  Here  I  use  the  method  of 
constant stimuli (e.g. Johnston, Benton & Morgan, 1999) to test this prediction. In 
this method participants are familiarized with a sine wave grating moving at a fixed 
‘standard’ speed and have to decide whether subsequent gratings are moving faster 
or slower. This type of stimuli is thought to activate early visual stages up to V1, in 
comparison to methods assessing global motion detection (Hietanen, Crowder, Price 
& Ibbotson, 2007) such as the RDKs used in Meteyard et al. (2008), which tap 
higher  stages,  predominantly  area  MT/hMT+  (Salzman,  Murasugi,  Britten  & 
Newsome, 1992; Newsome & Pare, 1988; Rudolph & Pasternak, 1999; Schenk & 
Zihl, 1997). Whilst completing the task participants passively listen to fast and slow 
motion verbs. By presenting words simultaneously with the visual task I can test the 
effect  of  word  speed  on  all  levels  of  processing.  This  method  provides  two 
psychophysical measures: speed discrimination threshold that denotes the smallest 
difference  in  speed  that  a  participant  can  reliably  detect,  and  point  of  subjective 
equality, or perceived speed, that denotes the perceived speed of the standard grating. 
Using this method I can assess the effect of speed words on perceptual sensitivity 
(speed discrimination threshold) and decision criteria (perceived speed) (Morgan et 
al.,  2012).  If  there  is  an  interaction  between  speed  words  and  low-level  visual 
processes,  effects  should  be  seen  in  measures  of  speed  discrimination  threshold. 
Alternatively,  should  interactions  occur  at  later  processing  stages  then  an  effect 
should be observed in measures of perceived speed. Based on the interactive nature 
of the visual processing system, effects could be observed in both measures, with  
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interactions  in  low-level  sensory  regions  feeding  forward  to  affect  later  decision 
processes. 
To summarize, the present experiment builds upon the work conducted in Chapter 4 
that provided evidence for speed simulation in word comprehension by assessing the 
converse  effect:  whether  speed  words  affect  visual  perception.  Further,  these 
experiments test whether speed simulations are found in low-level sensory regions 
where speed perception takes place, or at later, decisional stages. Based on the results 
of Chapter 4, that responses to words were facilitated when the visual stimulus and 
word meaning matched in terms of speed (and not also details about effector), here I 
predict that performance in the speed discrimination task will be higher when there is 
congruency between word speed and standard speed. That is, performance should be 
better at slow speeds when listening to slow words compared with fast words, and 
vice versa with fast words. 
5.1  Experiment 5-1: Fast, slow and neutral verbs 
5.1.1  Method 
5.1.1.1  Participants 
4
5 participants  (3  female,  average  age  =  24.75,  SD  =  1.89)  took  part  in  the 
experiment for payment. All participants were psychology students (postgraduate or 
undergraduate),  but  none  had  significant  experience  with  psychophysics 
experiments. 
5.1.1.2  Materials 
Visual  stimuli  were  luminance-modulated  sinusoidal  gratings  with  a  spatial 
frequency of 1 c/deg and a 50% Michelson contrast. Stimuli were presented on a 
CRT monitor (Mitsubishi Diamond Plus 230SB) with a refresh rate of 100 Hz and 
rendered online in Matlab using the Psychophysics toolbox extensions (Brainard, 
                                                 
5	 ﾠThe number of participants here was low, which could mean the study was underpowered. However, 
this experiment can be viewed as a pilot, as based on the four participants changes in the design were 
implemented in Experiment 5-2.  
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1997;  Pelli,  1997). Gratings  could  appear  in  8  possible  locations  on  screen  in  a 
notional circular aperture, 5 degrees from the centre. Gratings could move in either 
left or right direction, randomized over trials. Verbal stimuli consisted of 16 fast 
verbs (e.g. dash), 16 slow verbs (e.g. amble) and 16 motion verbs of neutral speed 
(e.g. go). See tables Appendix 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 for list of verbs. Verbs had previously 
been rated in a norming study as to their speed, as described in Chapter 4, section 
4.3.1.2.1. The verbal stimuli were recorded by a female speaker with an English 
accent, using Audacity. Slow verbs hade an average duration of 565 ms (SD = 75) 
and fast verbs had an average duration of 500ms (SD = 121). This difference was not 
significant (t (30) = 1.83, p = .08). 
5.1.1.3  Procedure 
Participants were seated 57cm from the computer screen, using a chin rest, in a dark 
experimental  room.  On  each  run,  participants  were  first  shown  8  examples  of 
gratings moving at the standard speed, one at each of the 8 possible locations. The 
standard  speed  could  be  1,  2,  3,  5  or  8Hz.  Gratings  were  shown  for  600ms. 
Participants were instructed to fixate the centre of the screen and try to internalize the 
speed of the standard grating. Participants then completed 12 practice trials in which 
they had to decide whether subsequent moving gratings were moving faster or slower 
than the standard speed.  Feedback was provided on all practice trials in order to 
establish an internalized memory for the standard speed. 
 
A  test  phase  followed  the  practice  phase.  The  experimental  task  was  the  same 
("faster or slower than standard speed?") in the two phases. However, in the test 
phase, no feedback was provided and participants passively listened to auditorily 
presented  words,  with  a  gap  of  1500ms  between  each  word.  This  duration  was 
chosen so that the presentation of words did not appear to be either fast or slow. The 
presentation of word types was blocked so that within each run, only one word type 
was heard. I used five different standard speeds (1, 2, 3, 5 and 8 Hz) in different 
sessions, whereas the comparison speed (i.e., the speed of a single drifting grating in 
each trial) varied between 0.6 * standard speed and 1.4 * standard speed in seven  
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steps  (see  Table  5-1)  in  order  to  generate  a  psychometric  function  (each 
psychometric function was built over 140 trials, i.e., 20 repetitions per each data 
point).  Each  comparison  speed  was  repeated  5  times  during  each  run.  Each 
combination of word type and standard speed was ran 4 times, resulting in a total of 
24 runs. Runs were presented pseudo-randomly so that the same standard speed did 
not appear consecutively. One run lasted approximately 3 minutes and the whole 
experiment lasted approximately 3 hours, which was divided into 3 separate sessions. 
At the beginning of each session, the participant completed one practice run which 
was thrown out. The participants were encouraged to take breaks throughout the 
experiment whenever they began to feel tired. Figure 5-1 illustrates the experimental 
procedure. 
5.1.1.4  Data analysis 
The first 5 trials of each run were removed from analysis. The data were fitted with 
cumulative Gaussian functions. The 50% point on the psychometric function (point 
of  subjective  equality)  provided  an  estimate  of  perceived  speed,  whereas  the 
discrimination threshold was defined as the width of the underlying Gaussian error 
distribution σ (corresponding to the difference between the 50% and the 84% points 
on  the  psychometric  function).  Analyses  were  conducted  on  point  of  subjective 
equality and speed discrimination threshold as a percentage of standard speed. A 
positive  point  of  subjective  equality  arises  when  the  standard  speed  is  perceived 
faster than its true speed and a negative point of subjective equality arises when the 
standard speed is perceived slower than its true speed (a value of 0 would mean the 
standard  speed  was  perceived  veridically).  For  speed  discrimination  threshold, 
increasing values reflect decreasing performance on the speed discrimination task: 
larger differences in speed between the standard speed and comparison speed are 
needed for the participant to reliably detect a difference. Response times were also 
recorded.  Each  measure  was  tested  with  a  repeated  measure  ANOVA  with  two 
factors: standard speed (1, 2, 3, 5, 8 Hz) and word speed (fast, slow). 
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Figure 5-1. Experimental procedure. Participants first observe and internalize standard speed 
(A) and then on experimental and practice trials decide whether gratings are moving faster or 
slower than the standard (B) whilst listening to words. 
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Table 5-1. Comparison speeds used for each standard speed 
Standard Speed (Hz)  Comparison Speeds (Hz) 
1  0.6, 0.84, 0.94, 1, 1.06, 1.16, 1.4 
2  1.2, 1.68, 1.88, 2, 2.12, 2.32, 2.8 
3  1.8, 2.52, 2.82, 3, 3.18, 3.48, 4.2 
5  3, 4.2, 4.7, 5, 5.3, 5.8, 7 
8  4.8, 6.72, 7.52, 8, 8.48, 9.28, 11.2 
5.1.2  Results 
5.1.2.1  Speed discrimination threshold 
Average  speed  discrimination  values,  as  a  percentage  of  standard  speed,  are 
displayed in Figure 5-2. There was a significant effect of standard speed (F (4, 12) = 
34.91, p <. 001, η
2
p =. 92) such that speed discrimination threshold was higher for 
lower standard speeds. This was supported by a significant linear effect of standard 
speed (F (1, 3) = 59.11, p <. 01, η
2
p =. 95). An effect of standard speed is not relevant 
to the hypothesis of interest because it does not reflect any interaction with word 
speed.  However  it  does  suggest  that  the  speed  discrimination  task  may  be  more 
difficult at lower levels of standard speed. There was no effect of word speed (F < 1) 
and no interaction between standard speed and word speed (F < 1). 
Thus  there  was  no  evidence  to  support  my  hypothesis  in  measures  of  speed 
discrimination threshold. 
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Figure 5-2. Average speed discrimination values, as a percentage of standard speed in 
Experiment 5-1. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
5.1.2.2  Point of subjective equality 
Average point of subjective equality values, as a percentage of standard speed are 
displayed in Figure 5-3. There was a significant effect of standard speed (F (4, 12) = 
11.6, p <. 001, η
2
p = .79) in which perceived speed was higher for lower standard 
speeds. This was supported by a significant linear effect of standard speed (F (1, 3) = 
26.72, p = .01, η
2
p = .9), however this is not theoretically relevant to the present 
hypotheses because it does not reflect any interaction with word speed. There was no 
effect of word speed (F <1) and no interaction between standard speed and word 
speed (F <1).  
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Figure 5-3. Average point of subjective equality values, as a percentage of standard speed in 
Experiment 5-1. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
5.1.2.3  Response times 
Responses for trials in which the comparison speed was the same as the standard 
speed were removed (14% of trials). Incorrect responses (27% of remaining trials) 
and responses outside 2.5 standard deviations of a participants mean response time 
were removed (less than 3% of correct responses). 
I only analysed responses to 3, 5 and 8 Hz (overall accuracy for 1 and 2Hz was less 
than 75%). A 3 (standard speed) X 3 (word type) within subjects ANOVA was used. 
I found no effect of standard speed (F <1), no effect of word type (F (2, 6) = 2.53, p 
= .16, η
2
p = .46) and no interaction between standard speed and word type (F (4, 12) 
= 1.39, p = .3, η
2
p = .32) in response time. Mean response times are displayed in 
Figure 5-4. 
I decided to divide responses into “faster” responses (when the comparison grating 
was  moving  faster  than  the  standard  speed)  and  “slower”  responses  (when  the 
comparison grating was moving slower than the standard speed), because the relative 
speed of the comparison stimulus to the standard stimulus may also be a factor that 
interacts with word speed.  
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For “faster” responses, a 3 (standard speed) X 3 (word type) within subjects ANOVA 
found  no  effect  of  standard  speed  (F<1),  no  effect  of  word  type  (F<1)  and  no 
interaction between standard speed and word type (F<1). Mean “faster” response 
times are displayed in Figure 5-5. 
For  “slower”  responses  a  3  (standard  speed)  X  3  (word  type)  within  subjects 
ANOVA found a main effect of word type (F (2, 6) = 9.42, p = .01, η
2
p = .76) with a 
Bonferonin-corrected alpha level of .025, for dividing responses into ‘’faster’’ and 
‘”slower’’ post-hoc. 2-tailed t-tests showed that response times during slow words 
were faster than during fast words (t (3) = 3.75, p = .03, d = 2.17) and faster than 
during neutral words (t (3) = 2.38, p = .1, d = 1.37), but this was not significant 
according to the corrected alpha level. There was no difference in response times 
during fast words and during neutral words (t (3) = 2.06, p = .13, d = 1.19). This 
result suggests that responses are facilitated when the speed of words matches the 
speed of the comparison (i.e. whether the comparison speed is “faster” or “slower”), 
for “slower” responses only. However, as inferred from the graph, this effect only 
occurs at 5Hz and 8Hz, but not at 3Hz. There was no effect of standard speed (F<1) 
and no interaction between standard speed and word type (F (4, 12) = 1.73, p = .21, 
η
2
p = .37). Mean “slower” response times are displayed in Figure 5-6. 
  
     
 
154 
 
Figure 5-4. Average response time in Experiment 5-1. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
 
Figure 5-5. Average response time for “faster” responses only in Experiment 5-1. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
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Figure 5-6. Average response time for “slower” responses only in Experiment 5-1. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
5.1.3  Discussion  
Experiment 5-1 did not find any effect of word type on psychophysical measures but 
did  find  an  effect  on  measures  of  response  time.  This  suggests  that  processes 
involved in comprehension of speed words and visual perceptual processes may not 
interact  at  low  levels  of  perception,  but  instead  during  higher  order  response 
decisions. 
Before discussing the implications of this result I decided to address some problems 
with the current design. Experiment 5-1 was very long and this may have had an 
adverse  effect  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  verbal  stimuli  for  two  reasons.  First, 
participants became sleepy and attention towards the spoken words may have been 
limited. Second, it is possible that retrieval of the meaning of the words was reduced 
the more each word was repeated. This effect is known as semantic satiation (e.g. 
Smith & Klein, 1990). Therefore, in Experiment 5-2 the length of the experiment 
was reduced. This was achieved by removing the neutral motion word-type because 
it was not crucial to the hypotheses (the comparison of interest was between fast and 
slow verbs). The number of standard speeds was also reduced to three (3, 5 and 8Hz) 
based  on  the  very  low  accuracy  for  1  and  2Hz  in  Experiment  5-1  (<  75%). 
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Additionally  the  duration  of  gratings  was  reduced  to  300ms  as  subjects  in 
Experiment 5-1 had been responding more quickly than 600ms and some participants 
commented that the presentation was too slow.  
5.2  Experiment 5-2: Fast and slow verbs only 
5.2.1  Method 
5.2.1.1  Participants 
7
6 participants  (6  female,  average  age  =  24.43,  SD  =  2.57)  took  part  in  the 
experiment for payment. All participants were psychology students (postgraduate or 
undergraduate),  but  none  had  significant  experience  with  psychophysics 
experiments. 
5.2.1.2  Materials 
Visual and verbal stimuli were identical to Experiment 5-1 except that the verbs of 
neutral motion were removed as well as standard speeds of 1 and 2Hz. 
5.2.1.3  Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 5-1 except that now gratings were shown 
for 300ms (half as long).  As the experiment now used only fast and slow verbs and 
standard speeds of 3, 5 and 8Hz, the number of runs was reduced to 24, with the 
whole experiment lasting approximately 1.5 hours, divided into 2 separate sessions. 
5.2.2  Results 
No effects or trends were found in response time for Experiment 5-2 and so will not 
be discussed further. 
                                                 
6 Again, this study may be underpowered. Meteyard, Bahrami & Vigliocco (2007) used 20 
participants in their motion detection task. Note however that when Experiment 5-2 and 5-3 are 
combined, results remain the same.  
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5.2.2.1  Speed discrimination threshold 
Average speed discrimination threshold values as a percentage of standard speed are 
displayed in Figure 5-7. There was no effect of standard speed (F <1), no effect of 
word speed (F (2, 12) = 2.21, p = .15, η
2
p = .27) and no interaction between standard 
speed and word speed (F<1).  
 
 
Figure 5-7. Average speed discrimination thresholds as percentage of standard speed for 
Experiment 5-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
5.2.2.2  Point of subjective equality 
Average values of perceived speed as a percentage of standard speed are displayed in 
Figure 5-8. A significant main effect of word type was found (F (1, 6) = 10.3, p = 
.02, η
2
p =. 63) such that perceived speed was overall lower for fast words than slow 
words. Planned comparisons found perceived speed was significantly lower for fast 
words than slow words at a standard speed of 3Hz (t (6) = 2.64, p =. 04, d = .99) but 
not at a standard speed of 5Hz (t (6) = .72, p = .51, d = .29) or 8Hz (t (6) = 1.18, p = 
.28, d = .48).  That is, at 3 Hz, the standard speed was perceived as moving more 
slowly when listening to fast words compared to slow words. There was no effect of 
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standard speed (F <1) and no interaction between standard speed and word speed (F 
(2, 12) = 1.67, p = .23, η
2
p =. 22).  
 
Figure 5-8. Average point of subjective equality values as a percentage of standard speed for 
Experiment 5-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
5.2.3  Discussion  
Results show that listening to speed words interferes with speed discrimination, as 
measured by perceived speed of the standard grating when discriminating between 
moving gratings of slow speeds (standard speed of 3Hz) but not between moving 
gratings  of  faster  speeds  (standard  speed  of  5Hz  and  8Hz).  This  suggests  that 
interactions between meaning inferred from the speed words and visual speed occur 
at later decisional processes (perceived speed), but only under certain conditions. 
 
Before  discussing  implications  of  the  results  I  decided  to  directly  replicate 
Experiment 5-2 in Experiment 5-3 with a new set of participants, since the effect was 
not found in Experiment 5-1. This would make sure that the observed pattern is 
reliable. 
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5.3  Experiment 5-3: Replicating Experiment 5-2 
5.3.1  Method 
5.3.1.1  Participants 
10 participants took part in the experiment for payment (6 females, average age = 
24.3, SD = 3.13). Seven participants were postgraduate psychology students with no 
significant experience with psychophysics experiments. The remaining 3 participants 
were taken from the UCL psychology subject pool. One participant was removed for 
accuracy less than 50%.  
5.3.1.2  Material and Procedure 
All material and the procedure were identical to Experiment 5-2. 
5.3.2  Results 
5.3.2.1  Speed discrimination threshold 
Average  speed  discrimination  threshold  as  a  percentage  of  standard  speed  is 
displayed in Figure 5-9. There was a significant main effect of standard speed (F (2, 
16) = 4.17, p = .04, η
2
p = .34) such that speed discrimination threshold was higher for 
lower standard speeds as confirmed by a significant linear effect of standard speed (F 
(1, 8) = 5.46, p = .05, η
2
p = .41). There was no effect of word type (F<1) and no 
interaction between standard speed and word speed (F (2, 16) = 2.52, p= .14, η
2
p = 
.24).  
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Figure 5-9. Average speed discrimination threshold as percentage of standard speed for 
Experiment 5-3. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
5.3.2.2  Point of subjective equality 
Average values of perceived speed as a percentage of standard speed are displayed in 
Figure 5-10. A significant main effect of word type was found (F (1, 8) = 10.49, p = 
.01, η
2
p =  .57) such that perceived speed was overall lower for fast words than slow 
words. Planned comparisons found perceived speed was significantly lower for fast 
words than slow words at a standard speed of 3Hz (t (8) = 2.4, p = .04, d = .8) but not 
at a standard speed of 5Hz (t (8) = 1.78, p = .11, d = .63) or 8Hz (t <1).  Thus, 
participants  perceived  the  standard  speed  as  slower  when  listening  to  fast  words 
compared  to  slow  words  when  the  standard  speed  was  3Hz.  There  was  also  a 
significant effect of standard speed (F (2, 16) = 8.07, p = .004, η
2
p =  .5), such that 
point of subjective equality was higher for lower standard speeds as confirmed by a 
significant linear effect of standard speed (F (1, 8) = 8.05, p =  .02, η
2
p = .5). There 
was no interaction between standard speed and word speed (F (2, 16) = 2.32, p = .13, 
η
2
p = .23).  
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Figure 5-10. Point of subjective equality as percentage of standard speed for Experiment 5-3. 
5.3.3  Discussion  
Results  show  that  listening  to  speed  words  interfered  with  visual  speed 
discrimination processing of moving gratings at slower speeds only (standard speed 
of 3Hz). The effect of word speed was only observed in measures of perceived speed 
and  not  speed  discrimination  threshold.  Listening  to  fast  words  lowered  the 
perceived speed of the standard grating compared with listening to slow words when 
the standard speed was 3Hz but not when it was a greater speed of 5Hz or 8Hz. This 
suggests that speed words reliably interact with visual speed processing at decisional 
levels only and not at levels of perceptual sensitivity. 
5.4  General Discussion 
The aim of the experiments presented here was to assess the level at which visual 
speed information interacts with semantic speed information of words. Participants 
completed a visual speed discrimination task at the same time as passively listening 
to fast and slow motion verbs. In Experiment 5-1 I failed to find an effect of word 
speed on speed discrimination measures but did find an effect in response time for 
“slower” responses only. This led to the suggestion that speed in language affects 
visual processes only via top-down processes from high-level semantic areas. An 
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alternative explanation for this effect is that the experiment was too long with words 
repeated multiple times, leading to reduced activation of speed-related meanings. I 
tested this idea with a modified version of the experiment that was significantly 
shorter. Using the shorter experiment, with two separate sets of participants I have 
shown  that  listening  to  words  describing  fast  and  slow  motion  affects  speed 
discrimination processes. Specifically there was an effect of word speed on point of 
subjective equality.  When passively listening to words that describe fast and slow 
motion  and  performing  a  speed  discrimination  task  with  a  slow  standard  speed 
(3Hz), the perceived speed of the standard was affected: perceived speed was slower 
after listening to fast words than after listening to slow words. In both experiments 
this effect was observed at 3Hz only. Overall results suggest that word speed affects 
decisional  stages  of  visual  perception  (perceived  speed)  however  there  were  no 
effects  on  perceptual  sensitivity  (speed  discrimination  threshold),  supporting  the 
view  that  interactions  between  word  meaning  and  perception  occur  at  higher 
processing levels. 
Thus, how do speed words affect the perceived speed of the standard stimulus? One 
explanation is that participants are more likely to respond in the opposite direction of 
the speed implied by the verb, because they attribute any matching speed to the 
verbal stimuli and not the standard speed stimuli. Francken et al (2014) suggest that 
language-vision  interaction  may  be  mediated  by  the  left  middle  temporal  gyrus 
(lMTG), a semantic area involved in the integration of modality-specific information 
as well as lexical retrieval. Thus, one explanation for the present data is that the 
speed of the comparison stimuli and the speed of the word were integrated. Here 
word speed would have affected how fast/slow the comparison was perceived. For 
example, when hearing words like “run dash etc.…” the fast speed implied by the 
verbs was integrated with the moving gratings, increasing the probability that the 
participant responded “faster”. 
Results do not show an effect of word speed on perceived speed at all standard 
speeds, but only when the standard speed is slow. It is likely that performance on the 
task is most difficult at 3Hz, making the stimuli more vulnerable to influence from  
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other  top-down  processes.  Speed  discrimination  is  poor  at  the  extremes  (i.e.  at 
extremely fast or slow speeds) (De Bruyn & Orban, 1988). In the current experiment 
I chose three standard speeds that were thought to cover a wide enough range of 
speed  (from  slow  to  fast)  without  it  being  too  difficult  for  the  participants  to 
complete the task. It may be the case though that 3Hz is closer to the extreme slow 
end  of  the  continuum  than  8Hz  is  to  the  extreme  fast  end.  Furthermore, 
discrimination performance is optimal for higher speeds when stimuli are presented 
at  greater  eccentricities  but  the  reverse  is  true  for  slower  speeds,  which  instead 
benefit  from  central  presentation  (Maunsel  &  van  Essen,  1983).  Both  pieces  of 
evidence point to increased difficulty at a standard speed of 3Hz. Here perception of 
the standard is more fragile because the gratings were presented in the periphery. 
Due to its fragility, it is more susceptible to influence from other processes, such as 
semantics.    Results  from  Pavan  et  al.  (2013)  support  the  view  that  semantic 
information is more likely to interact with perception when the sensory signal is 
reduced or the task is more difficult. In their direction discrimination task, listening 
to  direction  verbs  affected  perceptual  sensitivity  when  the  visual  stimuli  were 
presented at threshold but not when presented at suprathreshold. Pavan et al. (2013) 
describe  this  process  as  “cross-modal  compensation”,  that  allows  “a  processing 
system  (vision)  to  harness  information  from  other  brain  systems  (linguistic 
semantics)”.  When the processing system is already performing sufficiently it can 
work  in  a  “more  autonomous  manner”.    The  effect  of  speed  words  on  duration 
estimation shows a similar pattern to that found here. In Zhang, Jia & Ren (2014) 
participants had to decide whether the duration of a presented speed word was closer 
to 400ms or 1200ms. Fast words were perceived as longer than slow words when the 
actual  duration  of  the  presented  word  was  800ms,  but  not  at  other  comparison 
durations (800ms is exactly halfway between 400 and 1200ms and therefore reflects 
the most difficult condition of the experiment). The extent to which the visual system 
is vulnerable to information from other systems could therefore be determined by 
contextual and task factors, such as task difficulty.  
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Evidence from speech perception supports the view that perceptual processes are 
more easily influenced under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity (i.e. difficult 
conditions). Watching a speaker’s lip movements has been shown to enhance speech 
comprehension, and particularly in noisy environments (Sumby & Pollock, 1954; 
Erber,  1969;  Ma,  Zhou,  Ross,  Foxe  &  Parra,  2009).  Comprehenders  rely  more 
heavily on visual information as the signal to noise ratio increases (Erber, 1969). 
This effect has been termed “inverse effectiveness” (IE) (Ma, Zhou, Ross, Foxe & 
Parra, 2009; Senkowski, Saint-Amour, Hofle & Foxe, 2011). IE describes how a 
process is maximally enhanced by multisensory information when the unisensory 
stimulus is at its weakest. Based on this evidence, I cannot rule out the possibility 
that the effect of speed words on perceptual sensitivity (and not simply bias) could be 
observed using different tasks or contexts. For example, sensitivity effects could be 
found by making the speed discrimination task more difficult. Manipulations of the 
linguistic stimuli may also lead to greater simulations: using narratives instead of 
single words could lead to more of a global meaning structure and a greater exposure 
to the meaning (Dils and Boroditsky 2010). Based on the findings from Chapter 4 
that suggest that mental simulations include specific information about biological 
motion, here by manipulating the visual stimuli to be more similar to the type of 
motion  described  by  the  verbs,  word  speed  may  affect  the  speed  discrimination 
process more strongly.  
The present results are problematic for strongly embodied as well as unembodied 
theories of semantics (see Meteyard et al. (2012) for continuum of embodiment and 
Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.2.). Unembodied theories view semantics and perception as 
completely separable systems that are unable to interact. Strongly embodied theories 
propose  that  semantics  is  sensory  information  and  would  therefore  predict  that 
interactions would be observed at low-levels of perceptual processing. The results 
seem most compatible with a weak version of embodiment in which semantic and 
sensory information interact in regions of integration (e.g. lMTG) that are located in 
‘language  regions’  rather  than  perceptual  regions  (Francken  et  al.,  2014),  or  in 
convergence zones, near to but not in primary sensory regions (e.g. Barsalou, 1999a).  
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Secondary  embodiment  cannot  be  completely  ruled  out  with  the  current  data; 
however there are some suggestions as to why it should not be considered. It seems 
unlikely that associative connections between semantics and perception would be 
powerful  enough  to  affect  performance  on  a  psychophysics  task  that  is  very 
demanding, particularly when the linguistic stimuli are repeated several times and 
only passively perceived.  
Rather than seeing the current data as support for weak but not strong embodied 
theories in general, results can be seen as support for a weak theory of embodiment 
for  speed  language  specifically.  Previous  studies  have  found  evidence  for  word 
effects  on  perceptual  sensitivity  (Meteyard  et  al.  2007;  Pavan  et  al  2013)  for 
directional verbs. Since direction is more concrete than speed it could be the case 
that it is more strongly embodied than speed. In the real world, direction appears to 
be more easily perceived, interpreted and described than speed due to speed being 
continuous, relative and a more complex perceptual feature (Lingnau et al., 2009). 
As a clearly defined and salient property of the world, direction may be more easily, 
or more necessarily, grounded.  
In relating the work in this chapter to that of the previous, I have shown that in 
addition to perceptual speed affecting comprehension of speed words, the converse 
effect is also true: speed words affect perception of speed. In a similar way to how 
low-level, abstract perceptual speed does not affect comprehension of speed words, 
here interactions between semantic and perceptual speed do not occur at low-level 
sensitivity processing levels. Here however, I do find effects using abstract visual 
stimuli (moving gratings), but did not when investigating the effect of visual stimuli 
on verb comprehension in Chapter 4. Although these two findings seem at odds with 
each other, in the present experiment verbal and visual stimuli overlapped in time, 
whereas  in  Chapter  4,  visual  stimuli  occurred  before  verbal  stimuli.  Further,  the 
present tasks involves categorizing stimuli as “faster” or “slower” thereby providing 
a semantic interpretation for the visual stimuli that was not given in Chapter 4. Based 
on these factors then, the visual and verbal stimuli here overlapped to a greater extent  
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both in terms of time and semantic features than the abstract stimuli in Chapter 4 
thus created greater potential for interaction. 
5.5  Chapter conclusion 
This  chapter  complements  the  work  reported  in  Chapter  4  that  showed  that 
perceptual  speed  affects  speed  verb  comprehension  by  investigating  the  reverse 
effect: the effect of speed verbs on perception of speed. Further, the experiments 
investigated at what level of perceptual processing interactions with language occur. 
Listening to speed verbs affected performance on a speed discrimination task at the 
level of perceptual decision and not perceptual sensitivity. Results are in line with a 
theory of weak embodiment in which simulation of sensory information occurs in 
secondary  sensory  regions.  Following  from  Chapter  4,  the  work  here  highlights 
another  important  factor  that  affects  embodied  simulations:  task  difficulty. 
Interactions between language and sensorimotor stimuli appear to be more likely 
when one task is particularly difficult, and thereby more open to influence from other 
processes.  In  addition,  Experiment  5-1  further  highlights  the  effect  of  context  of 
embodied effects: when the experiment was long and words were repeated many 
times, no psychophysical effects were observed, only differences in response times. 
When the experiment was shortened, effects were observed in perceived speed. This 
suggests that the extent to which sensorimotor systems are recruited is dependent 
upon depth of processing and attentional factors.   
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Chapter 6  The influence of speeded actions and perceptual speed 
on comprehending sentences about fast and slow events  
Chapters 4 and 5 provided evidence for multimodal activation during the processing 
of  speed  presented  as  single  words.  In  this  chapter  I  move  forward  in  the 
investigation by exploring speed simulation in sentence comprehension.  Using a 
similar experimental paradigm to that of Chapter 4, I combine speeded sensorimotor 
experience with sentences that describe speed of motion/action (e.g. “The professor 
stormed/sneaked down the corridor”) and test for interference/facilitation effects in 
accuracy and response time for sentence sensibility judgments (reading a sentence 
and deciding if it makes sense or not). Using sentence sensibility judgments is the 
most  appropriate  method  here  as  it  requires  participants  to  fully  comprehend 
sentences and therefore access sentence meaning without having to make explicit 
judgments about semantic features (and thereby draw attention to the features being 
investigated). 
In  speed  sentences,  one  might  expect  a  larger  contribution  of  sensorimotor 
simulation than with single speed words since comprehension will require building a 
mental representation (Johnson-Laird, 1983), or situation model (Zwaan, 2004), of 
an  event  and  assigning  speed  to  specific  agents  in  specific  situations.  Sentences 
reflect token representations and are therefore more constrained and specified than 
single words (Meteyard, 2008).  In speed sentences, speed is not abstracted away 
from an event, as is the case for single verbs, but forms a component of an integrated 
event, giving it a more concrete meaning. The sentence context also removes any 
ambiguity about the verb. For example, the verb bolt could be interpreted as the noun 
bolt without any context, but in a sentence such as “The man bolted out of the room” 
the potential for misinterpretation is eliminated. Alternatively, one could reasonably 
predict  that  simulation  of  speed  will  be  reduced  for  sentence  comprehension 
compared  to  single  word  comprehension.  In  comparison  to  single  words,  the 
situation model built from comprehension of the sentence will include a variety of  
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other attributes such as agents and goals and their features, which could weaken or 
wash  out  the  simulation  evoked  by  a  speed  verb.  In  addition,  in  line  with  the 
Linguistic Focus Hypothesis (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008) that suggests simulation occurs 
only when an action is within linguistic focus and not when the focus switches to 
another aspect of an event, speed simulation may occur only for the verb itself. By 
using  a  measure  that  assesses  whole  sentence  comprehension  we  may  lose  the 
sensitivity to detect this. Bergen et al. (2007) argue however that mental simulations 
develop only when the meanings of single words are integrated into a larger sentence 
structure  and  not  for  lexical  associations  of  words  alone,  suggesting  that  speed 
simulations  should  be  observed  for  sentences.    Moreover,  previous  studies  have 
shown  that  behavioural  methods  can  reveal  motion  simulations  for  sentences, 
including simulations of motion direction in the visual (Kaschak et al. 2005; Zwaan 
et al. 2004), auditory (Kaschak et al. 2005) and action domain (Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002; Glenberg, Sato & Cattaneo, 2008). 
This chapter also adds to the thesis investigation by examining speed in different 
types of actions. I used four types of speed sentences: (1) full body speeded actions 
(speed verbs); (2) hand/arm speeded actions (speed verbs); (3) concrete actions with 
speed adverbs; (4) and abstract actions with speed adverbs. Sentence type 1 includes 
verbs of the same type as those used in Chapters 4 and 5. Here full body actions are 
described  in  which  speed  is  encoded  via  the  verb  (i.e.  the  action  and  speed  are 
combined  in  a  single  word),  e.g.  “The  professor  stormed/sneaked  down  the 
corridor”. Sentence type 2 includes actions that are performed with the hand/arm. 
Again, here the type of action and the speed of action are both encoded within a 
single verb, e.g. “Amy stroked her chin as she tried to remember” versus “Sarah 
smacked her head when she started to forget”. In sentence types 3 and 4 speed is 
encoded in adverbs that modify concrete or abstract actions that do not imply speed 
e.g.  “John  speedily/awkwardly  rolled  up  the  sleeping  bag”  and  “Bob 
speedily/awkwardly  thought over the business plan”.  By  including  four  different 
types of speed sentences I can assess whether simulation of speed is a general effect  
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or whether it is specific to certain types of actions and whether the nature of the 
simulation differs for different types of actions. Speed in full body actions may be 
more  salient  than  speed  in  hand/arm  actions  because  they  more  strongly  imply 
movement over a spatial distance whereas hand actions more strongly emphasise 
completion of a task or act (e.g. compare “Daniel rambled through the forest” with 
“Dave swung his bat toward the ball”).    It  is  also  likely  that  there  are  temporal 
differences in the development of the simulation between full body and hand action 
simulations  due  to  the  action  dynamics:  rambling  through  a  forest  may  involve 
simulating an action at a consistent speed for a lengthy duration but hitting a ball 
with a bat may involve simulating the quick swing of the bat as well as slower 
movements of action preparation. There may also be differences in the nature of the 
simulation in terms of the effectors and the type of posture involved.  
Including  sentence  types  3  and  4  addresses  simulation  of  speed  when  speed 
information is not encoded in the verb of action, but instead in a modifying adverb. 
The adverbs alone do not specify any information about the type of action, only the 
manner  in  which  an  action  is  executed  (i.e.  quickly  or  slowly).  Since  the  speed 
information is not strongly tied to the action (i.e. it is encoded in a separate word), 
speed simulation could be weaker than when speed is encoded within the action verb. 
Alternatively  speed  information  might  be  more  salient  because  it  is  not  hidden 
amongst  other  features  of  a  verb  but  presented  alone  in  the  adverb.  Finally,  by 
assessing  sentences  containing  adverbs  paired  with  concrete  actions  (e.g.  “John 
speedily/awkwardly rolled up the sleeping bag”) and adverbs paired with abstract 
actions (e.g. “Bob speedily/awkwardly thought over the business plan”), I can test 
whether speed simulations are specific to concrete speeded actions or whether they 
are also recruited to understand abstract speeded actions. As described in Chapter 1, 
embodied approaches often face difficulty when posed with abstract concepts. One 
way  in  which  abstract  concepts  could  be  embodied  is  via  the  use  of  metaphor: 
grounding  abstract  language  in  more  concrete  meanings.  For  example, 
comprehending a word like argue could involve the activation of a vertical spatial  
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metaphor  (Richardson,  Spivey,  Barsalou  &  McRae,  2003).  However,  some 
researchers  argue  that  embodied  simulations  occur  for  the  literal  meaning  of 
sentences  only  and  not  non-literal  meanings  (Bergen  et  al.,  2007).  For  example, 
literal sentences describing up- or down-related meaning (e.g. The cellar flooded) 
interfered with a concurrent object categorization task when the object appeared in 
the same part of the visual field as that described in the sentence, but non-literal 
versions of the sentences (e.g. The market sank) did not (Bergen et al., 2007). Here I 
can test whether fast and slow abstract sentences are understood by grounding those 
abstract actions in concrete action simulation of speed. 
To test speed simulation in sentences, I combined a sentence comprehension task 
with  a  manipulation  of  auditory  speed  and  physical  speed.  Each  manipulation  is 
presented separately below. 
6.1  Experiment 6-1: Manipulating Auditory Speed with Footsteps 
In Chapter 4 I showed that listening to fast and slow footsteps affected response time 
to fast and slow verbs, with responses slower when speed of footsteps matched speed 
of verb compared to when they did not match. Here I used the same footsteps stimuli 
to test the effect of auditory speed on comprehension of sentences describing speed. 
Footstep sounds have also been shown to successfully imply speed in other studies 
(Brunye et al., 2010): fast footsteps led to faster reading time of route descriptions 
and larger distance estimations than slow footsteps.  
In  order  to  maximize  the  potential  for  interaction  between  perceptual  speed  and 
speed in sentences, footsteps were played before and during the visual presentation 
of the sentences. Sentences take longer to process than single verbs so by presenting 
the footsteps simultaneously with the sentences the footsteps will be active at the 
point when speed information is extracted from the sentence. Additionally, speed 
information occurs at different points of the sentence across the four sentence types  
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so  this  will  ensure  that  the  overlap  of  footsteps  and  speed  information  in  the 
sentences match. This method is also comparable to that of Kaschak et al. (2005) in 
which directional white noise was played simultaneously with sentence presentation. 
Processing the sound of fast and slow footsteps whilst simultaneously completing a 
sentence task may affect some sentence types more than others due to shared features 
between  the  stimuli  and  the  simulation.  The  sound  of  footsteps  is  more  closely 
related to sentences that describe full-body actions than those that describe hand 
actions: footsteps reflect the sound made from full body actions. It could therefore be 
predicted that the speed of footsteps will only affect responses to sentences about 
full-body  actions  because  it  is  not  relevant  to  the  simulation  of  hand  actions. 
However, fast and slow footsteps may be processed in terms of a more general or 
abstract speed representation that overlaps with regions involved in comprehending 
speed in any sentence. 
If  speed  simulation  does  occur  then  hearing  speeded  footsteps  during  sentence 
processing should affect comprehension of those sentences. Responses to sentences 
should be different when the speed of the sentence matches the speed of footsteps 
compared to when they do not match. Because there is no clear explanation in the 
literature for the difference between facilitation and interference effects (see section 
2.4), I do not make a directional prediction in terms of an interaction.   
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6.1.1  Method 
6.1.1.1  Participants 
52
7 participants (35 females) took part in the experiment (mean age = 23.3, SD =4.9) 
for payment or course credit. One subject was removed for overall low accuracy (< 
75%). 
6.1.1.2  Material 
Full-body speed verbs and speed adverbs were rated according to their speed by 
seven  participants  (age  range  54-73,  average  58.9).  This  age  range  was  chosen 
because  I  intended  to  also  use  the  present  item  set  to  assess  comprehension  in 
Parkinson’s patients (Chapter 8), thus I needed ratings from healthy age-matched 
participants. Each rating session was divided into three sections: rating verbs for 
speed, rating adverbs for speed and rating verbs for valence. Valence values were 
used in the design of stimuli to be used in Chapter 8 (see section 8.1.2.3.). For speed 
ratings, participants were asked to rate how fast or slow the motion described by the 
word was on a scale of 1 to 7. A separate option of ‘none’ was available, placed 
outside of the speed scale. All verbs were preceded by ‘to’ so that only the verb 
meaning would be rated. For valence judgments participants were asked to rate how 
each  word  made  them  feel  on  9-point  scale  of  unhappy  to  happy  (following  the 
methodology used in Bradley & Lang, 1999). As a later consideration I decided to 
add verbs that described fast and slow hand/arm actions. Nine participants (age range 
25-43, average 28.9) rated all potential words online using the same 7-point scale as 
used for the other verbs.  
Verbs and adverbs were considered abstract if more than three participants had rated 
them as ‘none’ in terms of speed, all other verbs and adverbs were considered to be 
speed stimuli. However, abstract verbs were checked to ensure that their meaning 
                                                 
7 The choice of number of participants was based on Kaschak et al. (2005) who used a similar 
paradigm (48 participants).   
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was abstract, according to my intuition. If a word’s mean rating was greater than 3.5 
it was considered ‘fast’ and if its mean rating was less than 3.5 it was considered 
‘slow’. 
The lists of fast, slow and abstract full-body verbs (in past tense), fast, slow and 
abstract hand verbs (in past tense) and fast, slow and abstract adverbs that met the 
above  criteria  were  submitted  to  a  matching  program  ‘Match’  (van  Casteren  & 
Davis, 2007) which matched 20 triplets of fast, slow and abstract adverbs, 13 triplets 
of fast full-body, slow full-body and abstract verbs and 11 triplets of fast hand/arm 
verbs, slow hand/arm verbs and abstract verbs on number of letters, log frequency 
HAL,  number  of  orthographic  neighbours,  number  of  phonemes,  number  of 
syllables,  lexical  decision  response  time,  lexical  decision  accuracy  and  naming 
response time (when this data was available) as taken from the English Lexicon 
Project. However, not all adverbs fitted appropriately into sentences and so only 13 
triplets of adverbs were used. Full-body verbs and matching statistics are displayed 
in Table Appendix 1-6 and 1-7, hand/arm verbs and matching statistics are displayed 
in Table Appendix 1-8 and 1-9 and adverbs and matching statistics are displayed in 
Table Appendix 1-10 and 1-11. 
The matched words were placed into four types of speed sentences. Each sentence 
type was analysed separately:  
(1) 11 hand/arm speeded action sentences in which speed is encoded via the verb 
e.g. “Amy stroked her chin as she tried to remember” versus “Sarah smacked 
her head when she started to forget”. I was unable to fit the matched fast and 
slow hand/arm verbs into the same sentence because their meanings were so 
different. Thus, speed was manipulated between items and each participant 
saw both the fast and slow version.  
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 (2) 13 full-body speeded action sentences in which speed is encoded via the verb 
e.g.  “The professor stormed/sneaked down the corridor”
8.  Participants  saw 
either  a  fast  or  slow  version  of  each  sentence,  counterbalanced  across 
participants. 
 (3) 13 concrete action sentences in which speed is encoded with an adverb e.g. 
“John  speedily/awkwardly  rolled  up  the  sleeping  bag”.  Participants  saw 
either  a  fast  or  slow  version  of  each  sentence,  counterbalanced  across 
participants. 
 (4) 13 abstract action sentences in which speed is encoded with an adverb e.g. 
“Bob speedily/awkwardly thought over the business plan”. Participants saw 
either  a  fast  or  slow  version  of  each  sentence,  counterbalanced  across 
participants. 
Each speed sentence (both sentences with and without adverbs) was matched with an 
abstract sentence (using an abstract verb or adverb matched in the above process) in 
sentence length and several psycholinguistic features of the verbs. In addition to the 
initial matching of verbs for sentence types 1 and 2, and adverbs for sentence types 3 
and 4, as described above, for adverb sentences the verbs following each adverb were 
also matched across the three sentence types in number of letters, log frequency 
HAL,  number  of  orthographic  neighbours,  number  of  phonemes,  number  of 
syllables,  lexical  decision  response  time,  lexical  decision  accuracy  and  naming 
response time (see Table Appendix 1-12 1-13). In addition 39 grammatically correct 
nonsense  sentences  that  matched  experimental  sentences  in  length  and  syntactic 
structure were used e.g. The frog installed the pan in the joy (see Appendix section 
A2.1 for all sentences). 
                                                 
8	 ﾠIn comparison to hand/arm sentences, the actions described here are performed mainly with the legs 
but I will refer to them throughout the thesis as “full-body” rather than “leg” actions so that they are 
not confused with more stationary actions such as kicking.  
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The  same  adverbs  were  used  with  both  concrete  and  abstract  action  sentences 
(sentence types 3 and 4), therefore each participant saw one adverb with a concrete 
action  and  its  matched  adverb  with  an  abstract  action.  Figure  6-1  displays  the 
distribution of sentence conditions for two participants. 
The  sound  of  fast  and  slow  footsteps  was  taken  from  an  online  sound  database 
(www.freesound.org).  Both  sets  of  footsteps  sounded  like  a  person  walking  or 
running on gravel. The slow condition played footsteps at a rate of 93 steps per 
minute and the fast condition played footsteps at a rate of 194 steps per minute. 
6.1.1.3  Design & Analysis 
Speed of footsteps and speed of sentence was a within subjects factor.  
For  hand  action  sentences,  sentence  speed  (fast,  slow  or  none  (abstract))  was  a 
between  item  manipulation,  and  all  participants  saw  all  sentences.  For  full-body 
sentences, participants viewed all abstract sentences but speed was a within item 
manipulation:  participants  viewed  either  a  slow  or  fast  version,  counterbalanced 
across participants. Similarly, for adverb sentences, participants viewed all abstract 
sentences with abstract adverbs but viewed an abstract sentence with either a fast or 
slow  adverb,  and  a  concrete  sentence  with  either  a  fast  or  slow  adverb, 
counterbalanced across participants.  
6.1.1.4  Procedure 
The  experiment  was  presented  in  E-Prime  and  participants  were  tested  in  a 
soundproof testing booth. Fast and slow footsteps were played via headphones on 
every  trial  (50%  each),  starting  3000ms  before  presentation  of  the  sentence  and 
finishing  when  a  response  was  made  or  when  the  trial  timed  out  (5000ms  after 
sentence presentation). They saw the sentences presented on the computer screen and 
were asked to decide whether the sentence made sense or not by pressing ‘j’ on the  
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keyboard for ‘yes’ and ‘f’ for ‘no’. Example nonsense sentences were given and it 
was  emphasized  that  sensibility  was  based  on  meaning,  not  grammaticality. 
Participants  were  instructed  to  wear  headphones  and  were  informed  in  written 
instructions that they would hear the sound of footsteps during the task. Participants 
first  completed  six  practice  trials  with  feedback.  Sentences  were  presented  twice 
within  the  experiment,  once  with  each  speed  of  footsteps,  to  increase  statistical 
power. The experiment was divided into two blocks and participants could choose to 
take  a  break  midway.  Each  sentence  was  presented  once  in  each  block.  Both 
accuracy  and  response  time  were  recorded.  The  experiment  lasted  around  50 
minutes. 
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6.1.2  Results 
Items were removed from analysis if overall accuracy was less than 75%. This meant 
that  for  adverb-abstract  sentences  three  items  were  removed  and  for  full-body 
sentences one item was removed (an item including fast, slow and abstract version). 
Trials  were  removed  if  response  time  was  outside  2.5  standard  deviations  of  a 
subject’s mean response times (< 4%). 
Linear mixed effects models were used to analyse the data, with subjects and items 
as crossed random effects and sentence type and footsteps speed as fixed effects. 
Markov chain Monte Carlo approximation was used in all analyses to estimate p 
values.  I  first  report  a  model  including  all  three  sentence  types,  with  abstract 
sentences  as  the  reference  level  (Model  1).  I  then  report  a  model  with  abstract 
sentences removed, in order to compare fast and slow sentences types (Model 2). 
The  data  was  analysed  overall  as  well  as  by  Block  1  only,  as  sentences  were 
presented twice, once with each speed of footsteps. All results from Experiment 6-1 
are summarized in Table 6-1. 
6.1.2.1  Hand Sentences 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing fast and slow actions specifically performed with the hands (e.g. Rick 
shoved the bag behind the cupboard). An interaction between sentence speed and 
footstep speed is predicted for fast and slow sentences. 
6.1.2.1.1  Response time 
For response time across both blocks, Model 1 revealed that responses to abstract 
sentences were slower than responses to fast (β = -.1, t = 2.03, p = .04) and slow 
sentences  (β  =  -.11,  t  =  2.17,  p  =  .03).  This  effect  is  in  line  with  the  typical 
concreteness  effect  in  which  concrete  language  is  processed  faster  and  more  
 
 
 
179 
accurately  than  abstract  language  (Paivio,  1971,  1986,  2007;  Schwanenflugel  & 
Shoben, 1983). There was no effect of footsteps (t <1) and no significant interaction 
when  comparing  abstract  and  slow  sentences  across  footsteps  (t  <1)  or  when 
comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (β = .02, t =1.1, p = .27). For 
Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow sentences, no difference 
between fast and slow footsteps, and no interaction between the two (all ts < 1)  
When looking at block l only, Model 1 found responses to abstract sentences were 
marginally slower than responses to fast sentences (β = -.12, t  = 1.76, p = .08) and 
statistically slower than responses to slow sentences (β = -.15, t  = 2.3, p = .02). 
Neither the interactions nor the effect of footstep speed were significant (ts < 1). For 
Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow sentences, no difference 
between fast and slow footsteps, and no interaction between the two (all ts < 1)  
In  terms  of  the  present  hypothesis,  no  effects  of  an  interaction  between  footstep 
speed and sentence speed were observed in response time measures. LME predicted 
mean response times are displayed in Figure 6-1.  
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Figure 6-1. LME predicted response time for hand sentences in Experiment 6-1, both blocks (A) 
and Block 1 only (B).  
6.1.2.1.2  Accuracy 
Across  both  blocks,  Model  1  found  that  accuracy  for  abstract  sentences  was 
significantly lower than fast sentences (β = .7, z = 3.17, p < .01) and marginally 
lower  than  slow  sentences  (β =  .46,  z =  1.72,  p  =  .09).  There  was  no  effect  of 
footsteps (z < 1) and no significant interaction when comparing abstract and fast 
sentences across footsteps (β = -.18, z = 1.57, p = .11) or when comparing abstract 
and slow sentences across footsteps (z < 1). For Model 2, there was no difference 
between fast and slow sentences (β = -.26, z = 1.49, p = .14), no difference between 
fast and slow footsteps (β = -.09, z = 1.43, p = .15), and no interaction between the 
two (β = .2, z = 1.56, p = .12).  
When looking at block 1 only, Model 1 again found that accuracy was lower for fast 
sentences than abstract sentences (β = .66, z = 2.76, p < .001), but there was no 
difference between slow and abstract sentences (β = .54, z = 1. 31, p = .19). There 
was  no  effect  of  footsteps  (z  <1)  and  no  significant  interaction  when  comparing 
abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (β = -.21, z = 1.38, p = .17) or when  
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comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps (β = .17, z = 1.2, p = .23). 
For Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow sentences (β = -.16, z = 
1.48, p = .14), no difference between fast and slow footsteps (β = -.04, z = 1.54, p = 
.23), but there was a significant interaction between the sentence speed and footsteps 
speed (β = .38, z = 2.16, p = .03). The interaction shows that responses were more 
accurate when footsteps speed and sentence speed matched compared to when they 
didn’t match. However, the interaction does not quite meet a Bonferonni-corrected 
alpha level of .025 (required as looking at Block 1 only was a post-hoc comparison). 
Across  all  analyses  for  sentences  describing  hand  actions  responses  to  abstract 
sentences were less accurate than responses to fast and slow sentences, reflecting the 
“concreteness effect”. Critically, in line with my hypothesis I found a marginally 
significant interaction between sentence speed and footstep speed such that responses 
were more accurate when the two speeds matched (in block 1 only), reflecting a 
facilitation effect with matching speed. LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in 
Figure 6-2.  
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Figure 6-2. LME predicted accuracy for hand sentences Experiment 6-1, both blocks (A) and 
Block 1 only (B).  
6.1.2.2  Full body sentences 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing fast and slow actions specifically performed with the whole body (e.g. 
The professor stormed down the corridor). An interaction between sentence speed 
and footstep speed is predicted. 
6.1.2.2.1  Response time 
For response time across both blocks, Model 1 revealed that there was no difference 
between  abstract  sentences  and  fast  or  slow  sentences  (ts  <  1).  There  was  no 
interaction when comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps (β = -.02, t 
=1.4, p = .16) or when comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (t < 1). 
There was however, a significant effect of footsteps speed (β = .04, t = 2.26, p  = 
.02). For Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow sentences, no 
difference between fast and slow footsteps, and no interaction between the two (all ts 
< 1)   
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When  looking  at  block  l  only,  again  Model  1  found  no  difference  in  responses 
between abstract and fast sentences (β = -.05, t  = 1.28, p = .2) or abstract and slow 
sentences (β = -.06, t  = 1.16, p = .25). There was no interaction when comparing 
abstract and slow sentences across footsteps (β = -.02, t = 1.13, p = .26) or when 
comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (t < 1) and there was no effect 
of footsteps speed (t = 1.36, p = .17). For Model 2, there was no difference between 
fast and slow sentences (t < 1), no difference between fast and slow footsteps (β = -
.01, t = 1.11, p = .27), and no interaction between the two (β = t =1.03, p = .3)  
In  terms  of  the  present  hypothesis,  no  effects  of  an  interaction  between  footstep 
speed and sentence speed were observed in response time measures. LME predicted 
mean response times are displayed in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3. LME predicted response time for full body sentences in Experiment 6-1, both blocks 
(A) and Block 1 only (B). 
6.1.2.2.2  Accuracy 
Across  both  blocks,  Model  1  found  that  accuracy  for  abstract  sentences  was 
significantly higher than fast sentences (β = -.48, z  = 4.12, p < .001) but not slow  
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sentences (z = 1.3, p = .19). There was no effect of footsteps (z <1) and no significant 
interaction when comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (z < 1) or 
when comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps (z < 1). For Model 2, 
responses were less accurate for fast sentences than slow sentences (β = .22, z = 2.6, 
p < .01), there was a marginal effect of footstep speed (β = .07, z = 1.81, p = .07) and 
there was a marginal interaction between sentence type and footstep speed (β = .24, z 
= 1.9, p = .06).  
When looking at block 1 only, Model 1 found no difference in accuracy between fast 
sentences and abstract sentences (β = -.25, z = 1.68, p = .09) or between slow and 
abstract sentences (β = -.1, z = 1.04, p = .3). There was no effect of footsteps (β = 
.46, z = 1.63, p = .1) and no significant interaction when comparing abstract and fast 
sentences across footsteps (z <1) or when comparing abstract and slow sentences 
across footsteps (β = -.39, z = 2, p = .05), using a Bonferonni-corrected alpha of .025, 
for multiple comparisons (looking at Block 1 only is a post-hoc analysis). For Model 
2, there was a marginally significant difference between fast and slow sentences 
according to the adjusted alpha level (β = .22, z = 2.23, p = .03), with accuracy lower 
for  fast  sentences  than  slow  sentences.  There  was  also  a  marginally  significant 
interaction between sentence type and footstep speed (β = -.47, z = 2.22, p = .03), 
with sentences less accurate when speed of footsteps matched speed of sentence, 
than when they did not match. There was no effect of footstep speed (β = .04, z = 
1.82, p = .07). 
LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-4.  
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Figure 6-4. LME predicted accuracy for full body sentences Experiment 6-1, both blocks (A) 
and Block 1 only (B). 
6.1.2.3  Adverb sentences with abstract actions 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing abstract actions that are modified by adverbs (e.g. Bob speedily thought 
over the business plan.). By combining speeded adverbs with abstract actions I can 
test whether speed simulation can also be observed for actions that are not concrete. 
If speed is simulated then an interaction between sentence speed and footstep speed 
is predicted. 
6.1.2.3.1  Response time 
For response time across both blocks, Model 1 revealed that responses to abstract 
sentences were faster than fast (β = .04, t = 2.28, p = .02) and slow sentences (β = 
.04, t = 2.07, p = .03). There was no interaction when comparing abstract and slow 
sentences  across  footsteps  or  when  comparing  abstract  and  fast  sentences  across 
footsteps (ts < 1). There was however, a significant effect of footsteps speed (β = .05, 
t = 2.43, p = .01). For Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow  
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sentences, no difference between fast and slow footsteps, and no interaction between 
the two (all ts < 1)  
When looking at block l only, Model 1 found no difference in responses between 
abstract and fast sentences (β = .03, t  = 1.25, p = .21) or abstract and slow sentences 
(β = .04, t  = 1.16, p = .25). There was no interaction when comparing abstract and 
slow sentences across footsteps or when comparing abstract and fast sentences across 
footsteps (ts < 1) and there was no effect of footsteps speed (t < 1). For Model 2, 
there was no difference between fast and slow sentences, no difference between fast 
and slow footsteps and no interaction between the two (t < 1)  
In  terms  of  the  present  hypothesis,  no  effects  of  an  interaction  between  footstep 
speed  and  sentence  speed  were  found.  LME  predicted  mean  response  times  are 
displayed in Figure 6-5. 
 
Figure 6-5. LME predicted response time for abstract adverb sentences in Experiment 6-1, both 
blocks (A) and Block 1 only (B).  
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6.1.2.3.2  Accuracy 
Across  both  blocks,  Model  1  found  that  accuracy  for  abstract  sentences  was 
significantly higher than slow sentences (β = -3, z  = 3.18, p < .001) but not fast 
sentences  (z  <  1).  There  was  no  effect  of  footsteps  (z  <1)  and  no  significant 
interaction when comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (z  <1) or 
when comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps (β = .18, z = 1.52, p = 
.13).  For  Model  2,  responses  were  less  accurate  for  slow  sentences  than  fast 
sentences (β = -38, z = 3.06, p < .01), there was no effect of footstep speed (z < 1) 
and no interaction between sentence type and footstep speed (β = .26, z = 1.6, p = 
.11).  
When looking at block 1 only, Model 1 found that accuracy was lower for slow 
sentences than abstract sentences (β = -.33, z = 2.69, p < .01), but there was no 
difference  between  fast  and  abstract  sentences  (z  <  1).  There  was  no  effect  of 
footsteps (β = -.04, z = 1.63, p = .1) and no significant interaction when comparing 
abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (z <1) or when comparing abstract and 
slow sentences across footsteps (β = .22, z = 1.37, p = .17). For Model 2, there was a 
significant difference between fast and slow sentences (β = -.47, z = 2.25, p = .02), 
with accuracy lower for slow sentences than fast sentences (Bonferonni-corrected 
alpha of .025). There was no interaction between sentence type and footstep speed 
and no effect of footstep speed (zs < 1). 
LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-6.  
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Figure 6-6. LME predicted accuracy for abstract adverbs sentences Experiment 6-1, both blocks 
(A) and Block 1 only (B). 
6.1.2.4  Adverb sentences with concrete actions 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing concrete actions that are modified by adverbs (e.g. John speedily rolled 
up the sleeping bag.). An interaction between sentence speed and footstep speed is 
predicted. 
6.1.2.4.1  Response time 
For response time across both blocks, there was no difference between fast and slow 
sentences (β = .05, t = 1.52, p = .13), no difference between fast and slow footsteps, 
and no interaction between the two (t<1)  
When  looking  at  block  l  only,  there  was  no  difference  between  fast  and  slow 
sentences (β = .05, t = 1.53, p = .13), no difference between fast and slow footsteps 
and no interaction between the two (t < 1)   
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Thus there was no support for the predicted interaction between footstep speed and 
sentence speed in response time measures. 
LME predicted mean response times are displayed in Figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-7. LME predicted response time for concrete adverb sentences in Experiment 6-1, both 
blocks (A) and Block 1 only (B). 
6.1.2.4.2  Accuracy 
When looking at both blocks together there was a marginally significant interaction 
between footstep speed and sentence speed (β =  .28, z = 1.89, p = .06).  Accuracy 
was higher when sentence speed matched speed of footsteps. There was no effect of 
footsteps (β = -.03, z = 1.41, p = .16) and no effect of sentence speed (β = -.09, z = 
1.72, p = .09) 
For accuracy by block 1 only, there was no effect of footsteps (β = -.16, z = 1.25, p = 
.21) no effect of sentence type (β = -.22, z = 1.46, p= .15) and no interaction (β =  
.31, z = 1.3, p = .2).   
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LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-8. 
 
Figure 6-8. LME predicted accuracy for concrete adverbs sentences Experiment 6-1, both 
blocks (A) and Block 1 only (B). 
6.1.3  Discussion  
There  was  an  effect  of  footsteps  speed  in  two  sentence  conditions  (full  body 
sentences  and  adverbs  with  abstract  actions  sentences)  in  which  responses  were 
slower  with  slow  footsteps.  This  suggests  that  the  slow  footsteps  actually  prime 
slower movements.   
For both the hand and full body sentence sets, response time was longer for abstract 
sentences compared to fast and slow sentences. This is evidence of the concreteness 
effect (see Chapter 1 for discussion), often observed in the literature (Paivio, 1971; 
1986; 2007; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). 
The central findings of the experiment however are that the predicted interaction 
between footstep speed and sentence speed was observed across sentences describing 
hand  actions,  full  body  action,  and  concrete  actions  with  adverbs,  in  accuracy  
 
 
 
191 
measures. The interactions however, just fell short of statistical significance. The 
direction and timing of the marginally significant interactions (in terms of whether 
the  effect  was  observed  across  both  blocks  or  in  the  first  block  only)  differed 
between sentence sets. For hand sentences, an interaction was observed in block 1 
only.  This  interaction  reflected  more  accurate  responses  for  matching  speed 
conditions  compared  to  non-matching  speed  conditions.  This  facilitation  effect 
suggests that sentence processing and auditory processing share a common resource 
in terms of speed and that preactivation of this resource by sounds leads to greater 
comprehension of sentences matching in speed. That the effect was only observed in 
block  1  suggests  that  comprehension  is  shallow  in  the  second  block  of  the 
experiment where the same sentences are presented again because participants easily 
recognize  the  sentence  and  their  previous  response  and  do  not  have  to  fully 
comprehend the sentence. An interaction in accuracy scores was also observed for 
full-body sentences in block 1 only. However, the direction of effect differed to that 
for hand sentences in that responses were less accurate when the speed of a sentence 
matched  the  speed  of  footsteps.  This  again  implies  shared  resources  between 
sentence  speed  and  auditory  speed,  but  now  that  preactivation  of  this  resource 
interferes  with  comprehension  of  sentences.  For  adverb  sentences  with  concrete 
actions, interaction effects were found in the experiment overall but not at block 1 
only. One interpretation for this could be that effects with speed adverbs are weaker 
than with speed verbs and so more power is needed. Alternatively, speed effects with 
adverbs  may  take  a  longer  time  to  develop  than  with  speed  verbs.  For  adverb 
sentences with both concrete and abstract actions the pattern of accuracy was similar 
to that for hand sentences, with accuracy higher for matching conditions (although 
only with slow sentences for adverb sentences with abstract actions). Thus, across 
two  sentence  types  there  was  a  facilitation  effect  in  accuracy,  whereas  in  one 
sentence type there is an interference effect in accuracy. Why would the direction of 
effect be different for full body sentences?  
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Although  the  sound  of  footsteps  were  used  to  reflect  auditory  speed  relevant  to 
human  action,  the  sounds  themselves  specifically  reflect  full-body  actions  (i.e. 
running and walking) and not hand actions. Thus, they match the full-body sentences 
in terms of specific action features (using the legs/feet) but do not match the other 
sentences in this way. Note that the action verbs used in the adverb sentences with 
concrete actions were primarily actions performed with the hand/arms (e.g. press, 
pull, grasp) and thus could also be considered ‘hand sentences’. The difference in 
direction of the interaction in accuracy could therefore be explained by the degree of 
match  between  the  auditory  stimulus  and  the  actions  described  in  the  sentence 
(similar to the results of Chapter 4). When there is a match in both speed and action 
type  (e.g.  fast  footsteps  and  fast  full-body  action  sentences),  there  is  a  complete 
overlap in processing and the system is fully saturated. There are therefore little 
resources available to process the sentence. Conversely, when there is only a match 
in speed and not in action type (e.g. fast footsteps and fast hand action sentences) 
there is only partial overlap in processing. This partial activation will then act as a 
boost in the processing of the sentence (a “head start”). 
Effects  are  only  found  in  accuracy  measures  however  most  embodied  findings 
typically find effects in response time (e.g. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al., 
2002;  Zwaan  et  al.,  2004).  One  could  argue  that  effects  in  accuracy  suggest  a 
stronger effect than an effect in response time: rather than simply interfering and 
slowing  down  processing,  participants  actually  make  mistakes.  It  seems  more 
problematic to make more mistakes than to simply get to the correct answer more 
slowly. In Chapter 4 I found an effect of footsteps on response time in a lexical 
decision task. However, a sentence sensibility task may be more difficult than the 
lexical decision task. Due to the prevalent use of metaphor in language, many of the 
nonsense sentences may not so obviously be “nonsense”. The increased difficulty of 
the task may have made accuracy measures more sensitive. Thus it is possible that 
interaction effects in accuracy would be observed for the lexical decision task in  
 
 
 
193 
Chapter 4 if it were a more difficult task. However, the non-words were designed to 
be very word-like so it is not clear how it could be made more difficult. 
As  a  manipulation  check  I  observed  effects  of  footstep  speed  in  response  time, 
showing  that  participants  sufficiently  processed  the  sounds.  Further,  I  have 
demonstrated  the  typical  concreteness  effect.    Across  three  sentence  sets  I  have 
observed  a  marginal  interaction  between  sentence  speed  and  footsteps  speed  in 
accuracy scores, however the direction of this effect appears to be dependent on 
specific  action  features  of  the  sentence  and  auditory  stimulus.  It  should  be 
emphasized however, that the results do not meet a Bonferonni-corrected alpha level 
(because the Block 1 analyses were post-hoc). Thus, the interaction effects should be 
replicated  again  in  another  experiment,  in  which  effects  in  only  Block  1  are 
predicted. Table 6-2 summarizes the main findings of Experiment 6-1. 
Experiment  6-1  suggests  that  auditory  speed  is  simulated  during  sentence 
comprehension.  The  chapter  now  moves  toward  another  domain  in  which  speed 
simulation may be observed: action. 
Table 6-2 Summary of results Experiment 6-1. A single tick mark indicates a significant effect in 
response time and a tick mark within a box indicates a significant effect in accuracy. Only 
effects with p-values< 0.05 are included. 
Hand sentences 
 
  All blocks    Block 1   
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Footstep Speed         
Sentence Type 
Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
         
￼ ￾   
￼ 
                     
 
   
 
￾     
￼ 
 
 
Footsteps * Sentence Type                
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Full-body sentences 
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Adverb sentences (abstract) 
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Footsteps * Sentence Type 
Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
       
 
 
 
 
Adverb sentences (concrete) 
 
  All Blocks     Block 1   
  Model 1  Model 2 
Footstep Speed     
Sentence Type 
Fast vs. Slow 
     
Footsteps * Sentence Type 
Fast vs. Slow 
            
 
6.2  Experiment 6-2: Manipulating Speed of Physical Action 
So far this thesis has addressed the perceptual simulation of speed. As described in 
the literature review (Chapter 2) there have also been many studies showing motoric 
simulation for action language (e.g. Rueschemeyer et al., 2010; Buccino et al., 2005; 
Boulenger et al., 2009; Hauk et al., 2004). That is, when understanding action words, 
parts of the motor and premotor cortex (systems involved in planning and executing 
actions) are recruited. The meaning of words and sentences about speed of actions is 
likely to include both perceptual information of different modalities (see Chapter 4) 
and  motoric  information.  To  simulate  the  meaning  of  a  word  like  run one  may 
simulate the perceptual experience of watching another person running, as well as 
the motoric experience of planning and executing a run with one’s own body (as well 
as associated perceptual experiences). Results so far within the literature show that 
action simulations include specific information such as direction of action  (Glenberg  
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& Kaschak, 2002) and effector used in the action (Hauk et al., 2004), but what about 
more  fine-grained  parameters  of  action?  It  is  unclear  to  what  extent  action 
simulations mirror real-world action. For example, action simulations may include 
coarse  action  representations,  coding  for  salient  features  such  as  effector  and 
direction, but they may not contain fine-grained temporal and spatial features that 
real-world actions require for precision. By addressing the motoric simulation of 
speed  in  sentences  I  expand  on  previous  research  and  further  explore  the  action 
simulations that arise during comprehension of action sentences.  I do this by using 
the same sentences from Experiment 1 and assessing the effect of speeded actions on 
their comprehension. If action simulations are sensitive to parameters that are vital 
for accurate real-world motor behaviours, then I expect that speed of action is coded 
in simulations. 
Participants’ speed of movement was covertly manipulated by attaching wraps with 
or without weights to their arms and legs. They then completed a movement task in 
order  to  experience  moving  at  a  normal  versus  slowed  pace.  Participants  then 
completed the same sentence sensibility task as in Experiment 6-1. The procedure for 
this  experiment  differs  from  Experiment  6-1  due  to  constraints  involved  with 
manipulating  speed  of  physical  movement.  Manipulating  speed  of  action  during 
sentence processing may lead to unwanted attentional demands and further, forcing 
participants’  actions  to  be  fast  or  slow  may  interfere  with  measurements  of 
comprehension (reaction time), washing out any effect of the interaction between 
sentence speed and action speed For instance, if participants are moving fast due to 
the  action  manipulation  it  may  be  difficult  to  detect  whether  responses  to  the 
language stimuli are facilitated. Thus, I decided to manipulate action speed before 
presenting participants with the sentence task. Elsewhere studies have shown that 
sufficient motor experience before a language task can lead to changes in processing 
of action language. According to the Body Specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009), 
any changes in body experience should subsequently lead to changes in the way that 
language  about  the  body  is  understood.  For  example,  reading  words  referring  to  
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actions typically performed with the dominant hand led to different motor activity 
between right and left-handers (Willems et al., 2010). Similarly, Beilock et al. (2008) 
found that long-term experience of playing hockey led to faster comprehension of 
hockey  language  compared  to  novices.  Further,  it  has  been  shown  that 
experimentally induced motor experience can affect action language comprehension. 
Locatelli, Gatti and Tettamanti (2012) trained participants on a number of fine hand 
movements over a three week period and found performance on a sentence-picture 
matching task for sentences about similar hand actions to be significantly faster after 
training than before training. In fact, training the motor system for only 20 minutes 
can induce comprehension effects: Glenberg et al. (2008) had participants move 600 
beans from one container to another with a movement either towards or away from 
the  body.  After  this  short  duration  the  motor  system  had  adapted  to  a  particular 
direction and on a subsequent language task, responses were facilitated for sentences 
describing movement in a matching direction. 
Here I used a motor task in which participants moved cans to specified locations on a 
table a fixed number of times. I covertly manipulated the speed of movement of the 
participants by instructing them to wear arm and ankle wraps that either contained 
weights or were empty. Wearing weights in the wraps leads to slow arm and leg 
movements and makes movement more difficult. After completing the motor task, 
participants sat down to complete the sentence sensibility task. In order to keep the 
link between the motor task and the sentence task hidden I created a cover story for 
both  tasks.  By  hiding  the  weights  within  the  wraps  and  attaching  non-functional 
electrodes  to  each  participant’s  legs  and  arms,  I  set  up  a  false  skin  conductance 
recording  device  and  informed  participants  that  they  would  participate  in  a  task 
assessing changes in skin conductance whilst producing large (can movements) and 
small (keyboard presses and eye movements in a sentence reading task) movements.  
If  wearing  weights  sufficiently  leads  to  slower  movements  then  I  predict  that 
comprehension  of  sentences  describing  slow  movements  will  be  quicker  than 
sentences  describing  fast  movements,  because  the  motor  system  will  be  in  a  
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matching  state  of  speed.  The  converse  is  predicted  when  no  weights  are  worn: 
responses will be faster for fast sentences than slow sentences. In sum, an interaction 
is predicted between weights (present or absent) and sentence type (fast or slow). 
Since the weights are attached to the arms and the ankles, I predict the same pattern 
in  full-body  sentences  and  hand  sentences.  If  abstract  actions  are  grounded  in 
concrete actions then I predict the same pattern for adverb sentences with concrete 
and abstract actions. 
6.2.1  Method 
6.2.1.1  Participants 
59
9 participants took part (44 female, average age 21.25, SD = 2.71). All participants 
were psychology students from the University of South Carolina, taking part for 
course credit. Three participants were removed for having overall accuracy less than 
75%, one participant was removed because they were dyslexic and two participants 
were removed for indicating scepticism about the skin conductance measurement. 
6.2.1.2  Material 
The same set of sentences was used as in Experiment 6-1  
6.2.1.3  Design  
Participants either wore arms and ankle wraps with weights (three pounds (0.9kg) on 
each wrist and five pounds (2.3kg) on each ankle) or arm and ankle wraps without 
weights, manipulated between subjects (28 with weights, 31 without weights). 
The experiment used the same sentences as Experiment 6-1, but each sentence was 
presented only once. 
                                                 
9	 ﾠSince weights was a between subjects condition, the number of participants needed to be larger than 
Experiment 6-1. Thus the study may be underpowered. Note that testing was still taking place in 
South Carolina during thesis submission.  
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6.2.1.4  Procedure 
6.2.1.4.1  Cover story 
In order to manipulate the weight worn by the subjects, I came up with a cover story 
for why they had to wear wraps, in order to hide the true aims of the study. Upon 
arrival at the experiment participants were told that they were participating in a study 
that investigates how skin conductance changes with small and large movements. 
Skin conductance would be measured whilst they completed a task in which they 
moved  cans  around  a  table  (large  arm  movements)  and  whilst  they  completed  a 
reading task on the computer (small hand movements and eye movements). They 
were told that wearing the wrist wraps increases the skin conductance recording, so 
that the signal would be maximized. 
After filling out the consent forms, four fake recording devices were fitted to each 
participant along with wraps that either contained weights or did not. Electrodes 
were  attached  to  the  forearms  and  calves  of  each  participant  and  simulated  a 
recording system. Wraps were placed around each subject’s wrist and ankles. For the 
weights condition, there were three weights in each arm wrap and five weights in 
each ankle wrap, with each weight weighing one pound. In order to make the cover 
story  more  believable,  two  experimenters  acted  out  a  process  of  checking  an 
electrode’s signal and subsequently altering its position. 
6.2.1.4.2  Movement task 
Participants were stood at one end of a table in front of an arrangement of five full 
tin cans. They were instructed to move the cans, one at a time, using alternate hands, 
to the other end of the table and place them in the same arrangement as indicated by 
stickers on the table. The length of the table was long enough so that participants had 
to move their legs as well as their arms to complete the task. At the point in which a 
can  was  put  in  the  correct  location,  the  participant’s  body  also  had  to  be  in  an 
indicated location so that they would actually move their body, rather than simply  
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stretch to complete the task. When all cans were placed at the other end of the table, 
participants had to move them back to the original position in the same manner. 
Participants had to complete this full cycle eight times. The time taken to complete 
the task was recorded covertly by an experimenter. 
The set-up of the movement task is displayed in Figure 6-9. 
6.2.1.4.3  Sentence sensibility task 
Participants were seated in front of a laptop after completing the movement task and 
the electrodes were checked again. They were again told that the purpose of this task 
was to make small movements with the hands and eyes. It was explained that eye-
movements were not being recorded but that we were measuring accuracy on the 
task to check that they were actually reading the sentences. 
The sentence sensibility task was then completed in the same way as Experiment 6-1 
except that now each sentence was presented only once. 
6.2.1.4.4  Debriefing 
After completing the sentence task the true aims of the experiment were explained to 
the participants and they signed a debrief form. They were also asked if they had 
realized  the  true  purpose  of  the  experiment  at  any  points  (two  participants  were 
sceptical and were removed from analysis).  
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Figure 6-9. Movement task in Experiment 6-2. Participants wore arm and leg wraps that did or 
did not contain weights and had fake electrodes attached to their arms and legs that were 
hooked up to a pretend recording device. 
6.2.2  Results 
Items were removed from analysis if overall accuracy was less than 75%. This meant 
that for adverb-abstract sentences five items were removed, for full-body sentences 
six  items  was  removed  and  for  hand  sentences  one  item  was  removed  (an  item 
including fast, slow and abstract version).   
Trials  were  removed  if  response  time  was  outside  2.5  standard  deviations  of  a 
subject’s mean response times (< 2%).  
6.2.2.1  Movement times 
As a manipulation check, I measured how long it took each participant to complete 
the movement task and compared the mean time for participants wearing weights to 
those  not  wearing  weights  (although  movement  time  for  one  participant  in  the  
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weights condition and one participant in the no weights condition were not recorded 
due to experimenter error). Independent t-tests found that there was a significant 
difference in movement times (t (50) = 1.77, p = .041, d = .49, one-tailed) with 
participants wearing weights taking longer than those without weights with a mean 
difference of 55.44 seconds (Figure 6-10). Therefore, the weights manipulation was 
successful: wearing weights slowed down movement speed compared to participants 
not wearing weights.  
 
Figure 6-10. Average time to complete movement task for weights and no weights conditions in 
Experiment 6-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
6.2.2.2  Hand sentences 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing fast and slow actions specifically performed with the hands (e.g. Rick 
shoved the bag behind the cupboard). An interaction between sentence speed and 
weights condition is predicted. 
6.2.2.2.1  Response time 
Model 1 revealed that responses to abstract sentences were marginally slower than 
fast (β = -.21, t = 1.73, p = .08) and slow sentences (β = -.23, t = 1.87, p = .06). There 
was no interaction when comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps or 
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when comparing abstract and fast sentences across footsteps (ts < 1), and no effect of 
weights (β = -.12, t = 1.64, p = .1).  For Model 2, there was no difference between 
fast  and  slow  sentences  and  no  interaction  between  the  two  (t  <1).  There  was 
however  a  significant  effect  of  weights  with  responses  faster  with  weights  than 
without (β = -.14, t = 1.95, p = .05). 
Thus there was no evidence for the predicted interaction between weights condition 
and sentence speed in terms of response time. LME predicted mean response times 
are displayed in Figure 6-11. 
 
Figure 6-11. LME predicted response time for hand sentences in Experiment 6-2. 
6.2.2.2.2  Accuracy 
In Model 1, there was no difference in accuracy between abstract sentences and fast 
(β = .88, z = 1, p = .31) or slow sentences (z < 1), and there was no effect of weights 
(z  <  1).  The  interaction  of  sentence  type  and  weights  condition  was  significant 
comparing only fast and abstract sentences (β = .54, z = 2.36, p = .02) and marginally 
significant comparing slow and abstract sentences (β = .29, z = 1.74, p = .08). Since 
both interactions were in the same direction, I decided to collapse across fast and  
 
 
 
204 
slow sentences and run the model again comparing abstract sentences with ‘’speed’’ 
sentences. This revealed a significant interaction (β = .37, z = 2.67, p < .01) such that 
responses to speed words were more accurate when wearing weights compared to not 
wearing weights, but the opposite pattern was observed with abstract sentences. For 
Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow sentences and no interaction 
(z < 1), but there was a main effect of weights, with accuracy higher when wearing 
weights compared to not wearing weights, reflecting the above interaction. 
Thus, the main prediction of an interaction between weights condition and sentence 
speed  was  partially  supported  in  that  responses  were  different  between  abstract 
sentences  and  speed  sentences  between  weights  conditions.  This  may  reflect  an 
effect of action in general rather than speed. 
LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-12. 
 
Figure 6-12. LME predicted accuracy for hand sentences Experiment 6-2.   
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6.2.2.3  Full body sentences 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing fast and slow actions specifically performed with the whole body (e.g. 
The professor stormed down the corridor). An interaction between sentence speed 
and weights condition is predicted. 
6.2.2.3.1  Response time 
Model 1 revealed that responses to abstract sentences were slower than fast (β = -.1, t 
=  2.45,  p =  .02)  and  slow  sentences  (β  =  -.09,  t  =2.38,  p =  .02).  There  was  no 
interaction when comparing abstract and slow sentences across footsteps or when 
comparing  abstract  and  fast  sentences  across  footsteps  (ts<1),  and  no  effect  of 
weights (β =, t = 1.82, p = .07).  For Model 2, there was no difference between fast 
and slow sentences, no interaction between the two (t <1) and no effect of weights (β 
= -.1, t = 1.39, p = .17). 
Thus, there was no support for the predicted interaction between weights condition 
and  sentences  speed  in  response  time.  LME  predicted  mean  response  times  are 
displayed in Figure 6-13.  
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Figure 6-13. LME predicted response time for full-body sentences in Experiment 6-2.  
6.2.2.3.2  Accuracy 
In Model 1 abstract sentences were more accurate than slow sentences (β = -.55, z = 
2.87, p < .01) but not fast sentences (β = -.62, z = 1.26, p = .21). There was no effect 
of weights (z <1) and no interaction of sentence type and weights condition when 
comparing only fast and abstract sentences (z <1) or slow and abstract sentences (β = 
.41, z = 1.45, p = .15). For Model 2, there was no difference between fast and slow 
sentences (β = .03, z = 1.64, p = .1) and no effect of weights (z <1). There was 
however a significant interaction between sentence speed and weights (β = .58, z = 
2.01, p = .04). 
In line with my hypothesis I found an interaction between weights condition and 
sentences speed such that when the speed of movement and speed of sentence match 
responses are more accurate. 
LME predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-14.  
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Figure 6-14. LME predicted accuracy for full-body sentences in Experiment 6-2.  
6.2.2.4  Adverb sentences with abstract actions  
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing abstract actions that are modified by adverbs (e.g. Bob speedily thought 
over the business plan.). By combining speeded adverbs with abstract actions I can 
test whether speed simulation can also be observed for actions that are not concrete. 
If  speed  is  simulated  then  an  interaction  between  sentence  speed  and  weights 
condition is predicted. 
6.2.2.4.1  Response time 
Model 1 showed that responses to abstract sentences were significantly faster than 
both fast (β = .06, t  = 2.33, p = .02) and slow sentences (β = .13, t = 3.58, p < .01). 
There was no effect of weights (t < 1) and no interaction between sentence type and 
weights when comparing abstract and fast (β = -.06, t = 1.64, p = .1) or abstract and 
slow (β = -.04, t = 1.32, p = .19). In Model 2, there was a marginal effect of weights 
(β = -.18, t = 1.89, p = .06) with responses faster when wearing weights compared to  
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not wearing weights, but there was no difference between fast and slow sentences (β 
= .07, t = 1.26, p = .2) and no interaction (t < 1). 
There was no support in response time for the predicted interaction between weights 
condition and sentence speed. 
LME predicted mean response times are displayed in Figure 6-15. 
 
Figure 6-15. LME predicted response time for abstract sentences with adverbs in Experiment 6-
2.  
6.2.2.4.2  Accuracy 
For Model 1 there was a significant effect of weights (β = 1.36, z = 2.55, p = .01) 
with responses more accurate when wearing weights compared to not. There was no 
difference between abstract sentences and fast (β = -.28, z = 1.23, p = .22) or slow 
sentences (β = -.66, z = 1.07, p = .28), no interaction between sentence type and 
weights when comparing abstract and fast (β = -.75, z = 1.79, p = .07) or abstract and  
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slow (β = .41, z = 1.69, p = .09). In Model 2 there was a marginal difference between 
fast and slow sentences (β =-.59, z = 1.79, p = .07), but no effect of weights and no 
interaction (zs < 1). 
Again, there was no support for the predicted interaction in accuracy measures. LME 
predicted mean accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-1. 
 
Figure 6-16. LME predicted accuracy for abstract sentences with adverbs in Experiment 6-2. 
Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
6.2.2.5  Adverb sentences with concrete actions 
This  section  presents  an  analysis  of  response  time  and  accuracy  for  sentences 
describing concrete actions that are modified by adverbs (e.g. John speedily rolled up 
the sleeping bag.). An interaction between sentence speed and weights condition is 
predicted.  
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6.2.2.5.1  Response time 
For response time there was no difference between fast and slow sentences (t <1), no 
effect of weights (β = -.19, t = 1.46, p = .14) and no interaction (β = -.04, t = 1.17, p 
= .24). 
There was no support in response time for the predicted interaction between weights 
condition and sentence speed. LME predicted mean response times are displayed in 
Figure 6-17. 
 
Figure 6-17. LME predicted response time for concrete sentences with adverbs in Experiment 6-
2. 
6.2.2.5.2  Accuracy 
For  accuracy  there  was  no  effect  of  sentence  type,  no  effect  of  weights  and  no 
interaction (zs <1).   
Again, there was no support for the predicted interaction in accuracy measures. LME 
predicted accuracy is displayed in Figure 6-1.  
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Figure 6-18. LME predicted accuracy concrete sentences with adverbs in Experiment 6-2. Error 
bars reflect 1 standard error. 
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Table 6-3. Summary of results Experiment 6-2. A single tick mark indicates a significant effect 
in response time and a tick mark within a box indicates a significant effect in accuracy. Only 
effects with p-values< 0.05 are included. 
Hand sentences 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Weights    ￼ 
Sentence Type 
Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
            
Weights * Sentence Type 
 Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Abstract vs. Speed 
Fast vs. Slow 
 
 ￾ 
  
 ￾ 
 
 
Full-body sentences 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Weights     
Sentence Type 
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Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
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￼  
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Adverb sentences (abstract) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Weights     ￾ 
Sentence Type 
Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
 
￼  
￼        
 
Weights * Sentence Type 
Abstract vs. Fast 
Abstract vs. Slow 
Fast vs. Slow 
   
 
Adverb sentences (concrete) 
 
  Model 1 
Weights   
Sentence Type 
Fast vs. Slow 
 
Weights * Sentence Type 
Fast vs. Slow 
 
 
6.2.3  Discussion  
Experiment 6-2 extends the investigation of speed simulation in comprehension of 
sentences  to  the  action  domain.  Table  6-3  summarises  the  main  results.  In 
comparison to Experiment 6-1, which manipulated the speed of auditory footsteps 
during a sentence sensibility task, here I manipulated the speed of the participants’ 
own physical movement before completing the sentence sensibility task. Participants 
had to move cans from one side of a table and back eight times whilst wearing arm  
 
 
 
214 
and leg bands that either did or did not contain weights. Wearing weights made 
participants move more slowly than those not wearing weights. 
Although a main effect of weights was only found in one model, overall, responses 
tended  to  be  faster  for  those  wearing  weights  than  those  not  wearing  weights. 
Although one may have expected responses in the sentence task to be slower wearing 
weights than not because weights made the movement task slower, there are reasons 
for why the opposite effect might have been found. First, on later consideration it 
was noted that the arm wraps containing weights were bulkier than the arms wraps 
with no weights in. This meant that resting their hands on the keyboard ready to 
respond  in  the  sentence  task  was  more  awkward  than  without  weights  and  hand 
posture was different to one people would naturally adopt (or to that adopted in those 
wearing wraps without weights). Faster reaction times may simply be due to a closer 
location of the fingers to the response keys in the weights condition compared to the 
no  weights  condition.  Another  explanation  could  be  that  participants  were  more 
eager to complete the task when wearing weights either because of being restricted to 
moving slowly in the movement task or due to the weights being uncomfortable 
during the sentence task, or both. 
Response time to abstract sentences was longer than response time for fast and slow 
sentences in the full-body set. This replicated the concreteness effect observed in 
Experiment 6-1.   
The  most  notable  results,  consistent  with  the  hypotheses  of  the  chapter,  are  that 
interactions between sentence type and weights condition were observed for hand 
sentences and full-body sentences. For hand sentences, accuracy was higher for both 
fast and slow sentences when wearing weights compared to not wearing weights. 
There was no difference in weights conditions for abstract sentences. Thus, being 
forced to move more slowly improves comprehension of hand action sentences. It 
seems likely however that this effect is not about speed of movement but rather  
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movement effort or attention. Wearing weights makes movement more difficult and 
therefore requires more physical effort. Further, by making movement more difficult, 
participants may be focusing their attention on their movements and monitoring them 
more carefully than when they move freely without weights. This greater effort and 
attention will recruit the motor cortex to a greater extent, and thus it will be fairly 
active  when  comprehending  the  hand  sentences,  therefore  facilitating  their 
comprehension. In terms of the direction of this effect, one could hypothesise that if 
the movement task were being completed during the sentence task, wearing weights 
would  make  comprehension  of  hand  sentences  less  accurate,  because  the  motor 
system is strongly taxed by the movement task. Presenting the movement task first 
however means that it is no longer being recruited by real movement, but is still in an 
active state. 
For full-body sentences, an interaction was observed such that responses were more 
accurate for fast sentences when not wearing weights compared to wearing weights, 
and  responses  to  slow  sentences  were  more  accurate  when  wearing  weights 
compared to not wearing weights. This reflects a match effect: responses are more 
accurate  when  speed  of  movement  matches  speed  described  in  the  sentence 
suggesting  the  speed  in  the  motor  system  is  simulated  during  comprehension  of 
sentence describing speeded full-body actions. 
In  contrast  to  Experiment  6-1,  no  interaction  effects  were  observed  with  adverb 
sentences. One explanation for this is that the current experiment is underpowered. 
Firstly, the weights factor is a between subjects manipulation whereas the footsteps 
factor was a within subjects manipulation. Further, Experiment 6-1 contained two 
presentations of each sentence but here there was only one. A more sensitive analysis 
could be to include movement times from the movement task as a predictor, rather 
than using the categorical variable “weights” versus “no weights”. However, this 
would only have been plausible if the weights manipulation was a within-subjects 
manipulation, because a movement time across the two conditions is very variable.  
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For example, a strong male wearing the weights may still have completed the task 
more quickly that a small female not wearing weights, simple based on their physical 
ability. 
6.3  General Discussion 
The first aim of the work in this chapter was to address whether speed simulation is 
observed in sentences describing fast and slow actions. I used a sentence sensibility 
task  to  ensure  that  participants  fully  comprehended  the  meaning  of  the  sentence 
without drawing attention to the semantic domain of investigation. The results of the 
studies  described  here  show  that  comprehenders  do  simulate  speed  of  actions  as 
described in sentences that are part of events involving agents and goals.  
Another aim of the present set of experiments was to investigate different types of 
speeded actions (hand/arm actions, full-body actions, abstract actions) and different 
ways  of  describing  speeded  actions  in  language  (verbs  and  adverbs).  Within  the 
chapter there is evidence for speed simulation in all action types and using both 
adverbs  and  verbs,  but  there  are  differences  between  the  different  types  of 
simulation. Suggestive evidence for auditory simulation of speed was provided for 
hand/arm action sentences and full-body by combining sentences with the sound of 
fast and slow footsteps. A marginal interaction was found such that responses were 
more accurate when speed of action described in the sentence matched the speed of 
auditory  footsteps  played  simultaneous  with  sentence  presentation  for  sentences 
describing hand/arms actions and abstract sentences. An marginal interaction was 
also found for sentences describing full body actions but the direction of effect was 
different:  responses  were  less  accurate  when  speeds  matched.  This  suggests  that 
simulations used to comprehend these sentences included specific features about the 
effector used in the action (i.e. hands, arms). This is in line with imaging evidence 
showing that action words activate the motor and premotor cortex in an effector-
specific way (Hauk et al., 2004). When the sentence described action with the whole  
 
 
 
217 
body, the simulation matched the auditory footsteps in terms of actions features (leg 
movements) and speed. This large overlap in features led to interference between 
sentence and sound that led to lower accuracy. When the sentence described actions 
with the hands/arms, the simulation matched the auditory footsteps in terms of only 
speed  and  not  action  features.  Since  there  was  only  partial  overlap  in  features, 
responses were facilitated and hence more accurate. If it were possible to create an 
auditory stimulus that reflected hand/arm actions, then I would expect the opposite 
pattern  of  results.  For  example,  one  could  combine  the  sound  of  clapping  with 
sentence presentation.  
Evidence for simulation of speed in action was found for full-body sentences in 
Experiment  6-2.  Accuracy  for  full-body  sentences  was  higher  when  the  speed 
described in the sentence matched the speed in which participants had been moving 
during the movement task (e.g. fast sentence meaning and no weights condition). 
This suggests that the movement task activated motor processes in a way that is 
sensitive to the speed of movement. These processes overlapped with those involved 
in simulating speeded full-body actions during sentence comprehension, which led to 
greater accuracy. 
I  also  found  evidence  for  action  simulation  with  hand/arm  sentences,  but  this 
simulation was not sensitive to speed implicit in the sentence. Responses to fast and 
slow hand sentences were more accurate after wearing weights than not wearing 
weights, but there was no such difference for abstract sentences.  This effect was not 
predicted but there are possible post hoc explanations. Wearing the weights led to 
slower movements and possibly more difficulty and effort. The greater effort may 
have taxed the motor system to a greater extent, thereby making it more active at the 
time  of  sentence  processing  and  leading  to  facilitation  of  responses  to  action 
sentences in general. An alternative is simply that the movement task took longer 
when wearing weights compared to not wearing weights, and this longer duration 
activated  the  motor  cortex  to  a  greater  extent.  However,  according  to  these  
 
 
 
218 
explanations a similar effect of weights on accuracy should be seen for full-body 
sentences as well, which is was not. It may be the case though that simulations 
evoked by fast and slow full-body sentences differ in speed to a greater extent than 
simulations evoked by fast and slow hand actions, or that speed is more salient in 
full-body actions than hand actions, meaning that the speed of physical movement 
would not affect comprehension of hand actions sentences. A final possibility is that 
wearing  the  weights  did  not  slow  down  hand/arm  actions,  but  the  difference  in 
movement times is due to slower leg movements when wearing weights compared to 
not wearing weights. Participants were instructed to pick up a can, move to the other 
end of the table and then place the can in its position. Therefore, the hands and arms 
may have mostly been used for grasping and releasing actions, which is not slowed 
by  weight,  and  the  movement  between  the  ends  of  the  table  was  done  by  the 
legs/feet. Wearing the weights on the wrist may still have activated the motor cortex 
to a greater extent compared to not wearing weights because the system is aware that 
more effort would be needed for action preparation and execution. However, this 
activation  would  not  be  in  terms  of  speed  because  few  fast  or  slow  hand/arm 
movements had been made. This explanation seems most plausible based on the 
effects  found  with  full-body  sentences  and  the  fact  that  speed  simulations  were 
observed for hand action sentences in Experiment 6-1.  
For adverb sentences with both concrete and abstract actions, no interaction between 
sentence speed and weight condition was found. This suggests that speed described 
by adverbs does not lead to speed action simulations. In fact there was no specific 
effect of wearing weights on comprehension of fast and slow sentences compared to 
abstract sentences, which suggests that a general action simulation did not occur. 
One explanation for the difference between speed effects with adverbs and verbs is 
that  speed  information  is  tied  to  action  information  with  a  verb,  but  speed 
information is outside of the action with an adverb. This raises the question then of 
what the function of adverbs is if semantic features are more successfully simulated, 
or accessed, with verbs.  Another possible explanation is that the adverbs used in this  
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experiment  also  evoked  a  number  of  other  semantic  features.  Compared  to  the 
adverbs “quickly” and “slowly”, there are a variety of other adverbs, for example 
“reluctantly” and “frantically”, that may evoke simulations of other features more 
strongly, such as emotion and facial expression. Thus, speed simulations may be 
weaker and harder to detect amongst these other aspects of the simulations. 
A final point of discussion for the present chapter is why interaction effects were 
observed in accuracy measures and not response time, which is where embodied 
effects are typically observed. If comprehension of speed in language partially but 
not completely overlaps with systems involved in speed perception, then I would 
expect their combination to affect processing to the extent that it would be interfered 
with  or  facilitated  in  terms  of  the  temporal  nature  of  the  correct  process.  That 
differences were observed in accuracy suggests that the interaction affects whether or 
not  the  process  is  successfully  completed.  One  reason  for  this  could  be  that  the 
present experimental task is fairly difficult. Many of the “nonsense” sentences could 
be given a metaphorical or poetic description if one was so inclined, and therefore 
responding “sensible” is more difficult than responding “yes” in the lexical decision 
task of Chapter 4.  For example “Diane framed the zoo’s rain” could be interpreted 
as  describing  a  photograph  of  rain,  rather  than  a  nonsense  sentence.  Therefore, 
accuracy here is more sensitive to influence and anything the comprehension system 
detects as odd, such as mismatch between speed stimuli and speed in the sentence, or 
large overlap between the two, could lead to incorrect responses. Embodied effects 
were  observed  in  accuracy  measures  elsewhere  when  directional  supra-threshold 
motion (consciously perceived) was presented at the same time as a lexical decision 
task on directional verbs, but not when the motion stimuli was sub-threshold (not 
consciously perceived) (Meteyard et al., 2008). Here responses were less accurate to 
all motion verbs compared to control verbs. The authors suggest that the irrelevant 
supra-threshold stimuli were suppressed by higher-level mechanisms, which led to 
disruption of semantic processing. However, when the motion stimuli are less salient 
the suppression mechanism is not activated. This explanation does not seem to apply  
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here because effects were different for matching and mismatching speeds, rather than 
affecting speed sentences in general (except for hand sentences in Experiment 6-2). 
However, a similar argument could be used to explain the present findings in which 
responses  are  less  accurate  when  real-world  speed  (footsteps  or  action)  is 
incongruent with the sentence speed. The speed stimuli are suppressed because they 
are irrelevant to the present comprehension of the sentence, which disrupts semantic 
processing.  This  explanation  however  cannot  explain  the  higher  accuracy  for 
mismatching full-body sentences in Experiment 6-2 and hence further investigation 
is required. 
6.4  Chapter conclusion 
The  present  chapter  has  provided  evidence  for  speed  simulation  when 
comprehending sentences describing fast and slow full-body actions and fast and 
slow hand actions. Further, simulations are observed when speed is encoded both in 
verbs and in adverbs. The simulations evoked include auditory speed and speed of 
action, and as suggested in Chapter 4, include specific details about the effector used 
in the action. Differences were observed in accuracy and not response time, which 
could  suggest  that  the  task  was  particularly  difficult  or  that  the  comprehension 
system was dealing with the irrelevant speed stimuli in a particular way that led to 
disruption of processing.   
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Chapter 7  Eye-movements and the mental simulation of sentence 
speed 
In  this  chapter  I  continue  to  focus  on  speed  in  sentence  comprehension.  The 
experiments  here  build  upon  those  in  the  previous  chapter  by  combining  spoken 
sentences with visual scenes that contain static depictions of a described event. Thus, 
the comprehension process will involve mapping the incoming linguistic information 
onto the visual scene. Additionally, I use eye tracking to monitor comprehension. 
This means that I can measure simulation without requiring participants to make 
explicit  judgments  about  the  sentences.  This  allows  the  online  measurement  of 
simulation in a more naturalistic manner and provides temporal information that is 
not available from coarse measurements such as reaction time.  
Many  studies  have  demonstrated  the  link  between  language  input  and  eye-
movements (for review see Altmann & Kamide, 2004). Such studies have used the 
‘visual  world  paradigm’  in  which  participants  are  presented  with  visual  scenes 
containing  sentence  referents  at  the  same  time  as  spoken  linguistic  stimuli  (see 
Heuttig, Rommers & Meyer, 2011). The combination of visual scene and linguistic 
input allows one to track the comprehension process at a fine temporal grain. Studies 
have  shown  that  eye-movements  towards  reference  objects  are  time-locked  to 
incoming  linguistic  information  (e.g.  Allopenna  et  al.,  1998).  Tracking  eye-
movements allows one to look closely at the underlying processes occurring during 
language  processing.  For  example,  using  eye-tracking  and  presenting 
readers/listeners  with  garden  path  sentences  (ambiguous  sentences  that  lead 
comprehenders to initially parse the sentence incorrectly e.g. The horse raced past 
the barn fell) can indicate which sentential interpretations are being considered and 
ascertain  the  point  at  which  ambiguity  resolution  occurs  (Ferreira,  Engelhardt  & 
Jones, 2009). Similarly, eye-movements have shown that comprehenders are able to 
predict upcoming items in sentences or events: when participants listened to highly 
constrained sentences and corresponding visual scenes they were more likely to look  
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towards  an  object  before  it  was  mentioned  than  toward  distractors  compared  to 
unconstrained sentences and scenes (Altmann & Kamide, 1999).  
When employing eye tracking to study mental simulation, first, it is critical to note 
that  simulation  can  be  assessed  without  requiring  dual-task  designs  where  the 
presence of mental simulation is inferred by the existence of interference/facilitation 
effects (e.g. Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002, Zwaan & Taylor, 2006 and Chapters 4 and 
6 of this thesis). Second, looking behaviour during language processing reflects a 
low-level  aspect  of  cognition  that  is  most  often  outside  of  voluntary  control 
(Richardson  &  Spivey,  2000).  For  example,  in  a  model  of  saccade  generation, 
voluntary  eye-movements  have  been  described  as  “unusual”  (Findlay  &  Walker, 
1999).  Further,  studies  looking  at  the  processing  of  words  in  the  presence  of 
phonological  competitors  (e.g.  candy  and  candle)  show  that  participants  often 
saccade to a phonological competitor in a visual scene but are unaware of doing so 
(Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995).  
Eye-movements  observed  while  attending  to  a  visual  scene  and  comprehending 
language are thought to reflect sensorimotor patterns learned from experience with 
events  in  the  world.  That  is,  sensorimotor  content  of  sentences  (such  as  motion 
information) can influence the direction of visual attention and its interaction with 
visual  properties  of  the  scene  (Mishra  &  Marmolejo-Ramos,  2010).  Perceptual 
simulations  generated  during  language  comprehension  and  indexed  by  eye-
movements are consistent with the view that language develops in support of situated 
action (Barsalou, 1999b; Glenberg & Gallese, 2011). 
Previous studies have shown that eye-movements can reveal the unfolding of mental 
simulations.  Spivey  and  Geng  (2000)  found  that  when  participants  listened  to 
narratives describing movement in a certain direction, eye gaze was directed more to 
the  corresponding  area  of  a  blank  screen  than  other  areas.  For  example,  when 
listening to a description of a person descending into a canyon, a greater proportion  
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of looks were directed to the bottom of the screen than elsewhere. Eye-movements 
have also been shown to reflect implied motion in both sentences, such as sentences 
with  fictive  motion  “The road goes through the desert”  (Richardson  &  Matlock, 
2007) and pictures, such as a cereal box over a bowl where the falling of the cereal is 
implied (Coventry et al., 2010). Low-level motor mechanisms involved in perceiving 
an  event  become  activated  by  the  corresponding  visual  representation  activated 
through imagining that same event. Spivey, Richardson & Gonzalez-Marquez (2005) 
describe the function of eye-movements in such cases as doing “some of the work 
involved in the “high-level” cognitive act of visual imagery elicited by linguistic 
input”. Critically, in this view, the motor processes involved in visual perception are 
thought to be intrinsic components of the mental state rather than a separate function 
and therefore a necessary component of the comprehension process (Spivey & Geng, 
2000). 
In this chapter I look at how speakers direct their eye gaze to static scenes while 
listening to sentences describing slow or fast motion events. A similar approach has 
been  used  by  Richardson  and  Matlock  (2007),  in  which  speed  was  indirectly 
manipulated using descriptions of motion traversing easy (The desert is flat) versus 
difficult  (The desert is hilly)  terrain.  In  their  study,  participants  spent  more  time 
looking at a path region of a visual scene for fictive motion sentences that followed a 
description of a difficult terrain compared to an easy terrain, suggesting that listeners 
developed a mental representation of motion along the path. 
If speakers simulate the speed of events, events described as having different speeds 
should differ with respect to the duration of the corresponding simulation. Because 
of the interactive processes between language comprehension, world knowledge and 
visual attention (Altmann & Kamide, 2004; Crocker, Knoerfele & Mayberry, 2010; 
Heuttig  et  al.,  2011),  this  difference  in  duration  of  simulation  should  then  be 
reflected in the low-level visual processes engaged in eye-movement control, with  
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looking  times  to  objects  in  a  supporting  visual  scene  being  longer  for  events 
described as being slow than for events described as being fast.  
7.1  Experiment 7-1 
The first experiment contrasted events described by “slow” verbs (e.g. amble) and 
“fast” verbs (e.g. dash) and events in which speed was manipulated with the adverb 
“quickly” or “slowly”, in spoken sentences, accompanied by matching visual scenes. 
The aim was to assess whether listeners looked for longer/shorter durations at objects 
in the scene depending upon the speed of verb/adverb. In addition the speaking rate 
(fast  vs.  slow)  of  the  sentence  was  manipulated.  This  was  done  mainly  as  a 
manipulation check: differences in eye-movement behaviour between fast and slow 
speech would be expected simply because there will be more time to look around the 
scene for sentences that are spoken slowly compared to sentences spoken quickly. In 
addition, any interaction between speaking rate and speed of the verb would also be 
theoretically important suggesting that processing semantic features of speed words 
and  processing  differences  in  physical  speed  of  language  production  engage 
overlapping processes.  That is, understanding the meaning of speed described in the 
sentences may involve similar systems to those involved in processing the auditory 
speed of the sentences (i.e. speed perception), and combining these two types of 
speed may affect processing differently when the speeds match compared to when 
they do not match. This effect is similar to that observed in Chapter 6 when speeded 
footstep  sounds  affect  comprehension  of  sentences  about  speeded  actions.  There 
could also be differences in the extent to which simulation occurs for fast and slow 
speech. Some researchers argue that simulation is a slow process and thus does not 
fully develop all of the time (Barsalou et al., 2008; see Chapter 1 section 1.4.4.). 
Comprehension that requires quick or shallow understanding (for example in noisy 
situations  or  under  time  pressure)  may  rely  more  heavily  on  processes  such  as 
statistical  linguistic  patterns  (Louwerse  &  Jeuniaux,  2010).  Thus,  there  may  be  
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evidence of simulation for sentences that are spoken slowly but not for sentences that 
are spoken quickly. 
7.1.1  Method 
7.1.1.1  Participants 
Forty-four
10 native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (29 
females, mean age = 24.1) were recruited from the UCL Psychology Subject Pool 
and were paid for their participation. Four participants were removed for having an 
insufficient number of looks to any of the objects in the scene. 
7.1.1.2  Material 
Experimental items were spoken sentences describing either a fast or slow event, for 
example “The lion ambled/dashed to the balloon”. Sixteen fast verbs (e.g. dash) and 
16  slow  verbs  (e.g.  amble)  were  used  in  sentences  (verb  sentences)  and  had 
previously been rated as to their implied speed by a separate group of participants 
(see chapter 4 section 4.3.1.2.1). Additionally, the adverbs quickly and slowly were 
used (adverb sentences) and were paired with 25 verbs that were rated as neutral in 
terms of speed in norming procedure described in section 4.3.1.2.1. This made 41 
experimental items in total. Fast, slow and neutral verbs used in the sentences are 
displayed in Table Appendix 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3. 
The speaking rate of each sentence was also manipulated to be either fast (average of 
222  words  per  minute)  or  slow  (average  of  116  words  per  minute).  Each 
experimental item therefore had four versions; a slow event with a slow speaking 
rate, a fast event with a fast speaking rate, a slow event with a fast speaking rate and 
a fast event with a slow speaking rate. Each participant heard only one version of 
                                                 
10 Number of participants was estimated roughly based on previous work with speed manipulations 
(Fecica & O’Neill, 2010). Note that a limitation of the chapter could be the unequal sample size 
across experiments (i.e. Experiment 7-2). The additional subjects were tested to check that an 
observed result was not a false positive.  
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each item. Thus there were four versions of the experiment with items allocated to 
each  using  a  Latin  Square  design.  Forty-one  filler  sentences  were  created  that 
described  either  motion  of  no  specific  speed  or  no  motion  (e.g.  “The  moose 
approached the box”) or no motion (e.g. “The bird spotted the tree”). 
Sentences were recorded by a speaker with an English accent in a soundproof room 
and spliced so that sentences with the same speaking rate were identical except for 
the speed verb or adverb, with the resulting sentences sounding natural. For example, 
in the recording of “The lion ambled to the balloon”,  “dashed” would be inserted 
into  the  sound  file  in  the  place  of  “ambled”.  Mean  duration  of  sentences  was 
3667ms (SD = 242ms) for slow speaking rate and 1777ms (SD = 145ms) for fast 
speaking rate for verb sentences, and 3455ms (SD = 206ms) for slow speaking rate 
and 1821ms (SD = 149ms) for fast speaking rate for adverb sentences 
Each experimental item was paired with a visual scene that included the agent and 
target destination of the sentence and a distractor destination (see Figure 7-1A for an 
example). The distractor destination was included because participants’ task was to 
click  on  the  correct  target  destination.  Individual  pictures  were  taken  from  a 
collection of pictures used in previous projects in the lab and edited and placed in a 
scene using Paint.net. The agent was located at the centre of the scene connected by 
a path to the target destination and the distractor destination located on the left or 
right side, counter-balanced across trials.   
7.1.1.3  Procedure 
Before beginning the experiment participants completed a ‘Mouse Training’ task in 
which they had to click on circles on the screen for approximately two minutes. This 
task was included in order for participants to feel comfortable with the mouse and to 
give them practice at clicking on objects in an experimental setting.  
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In  each  trial,  participants  first  had  to  look  at  the  centre  of  the  screen  as  a  drift 
correction  check  and  then  had  to  click  on  a  fixation  cross  to  ensure  that  mouse 
position was central at the beginning of the trial. The visual scene was then presented 
for  1000ms  after  which  the  sound  file  was  played  whilst  the  scene  remained 
onscreen. Participants had to use the mouse to click on the last object mentioned in 
the sentence. After 25% of filler trials comprehension questions were presented on 
screen such as “Did the moose go to the box?” and participants were to respond 
pressing the left mouse button for “yes” and the right mouse button for “no”. Six 
practice trials were completed first. See Figure 7-2 for an example trial. Note that the 
mouse task and comprehension questions were not of primary interest as dependent 
variables, but rather served as an incentive for the participants to listen carefully to 
the sentences. 
Eye-movements were recorded using an Eyelink 2 head-mounted eye-tracker. The 
experiment lasted around 25 minutes. 
 
A             B 
         
Figure 7-1. Example scene with (A) and without (B) for the sentence "The man zoomed to the 
shop"  
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Figure 7-2. Example trial in Experiment 7-1. 
7.1.2  Results  
Eye-movements were recorded from the onset of the spoken sentence to the time at 
which  they  clicked  on  the  target  destination.  As  part  of  a  data  cleaning  process 
fixation times less than 150ms were removed from analysis (< 5%).  Interest areas 
were created for the agent and destination objects in the scene and looks to these 
areas were analysed. If participants simulate speed during spoken comprehension 
then I would expect looking time towards objects in the scene to differ between 
sentences describing fast and slow events. Analyses on response time to click on the 
target destination can be found in the Appendix section A3.1. 
7.1.2.1  Dwell time 
The total dwell time across the whole trial on the agent and target destination of the 
sentence  was  calculated  for  verb  sentences  (Figure  7-3)  and  adverb  sentences 
separately (Figure 7-4); this is the total time in a trial spent looking at each object.   
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7.1.2.1.1  Looks to the agent 
For looks to the agent (Figure 7-3A (verbs) and 7-4A (adverbs)), an LME controlling 
for verb/adverb frequency (taken from the English Lexicon Project (ELP); Balota et 
al., 2007) and duration (in ms) of each verb/adverb found no main effect of speed of 
verb (β = .09, t = .68, p = .5) or adverb (β = .04, t = 1.12, p = .32), but did find a main 
effect of speaking rate for both sentence types (verbs: β = -.43, t = 6.11, p < .001, 
adverbs: β = -.20, t = 2.21, p = .03); dwell time on the agent was longer for sentences 
with  a  slow  speaking  rate  than  sentences  with  a  fast  speaking  rate.  This  result 
however, is not theoretically interesting; it simply reflects that for sentences with a 
slow speaking rate, there was more time during a trial for the eyes to explore the 
scene. Results also showed a marginally significant interaction between speed of 
verb and speaking rate (β = -.06, t = 1.94, p = .05) for verb sentences. Planned 
comparisons showed that for sentences spoken slowly, dwell time on the agent was 
longer for sentences with slow verbs than for sentences with fast verbs (β  = .02, t = 
2, p = .04), but there was no difference between sentences with slow verbs and 
sentences with fast verbs for sentences spoken quickly (β  = .11, t = 0.51, p = .61). 
No significant interaction was found for adverb sentences (β = -.04, t = 1.6, p = .11). 
7.1.2.1.2  Looks to the destination 
For  looks  to  the  destination  (Figure  7-3B  (verbs)  and  7-4B  (adverbs)),  an  LME 
controlling for word frequency and duration (in ms) of the verb/adverb there was 
again  a  significant  effect  of  speaking  rate  in  which  dwell  time  was  longer  for 
sentences with a slow speaking rate than sentences with a fast speaking rate (verbs: β 
= -.20, t = 3.04, p < .01, adverbs: β = -.33, t = 2.37, p = .02). For adverb sentences 
there was no effect of adverb speed (β = -.06, t = .57, p = .59) and no interaction 
between  adverb  speed  and  speaking  rate  (β  =  .02,  t  =  .78,  p  =  .47).  For  verb 
sentences, there was no main effect of verb speed (β = -.02, t = .58, p = .58,) and in 
contrast to the analyses for looks to the agent, no interaction (β = -.02, t =  .54, p = 
.53).  
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Figure 7-3. LME predicted mean dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) for verb sentences 
in Experiment 7-1. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
 
Figure 7-4. LME predicted mean dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) for adverb 
sentences in Experiment 7-1. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
7.1.3  Discussion  
An interaction was found between speaking rate and verb speed for dwell time on the 
agent; for sentences with a slow speaking rate, dwell time was longer for slow verbs 
than for fast verbs, whereas within sentences with a fast speaking rate, dwell time 
was similar for fast and slow verbs.  
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These results suggest that listeners mentally simulated the speed of motion of the 
agent and thus looked at the agent for longer for slow verbs than fast verbs, at least 
for sentences spoken slowly, because this event would take longer to unfold in the 
real world. The lack of such effect in the fast speaking rate condition is consistent 
with the idea that simulations take time to develop (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons & 
Wilson, 2008; see Chapter 1 section 1.4.4.). Thus, it is possible that the duration of 
the  sentences  in  the  fast  speaking  rate  condition  was  too  fast  for  simulations  to 
completely develop or alternatively, the duration was too short for the simulation to 
be observed in the eye-movement recordings (i.e. the time to view the scene was not 
sufficient). The simulation of speed was not reflected in time to click on the target 
destination, which was only affected by speaking rate. 
Experiment 7-1 found no difference between fast and slow events when described 
with adverbs. This may suggest that verbs and adverbs do not describe the speed of 
an event in the same way. However, there may be alternative explanations for this 
result. First, there was a high degree of repetition of adverbs in the experiment (only 
two adverbs were used for a total of 25 sentences).  Further, there are aspects of the 
task  and  configuration  of  the  visual  scene  that  may  have  led  to  the  observed 
simulation  effect  occurring  for  verb  sentences  and  not  adverbs  sentences.  These 
differences may also account for why the effect was found only on the agent of the 
sentence, and not the destination, as described below. To investigate this suggestion, 
and to replicate the general finding, I ran a second experiment with a change of task 
and scene type. 
7.2  Experiment 7-2 
Experiment 7-1 provided the first demonstration that slow and fast verbs lead to 
different  patterns  of  eye-movements.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  the  task 
(clicking  on  the  target  destination)  could  have  reduced  simulation-driven  eye-
movements towards the target destination while participants comprehended the final  
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part of the sentence, as they were more focused on quickly completing their task.  
Such  a  strategy  could  lead  to  shallow  processing  of  the  agent  and  the  adverb. 
Alternatively,  it  may  be  that  the  target  destination  was  ambiguous  due  to  the 
presence of the distractor and therefore participants continued to look towards the 
agent  instead  of  a  destination  that  they  were  unsure  about.  In  order  to  better 
understand why effects of verb speed were observed on the agent and not on the 
destination, I carried out a second experiment in which the mouse-clicking task and 
the distractor object were removed. In Experiment 7-2 participants were to listen to 
the sentences whilst viewing the scenes, with comprehension questions asked on 
every trial, focusing on the destination of the sentence. Additionally, on some trials, 
a verb would appear onscreen and participants had to decide whether that verb had 
been used in the sentence or not. The new task was intended to force participants to 
encode all aspects of the sentence. 
7.2.1  Method 
7.2.1.1  Participants 
Fifty-two  native  English  speakers  with  normal  or  corrected-to-normal  vision  (29 
females, mean age = 24.3, SD = 4.58) were recruited from the UCL Psychology 
Subject Pool and were paid for their participation.  
7.2.1.2  Material 
A new set of scenes was created for all experimental trials and fillers (Figure 7-1B), 
as  the  distractor  object  was  no  longer  necessary.  The  location  of  the  agent  and 
destination in the scene was counterbalanced across trials (either on the left or right 
of the scene). 
The same set of sentences as Experiment 7-1 was used as well as an additional set of 
sixteen verb sentences created by taking each verb from Experiment 7-1 and placing 
them in a sentence with a new agent and destination, to allow more statistical power.  
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This meant that each participant now saw eight items in each condition. Sixteen new 
filler trials were added so that the number of experimental trials and filler trials was 
equal (see Appendix section A2.2.2. for new items and fillers). 
7.2.1.3  Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 7-1 except participants were no longer 
required to click on the target destination. The visual scene remained on screen until 
1500ms after sentence offset. The participant would then either be presented with a 
comprehension question or presented with a verb to which they had to decide if it 
had been used in the sentence, followed by a comprehension question. Participants 
responded with the mouse as before. The procedure is visually exemplified in Figure 
7-5. 
 
Figure 7-5. Trial procedure in Experiment 7-2.  
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7.2.2  Results 
Data extraction proceeded in the same way as Experiment 7-1. Analyses of response 
time and accuracy to comprehension questions can be found in the Appendix, section 
A3.2. 
7.2.2.1  Dwell time 
Three  verb  sentences  were  removed  from  analysis  due  to  a  coding  error.  As  in 
Experiment  7-1,  the  total  dwell  time  across  the  whole  trial  on  the  agent  and 
destination of the sentence was calculated. Again, if speed is simulated then I expect 
looks towards objects in the scene to be longer for sentences describing slow speed 
compared to fast speed. Further, if simulation of speed is hindered when sentence 
speaking  rate  is  fast,  as  suggested  by  the  results  of  Experiment  7-1,  then  an 
interaction  between  verb/adverb  speed  and  speaking  rate  is  predicted  such  that 
differences  between  fast  and  slow  verb/adverb  sentences  are  observed  only  for 
sentences spoken slowly. 
7.2.2.1.1  Looks to the agent 
For looks to the agent (Figure 7-6A (verbs) and 7-7A (adverbs)), an LME controlling 
for word frequency and duration (in ms) of each verb/adverb did not find a main 
effect of speed of verb (β = .01, t = .54, p = .59) or adverb (β = -.04, t = .26, p = .79).  
For verb sentences there was a main effect of speaking rate (β = -.33, t = 6.65, p < 
.001); dwell time on the agent was longer for slow speaking sentences than fast 
speaking sentences, but there was no effect of speaking rate for adverb sentences (β 
= -.14, t = .97, p = .33).  There was no interaction between speaking rate and speed 
of verb (β = .01, t = .32, p = .75) or between speaking rate and speed of adverb (β = 
.02, t = .89, p = .37).  
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7.2.2.1.2  Looks to the destination 
Average dwell times on the destination object are shown in Figure 7-6B (verbs) and 
7-7B (adverbs). Using a linear-mixed effects model including frequency and duration 
(in ms) of each verb/adverb as predictors there was no main effect of speed of verb 
(β =-.02, t = 0.91, p = .37) or adverb (β =  -.06, t = .95, p = .34) but there was a main 
effect of speaking rate (verbs: β =-.29, t = 4.9, p < .001, adverbs: β = -.47, t = 3.9, p 
<  .001);  dwell  time  on  the  destination  was  longer  for  slow  than  fast  speaking 
sentences.  There  was  also  a  significant  interaction  between  speed  of  verb  and 
speaking rate (β = .05, t = 2.18, p = .03) for verb sentences. Planned comparisons 
showed that for sentences spoken slowly, dwell time on the destination was longer 
for sentences with slow verbs than for sentences with fast verbs (β = -.11, t = 2.01, p 
= .04), but there was no difference between sentences with slow verbs and sentences 
with fast verbs for sentences spoken quickly (β = .07, t = 1.66, p = .1). There was no 
interaction between speed of adverb and speaking rate (β = .01, t = .36, p = .72). 
 
Figure 7-6. LME mean predicted dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) for verb sentences 
in Experiment 7-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error.  
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Figure 7-7. LME mean predicted dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) for adverb 
sentences in Experiment 7-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
7.2.3  Discussion  
In contrast to Experiment 7-1, Experiment 7-2 showed an effect of verb speed on the 
destination, not the agent. Differences between the task and visual scenes in the two 
experiments may be responsible for this difference in results. First, in Experiment 7-
1,  participants  had  to  click  on  the  destination  as  soon  as  they  could  identify  it, 
possibly cutting short time spent looking at the target destination but in Experiment 
7-2  participants  were  free  to  view  the  scene  until  1500ms  after  sentence  offset. 
Second, in Experiment 7-2, the destination was always known since there was no 
longer a distractor destination present in the scene. Thus, participants could look 
towards  the  destination  while  completing  the  simulation  of  the  event  whereas  in 
Experiment 7-1 the agent was the only certain object involved in the event up until 
hearing  the  name  of  the  destination.  Importantly  and  more  generally,  the  results 
suggest  that  the  online  simulations  developed  by  listeners  and  indexed  by  eye 
movements are not fixed but can develop in a flexible way depending on the task and 
the information that is available at any given time. However, given the differences in 
procedure between Experiment 7-1 and Experiment 7-2, I cannot exclude at this 
point other possible accounts. Therefore, Experiment 7-3 presents a replication of  
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both experiments within subjects in order to assess whether differences emerge as a 
result of differences in the visual scene and task. Since there were no effects using 
the adverbs “quickly” and “slowly” I decided to remove them from Experiment 7-3, 
and further investigate them separately in Experiment 7-4. 
7.3  Experiment 7-3 
Both Experiment 7-1 and 7-2 provide evidence that the speed described by verbs in a 
sentence affects looking behaviour towards depicted objects, when the sentence is 
spoken slowly. However, depending on the configuration/content of the scene, the 
effect appears to differ: verb speed affects how long listeners will look at the agent 
when there is more than one destination, whereas verb speed affects looks to the 
destination when it is clear where the agent will end up. This difference invites the 
speculation that simulations used during language comprehension are dynamic and 
changeable, developing in the way most appropriate for the on-going task.  
In  Experiment  7-3,  I  assess  whether  the  simulations  developed  during  the  task 
dynamically  adapt  to  differences  in  the  visual  scene  by  combining  the  major 
differences  between  Experiment  7-1  and  7-2.  In  this  experiment,  I  directly 
manipulated the scene type (with a distractor as in Experiment 7-1 or without a 
distractor as in Experiment 7-2) while keeping the task the same as Experiment 7-2 
(including the additional 1500ms after the sentence offset). I expect to replicate the 
effect of speed of verb on dwell time on the target destination for scenes without a 
distractor, like in Experiment 7-2. The prediction for scenes with a distractor is not as 
clear. Having two possible target destinations means that there is still ambiguity in 
the scene, however, since the task demands of Experiment 7-1 have been removed 
(i.e. of clicking on the target destination as soon as possible), participants may not be 
strategically focusing on the agent and it may be the case there will be no differences 
between fast and slow sentences.  
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7.3.1  Method 
7.3.1.1  Participants 
Forty native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (20 female, 
mean age = 24.25, SD = 6.94) were recruited from the UCL Psychology Subject Pool 
and paid for their participation.  
7.3.1.2  Material 
In order to establish the generalizability of the findings beyond the specific agent-
verb pairing used in Experiment 7-1 and 7-2, a new set of 16 experimental sentences 
were created using the same 16 fast and slow verbs from the previous experiments, 
but combined with different agents and destinations (see Appendix section A2.2.3). 
Sentences were recorded at a normal speaking rate (average 144 words per minute). 
Average sentence duration was 2498ms. Each sentence had two versions (fast and 
slow verb) and each participant now heard both versions (separated into two blocks). 
For each experimental item, four versions of each scene were created combining 
scene type (double or single) and location of the target destination (left or right). 
Each participant saw the same scene type for each sentence version, but with the 
location counterbalanced. For example, one participant may listen to sentence 1 with 
a fast verb combined with a single scene with the target destination of the left in the 
first block, and then listen to sentence 1 with a slow verb combined with a single 
scene with the target destination on the right in the second block. There were 32 filler 
sentences, half were paired with a scene that included a distractor and half were 
paired with a scene without a distractor. 
7.3.1.3  Procedure 
Participants were required to listen to the sentences and then answer comprehension 
questions that were presented on the screen. Responses were made with the mouse as 
before.  
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7.3.2  Results  
Data  extraction  proceeded  in  the  same  manner  as  the  previous  two  experiments. 
Analyses of response time and accuracy to comprehension questions can be found in 
the Appendix, section A3.3. 
7.3.2.1  Dwell time 
As in the previous two experiments, the total dwell time across the whole trial on the 
agent and destination of the sentence was calculated (see Figure 7-8). 
7.3.2.1.1  Looks to the agent 
For looks to the agent (Figure 7-8A), an LME controlling for word frequency and 
duration (in ms) of each verb did not find a main effect of speed of verb (β = -.03,t = 
.35, p = .73) nor an interaction between verb speed and scene type (β = .01, t = .61, p 
= .54). There was however, a main effect of scene type (β = .10, t = 6.93, p <0.001), 
with longer dwell time on the agent for scenes containing a distractor, than scenes 
without distractor.  
7.3.2.1.2  Looks to the destination 
Average dwell times on the destination are shown in Figure 7-8B. Using an LME 
including frequency and duration (in ms) of each verb as predictors there was no 
main effect of speed of verb (β =-.01, t = 1.17, p = .24) but there was again a main 
effect of scene type (β =-.31, t = 6.93, p < .001) with longer dwell time on the 
destination for scenes with no distractor than scenes with a distractor. There was also 
a significant interaction between speed of verb and scene type (β = .06, t = 2.49, p = 
.01): dwell time was longer for slow verbs than fast verbs for scenes in which there 
was no distractor, replicating the pattern of Experiment 7-2. This pattern was not 
observed for scenes with a distractor.  
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In order to further understand the time course of the differences in looks toward the 
destination,  Figure  7-9  and  7-10  display  the  average  proportion  of  samples  with 
fixations on the target destination over a whole trial for scenes with and without a 
distractor. This figure shows how the pattern of looks toward the target destination 
was slightly delayed for slow verb sentences compared to fast verb sentences, and 
that looks then remained on the destination for longer, for scenes without a distractor 
only. Based on this pattern, I suggest that the differences in dwell time observed 
across the experiments reported here is because the simulation of the meaning of the 
sentence was slower for sentences describing slow motion than sentences describing 
fast motion, rather than being due to a reanalysis of the sentence meaning (i.e. looks 
towards the target destination for slow sentences did not fall and then rise again, but 
remained higher than those for fast sentences, falling at a slower rate). 
 
Figure 7-8. LME predicted mean dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) for Experiment 7-
3. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
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Figure 7-9. Proportion of samples with fixations towards the target destination for scenes 
without a distractor averaged over items in Experiment 7-3. Vertical lines denote average verb 
onset and offset, and noun onset and noun offset across all sentences.  
 
Figure 7-10. Proportion of samples with fixations towards the target destination for scenes with 
a distractor averaged over items in Experiment 7-3. Vertical lines denote average verb onset 
and offset, and noun onset and noun offset across all sentences. 
7.3.3  Discussion 
Thus,  Experiment  7-3  has  provided  further  evidence  for  the  dynamic  nature  of 
simulations. When the visual scene was not ambiguous and contained only one target 
destination, looks to the destination were affected by the speed of the verb in the  
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sentence. However, when there were two possible destinations, this pattern was not 
observed, suggesting that simulation was hindered by the ambiguity in the scene.  
7.4  Experiment 7-4 
In Experiments 7-1 and 7-2, using the fast and slow adverbs quickly and slowly did 
not affect looking behaviour towards the agent or destination in the visual scene. 
This  could  suggest  that  speeded  adverbs  do  not  sufficiently  affect  the  speed  of 
motion simulations, as speeded verbs do. This explanation seems unlikely because in 
comparison to speed verbs, which often include information other than speed such as 
manner of motion, quickly and slowly only describe speed. A reason for the null 
effects  may  be  the  repetition  of  quickly  and  slowly.  After  hearing  them  multiple 
times, their meaning may reduce in activation (e.g. Smith & Klein, 1990). Therefore, 
Experiment 7-4 continues to test the effect of speeded adverbs on mental simulations 
of motion by including a larger number of different speeded adverbs. 
7.4.1  Method 
7.4.1.1  Participants 
Forty-four native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (22 
females, average age = 26.2 (SD = 10.9)) were recruited from the UCL Psychology 
subject pool and were paid for their participation. 
7.4.1.2  Material 
32 adverbs were chosen to be included in a norming study based on experimenter 
intuition and using an online dictionary and thesaurus. 10 participants (5 female, 
mean age = 25.1) were contacted by email and took part in the norming task online 
in their own time in the form of a Google survey. Two versions of the survey were 
created with a different random order of items. Participants viewed adverbs and were 
instructed to rate their speed with the following instructions:  
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“Please judge how fast you think the actions implied by the adverbs below are. 
Please imagine that all adverbs are used in the construction "the X adverb went to 
the Y" e.g. "The man angrily went to the car". Please rate an adverb as "7" if you 
think it is very fast, and please rate an adverb "1" if you think it is very slow. A score 
of "4" would mean motion that is neither fast nor slow. Please leave a question blank 
if you are unsure of the meaning of the adverb.” 
Participants viewed a horizontal 7-point scale with “Very slow” written on the left 
side and “Very fast” written on the right side. Responses were made using on the 
mouse. 
Adverbs were classified as “fast” if both the mean and mode rating was greater than 
or equal to 5, and verbs were labelled as “slow” if both the mean and mode rating 
was less than or equal to 3. This led to 15 adverbs being classified as “slow” and 14 
being  classified  as  “fast”.  So  that  the  2  lists  were  equal,  one  slow  adverb  was 
removed. The chosen fast and slow adverbs were placed into sentences paired with 
the verb went e.g. The gorilla lazily went to the pool. Fast and slow adverbs are 
displayed in Table Appendix 1-4 and 1-5 and experimental sentences are displayed 
in Appendix section A2.2.4. 
As in Experiment 7-1 and 7-2, the speaking rate was manipulated to be either slow or 
fast. Each experimental item therefore had four versions; a slow event with a slow 
speaking rate, a fast event with a fast speaking rate, a slow event with a fast speaking 
rate and a fast event with a slow speaking rate. Each participant heard only one 
version of each item. Thus there were four versions of the experiment with items 
allocated to each using a Latin Square design. Twenty-four filler sentences were 
created that did not describe motion (e.g. “The gorilla glanced at the castle”). 
Sentences were recorded by a speaker with an English accent in a soundproof room 
and spliced so that sentences with the same speaking rate were identical except for  
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the  adverb,  with  the  resulting  sentences  sounding  natural.  Mean  duration  of 
sentences was 3936ms (SD = 177 ms) for slow speaking rate and 1749 ms (SD = 265 
ms) for fast speaking rate. 
Each experimental item was paired with a visual scene that included the agent and 
target destination of the sentence, as in Experiment 7-2.  
7.4.1.3  Procedure 
The experimental procedure was identical to Experiment 7-2. 
7.4.2  Results  
Data extraction proceeded in the same manner as the previous experiments. Analyses 
of response time and accuracy to comprehension questions can be found in section 
A3.4. 
7.4.2.1  Dwell time 
As in the previous experiments, the total dwell time across the whole trial on the 
agent and destination of the sentence was calculated.  
7.4.2.1.1  Looks to the agent 
For looks to the agent (Figure 7-11A), an LME controlling for word frequency and 
duration (in ms) of each adverb did not find a main effect of speed of adverb (t < 1) 
nor an interaction between adverb speed and scene type (t < 1). There was however, 
a main effect of speaking rate (β = -.31, t = 3.9, p <0.001), with longer dwell time on 
the agent for slow speaking rate than fast speaking rate. 
7.4.2.1.2  Looks to the destination 
Average dwell times on the destination are shown in Figure 7-11B. Using an LME 
including frequency and duration (in ms) of each verb as predictors there was no  
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main effect of speed of adverb (β = .01, t = 1.16, p = .25) but there was again a main 
effect speaking rate (β = -.54, t = 6.97, p < .001) with longer dwell time on the 
destination for slow speaking rate compared to fast speaking rate. There was also a 
marginally significant interaction between speed of adverb and speaking rate (β = -
.07, t = 1.93, p =. 05). Looking at Figure 7-11B, dwell time was longer for slow 
adverbs than fast adverbs with fast speaking rate and dwell time was longer for fast 
adverbs than slow adverbs with slow speaking rate. There were no significant simple 
effects of adverb speed at either level of speaking rate (ps > 0.05). 
In  order  to  further  understand  the  interaction  in  looks  toward  the  destination,  in 
Figures 7-12 and 7-13 I display the average proportion of samples with fixations on 
the target destination over a whole trial for sentences with a slow speaking rate and 
for sentences with a fast speaking rate. This figure shows that the proportion of looks 
toward the target destination was higher for fast adverb sentences than slow adverb 
sentences  after  the  adverb  offset  (equivalent  to  verb  onset)  for  sentences  spoken 
slowly but not for sentences spoken quickly. For sentences spoken quickly, no clear 
patterns are visible.  Based on this, I would like to argue that this is again evidence of 
simulation taking time to unfold and therefore, being present for sentences spoken 
slowly but not for sentences spoken quickly, as observed in Experiment 7-1 and 
Experiment 7-2.   
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Figure 7-11. LME predicted mean dwell time on agent (A) and destination (B) in Experiment 7-
4. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
 
Figure 7-12. Proportion of looks to destination slow speaking rate Experiment 7-4. Vertical lines 
denote average adverb onset and offset and noun offset across all sentences.  
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Figure 7-13. Proportion of looks to destination fast speaking rate Experiment 7-4. Vertical lines 
denote average adverb onset and offset and noun offset across all sentences. 
7.4.3  Discussion 
Participants spent more time looking towards the destination for sentences with fast 
adverbs compared to slow adverbs. This pattern is the opposite of what has been 
observed with verbs throughout Experiments 7-1 to 7-3. However it is in line with a 
very similar study (Lindsay, Scheepers & Kamide, 2013) that found greater looks to 
a target destination for fast verb sentences than slow verb sentences. They attributed 
this effect to mental simulation of fast events being completed more quickly, leading 
to  earlier  looks  to  the  target  destination  and  hence  longer  looking  durations. 
However, in their study, experimental sentences emphasized the path of motion e.g. 
The  jeep  will  race  along  the  road  to  the  shop.  This  directed  participants’  looks 
towards the path region, and did so for a longer duration for sentences with slow 
verbs compared to sentences with fast verbs, which subsequently lead to earlier looks 
to the destination for fast verbs. In the present case however, the sentences do not 
refer to the path and hence the path region received few looks. It is possible however, 
that less looks were directed to the destination for slow adverb sentences than fast 
adverbs sentences because they continued to look at other regions of the scene i.e.  
 
 
 
248 
the  agent,  whilst  completing  the  simulation  of  motion.  Although  there  is  no 
significant interaction for looks to the agent, there is a visual trend for longer dwell 
time  on  the  agent  for  sentences  with  slow  adverbs  compared  to  fast  adverbs. 
Therefore, it is likely that when simulating slow sentences participants spent more 
time focusing on the agent, simulating it in motion for longer, but when simulating 
fast  sentences,  participants  simulated  the  event  more  quickly,  thereby  looking 
towards the agent less and the destination more. 
7.5  General Discussion 
Using eye tracking, I found that when listening to sentences describing motion and 
viewing corresponding visual scenes, time spent looking at participating objects was 
affected  by  the  interaction  between  speed  of  the  verb/adverb  of  the  sentence, 
speaking rate of the sentence and configuration of a corresponding visual scene. The 
data  provide  evidence  that  simulations  develop  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the 
kinematics of real-world motion. Moreover, the results suggest that there is a link 
between simulation in language understanding and the low-level motor mechanisms 
that control eye-movements, and that these mechanisms are sensitive to fine-grained, 
dynamic motion information contained in a sentence. Mental simulations are not 
fixed but are flexible and built on the fly, interacting with relevant visual information 
when  it  is  made  available.  The  simulation  observed,  as  evidenced  by  eye-
movements,  is  the  combination  of  linguistic  information  from  the  sentence, 
information  extracted  from  the  visual  scene,  and  world  knowledge,  such  as  how 
motion  events  unfold.  When  this  information  is  in  conflict,  or  one  source  is 
unavailable or ambiguous (as the destination is in Experiment 7-1), the simulation 
does not take that into account and is limited to the other available information that is 
reliable. In the case of Experiment 7-1, since only the agent is known, the simulation 
focuses exclusively on the agent. The simulation is very different when, instead, the 
destination is known in which case, this latter is simulated. Note that in Experiment 
7-3,  the  result  of  Experiment  7-1  was  not  replicated.  This  difference  could  be  
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explained by the difference in task. In Experiment 7-3, participants were no longer 
required to click on the target destination, thus they did not have as much of an 
incentive to pay attention to the sentence and scene as in Experiment 7-1.  Since the 
scenes with a distractor were temporarily ambiguous, comprehension of the sentence 
and scene was likely to be more difficult here, and hence participants may have 
processed  them  less  efficiently.  This  is  supported  by  the  accuracy  results  for 
comprehension questions (Appendix section A3.3.) in which participants performed 
significantly worse in the ‘with distractor’ condition than the ‘without distractor’ 
condition. Importantly, in two experiments we have shown that when there is no 
ambiguity between the sentence meaning and the visual scene, there is a clear effect 
of the perceptual simulation of speed of motion as implied by verbs.  
A difference in the pattern of interaction between sentence speed and speaking rate is 
observed between sentences that encode speed with a verb and sentences that encode 
speed with an adverb. Both verbs and adverbs find speed effects with slow speaking 
rate only, however for verb sentences, fast verbs lead to shorter dwell time on the 
destination than slow verbs, but for adverb sentences, fast adverbs lead to longer 
dwell time on the destination than slow adverbs. The effect with adverbs was not 
predicted,  yet  it  is  in  line  with  results  found  elsewhere  (Lindsay,  Scheepers  & 
Kamide, 2013). One major difference between the two sentence types in the present 
experiments  is  the  timing  of  speed  information.  For  verb  sentences,  speed  is  a 
component of the verb and is thus immediately tied to the motion event. For adverb 
sentences, speed is a component of the adverb and thus occurs earlier in the sentence, 
before the motion verb. The difference in timing of speed information may affect the 
way the motion simulation develops. When speed is a component of the verb, the 
simulation of motion is likely to already include the target destination because the 
motion event (of moving somewhere) is the dominant meaning of the verb (i.e. one 
simulates the meaning of a motion verb as movement to a specific location).  Here 
the speed component affects the simulation at the target destination and hence looks 
here are longer for slow verbs than fast verbs because this simulation takes longer.  
 
 
 
250 
For adverbs however, the speed information occurs before the motion in the verb and 
thus is able to influence the simulation of motion more freely. Thus slow speed 
implied  in  an  adverb  leads  to  a  slower  simulation  developing  compared  to  fast 
adverbs, with the agent focused on for longer because it is in motion for longer. 
Conversely, fast speed implied in the adverb leads to a faster simulation than slow 
adverbs, which means than the target destination is reached earlier and hence looked 
at longer. To reiterate, this explanation suggests that verbs emphasize the motion 
event and so attract looks to the destination where the motion is completed, but by 
using an adverb first, the motion event can be modified by other factors implied by 
the adverb. Another possible explanation is linguistic focus (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008). 
By using an adverb, the focus of the sentence is likely to be on the manner of motion 
(i.e. fast or slow), because the purpose of an adverb is to modify an act.  By using 
only a verb the focus instead is on the completion of the motion event (and hence the 
destination). This idea is also consistent with the results from Lindsay, Scheepers & 
Kamide (2013). In their sentences, the immediate focus of the motion verb was the 
path (e.g. The jeep will race along the road to the shop) and so differences in looks 
between fast and slow events were found at the path region and then the destination 
region.  These  results  suggest  that  simulations  also  develop  flexibly  based  on 
syntactic and grammatical information. 
How  are  eye-movements  engaged  during  sentence  comprehension?  The  observed 
pattern of eye-movements could be explained as the mapping between one’s mental 
representation  of  the  world,  which  is  dynamic  and  changeable,  and  incoming 
linguistic  information  (Altmann  &  Kamide,  2007).  Thus,  increased  activation  of 
elements in the developing simulation caused by the linguistic input can lead to a 
shift in covert attention to the corresponding elements in a visual scene, increasing 
the likelihood of overt eye-movements to their location (Altmann, 2011). In terms of 
the present results, the speed of motion described in the sentences affected the speed 
of the internally simulated event; thus, the duration of the activation of the elements 
in the sentence differed according to the speed of the verb/adverb and thus the time  
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spent looking at those objects also differed. Spivey & Geng (2000) propose that the 
oculomotor system should respond to an activated visual representation irrespective 
of how it was generated (e.g. by visual perception, through language or by memory) 
because “After all, how could it know the difference?” (p. 240)  
These results are also compatible with an action-based language theory (Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2011; see Chapter 1 section 1.5.1.). This theory proposes that when listening 
to sentences, speech controllers are activated as a form of covert imitation, which in 
turn  activates  corresponding  action  controllers  for  the  meaning  of  the  words.  
Following this, forward models are generated via predictors and the perceptual or 
motor consequences of the action controllers are anticipated. Predictors in this model 
correspond to simulators in embodied approaches (Barsalou, 1999a). In terms of the 
present data, activation of forward models for the heard sentences causes the eyes to 
move  towards  the  objects  that  are  anticipated,  and  they  are  looked  at  in  a  way 
consistent with the form of the predicted action. 
One implication arising out of these results is that sentence comprehension in the 
conditions in which eye-movement simulation was not observed may be different to 
when simulation was observed. For example, when sentences are spoken quickly, or 
when the configuration of the visual scene makes matching between sentence and 
objects ambiguous, comprehension may be hindered. The present data does not allow 
this hypothesis to be tested. Additional research, such as directly manipulated eye-
movements, would be invaluable to test these implications.  
It is possible that the observed eye-movement patterns could be explained by a non-
simulation account in which post-semantic imagistic representations develop from an 
amodal representation of the sentence meaning.  Although I do not have evidence to 
rule out this view, the present interpretation is more favourable due to its parsimony: 
it postulates fewer representations. Moreover, looking at the time course of effects in 
Experiment  8-3  and  8-4  suggests  that  simulations  develop  quickly  during  online  
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comprehension.  Further  investigations  could  test  the  functional  role  of  the 
simulations  evidenced  by  eye-movements  by  manipulating  the  eye-movement 
patterns in some way and assessing any comprehension difference 
7.6  Chapter conclusion 
The experiments in this chapter provide evidence for the online simulation of speed 
during spoken sentence comprehension using an experimental paradigm that allows a 
clear and natural observation of simulation: in comparison to the task employed in 
Chapter 6, measures of simulation do not require an explicit judgment about the 
sentence. Further, this work builds on the previous chapters by revealing the flexible 
and dynamic quality of mental simulation, showing that simulations are affected by 
factors other than the semantics of the sentence, such as speaking rate and concurrent 
visual information. This chapter also adds to the theoretical understanding of the 
processes  linking  language  understanding  and  low-level  visual  mechanisms  by 
showing that eye-movements are sensitive to subtle semantic differences like speed.   
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Chapter 8  Is speed processing in language affected by deficits in the 
motor system? 
As described in the introduction of this thesis (Chapter 1 and 2), strong evidence for 
embodied theories comes from patient studies.  Evidence from behavioural and fMRI 
studies  only  provide  correlational  support  for  the  role  of  sensorimotor  systems  in 
comprehension, but not a causal role. Studies that use TMS to disrupt processing and 
then measure effects in comprehension show how these systems are causally involved 
in  comprehension  (e.g.  Pulvermüller  et  al  2005;  Tremblay,  Sato  &  Small,  2012).  
More direct evidence for a necessary role of sensorimotor systems in comprehension 
comes from studies with neurological patients. In this chapter I assess the necessary 
role  of  speed  simulation  in  comprehension  of  speed  language  by  comparing 
performance on a number of tasks assessing comprehension of speed in language of 
patients with motor problems with healthy controls. 
The  majority  of  patient  studies  that  investigate  embodied  theories  assess 
comprehension of action language in patients who have motor difficulties. Bak et al. 
(2001) found that patients with motor neuron disease were significantly impaired in 
the production of verbs but not nouns, compared to healthy controls and patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease. Further, Grossman et al. (2008) found that the degree of cortical 
atrophy  in  motor  and  premotor  areas  correlated  with  performance  on  action-verb 
judgments.  Boulenger  et  al.  (2008)  examined  action  word  comprehension  in 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) using a masked priming paradigm and found that priming 
effects  for  action  verbs  varied  as  a  function  of  Levodopa  uptake  (medication  that 
improves the motor impairment in PD). Further support from PD patients for a crucial 
role of the motor system in comprehension comes from Fernandino et al (2012), who 
removed the grammatical confound occurring when comparing verbs versus nouns by 
comparing PD patients and age-matched healthy controls on action verb and abstract 
verb processing. Compared to healthy controls, patients performed worse with action 
verbs than abstract verbs, reflecting a problem with action language rather than the  
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grammatical category of verbs. Thus, action language depends on the integrity of the 
motor system.  It should be noted however that these effects tend to be relatively 
small, and although differences do exist between patients and controls, patients can 
still comprehend action language to some extent. This suggests that although motor 
simulation  may  be  a  crucial  component  in  comprehension  of  action  language, 
comprehension  is  also  supported  by  other  systems  including  simulation  in  other 
modalities as well as other types of information such as statistical relations between 
words (Andrews et al., 2009). 
A more definitive test for a functional role of sensorimotor systems in understanding 
speed language therefore would be to assess whether individuals with deficits in the 
sensorimotor processing of speed, for example from damage to the respective brain 
areas,  also  show  impaired  speed  language  comprehension.  Patients  with  motor 
impairment,  such  as  PD,  provide  an  opportunity  to  test  this  hypothesis.  PD  is  a 
neurodegenerative  disease  caused  by  a  deficiency  in  the  dopaminergic  pathway 
leading to reduced activation in brain areas involved in motor planning and execution, 
including the primary motor cortex and the supplementary motor area (Fernandino et 
al.,  2013).  PD  patients  are  characterized  by  a  range  of  motor  problems  including 
bradykinesia (slowed movements) and rigidity. If the motor regions affected in PD are 
involved  in  understanding  language  about  speed,  then  PD  patients  should  show 
difficulties comprehending speed language compared to non-action language. Further, 
since  PD  patients  have  more  difficulty  moving  quickly  compared  to  slowly,  they 
should be more impaired with language about fast actions compared to slow actions. 
Disembodied approaches would predict that comprehension of speed is not affected 
since the sensorimotor areas that are damaged are thought to have no functional role in 
language understanding.  
I used three tasks that assess comprehension of speed in language at different depths 
of processing to investigate the conditions in which the motor system is involved in 
semantic processes for speed. Lexical decision (shown to be sensitive to a number of  
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semantic  variables  (Yap  et  al.,  2012))  with  masked  priming  assesses  motor 
contribution at an automatic, implicit level. In masked priming, the prime word is not 
consciously  perceived.  Thus,  assessing  priming  with  speed  words  assesses  the 
automatic activation of speed simulation. If Parkinson’s patients have impaired speed 
simulation at an automatic level, they should have reduced priming effects for speed 
verbs compared to abstract verbs (i.e. no difference between primed and unprimed 
targets). The controls however are expected to have faster responses to primed targets 
that unprimed targets for all verb types, due to preactivation of the target concept by 
the prime. Sentence comprehension assesses motor contribution at a level of implicit 
conscious  activation.  And  semantic  similarity  judgments  assess  motor  contribution 
during  explicit  semantic  comparisons  (Fernandino  et  al.  2013).  Fernandino  et  al. 
(2013) found evidence for a causal role of the motor system in comprehension at all 
levels  of  processing,  however  since  speed  is  a  fine-grained  and  relatively  abstract 
action feature it is not clear whether it would necessarily be activated at all levels or 
only when explicit semantic processing is required. 
8.1  Method 
8.1.1  Participants 
Thirteen patients diagnosed with PD (average age 71.6, SD = 4.5, age range 64 - 78) 
were recruited from the Columbia Parkinson’s support group and from the Palmetto 
Health Richmond hospital in Columbia, South Carolina. Table 8-1 presents patient 
details. Four patients were removed from all analyses for having low scores on the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (<21) (see description of test below). One patient did 
not complete the sentence sensibility task due to a computer error midway through the 
task and one patient was not included in the semantic similarity judgment analysis for 
performance being lower than 50% (although their accuracy in the other two tasks was 
high). Eleven healthy controls were recruited of a similar age (average 70.8 (SD = 
8.6)), most of whom were partners of the PD patients. One control was removed for 
having  a  low  MoCA  score  (<21)  and  one  control  did  not  complete  the  sentence  
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sensibility  task  due  to  a  computer  crash.  All  participants  were  paid  for  their 
participation. 
Table 8-1. Individual patient information for age (years), Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
(max=30), Unified Parkinson’s Disease Scale (max = 32), Hoen-Yahr stage (max = 4). 
 
8.1.2  Material 
Words to be used in the following experimental tasks were rated by participants of a 
similar age to the PD patients and matched on a number of psycholinguistic variables 
as described in Chapter 6, section 6.1.1.2. 
Patient  Gender  Age  MoCA  UPDRS 
Hoen-
Yahr 
stage 
Time since 
medication 
(minutes) 
Years since 
diagnosis 
P1  M  76  21  -  -  30  6 
P2  M  76  25  17  2  75  24.4 
P3  M  64  17  29  1  15  4.3 
P4  F  65  18  26  3  90  3 
P5  M  71  25  10  1  180  7.5 
P6  M  66  29  31  2  320  3.8 
P7  M  73  23  55  5  300  11 
P8  F  74  27  19  1  300  11 
P9  M  71  22  10  1  -  3.3 
P10  F  74  20  41  3  330  - 
P11  M  74  22  9  2  -  - 
P12  M  69  25  22  2  355  0.4 
P13  M  68  15  -  -  -  12  
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Once the items sets had been selected, I ran a pilot study to check that response time 
and accuracy were equal across conditions for healthy subjects. Any condition that is 
already  difficult  for  healthy  subjects  would  be  exaggerated  with  the  PD  group.14 
healthy participants (average age 63.2, range 44-78) were recruited from the UCL 
Psychology Subject Pool and via email contact with members of the University of the 
Third Age in London (www.u3a.org.uk) and were paid for their participation. Any 
relevant results from the pilot study are discussed in reference to the particular word 
type below. 
8.1.2.1  Lexical decision task (LDT) 
The lexical decision task comprised three sets of experimental items: full body verbs 
matched with abstract verbs, hand/arm verbs matched with abstract verbs and fast, 
slow and abstract adverbs. Each set will be analysed separately. Sixteen fast & slow 
full body verbs and 16 abstract verbs were normed and matched e.g. to whiz, to roam, 
to profess (see Table Appendix 1-15 and 1-15), 11 fast and slow arm/hand action 
verbs and 11 abstract verbs were normed and matched e.g. to yank, to brush, to know 
(see  Table  Appendix  1-17  an  1-18),  and  20  fast,  slow  and  abstract  adverbs  were 
normed and matched e.g. slowly, actively, hopefully (see Table Appendix 1-20 and 1-
21). The norming task and the matching procedure is described Chapter 4. Pseudo-
words  were  generated  from  the  English  Lexicon  Project  (http://elexicon.wustl.edu) 
and matched with experimental words on length, number of orthographic neighbours 
and lexical decision accuracy (see Table Appendix 1-16, 1-19 and 1-22). 
8.1.2.2   Sentence sensibility task (SST) 
Sets of 13 abstract, fast and slow adverbs were matched as described in Chapter 6 (see 
Table  Appendix  1-10  and  1-11).  These  adverbs  were  then  placed  into  sentences 
matched  in  length  and  syntactic  structure:  13  sentences  with  abstract  adverbs  and 
abstract actions (e.g. Gwen knowingly allowed the breach), 13 sentences with fast and 
slow adverbs and abstract actions (e.g. Mike quickly/carefully rated all the entries) and  
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13  sentences  with  fast  and  slow  adverbs  and  concrete  actions  (e.g.  Phil 
quickly/carefully lifted up the case). Each participant saw all abstract adverb sentences 
and  either  a  fast  or  slow  version  of  each  speeded  abstract  and  concrete  sentence, 
counterbalanced  across  trials  (See  Figure  8-1  for  an  example  of  three  items 
counterbalanced  across  two  participants).  All  sentences  are  displayed  in  Appendix 
section A2.1.3. 
A. 
Adverbs  Abstract action  Concrete action 
Abstract 
Max usefully acquired all the new clients   
Fast 
  John speedily rolled up the sleeping bag. 
Slow 
Bob awkwardly thought over the business plan   
 
           B. 
Adverbs  Abstract action  Concrete action 
Abstract 
Max usefully acquired all the new clients   
Fast 
Bob speedily thought over the business plan   
Slow 
 
John awkwardly rolled up the sleeping 
bag. 
Figure 8-1. Example of the distribution of sentence conditions for two participants A and B. 
8.1.2.3  Semantic Similarity Judgments (SSJ) 
From the verbs that received more than three ‘none’ responses in the speed ratings, 
those with an average valence rating of 3 or less were considered ‘negative’ verbs, and  
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those that scored an average valence rating greater than 6 were considered ‘positive’ 
verbs  (following  the  methodology  used  in  Bradley  &  Lang,  1999).  The  lists  of 
positive, negative, fast and slow verbs were submitted to a matching program ‘Match’ 
(van Casteren & Davis, 2007) which matched 10 quadruplets of positive, negative, fast 
and  slow  verbs  on  number  of  letter,  log  frequency,  number  of  orthographic 
neighbours, number of phonemes and number of syllables. The matched stimuli were 
then organized into ten triplets of either speed or valence to be used in the semantic 
similarity judgment task (see Table Appendix 1-23 and 1-24). Each word occurred in 
each of the three positions (target, match and foil). 
After looking at the pilot data I decided that the speed trials were too difficult: mean 
accuracy for the fast and slow judgments were 74% and 67% respectively compared to 
92% for both positive and negative emotion judgments. I also became aware of an 
existing  hypothesis  that  would  predict  that  Parkinson’s  patients  would  also  be 
impaired  in  emotion  language  because  of  their  inability  to  fully  experience  facial 
expression  (Mermillod,  Vermuelen,  Droit-Volet,  Jalenques,  Durif  &  Niedenthal, 
2011). To address these issues I decided to change the speed trials to fast movement 
versus static movement and slow movement versus static movement (instead of fast 
vs. slow) to make judgments easier and add an additional set of trials as a control 
(word types where I would expect no impairment): thinking (e.g. to ponder) versus 
seeing words (e.g. to watch). 
Thus, sixteen fast (e.g. to run), slow (e.g. to shuffle), positive (e.g. to inspire), negative 
(e.g. to deceive), thinking (e.g. to ponder) and seeing (e.g. to watch) verbs and two 
sets of verbs of no movement (e.g. to stand) were matched. Half of the fast and slow 
verbs were full body actions (e.g. to run) and half were hand/arm movements (e.g. to 
grasp). Items were then divided into four separate sets to serve as separate blocks 
within the experiment; positive and negative verbs; thinking and seeing verbs, fast 
actions and static actions and slow actions and static actions (see Table Appendix 1-25  
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and  1-26).  The  items  were  then  divided  into  32  triplets  per  block  with  each  item 
serving as the target, match and foil once.  
8.1.3  Procedure 
Participants either came into the lab or were tested at Palmetto Richland Hospital, 
Columbia,  South  Carolina.  All  experimental  testing  was  completed  on  a  laptop 
running  Windows.  The  whole  session  took  around  one  hour  but  could  be  longer 
depending on the patients’ need for breaks. 
8.1.3.1  Unified Parkinson’s Disease Scale  
For those patients tested in the hospital (N = 11), the neurologist administered part III 
of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Scale (UPDRS), which assesses the patients’ motor 
problems, to the patient. This testing took place either before of after the experimental 
session, depending on the availability of the neurologist. 
8.1.3.2  Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
Before the experimental session began all patients and controls were first administered 
the  Montreal  Cognitive  Assessment  (MoCA)  to  assess  cognitive  impairment.  If 
participants scored too low on this assessment (cutoff score = 21 (Dalrymple-Alford et 
al., 2010)) then they were excluded from the analysis, as this would suggest that they 
had  PD  dementia.  The  MoCA  has  been  shown  to  be  more  sensitive  than  other 
cognitive  assessments  such  as  the  Mini  Mental  State  Examination  (MMSE), 
particularly for assessing milder cognitive deficits in PD (Hoops, Nazem, Siderowf, 
Duda,  Xie,  Stern  &  Weintraub,  2009),  and  as  good  as  or  better  than  PD-focused 
cognitive  instruments  (Dalrymple-Alford  et  al.,  2010)  in  discriminating  between 
patients  with  normal  cognitive  functioning  and  patients  with  mild  cognitive 
impairment (MCI).   
 
 
 
261 
The MoCA comprises seven sections assessing visuospatial/executive skills, naming, 
delayed recall, attention, language, abstraction and orientation. The test is scored out 
of 30, with typical cutoffs for MCI at <26 and dementia at <21. The test takes around 
10 minutes to administer. 
8.1.3.3  Language comprehension tasks 
All comprehension tasks were administered on a laptop running E-prime software in 
one session, with short breaks between each task. For all tasks, participants responded 
using two coloured Ablenet Jelly Bean buttons (www.ablenetinc.com). Responding 
with the Jelly Bean buttons is easier than other types of button response (e.g. keyboard 
press) because they are much larger. The red button was placed on the left and the 
green button was placed on the right (serving as “no” and “yes” responses respectively 
for  the  LDT  and  SST).  Participants  were  instructed  to  respond  only  with  their 
dominant hand and to rest it between the two buttons between responses. This meant 
that the average speed of response was the same for ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses. The 
LDT  and  SST  were  administered  either  first  or  second  (counterbalanced  across 
participants). The SSJ was always administered last since this task required explicit 
judgments about the word types of interest, which could affect performance in the 
LDT and SST if participants were aware of them. 
8.1.3.3.1  Lexical Decision Task 
Each lexical decision trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 
500ms, followed by eight hashmarks for 100ms, then the prime stimulus for 50ms, a 
further 100ms of eight hashmarks and finally the target word (see Figure 8-2). The 
target word remained onscreen until the participant responded or until the trial timed 
out (after 4000ms). Each verb or pseudo-verb was presented with the word “to” to the 
left and each adverb or pseudo-adverb was presented alone. The prime was either the 
same word in capitalized form so that it was visually distinct from the target word, or a 
string  of  capitalized  consonants  of  the  same  length  of  the  word,  counterbalanced  
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across participants. Participants were instructed to press the green button if the item 
was a real English word, and to press the red button if it was not. The letters “N” and 
“Y” were presented under each item with a blue box appearing around the response 
made to indicate that the response had been registered. Participants first completed six 
practice trials with three real words and three non-words, with feedback on each trial. 
The task was divided into two blocks with the order counterbalanced: one block of 
verbs and one block of adverbs. The task took around 15 minutes to complete. 
 
Figure 8-2. Procedure for lexical decision task. Figure taken from Fernandino et al/ 2013. 
8.1.3.3.2  Sentence Sensibility Task 
Each trial began with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500ms followed 
by presentation of the full sentence in written form. The sentence remained on screen 
until the participant had responded or until the trial had timed-out (after 5000ms). 
Participants were instructed to press the green button if the sentence made sense or the 
red button if it did not. They were given examples of sentences that did and did not 
make sense in the instructions and the experimenter confirmed that they understood 
the task. The letters “N” and “Y” were presented under each sentence with a blue box 
appearing around the response made to indicate that the response had been registered.  
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Participants first completed six practice trials with three sentences that made sense and 
three that did not, with feedback on each trial. The task took around 10 minutes to 
complete. 
8.1.3.3.3  Semantic Similarity Judgment 
For each trial, three verbs were presented in a triangular arrangement. Each verb was 
presented with the word “to” to its left. Participants were instructed to indicate which 
of the two bottom words was most similar in meaning to the top and to press the right 
button for the word on the right and the left button for the word on the left. The 
position of the matching verb was counterbalanced across subjects. Since the way that 
items could be similar was so diverse, the items were divided into four blocks of 
judgments (movement vs. static action (with slow verbs), movement vs. static action 
(with  fast  verbs),  thinking  vs.  seeing  verbs  and  positive  vs.  negative  verbs)  with 
specific instructions about the type of judgment to be made at the beginning of each 
block.  The  experimenter  went  through  these  instructions  carefully  with  each 
participant to ensure that they knew what type of judgment they were making. The 
triangular arrangement stayed on screen until the participant had responded or the trial 
had timed out (after 5000ms). A blue square appeared around a word when a response 
had  been  made  to  show  that  the  response  had  been  registered.  Participants  first 
completed six practice trials with words that denoted facial expressions (e.g. to grin) 
versus words that denoted vocalizations (e.g. to yell) with feedback given on each 
trial. The task took around 10 minutes to complete.  
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Figure 8-3. Example trial for semantic similarity judgments. Participants had to choose which of 
the bottom two words matched the top word according to a specific dimension (in this case 
movement versus static action). 
8.2  Results 
8.2.1  Lexical decision task 
Items and their matched items were removed from analysis if their accuracy in control 
participants was less than 70%. Trials with response time greater than 3000ms, less 
than 250ms or outside 1.5SD
11 of a participant’s mean response time were removed (< 
10%). Average accuracy and response time, based on correct responses only, for each 
condition  was  calculated  for  each  participant  (collapsing  across  both  primed  and 
unprimed  trials).  Priming  scores  were  calculated  for  each  condition  for  each 
participant  by  subtracting  their  average  response  time  for  primed  trials  from  their 
average response time for unprimed trials. 
Data was initially explored with a 3 (word type) X 2 (group) mixed ANOVA, with 
word  type  a  within  subjects  variable  and  group  a  between.  To  directly  test  the 
predictions of the chapter that PD patients will be impaired with fast versus slow 
words and with fast and slow words compared with abstract words, and controls will 
not, I also conducted independent t-tests between PD patients and controls on net 
response time, net accuracy and net priming (abstract – fast, abstract – slow, abstract – 
                                                 
11	 ﾠA cutoff value of 1.5SD provides more power to detect differences in data with a large amount of 
variance (Ratcliff, 1993).	 ﾠ 
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speed and fast - slow). Using independent t-tests allows greater power to detect a 
priori predictions (Fernandino et al. 2013). 
8.2.1.1  Adverbs 
Here I contrast accuracy, response time and priming scores for abstract adverbs (e.g. 
hopefully),  fast  adverbs  (e.g.  actively)  and  slow  adverbs  (e.g.  slowly)  between  PD 
patients and controls. If comprehension of speed words at all levels of processing 
requires simulation of speeded action I would expect performance to be worse (lower 
accuracy, longer response time or reduced priming) in patients but not controls for fast 
adverbs  compared  to  slow  adverbs,  and  between  speed  adverbs  (fast  and  slow) 
compared to abstract adverbs. The predicted effect would be shown in an interaction 
between word type (abstract, fast and slow) and group (PD vs. controls) in accuracy, 
response time or priming scores or as an effect of group in net accuracy, net response 
time or net priming scores. 
8.2.1.1.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-4. There was no difference in accuracy for 
adverbs between word types (F (2, 34) = 1.12, p = .34, η
2
p = .06) or group (F (1, 17) = 
1.12, p = .31, η
2
p = .06) and no interaction (F (2, 34) = 1.12, p = .34, η
2
p = .06).   
There was no difference in net accuracy between PD patients and controls for any of 
the comparisons (t (17) = 1.06, p =. 31, d = .49). Thus there was no evidence for a 
difference between patients and controls in accuracy scores to adverbs.  
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Figure 8-4. Average accuracy to adverbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 standard 
error. 
8.2.1.1.2  Response time 
Average  response  time  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-5.  PD  patients  were  significantly 
slower  than  controls  (F  (1,  17)  =  6.09,  p  =  .025,  η
2
p  =  .26)  but  there  were  no 
differences across word types (F < 1) and no interaction (F (2, 34) = 2.29, p =. 12, η
2
p 
= .12).  
There was however a significant difference in net response time between PD patients 
and controls for the difference between abstract and fast adverbs (t (17) = 2.66, p = 
.02, d = 1.22) and abstract and speed adverbs combined (t (17) = 2.24, p = .04, d = 
1.03), but not between abstract and slow adverbs (t (17) = 1, p = .33, d = .46) or 
between fast and slow adverbs (t < 1). Response time was slower for abstract words 
compared to fast and fast and slow combined in PD patients but not controls. This 
result is opposite to the hypotheses in this chapter. 
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Figure 8-5. Average response time to adverbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.1.3  Priming 
Average priming scores are displayed in Figure 8-6.There was a marginal difference in 
priming scores across word types (F (2, 34) = 3.17, p = .06, η
2
p = .16) but not across 
groups (F (1, 17) = 1.85, p = .19, η
2
p = .1) and there was no interaction (F (2, 34) = 
1.48, p = .24, η
2
p = .08).  Priming scores were lower for abstract adverbs than fast 
adverbs (F (1, 17) = 7.91, p = .012, η
2
p = .32) and marginally lower than slow adverbs 
(F (1, 17) = 3.92, p = .06, η
2
p = .19) but there was no difference between fast and slow 
adverbs (F < 1).  
There was a marginal difference in net priming between PD patients and controls with 
abstract adverbs having lower priming scores compared to fast (t (17) = 1.74, p = .1, d 
=  .8) and speed combined (t (17) = 2.02, p = .06, d = .9) in PD but not controls. This 
suggests that PD patients have problems processing abstract adverbs compared to fast 
and  slow  adverbs  but  controls  do  not,  which  was  not  predicted.  There  was  no 
difference between PD patients and controls in net priming between fast and slow 
adverbs (t < 1).  
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Figure 8-6. Average priming effect for adverbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.2  Full Body Verbs 
Here I contrast accuracy, response time and priming scores for abstract verbs (e.g. to 
profess), fast full-body verbs (e.g. to whiz) and slow full-body verbs (e.g. to roam) 
between PD patients and controls. To reiterate the main hypotheses, if comprehension 
of speed words at all levels of processing requires simulation of speeded action I 
would  expect  performance  to  be  worse  (lower  accuracy,  longer  response  time  or 
reduced priming) in patients but not controls for fast verbs compared to slow verbs, 
and between speed verbs (fast and slow) compared to abstract verbs. The predicted 
effect would be shown in an interaction between word type (abstract, fast and slow) 
and group (PD vs. controls) in accuracy, response time or priming scores or as an 
effect of group in net accuracy, net response time or net priming scores. 
Two full body verbs (to plod and to flit) and their matched items were removed from 
analysis for having low accuracy in controls (70%). 
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8.2.1.2.1  Accuracy 
Average  accuracy  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-7.  There  was  a  significant  difference 
between word type (F (2, 34) = 4.15, p = .02, η
2
p = .2) with accuracy for abstract verbs 
lower than accuracy for fast full body verbs (F (1, 17) = 5.85, p = .03, η
2
p = .26) but 
not slow fully body verbs (F (1, 17) = 2.97, p = .1, η
2
p = .15) and no difference 
between fast and slow full body verbs (F (1, 17) = 2, p = .18, η
2
p = .11). There was no 
difference in accuracy across groups (F<1) and no interaction (F<1).   
There was no difference in net accuracy between PD patients and controls for any of 
the contrasts (ps > .05) 
Thus there was no support for my hypotheses in accuracy for full-body speed verbs. 
 
Figure 8-7.  Average accuracy for full-body verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.2.2  Response time 
Average response tine is displayed in Figure 8-8. There was a significant difference 
across word types (F (2, 34) = 4.46, p = .019, η
2
p = .21) with responses slower to 
abstract verbs than fast full body verb (F (1, 17) = 7.2, p = .02, η
2
p = .3) but there was 
no difference between abstract verbs and slow full body verbs  (F (1, 17) = 2.05, p = 
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.17, η
2
p = .11) or between fast full body verbs and slow full body verbs (F (1, 17) = 
2.86, p =. 11, η
2
p = .14). Responses for PD patients were significantly slower than 
responses for controls (F (1, 17) = 8.98, p < .01, η
2
p = .35). There was no interaction 
(F < 1).  
There  was  no  difference  in  net  response  time  between  PD  patients  and  controls 
between any of the comparisons (ps> .05) 
Thus there was no support for my hypotheses in response time for full-body speed 
verbs. 
 
Figure 8-8. Average response time for full-body verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.2.3  Priming 
Average priming scores are displayed in Figure 8-8. There was a significant difference 
between groups (F (1, 19) = 5.56, p = .03, η
2
p = .25) with overall less priming in PD 
than control. There was no difference in priming scores across word types (F < 1) and 
no interaction (F < 1). However there was a numerical trend for reduced priming in 
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both  fast  and  slow  full  body  verbs  but  not  abstract  verbs  for  PD  patients  but  not 
controls.  
There was no difference in net priming between PD patients and controls for any of 
the comparisons. 
 
Figure 8-9. Average priming effect for full-body verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.3  Hand/arm verbs 
Here I contrast accuracy, response time and priming scores for abstract verbs (e.g. to 
know), fast hand/arm verbs (e.g. to yank) and slow hand/arm verbs (e.g. to brush) 
between  PD  patients  and  controls.  Again,  if  comprehension  of  speed  words  at  all 
levels of processing requires simulation of speeded action I would expect performance 
to be worse (lower accuracy, longer response time or reduced priming) in patients but 
not controls for fast verbs compared to slow verbs, and between speed verbs (fast and 
slow)  compared  to  abstract  verbs.  The  predicted  effect  would  be  shown  in  an 
interaction between word type (abstract, fast and slow) and group (PD vs. controls) in 
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accuracy, response time or priming scores or as an effect of group in net accuracy, net 
response time or net priming scores. 
8.2.1.3.1  Accuracy 
Average  accuracy  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-10.  there  was  a  significant  interaction 
between word type and group (F (2, 34) = 4.29, p = .02, η
2
p = .2). Accuracy for 
abstract verbs was marginally lower than accuracy for fast and slow hand/arm verbs 
for PD patients (t (8) = 2, p = .08, d = .7) but not for controls (t (9) = 1, p = .34, d = 
.32). There was no overall difference in accuracy between word types (F (2, 34) = 
2.44, p = .1, η
2
p = .13) or groups (F (1, 17) = 1.5, p=. 24, η
2
p = .08). 
The interaction was supported with independent t-tests on net accuracy. There was a 
significant  difference  in  net  accuracy  between  PD  patients  and  controls  for  the 
difference between abstract and fast hand/arm verbs (t (17) = 2.12, p = .05, d = .97), 
abstract and slow full hand/arm verbs (t (17) = 2.28, p = .04, d = 1.05) and abstract 
and speed verbs combined (t (17) = 2.31, p = .0, d = 1.06). There was no difference in 
net accuracy between fast and slow hand/arm verbs between PD patients and controls 
(t < 1).  
Thus contrary to predictions, PD patients performed worse with abstract verbs than 
speeded verbs describing hand/arm actions.  
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Figure 8-10. Average accuracy for hand/arm verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 1 
standard error. 
8.2.1.3.2  Response time 
Average response time is displayed in Figure 8-11. Responses in the PD group were 
slower than the control group (F (1, 17) = 6.81, p = .02, η
2
p = .29) but there were no 
differences in response time between word types (F (2, 34) = 1.45, p = .25, η
2
p = .08) 
and no interaction (F (2, 34) = 1.27, p = .29, η
2
p = .07).  
There was no difference in net response time between PD patients and controls for any 
of the comparisons (ps> .05). 
Thus there was no evidence in support of the hypotheses in response time to hand/arm 
verbs. 
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Figure 8-11. Average response time for hand/arm verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 
1 standard error. 
8.2.1.3.3  Priming 
Average priming scores are displayed in Figure 8-12. There was no effect of word 
type (F (2, 34) = 1.62, p = .21, η
2
p = .09) or group and no interaction (F<1). There was 
no difference in net priming between patients and controls for any of the comparisons 
( ts <1). 
 
Figure 8-12. Average priming effect for hand/arm verbs in lexical decision task. Error bars reflect 
1 standard error. 
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8.2.1.4  Summary: Lexical Decision 
In terms of the predictions of this chapter, there were no differences between PD 
patients and controls for the difference between responses to fast and slow verbs and 
adverbs. For full body verbs, there was a trend for reduced priming for fast and slow 
verbs compared to abstract verbs, for PD patients only, suggesting that processing of 
action words is impaired compared to abstract words, as shown in previous work (e.g. 
Fernandino et al, 2013). However, speed does not appear to be affected at this level. 
Contrary to predictions, PD patients but not controls showed less priming for abstract 
adverbs  compared  to  fast  and  slow  adverbs  and  lower  accuracy  to  abstract  verbs 
compared  to  fast  and  slow  hand/arm  verbs.    Thus,  abstract  verbs  appear  to  be 
problematic for PD patients. Possible reasons for these difficulties are discussed in the 
General Discussion. 
8.2.2  Sentence sensibility judgments 
Sentences  and  their  matched  sentences  were  removed  if  accuracy  in  control 
participants was less than 70% (two abstract sentences with abstract adverbs and one 
concrete  sentences  with  a  slow  adverb).  Trials  with  response  time  greater  than 
5000ms, less than 250ms or outside 1.5SD of a participant’s mean were removed ( 
<12%). Average accuracy and response time, based on correct responses only, for 
each condition was calculated for each participant.  
For abstract sentences, data was initially explored with a 3 (sentence type) X 2 (group) 
mixed ANOVA, with sentence type a within subjects variable and group a between. 
To directly test the prediction that PD patients will be impaired with fast sentences the 
most, and with fast and slow sentences compared with abstract words, and controls 
will not, I also conducted independent t-tests on net response time and net accuracy 
(abstract  –  fast,  abstract  –  slow,  abstract  –  speed,  fast  –  slow)  for  greater  power 
(Fernandino et al., 2013).  
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For concrete sentences, data was analysed with a 2 (sentence type) X 2 (group) mixed 
ANOVA,  with  sentence  type  a  within  subjects  variable  and  group  a  between. 
Independent t-tests were also conducted on net accuracy and net response time (fast – 
slow). 
8.2.2.1  Abstract sentences 
Here I contrast accuracy and response time to sentences describing abstract actions 
with  either  a  fast,  slow  or  abstract  adverb,  between  PD  patients  and  controls.  If 
comprehension  of  speed  requires  simulation  of  speeded  action  I  would  expect 
performance to be worse (lower accuracy or longer response time) in patients but not 
controls for sentences with fast adverbs compared to sentences with slow adverbs, and 
between sentences with speed adverbs (fast and slow) compared to sentences with 
abstract  adverbs.  The  predicted  effect  would  be  shown  in  an  interaction  between 
adverb  type  (abstract,  fast  and  slow)  and  group  (PD  vs.  controls)  in  accuracy  or 
response time or as an effect of group in net accuracy or net response time. 
8.2.2.1.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-13. There was no evidence of impairment 
in comprehension of speed for PD patients in accuracy scores for abstract sentences. 
There was no difference in accuracy between adverb type (F<1) or group (F<1) and 
no interaction (F (2, 36) = 1.01, p = .37, η
2
p = .05). There was no difference in net 
accuracy between PD patients and controls for any of the comparisons.  
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Figure 8-13. Average accuracy for abstract sentences in sentence sensibility task. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.2.1.2  Response time 
Average response time is displayed in Figure 8-14.Responses were slower in the PD 
group compared to the control group (F (1, 18) = 5.77, p = .03, η
2
p = .24) and there 
was a marginal difference across adverb types (F (2, 36) = 2.97, p = .06, η
2
p = .14). 
There was also a significant interaction between adverb type and group (F (2, 36) = 
3.38, p = .05, η
2
p = .19). In line with predictions, the PD group responded to sentences 
with fast adverbs more slowly than they responded to sentences with slow adverbs (t 
(8)  =  2.53,  p  =  .04,  d =  .84)  and  marginally  slower  than  sentences  with  abstract 
adverbs (t (8) = 2.06, p = .07, d = .69), but there was no difference between sentences 
with abstract and slow adverbs (t (8) = 1.15, p = .28, d = .38).  For controls there was 
no difference between sentences with abstract adverbs and sentences with fast adverbs 
(t (10) = 1.08, p = .31, d = .34), nor between sentences with fast adverbs and sentences 
with  slow  adverbs  (t  <  1).  However,  there  was  a  marginal  difference  between 
sentences with abstract adverbs and sentences with slow adverbs (t (10) = 1.88, p = 
.09, d = .59), with response to slow adverbs sentences being longer than response to 
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abstract adverb sentences. This marginal difference may reflect simulation of slow 
speed in controls. 
In  net  response  time  there  was  a  significant  difference  between  PD  patients  and 
controls between fast and slow sentences (t (18) = 2.23, p = .04, d = 1). However there 
was no difference in net response time between PD patients and controls between 
abstract and fast sentences (t < 1) nor abstract and speed sentences combined (t < 1) 
but there was a marginal difference between groups for abstract and slow sentences (t 
(18) = 1.85, p = .08, d = .83) with response faster to slow sentences than abstract 
sentences  in  PD  patients,  but  the  opposite  pattern  for  controls.  There  were  no 
differences between adverb types however for control participants (p > .1). 
Thus here I provide evidence that PD patients are slower to comprehend sentences 
describing fast speed than sentences describing slow and abstract versions of the same 
action, in line with predictions. 
 
Figure 8-14. Average response time for abstract sentences in sentence sensibility task. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error 
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8.2.2.2  Concrete sentences 
Here I contrast accuracy and response time to sentences describing concrete actions 
with  either  a  fast  or  slow  adverb,  between  PD  patients  and  controls.  Again,  if 
comprehension  of  speed  requires  simulation  of  speeded  action  I  would  expect 
performance to be worse (lower accuracy or longer response time) in patients but not 
controls for sentences with fast adverbs compared to sentences with slow adverbs. The 
predicted effect would be shown in an interaction between adverb type (fast and slow) 
and group (PD vs. controls) in accuracy or response time or as an effect of group in 
net accuracy or net response time. 
8.2.2.2.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-15. There was no evidence for impairment 
in  fast  versus  slow  comprehension  in  PD  patients  or  controls.  PD  patients  were 
marginally less accurate than control patients (F (1, 18) = 3.91, p = .06, η
2
p = .18) but 
there was no difference in accuracy between adverb type (F (1, 18) = 1.38, p = .26, η
2
p 
= .07) and no interaction (F < 1). There was no difference in net accuracy between PD 
patients and controls (t < 1). 
 
Figure 8-15. Average accuracy for concrete sentences in sentence sensibility task. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
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8.2.2.2.2  Response time 
Average response time is displayed in Figure 8-16. PD patients were significantly 
slower than control participants (F (1, 18) = 6.49, p = .02, η
2
p = .27) but there was no 
difference in response time across adverb type  (F<1) and no interaction (F < 1). There 
was no difference in net response time between PD patients and controls (t < 1). Thus 
there was no evidence in support of my hypotheses in response time. 
 
Figure 8-16. Average response time for concrete sentences in sentence sensibility task. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.2.3  Summary SSTs 
In  line  with  predictions,  PD  patients  were  slower  comprehending  fast  sentences 
compared to abstract and slow sentences, but only when the sentence described an 
abstract action and not a concrete action. This pattern was not observed for control 
participants,  who  instead  were  slowest  with  slow  adverbs.  This  suggests  that  fast 
speed information is difficult for PD patients to comprehend when it is used in non-
typical situations (i.e. to describe abstract actions).  No differences were observed for 
concrete action sentences. 
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8.2.3  Semantic Similarity Judgments (SSJs) 
Performance in the semantic similarity judgments was quite low (average accuracy of 
78% in controls and 70% in PD patients), therefore I decided to remove individual 
items (one triplet of verbs) if overall accuracy for that item was 50% or less in the 
control group, in order to minimize the amount of data discarded.  Based on these 
criteria  two  ‘positive  vs.  negative’  trials  (targets  to  boast  and  to  deserve),  two 
‘movement vs. static’ trials (targets to caress and to sprawl) and three ‘thinking v. 
seeing’ trials (targets to detect, to judge, and to regard) were removed. Individual 
trials were removed if responses were faster than 250ms or outside of 1.5SD of a 
participant’s mean response time (13%). One patient was removed for having overall 
accuracy less than 50%. 
Three separate sets of analyses were conducted in accordance with my predictions: 
1.  Abstract trials: positive, negative, thinking and seeing verbs 
2.  Full body trials: fast and slow full-body verbs and their matched static verbs 
(one set of static verbs used in the triplets with fast verbs and one set used in 
the triplets with slow verbs) 
3.  Hand/arm trials: fast and slow hand/arm verbs and their matched static verbs 
(one set of static verbs used in triplets with fast verbs and one set used in the 
triplets with slow verbs) 
 
Each set was analysed with a 4 (target type) by 2 (group) ANOVA on accuracy and 
response time. 
Based on the predictions and patterns emerging in the data, and to have more power to 
detect  differences,  I  also  ran  independent  t-tests  comparing  net  accuracy  and  net 
response time between PD patients and controls for emotion versus thinking/seeing 
targets, fast hand versus slow hand targets, and fast full body versus slow full body 
targets.  
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8.2.3.1  Abstract trials 
Here  I  contrast  accuracy  and  response  time  to  abstract  targets  (negative,  positive, 
thinking and seeing verbs). There is no speed information in these words and as such I 
would not expect any differences between PD and controls to differ according to target 
types (i.e. I do not expect any interaction). 
8.2.3.1.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-17.Accuracy was significantly lower in PD 
patients than in controls (F (1, 17) = 5.41, p =. 03, η
2
p = .24) but there was no overall 
difference in accuracy across target word type (F (3, 51) = 1.09, p = .36, η
2
p = .06). 
There was a numerical trend for an interaction between target type and group (F (3, 
51) = 2.17, p = .1, η
2
p = .11), with responses to positive and negative targets being less 
accurate than responses to thinking and seeing targets.  When collapsing over emotion 
trials and thinking and seeing trials, the interaction between target and group became 
marginally significant (F (1, 17) = 3.45, p = .08, η
2
p = .17). For net accuracy between 
thinking/seeing  and  emotion  trials,  there  was  a  marginal  difference  between  PD 
patients and controls (t (17) = 1.86, p = .08, d = .85). 
Contrary to predictions, accuracy scores suggest that PD patients have difficulty with 
emotion language compared to abstract language describing thinking and seeing, but 
control participants do not.  
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Figure 8-17. Average accuracy for abstract targets in semantic similarity judgments. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.3.1.2  Response time 
Average  response  time  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-18.  PD  patients  were  marginally 
slower than control participants (F (1, 17) = 4, p = .06, η
2
p = .19) but there was no 
difference between target type in response time (F (3, 51) = 1.16, p = .33, η
2
p = .06) 
and no interaction (F < 1). There were no differences in net response time (t < 1). 
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Figure 8-18. Average response time for abstract targets in semantic similarity judgments. Error 
bars reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.3.2  Full body trials 
Here I contrast accuracy and response time to fast full-body targets, slow full-body 
targets, static targets with fast full-body distractors and static targets with slow full-
body distractors. I predict that PD patients will perform worse with fast targets than 
slow targets (lower accuracy or slower response time) but control participants will not. 
8.2.3.2.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-19. There was no significant difference 
across target type (F (3, 51) = 3.15, p = .33, η
2
p = .16) in accuracy. There was no effect 
of group (F (1, 17) = 1.42, p =. 25, η
2
p = .08), nor was there an interaction between 
target type and group (F (3, 51) = 1.28, p = .29, η
2
p = .07). For net accuracy between 
fast full body and slow full body targets, there was no difference between PD patients 
and controls (t (17) = 1.25, p = .23, d = .58). 
Thus there was no evidence in accuracy that PD patients were impaired for slow full-
body verbs compared to fast. 
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Figure 8-19. Average accuracy for full-body and static targets in semantic similarity judgments. 
Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.3.2.2  Response time 
Average  response  time  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-20.  PD  patients  were  marginally 
slower than control patients (F (1, 17) = 3.61, p =. 08, η
2
p = .18) but there was no 
difference across target types in response time (F (3, 51) = 1.46, p = .24, η
2
p = .08) and 
no interaction (F (3, 52) = 1.08, p = .37, η
2
p = .06). There were also no differences in 
net response time (t (17) = 1.57, p = .14, d = .7).  
Again there is no evidence that PD patients are more impaired in fast full-body verbs 
than slow full-body verbs. 
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Figure 8-20. Average response time for full-body and static targets in semantic similarity 
judgments. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.3.3  Hand/Arm trials 
Here I contrast accuracy and response time to fast hand/arm targets, slow hand/arm 
targets,  static  targets  with  fast  hand/arm  distractors  and  static  targets  with  slow 
hand/arm targets. Here I predict that PD patients will perform worse with fast targets 
than slow targets (lower accuracy or slower response time) but control participants 
will not. 
8.2.3.3.1  Accuracy 
Average accuracy is displayed in Figure 8-21.There was a significant difference in 
accuracy across target type (F (3, 51) = 5.75, p < .01, η
2
p = .25): responses to slow 
hand/arm targets were less accurate than all other target types (all ps<. 05). Accuracy 
did not differ between groups (F = 1, p = .33, η
2
p = .06) and there was no interaction 
(F < 1).  
For  net  accuracy  between  fast  hand  and  slow  hand  targets,  there  was  a  marginal 
difference between PD patients and controls (t (17) = 1.74, p = .1, d = .8) such that net 
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accuracy was larger for controls than patients. Accuracy was higher for fast hand/arm 
targets than slow hand/arm targets in both groups but this difference was larger in 
controls. This result has no clear implication for the present hypotheses. 
 
Figure 8-21. Average accuracy for hand/arm and static sentences in semantic similarity 
judgments. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
8.2.3.3.2  Response time 
Average  response  time  is  displayed  in  Figure  8-22.  PD  patients  were  marginally 
slower to respond than control participants (F (1, 17) = 5.26, p = .04, η
2
p = .24). There 
was also a significant difference in response time across word types (F (3, 51) = 5, p < 
.01, η
2
p = .23) with responses slower to slow hand/arm targets than other target types 
(all ps < .05).  However, contrary to the prediction, there was no interaction between 
word type and group (F < 1). There were no differences in net response time (t (15) = 
1.2, p = .25). 
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Figure 8-22. Average response time for hand/arm and static sentences in semantic similarity 
judgments. Error bars reflect 1 standard error 
8.2.3.4  Summary SSJs 
There were no significant differences in performance on SSJs in line with predictions. 
Results showed that accuracy was lower in emotion trials compared to thinking and 
seeing trials, in PD patients but not controls. This, in addition to results from the 
lexical decision data, suggests that PD may lead to problems comprehending certain 
types of abstract language.  
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Table 8 -2.  Summary of results for Chapter 8. A tick mark indicates a significant effect. Only 
effects with p < .05 are included. 
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Sentence Sensibility Judgments 
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8.3  General Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to assess comprehension of speed language in patients 
with PD compared to healthy controls. PD patients have a number of problems with 
movement, including rigidity and bradykinesia, meaning that they move more slowly 
than healthy adults of the same age and have difficulty moving quickly. Since they 
have greater difficulty moving quickly compared to moving slowly, I predicted that 
they would have difficulty in comprehending language about fast actions compared to 
slow actions, and more difficulty with both compared to abstract actions. Table 8-2 
summarizes the main results of the chapter. 
I  tested  comprehension  of  speed  at  several  depths  of  processing,  starting  with 
automatic processing and primed lexical decision, moving to more explicit semantic 
processing  and  sentence  sensibility  judgments,  finally  to  semantic  similarity 
judgments, which require explicit, effortful semantic processing. Assessing different 
depths of processing allows one to ascertain the extent to which speed processing in 
the motor system contributes to comprehension of language about speed. 
Before  discussing  the  present  results  it  should  be  noted  that  this  dataset  is 
underpowered (testing of patients is still in progress while writing this chapter): here 
there are eight PD patients and 11 controls included in the analysis and in Fernandino 
et al. (2013) there were 20 PD patients and 22 controls. Further, since speed is a fine-
grained level of action, more statistical power may be necessary to detect differences 
in fast versus slow comprehension compared to action versus abstract differences (as 
in Fernandino et al. (2013)).  Testing was completed in a fairly small area of South 
Carolina, which meant that recruitment of patients was difficult. It should therefore be 
noted that the lack of significant interactions does not yet serve as evidence against a 
critical role of speed simulation in comprehension of speed in language.   
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8.3.1  Speed in automatic and implicit processing 
Results suggest that there is no crucial role for speed in automatic processing of speed 
language. For speeded adverbs, full body verbs and hand/arms verbs there was no 
indication of differences in processing between fast and slow words for PD patients in 
the lexical decision task.  
8.3.1.1  Speed in sentence comprehension 
In line with predictions, PD patients did show slower processing of sentences with fast 
adverbs compared to slow and abstract adverbs, and controls did not. However, this 
effect was found when the verb of the sentence was abstract but not when the verb was 
concrete. Thus processing of fast abstract actions was impaired but processing of fast 
concrete actions was not.  Note that in both abstract and concrete action sentences, the 
fast adverbs were identical. Thus, the slower response time reflects the combination of 
fast speed with the abstract action and not simply speed implicit in the adverb. This is 
an unexpected finding, as I would have expected PD patients to have problems with 
fast concrete actions, because they reflect the type of physical problems that they have, 
but not with abstract actions, which are not impaired. This result instead suggests that 
PD patients may have difficulty applying fast speed in atypical, flexible ways. This 
also suggests that when using abstract or metaphorical language, the motor cortex is 
still  recruited  in  simulations  during  comprehension  (in  line  with  Boulenger  et  al. 
(2009)). An alternative explanation could be that fast-abstract sentences are the most 
valenced of all sentences types, and PD patients have difficulty with highly valenced, 
or emotional, language (see below). Although fast and slow adverbs were chosen that 
imply speed, they also imply other characteristics such as the mood or motivation of 
an agent in action. Examples of fast adverbs that imply other characteristics, such as 
valence, include fiercely and frantically.  However, the adverbs used had been rated as 
neutral in terms of valence, so this is unlikely to be an explanation. It should also be 
noted that the abstract verbs and concrete verbs used in the sentences were matched on 
valence.  It  may  be  possible  however  that  combining  the  adverbs  with  the  verbs  
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changes the valence so that they are not simply an average of the two words. For 
example, the act of debating is likely to be more valenced in “fiercely debated” than in 
“eagerly debated”.  Ratings of whole sentence valence will be needed to investigate 
this suggestion. A related explanation could be arousal. Although adverbs and verbs 
were matched according to valence, measures of arousal were not checked. Arousal 
has been described as one of the three components of emotion (including also valence 
and  dominance),  and  measures  range  from  “calm’’  to  “excited’’  (Osgood,  Suci  & 
Tanenbaum,  1957).  Thus,  if  Parkinson’s  patients  have  difficulty  with  emotional 
language, then language with high levels of arousal may be problematic. It seems 
likely  that  the  fast  adverbs  used  here  would  rate  higher  in  arousal  than  the  slow 
adverbs used (e.g. compare urgently, frantically and suddenly with casually, calmly 
and leisurely). However, if arousal played a role, then performance should have been 
slower when fast adverbs were paired with both concrete and abstract verbs, which 
was not the case. Yet, as mentioned above, combining the adverbs with abstract verbs 
may in fact increase the emotional content, making those sentences more difficult. 
8.3.2  Speed in explicit processing 
At explicit levels of processing (semantic similarity judgments), no effects of speed 
were observed. It is possible that the design of the semantic similarity judgment task is 
not sufficient to reveal problems in comprehension of speed in PD patients. The task 
may be too difficult, particularly when matching movement and static trials.  The 
verbs denoting static movements were chosen by experimenters only and not rated 
according to amount of movement by a set of naïve participants. Some ‘static verbs’ 
may imply some movement, although the end point or goal of that movement is to be 
still. For example to retire, to cease, to stop imply movement to some extent (i.e. the 
stopping of movement). Further, although verbs such as to sit, to stand and to squat 
were intended to refer to being in a stationary position, they may have instead evoked 
movement into those particular positions. Matching to targets on these trials becomes 
even  more  difficult  when  comparing  static  actions  against  slow  hand  actions  that  
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imply very little movement e.g. to feel and to stroke. Comparing the current task with 
the  semantic  similarity  judgments  used  in  Fernandino  et  al.  (2013)  highlights  the 
difficulty. In their task, on each trial two of the words had similar meanings (e.g. to 
stroke  and  to  caress,  with  to embrace  as  the  foil).  Although  the  foil  is  related  in 
meaning it is clear that the matching words have more or less the same meaning. In the 
present  study  however,  two  words  match  according  to  one  dimension  but  the  full 
meanings of the words are not the same. For example, to sneak and to wander match 
in that they are both slow movements, but sneaking implies a sly or shifty movement 
and wandering implies moving without any particular aim. The two tasks are therefore 
not comparable. Thus, although differences in speed processing may be revealed with 
more power in the study, it is also possible that this task with this particular set of 
items is not suitable to assess the level of comprehension of speed intended. 
8.3.3  Abstract comprehension in Parkinson’s disease 
Results also present an interesting finding that was not part of the predictions of this 
thesis.  PD  patients  appear  to  have  more  difficulty  with  comprehension  of  abstract 
language  compared  to  controls.    PD  patients  showed  reduced  priming  for  abstract 
adverbs  compared  to  fast  and  slow  adverbs,  lower  accuracy  in  lexical  decision  to 
abstract verbs compared to hand/arm verbs and lower accuracy for emotion targets 
compared to thinking and seeing verbs in the semantic similarity judgments. These 
patterns did not exist for controls. Thus, PD patients were impaired at both automatic 
and explicit levels of processing abstract language. One explanation could be in terms 
of  valence.  Abstract  adverbs  in  the  lexical  decision  task  were  not  controlled  for 
valence, and in fact many turned out to be highly valenced e.g. terribly, miserably. 
Note that the abstract adverbs used in the sentence sensibility task were matched on 
valence, which may be why no impairments were observed here. That PD patients 
may have difficulty processing emotion language is in line with the idea that they have 
problems  recognizing  emotions  due  to  their  inability  to  fully  experience  facial 
expression (e.g. Mermillod et al., 2011).  However, patients did have lower accuracy  
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on abstract trials compared with hand/arms verbs, which had been rated as neutral 
valence in the norming procedure. This suggests that there may be something inherent 
in abstract language in general, rather than valence, which PD patients have problems 
with. However, the abstract verbs were rated on valence by only seven subjects, so 
strong conclusions cannot be drawn about their neutrality.  
Another possible explanation for poorer performance with abstract language is that PD 
patients have problems with executive function. Impairments in executive function 
including maintenance of objects in working memory and allocation of attention have 
been reported in PD (Dubois & Pillon, 1997). Abstract words may be more demanding 
on executive control because they are associated with a greater number of senses and 
more varied linguistic context (Fernandino et al 2013). It has been suggested that the 
meaning  of  abstract  words  is  based  on  a  wider  range  of  simulations  than  that  of 
concrete  words  and  the  type  of  information  and  situations  relevant  for  abstract 
meaning is more difficult to access (e.g. Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). Thus more 
cognitive control is required to filter out irrelevant information during comprehension 
(Fernandino et al. 2013). That PD patients might have problems with this resonates 
with  research  suggesting  PD  leads  to  the  inability  to  suppress  previously  learned 
responses  (Cronin-Golomb,  Corking  &  Growdon,  1994).  The  comprehension  of 
abstract language in PD is clearly a topic that requires further investigation. 
Fernandino  et  al.  (2013)  also  suggest  that  the  executive  deficits  occurring  in  PD 
patients may make it more difficult to find predicted semantic deficits in patients.  A 
decline in executive processing may affect controlled measures of task performance 
such as response time, which would reduce differences between conditions. Thus, the 
more impaired a patient may be, the more difficult it may be to detect problems in 
specific semantic categories. Executive function in PD is thought to decline rapidly 
around 13 years after diagnosis (Aarsland, Muniz & Matthews, 2011). The average 
length of time since diagnosis for the patients in the present study was 7.9 years, and 4 
patients were close to or greater than the 13 year mark. Thus, perhaps the progression  
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of  executive  dysfunction  in  this  selection  of  patients  is  too  severe  for  semantic 
difficulties  to  be  detected.  Additionally,  although  patients  were  removed  from  the 
analysis for having MoCA scores of less than 22, as this would suggest PD dementia, 
a score between 22 and 26 does suggest mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Only two 
patients in the PD group scored greater than 26, suggesting that the majority have 
cognitive  impairments,  which  may  have  led  to  greater  difficulty  with  abstract 
language. 
8.3.4  Further investigation 
It would be interesting to conduct further analyses with the data, investigating how 
UPDRS  scores  (assessment  of  motor  difficulties)  and  time  since  diagnosis  are 
correlated with differences in comprehension between PD patients and controls.  I 
would predict that this difference would be larger the higher the UPDRS score and the 
longer length of time since diagnosis (although progression of the disease is variable).  
That is, the more impairment in motor capabilities a patient has, the more they should 
be impaired in language about fast and slow actions. Unfortunately, due to the small 
number of patients and small amount of variability in their UPDRS scores, I cannot 
conduct these analyses with the present data set. 
8.4  Chapter conclusion 
With  a  small  number  of  patients  and  controls  I  have  found  evidence  for  slower 
processing  of  sentences  with  fast  adverbs,  when  the  adverb  modifies  an  abstract 
action, in PD patients compared to controls. Thus, PD patients, who have difficulty 
moving  quickly  in  their  daily  lives,  also  have  difficulty  processing  fast  speed  at 
implicit  levels  of  comprehension.  Moreover,  this  deficit  in  comprehension  of  fast 
speed is only observed for abstract actions, but not concrete actions. This may suggest 
that PD patients have difficulty with fast speed in language when they are required to 
use the speed information flexibly, or to apply it in unusual scenarios using processes 
that  may  tax  executive  processing.  At  explicit  levels  of  comprehension,  when  
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comparisons  between  stimuli  are  required,  no  significant  effects  were  found.  This 
level of comprehension requires the participant to think explicitly about the meaning 
of the verbs and make decisions, thus I would expect it would be the level in which 
sensorimotor systems would contribute the most because the full meaning of a word 
would need to be accessed. Comprehension of speed does not appear to be affected in 
automatic processing in PD. In comparison to other studies that have found problems 
with action language at this level of processing in PD patient (Fernandino et al. 2013), 
speed may be too fine-grained to be a necessary component of comprehension at this 
level. 
Results also suggest that PD patients have difficulty in processing abstract language, 
both at conscious and preconscious levels of processing. Possible explanations for this 
could be that PD patients have difficulty with emotion due their inability to produce 
facial  expressions,  or  that  abstract  language  requires  greater  cognitive  effort  and 
executive functioning. This finding requires further exploration with tasks and stimuli 
designed to specifically test a variety of abstract language.   
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Chapter 9  General discussion and conclusion 
How do we map words and sentences to their corresponding concepts in order to 
comprehend  and  communicate  effectively?  Embodied  theories  propose  that 
understanding  meaning  in  language  requires  mental  simulation  taking  place  in  the 
same modality-specific systems involved in perceiving and acting in the world, such 
as perception and action systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; 
Glenberg  &  Kaschak,  2002).  This  mental  simulation  grounds  language  in  the  real 
world and moves away from abstract, symbolic representations of word meaning. The 
aim of this thesis was to investigate how language about speed of motion and action is 
understood  from  an  embodied  language  perspective.  According  to  this  approach, 
understanding words and sentences that describe speed will involve simulating speed 
in the brain’s sensorimotor systems, the same systems involved in perceiving speed in 
the world. 
The  literature  now  contains  support  for  embodiment  with  demonstrations  of 
simulation  of  a  number  of  features  of  action  and  perception.  Investigating 
comprehension  of  speed  language  adds  and  extends  the  dimensions  within  this 
literature. Speed is computed using both spatial and temporal information, so it is a 
more complex semantic feature in comparison to those investigated so far such as 
object shape and orientation (e.g. Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001, Zwaan et al., 2002, Zwaan 
et al., 2004). Further, speed if a more fine-grained dimension of motion events. This is 
especially important because embodied theories are underspecified in terms of how 
much information from an event is contained in mental simulations (Sanford, 2008), 
what features are included or at what grain information is represented.  
In  this  chapter  I  will  start  by  providing  a  summary  of  the  experimental  questions 
outlined in Chapter 3 and the evidence reported throughout the thesis. I will then 
discuss in more detail the main findings and how my research contributes to the main 
issues of embodiment that I outlined in Chapter 2 and 3 before suggesting some future  
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directions for work in embodiment. I will then conclude by sketching the contributions 
of vision, action and audition to the mental simulation of speed. 
Within my experiments I used both words and sentences that describe speed thereby 
assessing to what extent the presence and nature of speed simulations differ between 
different linguistic contexts. In addition, I used a range of experimental paradigms: 
behavioural testing with response time and accuracy measures, visual psychophysics, 
eye-tracking and patient work in order to thoroughly investigate the nature of speed 
simulation. Testing comprehension of speed across a variety of conditions means I had 
the opportunity to assess the boundaries of embodied effects for speed and reveal any 
factors important in moderating the presence and nature of speed simulations.  
9.1  Research questions  
Below I reiterate the main research questions as outlined in Chapter 3 and summarize 
the results of my research. 
9.1.1  The influence of perceptual processing on speed word comprehension 
(Chapter 4) 
If  comprehension  of  speed  words  involves  processes  used  in  real-world  speed 
perception, then combining speed in language with perceptual speed stimuli should 
affect processing to some extent. The first experimental chapter investigated whether 
combining  speed  words  with  perceptual  speed  affects  processing  of  those  words. 
Perceptual speed of different modalities (auditory and visual) was combined with a 
lexical decision task on single verbs that describe fast and slow motion (e.g. dash, 
amble). To create visual speed, fast and slow moving horizontal lines (Experiment 4-
2) and fast and slow moving vertical lines in perspective (Experiment 4-4 and 4-6) 
were used. To create auditory speed, fast and slow moving beeps (Experiment 4-3), 
fast  and  slow  moving  white  noise  (Experiment  4-5  and  4-7)  and  fast  and  slow 
footsteps sounds (Experiment 4-8 and 4-9) were used. Each perceptual stimulus was  
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presented for three seconds before a word was presented (visually or auditorily) to 
which participants had to decide if it was a real word or not. I predicted that if speed 
simulation does occur for single speed verbs then responses should be different when 
the speed of a verb matches the speed of perceptual stimulus (congruent) compared to 
when they do not match (incongruent). 
Results showed that speed simulation does occur for single word comprehension when 
there is no sentence context. However, there were three constraints on whether or not 
speed  simulation  was  observed  in  these  experiments.  First,  reaction  times  showed 
interactions between verb speed and perceptual speed, but only when the perceptual 
stimulus was vertical lines moving in perspective or the sound of footsteps, but not the 
other  types  of  auditory  and  visual  stimuli.  Lines  moving  outwards  in  perspective, 
creating  a  sense  of  moving  forwards  in  the  perceiver,  and  the  sound  of  footsteps 
emphasize  motion  with  the  body  whereas  the  other  perceptual  stimuli  portrayed  a 
more abstract motion depiction. That simulations only occur when perceptual stimuli 
imply bodily motion suggests that speed simulations reflect the full meaning of the 
verbs in terms of an agent moving quickly or slowly instead of a schematic depiction 
of  speed  that  is  abstracted  away  from  agents.  A  further  condition  that  determined 
whether or not speed simulation was observed was whether the modality in which the 
perceptual and word stimuli were presented in matched (i.e. visual lines and visual 
words,  auditory  footsteps  and  auditory  words).  It  is  thought  that  because  the 
perceptual stimuli and words were presented consecutively then they were less likely 
to overlap in processing than if they would have been presented simultaneously and 
even  less  likely  if  they  were  of  different  modalities.  Finally,  the  nature  of  the 
interaction between word speed and perceptual speed differed between auditory and 
visual modalities. When both the perceptual and word stimuli were visual, facilitation 
in  responses  was  observed  (faster  response  time  for  congruent  trials).  Conversely, 
when both the perceptual and word stimuli were auditory, interference to responses 
was  observed  (slower  response  time  for  congruent  trials).    These  differences  are 
thought to be due to differences in the overlap of features between the perceptual and  
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verbal  stimuli  and  not  modality  differences,  as  discussed  in  more  detail  below  in 
section 2.4. 
9.1.2  The influence of speed words on perceptual processing (Chapter 5) 
This chapter looked at the converse effect of the bidirectional relationship between 
speed in language and speed in perception by testing whether comprehending speed 
words affected the visual perception of speed.  Participants passively listened to verbs 
that described fast and slow actions while performing a visual speed discrimination 
task. They were first presented with a ‘standard’ sinusoidal grating moving at a fixed 
speed (3, 5 or 8Hz) and then were subsequently presented with comparison gratings to 
which they had to decide whether they were moving faster or slower than the standard 
stimulus. By fitting a psychometric function to the data, measures of both perceptual 
sensitivity (speed discrimination threshold) and perceptual bias (point of subjective 
equality) could be extracted. Listening to fast and slow speed verbs was found to 
affect  measures  of  point  of  subjective  equality  only  and  not  speed  discrimination 
threshold. Point of subjective equality describes the perceived speed of the standard 
grating and reflects perceptual bias. This suggests that the interaction between speed in 
language and speed in visual perceptual reflects perceptual biases and does not affect 
perceptual sensitivity. Further, this effect was observed only when the standard speed 
was 3Hz and not at 5Hz or 8Hz. At 3Hz the speed discrimination task was more 
difficult: speed discrimination is poor at the extremes (i.e. at very slow speeds) (De 
Bruyn & Orban, 1988) and perception of slow speed has been shown to be particularly 
difficult  in  the  periphery  (in  comparison  to  central  presentation)  (Maunsel  &  van 
Essen, 1983). Results therefore suggest that semantic speed information is more likely 
to interact with perception of visual speed when the sensory signal is reduced and 
therefore the task is more difficult.  
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9.1.3  The influence of speeded actions and perceptual speed on speed sentence 
comprehension (Chapter 6) 
In this chapter I moved to comprehension of speed in sentences and tested whether 
sensorimotor  speed  can  affect  comprehension  by  manipulating  auditory  speed  and 
speed of action. In the first experiment participants listened to the sound of fast and 
slow footsteps before and during visual presentation of sentences and had to make 
sensibility  judgments  on  the  sentences.  In  the  second  experiment,  the  speed  of 
participants’ movement in a movement task was manipulated by wearing arm and leg 
bands  that  did  or  did  not  contain  weights,  after  which  they  completed  the  same 
sentence sensibility judgment task.  Sentences described both fast and slow full-body 
actions (e.g. running) as well as fast and slow actions performed with the hands (e.g. 
grasping). Additionally I included both speed verbs and speed adverbs to see if the 
way in which speed is encoded affects the nature of speed simulation.  
Not  surprisingly,  given  the  results  of  the  experiments  with  single  words,  results 
suggest that comprehenders do simulate speed of actions as described in sentences and 
that  these  simulations  include  auditory  speed  information  and  action  speed 
information. Auditory speed simulation for concrete action types using both adverbs 
and verbs was suggested by marginal interactions. However differences were observed 
between the different types of action. When combining sentences with the sound of 
fast and slow footsteps a marginal interaction was found such that responses were 
more accurate when speed of action described in the sentence matched the speed of 
auditory footsteps for sentences describing speeded hand/arms actions and sentences 
with speeded adverbs paired with concrete actions. However, the opposite interaction 
was found for sentences describing full body actions: responses were less accurate 
when  the  speeds  matched.  This  suggests  that  speed  simulations  include  specific 
features about the effector used in the action (e.g. hands, arms). When the sentences 
described action with the whole body there was a large overlap in activation from the 
auditory stimulus and the speed simulation, which led to interference: the simulation 
matched  the  sound  of  footsteps  in  terms  of  actions  features  (leg  movements)  and  
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speed. When the sentence described actions with the hands/arms there was only partial 
overlap in activation, which facilitated responses: the simulation matched the auditory 
footsteps in terms of only speed and not action features.  
When manipulating participants’ movement speed, no evidence was found for action 
simulation  with  sentences  in  which  speed  was  encoded  in  adverbs.  For  hand/arm 
sentences there was no evidence of the simulation of speed specifically, but there was 
for action more generally: responses to hand/arm sentences were more accurate in the 
condition with weights compared to the condition without weights, but there was no 
such difference for abstract sentences. One explanation for this effect is that wearing 
weights taxes the motor system to a greater extent than when not wearing weights, 
leading  to  greater  motor  activation,  which  then  facilitated  processing  of  the  hand 
sentences in general. For full body sentences, an interference effect was observed with 
responses less accurate in congruent conditions (i.e. fast sentences with no weights 
and  slow  sentences  with  weights)  than  incongruent  conditions.  Again,  this  is 
interpreted in terms of feature overlap: the motor task matches the actions described in 
the sentence in terms of speed as well as effectors used in the action (the whole body). 
9.1.4  Eye movements and the mental simulation of speed in sentences (Chapter 
7) 
This chapter investigated speed simulation in sentences in a more naturalistic manner 
by  measuring  eye  movements  during  comprehension.  Spoken  sentences  were 
presented to participants whilst they viewed a visual scene that contained agents and 
destinations that were depicted in the sentences.  Sentences described an agent moving 
to a destination at a fast or slow speed, with speed encoded either in the verb or adverb 
of the sentence. Additionally, the speaking rate of the sentence was manipulated to be 
fast  or  slow.  Eye-movements  towards  objects  in  the  visual  scenes  were  measured 
during comprehension.   
 
 
 
307 
Time  spent  looking  at  objects  in  the  visual  scene  was  affected  by  the  interaction 
between speed of the verb/adverb of the sentence, speaking rate of the sentence and 
configuration of the corresponding visual scene. Simulations of speed were observed 
when sentences were spoken slowly but not when they were spoken quickly. This 
suggests  that  speed  simulation  may  not  occur  in  contexts  in  which  there  is  time 
pressure and instead a shallow interpretation of the sentence will suffice. For sentences 
with speed verbs, participants spent longer looking towards the target destination for 
sentences describing slow motion compared to fast motion, but only when the scene 
was unambiguous (i.e. contained only the agent and target destination described in the 
sentence and not a distractor destination). When the scene was ambiguous, containing 
a target distractor, longer looks for sentences describing slow compared to fast motion 
were found on looks to the agent, or sometimes the ambiguity led to no differences at 
all. This suggests that speed simulation is flexible and the nature of the simulation 
develops in line with the information currently available in the environment. When 
speed was described by the adverb of the sentence, the opposite effect was found, with 
longer  looks  towards  the  target  destination  for  sentences  describing  fast  motion 
compared to sentences describing slow motion (when there was no distractor). One 
potential explanation for the difference between verbs and adverbs is the timing of 
speed information in the sentence. For adverbs, the speed information comes early, 
before the action described by the verb, but for verbs, speed is tied to the action event. 
This  means  that  for  adverbs,  speed  can  more  easily  modify  the  event  and  is  not 
constrained by a simulation of motion that is already developing (as is the case with 
verbs).    For  adverb  sentences,  looks  are  directed  towards  the  target  when  the 
simulation is complete (meaning that looks are directed earlier and hence longer for 
fast  events).  For  verbs  sentences,  looks  are  directed  towards  the  target  during  the 
simulation, because the target is as integral part of the verb simulation. Looks are 
directed away from the target when the simulation is complete, leading to longer looks 
for slow motion events compared to fast motion events. Another potential explanation 
is in terms of linguistic focus (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008). Using a speed adverb may  
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focus attention on the manner of motion but using a verb instead focuses attention on 
the completion of the event. 
Thus  evidence  for  the  online  simulation  of  speed  during  spoken  sentence 
comprehension  was  demonstrated  using  an  experimental  paradigm  that  provides  a 
naturalistic observation of simulation (i.e. does not require explicit judgments about 
sentences). Eye-movements are sensitive to subtle semantic differences such as the 
fine-grained dimension of speed. 
9.1.5  Is speed processing in language affected by deficits in the motor system? 
(Chapter 8) 
The final experimental chapter served as a crucial test of an embodied theory of speed 
by investigating whether individuals with impairments in movement, particularly in 
moving quickly, also have difficulty understanding speed in language. I used a range 
of language related to speed, including speed verbs and adverbs, as well as abstract 
verbs and adverbs, and addressed comprehension of speed language in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease (PD) and healthy controls at various depths of processing: lexical 
decision  with  priming  assessing  comprehension  at  subliminal  levels,  sentence 
sensibility  judgments  assessing  implicit  comprehension  and  semantic  similarity 
judgments assessing explicit semantic processes. 
Results showed that PD patients are slower to comprehend sentences with fast adverbs 
compared to slow and abstract adverbs when they are used in sentences describing 
abstract but not concrete actions. This pattern is not observed in control participants. 
This suggests that comprehension of fast speed is impaired in PD patients when they 
have to use speed information in an unusual or flexible manner, perhaps because they 
have to access speed information at a deeper and more explicit level in order to apply 
it to non-concrete events. Although there is no evidence that PD patients had greater 
difficulty than controls with the explicit semantic similarity judgments. There was no 
evidence that comprehension of speed is affected in PD at more automatic levels of  
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comprehension. Previous studies have shown deficits in processing of action language 
at this level in PD. Thus, speed information may be too fine-grained to be included in 
simulations that are fast and automatic and instead may only affect simulations at 
deeper processing levels (i.e. sentence comprehension). 
PD  patients  were  also  found  to  be  impaired  in  abstract  language  on  a  number  of 
measures but control participants were not. Possible explanations for this impairment 
are that abstract language strongly relies on emotional information (Vigliocco et al, 
2013), which is problematic for PD patients due to their inability to produce facial 
expressions (Mermillod et al.,  2011). Alternatively, since abstract language is more 
complex with a greater number of senses and possible meanings (Fernandino et al., 
2013),  PD  patients  may  struggle  to  comprehend  due  to  their  deficits  in  executive 
processing (Dubois & Pillon, 1996). 
9.2  Results in relation to current issues in embodiment 
Below I discuss the above research findings in relation to current issues in embodied 
research:  features,  specificity,  mental  imagery  versus  simulation,  context  and  the 
continuum of embodiment, linking them with work in the literature. 
9.2.1  Features 
As described in the beginning of this chapter, it is at present unclear to what extent 
mental  simulations  during  language  comprehension  reflect  the  full  details  of  real 
world experience. By investigating the simulation of speed I have explored a fairly 
neglected feature in terms of embodiment, a feature that is more fine-grained than 
most in the literature. It has been suggested that perceptual simulations are schematic 
(Zwaan,  2003;  Barsalou,  1999a)  and  thus  it  is  conceivable  that  they  only  include 
salient  or  coarse  details.  That  evidence  exists  for  speed  simulation  shows  that 
simulations go beyond a schematic reconstruction of action events in general, to a 
further level of detail, including fine-grained information about the manner of action.  
 
 
 
310 
Much work in the embodied literature tends to provide evidence for the simulation of 
a particular type of language or feature in a single modality, for example Stanfield & 
Zwaan (2001) investigated the simulation of orientation using visual stimuli only. For 
the first time I have provided evidence for simulation of both auditory and visual 
information using the same stimuli and the same task (Chapter 4). Thus, like real-
world  experience,  speed  simulations  reflect  experience  in  multiple  modalities. 
Although work in the present thesis shows to some extent different results for auditory 
and visual simulations, it is thought that these differences reflect idiosyncrasies of the 
experimental  paradigm  (see  below)  rather  that  the  composition  of  the  simulations 
themselves. That is, there is no evidence that visual or auditory information is more 
important  to  speed  simulations.  It  remains  to  be  investigated  whether  speed 
simulations  would  be  observed  in  other  modalities,  such  as  the  tactile  domain, 
domains that may not provide such precise information as vision and audition. 
My research suggests that simulations of speed include visual, auditory and action 
information and are specific to the body in motion, including details about the types of 
effector used in the action. Simulations are not fixed but are dynamic and changeable 
depending  on  contextual  factors  (see  discussion  of  context  below).  They  can  be 
affected by information in the environment and integrate this information into the 
simulation. Evidence from this thesis (Chapter 5) suggests that speed simulations may 
not occur within low-level perceptual areas but at higher levels of processing, at more 
semantic  levels.  Interactions  between  speed  in  semantic  information  and  speed  in 
sensory information may be found in regions where modality-specific information is 
integrated  (e.g.  lMTG)  within  typically  defined  ‘language  regions’  rather  than 
perceptual regions (Francken et al., 2014), or in convergence zones, near to but not in 
primary sensory regions (e.g. Barsalou, 1999a). This finding is in line with results 
showing  that  speed  simulations  include  information  about  the  body  and  effectors 
(Chapters 4 and 6): at early visual areas information such as biological motion and 
agency would not be processed (Gennari, 2012).  
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9.2.2  Specificity 
Looking at speed in language also addresses the question of specificity of simulations: 
speed information is not crucial to understand an event such as an agent moving to a 
destination, but for a simulation to accurately reflect real-world experience it should 
include this level of detail. Thus, results of this thesis support the idea that simulations 
can include fine-grained reflections of real-world experience reflecting specific details 
about manner of motion.  
Further details of the specificity of speed simulations in terms of effectors used are 
revealed in Chapters 4 and 6. Chapter 4 demonstrates that speed simulations for single 
verbs specifically reflect speed of motion with the body. Simulations of speed do not 
appear to be an abstracted depiction of speed, but instead are tied to speed of an agent. 
This specificity was revealed in the finding that abstract visual and auditory depictions 
of speed such as a line moving horizontally quickly or slowly or the sound of fast and 
slow beeps or white noise did not affect responses to speed verbs, but depictions of 
speed that involve the body did (the sound of fast and slow footsteps or fast and slow 
lines moving in perspective creating a sense of forwards motion). However, in other 
studies that use a similar paradigm but investigate direction simulation (Kaschak et al., 
2005; Meteyard et al., 2009), abstract stimuli did interact with word and sentence 
meaning. For example, Kaschak et al. (2005) used moving black and white lines that 
did not imply any type of agent or object to depict different directions of motion. One 
explanation for why abstract depictions of speed did not work here may be that speed 
is subtler, more abstract, and needs more context than other dimensions like direction. 
For example, it is easy to think about the concept of “up” without having to think 
about an agent or object, but thinking about “fast” requires thinking about something 
or someone in motion. Thus speed cannot be abstracted away from agents but must be 
integrated with them. Direction instead is more salient and necessary in understanding 
motion  events  and  therefore  simulated  more  independently.  An  alternative  reason 
could be the types of words used in the experiments. For example, the verbs used in  
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Meteyard et al., (2009) did not describe actions specifically performed with the body 
but  actions  that  could  also  be  applied  to  non-biological  entities.  For  example,  the 
words rise and fall could describe movement of a number of inanimate objects such as 
a balloon or a rock as well as the movement of humans or animals. The items used in 
the present experiments however strongly refer to actions performed with a human 
body and cannot be applied to inanimate objects. Since the items in Meteyard et al., 
(2009) do not specifically refer to actions of humans or animals they possibly involve 
motion simulations that are more abstract and schematic. Thus, there may be large 
differences in the nature of simulations for language about direction and language 
about speed, with direction allowing for more abstract simulation but speed requiring 
particular agents. 
That simulations for speed verbs were only found when combining them with body-
relevant stimuli raises the question of whether speed simulations are egocentric. The 
idea of mental simulations having an egocentric perspective has been suggested by 
other work. The body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009) proposes that we tend 
to comprehend action language in terms of our own actions rather than that of others 
because our bodies constrain the way that experience shapes our concepts. Evidence 
suggesting  the  self-relevance  of  simulations  includes  that  of  Rueschemeyer  et  al., 
(2010), who found that motion sensitive area MT is activated by sentences describing 
motion  towards  a  participant  but  not  sentences  describing  motion  away  from  the 
participant. It seems unlikely though that speed simulations could only reflect actions 
with one’s own body since we have a wealth of experience perceiving others moving 
quickly  and  slowly  in  the  world.  It  might  be  possible  that  the  default  for  speed 
simulations without any sentence or narrative (or situational) context is egocentricity, 
but when given the correct context simulation of others in action is possible. Evidence 
from Chapter 7 shows that speed of others can be reflected in simulations, as eye-
movements towards agents and objects in a scene were sensitive to speed in a manner 
consistent with the motion of those depicted objects (i.e. motion of an other, not the 
self). If it is the case that default speed simulations for single words are egocentric but  
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they are not when given the correct sentence context then perhaps a more abstract 
prime, such the horizontal moving prime in Chapter 4, would affect comprehension of 
sentences describing an agent moving quickly or slowly, because the two types of 
motion would match (i.e. we often perceive agents moving across a horizontal plane). 
This idea is in lie with results of Chapter 7 and discussions elsewhere (Zwaan, 2014; 
Lebois  et  al.,  2014)  that  describe  how  mental  simulations  are  dynamic  and  differ 
depending and task and other contextual factors. 
As  well  as  simulations  of  speed  specifically  reflecting  motion  of  the  body,  speed 
simulations also code for the specific effector used in the action: whether it is an 
action performed with the whole body such as running or instead the hand/arm such as 
grasping. This ‘effector specificity’ (Hauk et al., 2004) was evident in the finding that 
the  sound  of  fast  and  slow  footsteps  interfered  with  comprehension  of  sentences 
describing fast and slow full body actions (e.g. sentences about running) but facilitated 
comprehension  of  sentences  describing  fast  and  slow  hand  actions  (e.g.  sentences 
about grasping, Chapter 6). Interference was thought to occur because the sounds of 
footsteps and the simulation used in the full-body sentences overlapped in terms of 
both speed and the specific effectors used in the action (i.e. there was full overlap 
between  processing).  Hand  sentences  however  did  not  overlap  with  the  sound  of 
footsteps in terms of effector (the sentences encoded the hands/arms and the sounds 
encoded  the  feet)  but  did  overlap  in  speed  (when  the  speeds  matched).  Thus  the 
sounds and the sentences here only partially overlapped, and this acted as a head start 
in  processing  of  the  sentence.  This  effect  was  also  supported  in  the  interaction 
between action speed and sentence speed: when participants were forced to moved 
slowly  by  wearing  weights  and  complete  a  movement  task,  accuracy  in 
comprehension for sentences describing full body actions was lower than when they 
completed the task without weights (i.e. accuracy was lower when speed of the whole 
body matched speed in sentences about the whole body).  
 
 
 
314 
9.2.3  Mental simulations are post-comprehension mental images, and other 
criticisms 
 My  research  adds  to  the  discussion  of  whether  embodied  results  reflect  mental 
imagery or mental simulation (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) by using eye tracking 
combined with a task that does not require explicit judgments about the linguistic 
stimuli  (Chapter  7).  By  having  participants  simply  listen  to  sentences,  sometimes 
responding to simple comprehension questions, the likelihood of them engaging in 
explicit imagery is reduced. This is not the case for other studies such as Zwaan et al 
(e.g.  Stanfield  &  Zwaan,  2001,  Zwaan  et  al.,  2002,  Zwaan  et  al.,  2004)  where 
participants  are  asked  to  decide  if  a  picture  was  mentioned  in  a  sentence  or  not, 
thereby encouraging them to visualise the described objects. Further, mapping the time 
course of speed simulations in my eye-tracking data suggests that they are built online 
during comprehension, rather than being a post-comprehension process. Although not 
directly tested, an effect of speed words in the speed discrimination task (Chapter 5) 
also  supports  an  argument  for  the  mental  simulation  of  speed  rather  than  mental 
imagery. In this task, speed words were comprehended passively (and repeated over 
and over) and were of no relevance to the task. Moreover, the speed discrimination 
task was both inherently difficult and very fast, meaning that participants would have 
little cognitive resources or time to engage in any imagery or explicit thoughts about 
the verbal stimuli.  
Another  argument  from  critics  of  embodiment  is  that  mental  simulations  are  not 
crucial to comprehension but only epiphenomenal (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). By 
testing comprehension of speed in Parkinson’s disease (PD), I assessed whether or not 
speed in action simulation is critical to comprehension of speed language. PD patients 
have reduced activation in the motor cortex and therefore have difficulty moving. If 
speed representations in the motor cortex are crucial to speed simulations in language 
then PD patients should be impaired with speed language compared to other non-
action language. Although the data presented in Chapter 8 is currently underpowered, 
at present it suggests that PD patients are not impaired with speed language when it is  
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processed  implicitly  (priming  scores)  or  when  understood  explicitly  (semantic 
similarity judgments) but they are when fast speed information is used in an atypical 
way (sentence sensibility judgments on speeded abstract actions). This suggests that 
speed  simulation  is  crucial  in  comprehension  of  speed  language  but  perhaps  only 
when comprehension is difficult or speed information needs to be manipulated. At 
more implicit levels of processing, PD patients may rely on other information, such as 
simulations  in  non-impaired  modalities  or  linguistic  associations  (Barsalou  et  al., 
2008). 
Thus, the data presented in this thesis supports the view that speed simulations are 
automatic  in  that  they  do  not  require  conscious  strategies  (although  they  do  not 
necessarily occur in all contexts) and that these simulations are critical to deep levels 
of the comprehension of speed. 
9.2.4  Context 
Recently,  embodied  research  has  begun  to  discuss  the  claim  that  simulations  are 
dynamic and context dependent (Zwaan 2014; Lebois et al., 2014), being relied upon 
more or less in different linguistic and situational contexts. Results from this thesis 
support this view. Within the experiments here I manipulate a variety of contexts, 
including linguistic type, modality of perceptual and verbal stimuli, supporting visual 
scenes  and  speaking  rate  of  presented  sentences.  Below  I  discuss  how  these 
manipulations affect the nature of any simulation effects. 
9.2.4.1  The role of modality 
In Chapter 4, interactions between speed of verb and speed of perceptual stimuli were 
only observed when the modality of the speed stimulus and the modality of word 
presentation  matched.  This  might  suggest  that  simulations  develop  in  a  manner 
consistent with the way in which language is presented. For example, when a word or 
sentence is presented visually, visual simulations of the referent may be produced, or  
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simulations that are dominated by visual information. Connell & Lynott (2014) found 
that for words presented visually in a lexical decision task and reading-aloud task, 
words with strong visual associations were processed faster than words with strong 
auditory  associations,  because  visual  attention  was  engaged  (and  the  converse  for 
naming words with strong auditory associations). This shows that the type of attention 
directed to the verbal stimuli (i.e. visual or auditory) can affect the way that semantic 
information is retrieved. But, although perceptual attention may facilitate processing 
of  a  word  whose  meaning  is  strongly  dominated  by  the  same  modality,  it  seems 
unlikely that it would block simulations in other modalities (i.e. this would not explain 
the  lack  of  effects  in  the  cross  modal  experiments  of  Chapter  4).    Moreover, 
simulation effects are observed in Chapter 6 and elsewhere (Kaschak et al., 2005; 
Brunye et al 2010) when the verbal and perceptual stimuli are of different modalities. 
A more plausible explanation for why simulation effects were only observed with 
matching  modalities  involves  details  of  the  experimental  method,  particularly  the 
importance  of  timing  in  stimulus  presentation.  In  Experiment  2  of  Chapter  6 
simulation  effects  were  observed  when  sentences  were  presented  visually  and  the 
speed  stimuli  were  presented  auditorily  and  in  Chapter  5  an  effect  of  speed  was 
observed  when  verbs  were  presented  verbally  but  the  speed  task  was  presented 
visually. Additionally, results in both Kaschak et al. (2005) and Brunye et al. (2010) 
are found when the modality of verbal and perceptual stimuli is different. The main 
difference between these tasks and those in Chapter 4 is that the verbal and perceptual 
stimuli  are  presented  simultaneously,  whereas  in  Chapter  4  the  perceptual  stimuli 
precede the verbal stimuli. When stimuli are presented simultaneously they are more 
likely to interfere (or facilitate) with each other because processing resources are being 
recruited at the same time (or attentional resources are being recruited, Connell & 
Lynott, 2012b). When perceptual stimuli precede the verbal stimuli there is a lower 
chance of an interaction occurring because one process may have been completed 
before the other begins. When both are of the same modality however an effect is 
more  likely  to  occur  due  to  residual  activation  in  that  modality.  For  different  
 
 
 
317 
modalities,  the  two  processes  are  more  likely  to  be  separated,  because  switching 
between modalities can result in temporal processing costs (Pecher et al., 2003). 
9.2.4.2  Attentional demands 
Results  suggest  that  attentional  or  processing  demands  may  affect  whether  or  not 
speed simulations are recruited in comprehension. For example, no effects of verb 
speed were found in the speed discrimination task  (Chapter 5) when the task was very 
long and tiring. Similarly, no evidence of speed simulation in eye movements was 
observed in Chapter 7 when the speaking rate of the sentences was fast. Thus, when 
comprehension is at a shallow level either due to lack of attention (Chapter 5) or 
because of environmental factors such as time constraints or a noisy signal (Chapter 7) 
speed simulation does not occur. This also resonates with findings in Chapter 8 in 
which speed information is not simulated at implicit levels (in priming effects). Speed 
simulation  appears  to  require  greater  context  or  greater  depths  of  processing  than 
action simulation in general. Work elsewhere (Barsalou et al., 2008) suggests that 
simulations  take  time  to  develop  and  that  when  a  quick  response  is  required  in  a 
comprehension  situation  lexical  associations  (statistical  information  about  the  co-
occurrence of words) are more likely to be activated than simulations (Louwerse & 
Jeuniaux,  2008)  (see  Chapter  1  Section  4.5).  Thus,  the  conditions  for  which  no 
evidence  of  simulation  was  found  in  Chapters  5  and  7  likely  reflect  the  type  of 
comprehension situations for which lexical information would dominate, or possibly 
the simulation of more salient features. That is not to say that statistical linguistic 
information is being used to aid in completion of the task, but rather to emphasize that 
embodied simulations may not have sufficiently developed because comprehension 
was shallow. 
9.2.4.3  Task difficulty 
Related,  in  terms  of  when  speed  simulations  can  affect  perceptual  processes,  task 
difficulty seems to be an important factor. Speed words affected performance in the  
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speed discrimination task (Chapter 5) in terms of point of subjective equality only 
when conditions of the task were very hard (when the standard speed was very slow). 
This suggests that when perception is particularly difficult it is more susceptible to 
influence from other processes, such as semantics.  This idea is supported in other 
studies investigating the effect of language on perception. In a direction discrimination 
task, Pavan et al (2013) found that listening to direction verbs affected perceptual 
sensitivity when the visual stimuli were presented at threshold but not when presented 
suprathreshold.  A  similar  effect  has  been  found  using  speed  words  and  duration 
estimates (Zhang et al., 2014). Here participants had to decide whether the duration of 
a presented speed word was closer to 400ms or 1200ms. Fast words were perceived as 
longer than slow words when the actual duration of the presented word was 800ms, 
but not at other comparison durations: 800ms is exactly halfway between 400 and 
1200ms and therefore reflects the most difficult condition of the experiment. Research 
in other fields, such as speech perception, also support the idea that perception is more 
easily influenced by other information in ambiguous or uncertain situations (Sumby & 
Pollock, 1954; Erber, 1969; Ma et al., 2009; Erber, 1969; Senkowski et al., 2011). 
9.2.4.4  Linguistic type 
Another form of context that could affect simulation is linguistic type. Differences in 
simulations for words and sentences might be expected. For example, simulations for 
single words may not be strong enough to affect sensorimotor processes and instead a 
larger simulation of an event, as used in sentence comprehension, may be necessary 
(Bergen  et  al.,  2007).  Alternatively,  information  given  in  sentences  may  be  too 
specific and could constrain simulations in such a way that any general simulation 
effects would be washed out (Meteyard, 2008). Although direct comparisons were not 
made here, results of the present thesis seem to be similar for words and sentences. 
That is, evidence for the simulation of speed was observed using both single words 
and sentences in more (Chapter 5 and 7) and less passive comprehension (Chapter 4 
and 6). Although a visual speed condition comparable to Experiment 4 of Chapter 4  
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was not included with sentences in Chapter 6, results using auditory speed (footsteps 
sounds) suggest an interference effect with both words and sentences that describe full 
body actions. Results from Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 suggest however that there may 
be a difference between speed as encoded in verbs and speed as encoded in adverbs 
(described above in Section 9.1.4 in more detail). 
9.2.4.5  Facilitation versus interference 
Context also plays a role in the nature of simulations in terms of the direction of 
effects. As discussed in section 2.4 of Chapter 2, interactions between language and 
sensorimotor information have been shown to result in both facilitation in processing 
and  interference  and  the  reasons  for  the  differences  are  not  always  clear  in  the 
literature. In the present investigation both interference and facilitation effects have 
been observed (see Table 9-1). In a lexical decision task (Chapter 4), when speed 
verbs were presented verbally after an auditory speed stimulus, an interference effect 
was observed in response time. When speed verbs were presented visually after a 
visual speed stimulus, a facilitation effect was observed. Some potential explanations 
for the differences exist in the literature. Kaschak et al. (2005) propose the concept of 
intergratability whereby interference occurs when two stimuli are difficult to integrate 
into  a  single  event.  For  example,  black  and  white  moving  lines  would  be  
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more difficult to integrate with a simulation of a moving car than an image of a 
moving car would be. However, when looking at the type of perceptual speed stimuli 
used in Chapter 4, from this perspective an interference effect with the visual stimuli 
would be predicted because they are less integratable with the speed verbs (as they 
are  simple  moving  lines)  than  the  auditory  stimuli,  which  are  actual  real-world 
sounds  that  reflect  the  meaning  of  the  verbs.  There  are  two  other  potential 
explanations that are more plausible. The first is that speed simulations could be 
dominated by visual information and hence when the words and speed stimuli are 
presented  visually  this  match  facilitates  processing  compared  to  when  presented 
auditorily. This idea reflects the attentional facilitation effects for visual or auditory 
dominated  words  in  Connell  &  Lynott  (2014)  as  described  above.  The  second 
explanation is that the footsteps sounds are emotional stimuli and emotion may lead 
to greater simulation due to its close link with the body. This greater simulation 
results in more competition between speed stimuli and verbal stimuli creating an 
interference effect.  Although both of these explanations seem plausible, they cannot 
be applied to the present results because both interference and facilitation effects 
were found with the same speed stimulus (footsteps sounds) with linguistic stimuli of 
the same modality (spoken sentences) in Chapter 6. When the sound of footsteps was 
combined with spoken sentences describing actions with the full-body interference 
effects were observed (consistent with the finding of Chapter 4). But when the sound 
of  footsteps  was  combined  with  spoken  sentences  describing  actions  with  the 
hands/arms a facilitation effect was found. Adding sentences describing actions with 
the  hands/arms  therefore  aided  in  understanding  these  effects.  The  most  likely 
explanation for the direction of effects, as described above, is feature overlap. When 
fast and slow auditory footsteps are combined with words and sentences describing 
fast  and  slow  actions  with  the  whole  body  (e.g.  run,  amble)  interference  results 
because the two stimuli completely overlap: they match in terms of speed and type of 
effector use in the action (feet). When fast and slow footsteps are instead combined 
with words and sentences describing fast and slow actions with the hands/arms (e.g. 
grab, stroke) facilitation results because there is only partial overlap between the two 
stimuli: they match only in terms of speed but not in type of effector used (feet  
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versus hands/arms). This effect could also be described as an effect of integratability 
but in the opposite direction as that described in Kaschak et al (2005): when two 
events are integratable (e.g. the sound of footsteps and language describing actions 
that  would  produce  the  sound  of  footsteps)  then  interference  is  likely  to  occur 
because they are competing for the same resources. This greater overlap in features 
could also be explained as greater competition for attentional resources (Connell & 
Lynott, 2012b). 
9.2.4.6  Visual context 
Finally, the visual context in which the language is comprehended is also important 
for how simulations develop.  As demonstrated in previous studies of ‘real-world’ 
language  comprehension,  information  currently  available  in  the  environment  is 
extracted  and  used  online  in  language  comprehension  (e.g.  Altmann  &  Kamide, 
1999). In Chapter 7 I find that the presence of a distractor object in a supporting 
visual scene modifies the speed simulation to a spoken sentence. When presented 
with a spoken sentence and a scene containing the agent of the sentence, the target 
destination and a distractor destination, speed simulation is either hindered, or it is 
evidenced in longer looks towards the agent for sentences describing slow motion 
compared to sentences describing fast motion. When there is no distractor present in 
the scene the difference between sentences describing fast and slow motion is found 
instead  in  looks  to  the  target  destination.  Thus,  the  simulation  process  uses  any 
relevant information currently available the context to build a sufficient simulation. 
9.2.4.7  Continuum of embodiment 
As described in Chapter 1, embodied theories have been placed on a continuum from 
disembodied  to  fully  embodied.  Where  do  the  current  results  fall  along  this 
continuum? It is clear that neither extreme versions account for the present findings. 
Throughout  the  thesis  I  have  consistently  provided  evidence  for  the  mental 
simulation of speed of motion, thus there must be some role for sensory and motor 
information in language comprehension. Additionally, that patients with Parkinson’s 
disease were able to sufficiently comprehend sentences and words describing actions  
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and speed, suggests that comprehension is not completely dependent on sensory and 
motor  information.  Thus,  the  results  of  the  thesis  support  a  theory  somewhere 
between  secondary  and  weak  embodiment.  Further  work  would  be  required  to 
determine whether sensory and motor simulation observed here plays a fundamental 
role, or is rather due to secondary activation. This could involve the use of more fine-
grained temporal measures, such as EEG. However, it should be noted, that a more 
fruitful research venture now is to further examine the nature and functions of mental 
simulations, rather than arguing for or against a particular view, as described below 
in section 9.4. 
9.3   Overarching implications of the work 
Thus, the main theoretical implications from the thesis are: 
1. Simulations involve fine-grained features of events such as speed and include 
information from vision, audition and action. 
2. Simulations are dynamic. They are built on the fly and are dependent on and 
interact with contextual factors. 
3. Simulations of speed are body-related in that the motion of a specific agent is 
simulated. These body-relevant simulations can include specific details such as the 
effector implicated in an action. 
9.4  The way forward 
It is clear from the present results that the effect of context is of great importance to 
embodied theories in terms of when simulations are used in comprehension and what 
the nature of these simulations are. Further work is needed to clearly define the 
contextual factors that affect simulation and when and how they come into play. 
One avenue for an investigation of context would be to compare simulations between 
reading and listening. Listening typically occurs in a social environment with an  
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interlocutor.  This  means  there  is  often  a  large  amount  of  noise  and  contextual 
information and as a listener one needs to be prepared to act, be it making a verbal or 
action response. When reading however, most often the greater goal is to build a 
representation of the text and not necessarily respond in any way at all (at least not 
immediately). Therefore, when listening there will be multiple perceptual and action 
processes  occurring  due  to  environmental  factors,  whereas  when  reading  there  is 
little additional perceptual or action processes other than those in response to reading 
itself.  Labruna,  Fernández-del-Olmo,  Landau,  Duqué  and  Ivry  (2011)  found 
increased  MEP  activity  after  TMS  to  the  left  premotor  cortex  for  action  words 
compared to control words but only when the words were presented visually and not 
auditorily.  They  speculated  that  this  difference  might  be  due  to  stronger  links 
between sensorimotor information and language in reading compared to listening 
because of the longer learning process for reading compared to listening, for which 
real-world referents and actions towards them are mapped to words and sentences. 
However  it  could  be  that  simulation  during  reading  is  easier  due  the  lack  of 
concurrent  environmental  information  typically  occurring  in  the  comprehension 
situation. 
The results in the present thesis suggest that speed simulation may be occurring at a 
different level of processing compared to simulation of other dimensions, such as 
direction: Meteyard et al. (2009) and Pavan et al. (2012) found that direction words 
affected perceptual sensitivity in a motion detection task but in Chapter 5 I did not 
find evidence that speed words affect perceptual sensitivity but perceived speed (a 
level of perceptual decision) in a speed discrimination task.  There may also be a 
difference in terms of necessity of speed simulation in comprehension compared to 
other  dimensions.  For  example,  in  Chapter  8,  results  suggest  that  Parkinson’s 
patients  are  not  impaired  in  implicitly  processing  speed  information,  but  work 
elsewhere has shown that they are for action information more generally (Fernandino 
et al. 2013). Thus speed may not be a crucial component to the meaning of the words 
used  in  the  thesis  unless  comprehension  is  specifically  oriented  to  the  speed 
dimension or if a deep level of processing is possible. It might be possible therefore  
     
 
325 
that there is a hierarchy of domains in terms of which are necessarily simulated, or 
more  easily  simulated,  and  those  that  are  instead  more  superfluous,  providing  a 
richer  simulation  dependent  on  context  or  comprehension  goals.  This  hierarchy 
might  reflect  the  salience  and  frequency  of  these  domains  in  our  real  world 
interactions: just as not all aspects of the environment are processed or attended to, 
not every feature of a described referent or an event is necessarily simulated. For 
example, in simulating an object salient features such as size and colour may be more 
necessarily  simulated  than  a  less  important  feature  such  as  texture.  There  are  of 
course a number of differences in both the tasks and stimuli utilized between the 
work presented here and the work that has addressed other dimensions, thus the 
above description is at present only speculative. A more controlled investigation of 
simulations of different domains would be required to investigate this idea. 
One obvious direction for embodied research to take is to move into more real-world 
experimental settings. It is possible that within experimental conditions in which the 
stimuli and situation are carefully designed and controlled, and when responses are 
averaged over many trials, evidence for simulation is found. However, it is unclear to 
what extent the same simulations are used during real-world interactions in which we 
are presented with lots of information, in noisy environments and in which multiple 
responses are required. A first step would be to move away from single words and 
sentences  out  of  context  towards  longer  discourse.  As  described  earlier,  longer 
discourse provides the opportunity for meaning to build up and for more elaborate 
simulations to develop. Studies are beginning to find evidence for mental simulation 
during comprehension of discourse, including discourse taken from real books and 
not designed for the purpose of eliciting specific simulations (e.g. Kurby & Zacks, 
2013). 
To  more  accurately  reflect  comprehension  in  the  real  world,  further  perceptual 
modalities  and  their  interactions  could  be  investigated.  At  present  studies  of 
simulation  mainly  focus  on  visual,  auditory  and  action  information  but  our 
experience  in  the  world  is  much  richer  than  this.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  4, 
simulations  during  language  comprehension  should  reflect  the  multimodal  
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experiences  of  the  world,  and  should  therefore  include  the  less-studied  senses 
including tactile perception, olfaction and taste. It would be interesting to investigate 
to  what  extent  each  modality  is  represented  in  particular  concepts,  if  particular 
modalities dominate and whether this changes depending on context (e.g. Hoenig et 
al 2008). Further, research has suggested that there are crossmodal correspondences 
between perceptual modalities (e.g. Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto 2013), 
which could affect the nature of multimodal simulations. It would therefore also be 
fruitful  to  investigate  simulation  in  comprehension  of  language  that  suggests 
crossmodal correspondences and their interaction with modal information present in 
the environment. Investigating the meaning of words in terms of their multimodal 
composition  may  in  fact  be  the  most  fruitful  direction  to  take.  Recent  research 
suggests that defining words in terms of their perceptual strength and perceptual 
dominance may be most advantageous for language research as such measures more 
accurately reflect the comprehension process than other descriptions of words such 
as semantic similarity and lexical association (Connell & Lynott, 2012a). 
Finally,  if  the  presence  and  nature  of  simulations  varies  so  much  depending  on 
contextual factors then the implications of this variability needs to be addressed. 
There  is  likely  to  be  comprehension  consequences  for  simulation  versus  no 
simulation.  For  example,  when  there  is  less  simulation  the  probability  of 
misinterpretation  may  be  increased  because  linguistic  associations  will  be  relied 
upon more, which are viewed as “quick and dirty” shortcuts. For example, based on 
associations between a few key words in a sentence a comprehender might predict an 
interpretation that is in fact incorrect. Comprehension with less simulation may also 
reduce or alter the memory for sentence content because the representation of the 
meaning is less rich so there is less context for memory retrieval. On the other hand, 
greater simulation may lead to false memories for features that are common to a 
particular simulation.  For example, in a famous study by Loftus and Palmer (1974), 
after participants had viewed a video of a car accident, they recalled that the car was 
moving faster and were more likely to report that there was broken glass at the scene  
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when the car accident was described with the verb smashed compared to other verbs 
that suggested less impact such as collided. 
9.5  Conclusion 
The work contained in this thesis has provided evidence for the simulation of speed 
in  both  word  and  sentence  comprehension.    The  findings  suggest  that  speed 
simulations contain visual, auditory and action information. Speed simulations do not 
reflect speed in an abstracted way but reflect speed in terms of an agent in action and 
can code specific information such as the effector involved in the action. This is 
reflected in the finding that interactions between speed in language and visual speed 
occur at levels of perceptual decision and not perceptual sensitivity. Based on the 
patterns found in the comprehension of speed language in patients with Parkinson’s 
disease,  speed  simulation  may  not  be  critical  to  comprehension  of  language 
describing fast and slow actions at all levels of processing. At shallow or implicit 
levels  of  processing  only  action  simulations  in  general  may  be  necessary  whilst 
speed information is more crucial for deep and explicit processing.  As with other 
embodied findings within the literature, speed simulations is highly dependent on 
contextual factors. The specific details and comprehension consequences of these 
contextual effects needs to be determined in further investigations. 
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Appendix 1. Norming and matching data 
Table Appendix 1-1. Slow verbs used in Chapters 4, 5 and 7 
Verb  Mean Speed Rating  Mode Speed Rating 
ambled 
crawled 
dallied 
dawdled 
meandered 
plodded 
rambled 
roamed 
sauntered 
shuffled 
sneaked 
strolled 
tiptoed 
traipsed 
trudged 
wandered 
2.39 
1.45 
2.05 
1.68 
2.35 
2.15 
3.05 
2.75 
2.75 
2.9 
2 
2.6 
1.4 
2.9 
2.05 
1.8 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
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Table Appendix 1-2. Fast verbs used in Chapters 4, 5 and 7 
Verb  Mean Speed Rating  Mode Speed Rating 
bolted 
charged 
darted 
dashed 
galloped 
hurried 
raced 
raged 
ran 
rushed 
shot 
sped 
sprinted 
stormed 
zipped 
zoomed 
6.4 
5.95 
6 
6 
5.6 
5.6 
6.3 
5.5 
5.8 
5.96 
6.1 
6.25 
6.7 
5.79 
5.65 
6.1 
7 
6 
7 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
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Table Appendix 1-3. Neutral verbs used in Chapters 5 and 7 
 
Verb  Mean Speed Rating  Mode Speed Rating 
advanced 
bounded 
clambered 
coasted 
cruised 
fell 
hastened 
hopped 
jogged 
jumped 
marched 
moved 
paced 
paraded 
pranced 
scampered 
shifted 
skipped 
slid 
stamped 
strode 
strutted 
travelled 
trotted 
walked 
4 
4.65 
3.2 
3.4 
3.65 
4.85 
4.6 
3.75 
4.65 
4.65 
3.95 
3.53 
3.85 
3 
4.2 
4.8 
3.05 
4.15 
4.05 
3.6 
3.9 
3.6 
3.9 
3.2 
3.45 
2 
5 
2 
3 
3 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
4 
5 
3 
5 
5 
2 
3 
4 
4 
3 
4 
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Table Appendix 1-4. Slow adverbs used in Chapter 7, Experiment 7-4 
Verb  Mean Speed Rating  Mode Speed Rating 
slowly 
lazily 
sluggishly 
sleepily 
reluctantly 
cautiously 
idly 
carefully 
gently 
gradually 
leisurely 
listlessly 
calmly 
casually 
1.4 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
2 
2.4 
2.6 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.8 
2.89 
3.1 
3.2 
1 
2.5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
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Table Appendix 1-5. Fast adverbs used in Chapter 7, Experiment 7-4 
Verb  Mean Speed Rating  Mode Speed Rating 
readily 
actively 
abruptly 
briskly 
promptly 
immediately 
hastily 
swiftly 
quickly 
suddenly 
speedily 
hurriedly 
rapidly 
frantically 
4.9 
5.3 
5.5 
5.5 
5.6 
5.8 
6 
6 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.4 
6.8 
5 
5 
5.5 
6 
5 
7 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
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Table Appendix 1-6. Full-body verbs matched for Chapter 6 
Slow Verbs  Fast Verbs  Abstract Verbs 
sneaked 
floated 
drifted 
crawled 
stepped 
plodded 
roamed 
rambled 
tiptoed 
sauntered 
climbed 
strolled 
wandered 
shuffled 
 
stormed 
hurried 
shifted 
skipped 
stamped 
flitted 
zoomed 
darted 
trotted 
scampered 
sprang 
scurried 
plunged 
bolted 
 
mourned 
ensured 
admired 
shocked 
pleased 
fancied 
joked 
meddled 
scolded 
professed 
dreamt 
forgave 
deceived 
insured 
 
 
Table 1-7. Lexical variables (mean and standard deviation) and p-values from 
ANOVA with word type as factor for matched full-body verbs in Chapter 6. All 
lexical  measures  taken  from  the  English  Lexicon  Project 
(http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow full body 
actions 
Fast full body 
actions 
Abstract actions  p-value 
Length  7.29 (0.73)  6.93 (0.83)  7 (0.88)  0.07 
Log frequency  6.12 (1.47)  6.12 (1.32)  6.56 (1.32)  0.09 
Ortho 
neighbour 
2.57 (1.45)  2.79 (1.58)  2.86 (1.46)  0.32 
Phonemes  5.57 (0.76)  5.71 (0.73)  5.5 (0.94)  0.51 
Syllables  1.57  (0.51)  1.57 (0.51)  1.64 (0.5)  0.62 
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Table Appendix 1-8. Hand/arm verbs matched for Chapter 6 
Slow hand actions  Fast hand actions  Abstract actions 
brushed 
caressed 
cradled 
grazed 
handled 
held 
hugged 
moved 
rolled 
stroked 
touched 
yanked 
snatched 
whacked 
swung 
punched 
hit 
hurled 
struck 
shoved 
smacked 
slapped 
spared 
disliked 
doubted 
regretted 
feared 
lost 
obeyed 
hoped 
scared 
owed 
ruled 
 
Table 1-9. Lexical variables (mean and standard deviation) and p-values from 
ANOVA with word type as factor for matched hand/arm verbs in Chapter 6. All 
lexical  measures  taken  from  the  English  Lexicon  Project 
(http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow hand 
actions 
Fast hand 
actions 
Abstract 
actions 
p-value 
Length  6.36 (1.12)  6.18 (1.33)  6 (1.55)  0.69 
Log frequency  7.95 (1.88)  7.43 (1.46)  7.89 (1.41)  0.15 
Ortho neighbour  5 (3.54)  5.73 (4.84)  5.55 (5.09)  0.88 
Phonemes  4.91 (0.94)  4.54 (0.69)  4.73 (1.62)  0.74 
Syllables  1.27  (0.47)  1 (0)  1.45 (0.69)  0.08  
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Table Appendix 1-10. Adverbs matched for Chapter 6 and sentences in Chapter 
8 
Slow Adverbs  Fast Adverbs  Abstract Adverbs 
awkwardly 
patiently 
leisurely 
intently  
gradually 
carefully 
vaguely 
calmly 
reluctantly 
slowly 
painfully 
casually 
cautiously 
speedily 
urgently 
fiercely 
abruptly 
efficiently 
eagerly 
quickly 
keenly 
frantically 
actively 
rapidly 
suddenly 
comfortably 
usefully 
knowingly 
normally 
loosely 
officially 
certainly 
genuinely 
sensibly 
voluntarily 
openly 
evidently 
clearly 
customarily 
 
Table Appendix 1-11. Lexical variables (mean and standard deviation) and p-
values from ANOVA with word type as factor for matched adverbs used in 
sentences  in  Chapter  6  and  Chapter  8.  All  lexical  measures  taken  from  the 
English Lexicon Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow Adverbs  Fast 
Adverbs 
Abstract 
Adverbs 
p-value 
Length  8.46 (1.45)  8.31 (1.65)  8.62 (1.5)  0.68 
Log frequency  7.52 (1.33)  7.81 (1.53)  8.13 (1.79)  0.31 
Ortho 
neighbour 
0.23 (0.44)  0.23 (0.44)  0.38 (0.65)  0.63 
Phonemes  6.77 (1.64)  7 (1.47)  7.23 (2)  0.67 
Syllables  2.85  (0.55)  2.92 (0.64)  3.38 (0.65)  0.08 
LD RT  716 (91)  736 (91)  724 (88)  0.79 
LD Acc  0.97 (0.03)  0.95 (0.06)  0.98 (.03)  0.17 
Naming RT  673 (42)  681 (57)  688 (74)  0.79  
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Table  Appendix  1-12.  Concrete  and  abstract  verbs  matched  for  adverb 
sentences in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 
 
Concrete Verbs  Abstract Verbs  Abstract-Abstract Verbs 
rolled 
pressed 
pulled 
grasped 
picked 
lifted 
tapped 
twisted 
knocked 
twirled 
took 
threw 
raised 
thought 
checked 
complied 
considered 
figured 
rated 
pondered 
mused 
worked 
debated 
saw 
wished 
reasoned 
acquired 
admired 
boasted 
claimed 
expressed 
joked 
loved 
planned 
selected 
tested 
trusted 
upset 
won 
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Table Appendix 1-13. Lexical variables (mean and standard deviation) and p-
values  from  ANOVA  with  word  type  as  factor  for  matched  concrete  and 
abstract verbs for adverb sentences in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8. All lexical 
measures taken from the English Lexicon Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Concrete 
Verbs 
Abstract Speed 
Verbs 
Abstract-Abstract 
Verbs 
p-value 
Length  6.15 (0.9)  6.69 (1.75)  6.31 (1.89)  0.66 
Log frequency  8.72 (1.66)  8.96 (2.07)  9.85 (1.6)  0.3 
Ortho 
neighbour 
5.85 (4.74)  5.07 (5.94)  6.3 (7.43)  0.87 
Phonemes  4.54 (1.2)  5.07 (1.71)  5.46 (1.56)  0.4 
Syllables  1.15  (0.38)  1.69 (0.75)  1.69 (0.63)  0.09 
LD RT  647 (58)  678 (67)  649 (52)  0.4 
LD Acc  0.96 (0.03)  0.97 (0.03)  0.97 (0.03)  0.68 
Naming RT  621 (47)  648 (58)  624 (46)  0.36 
Valence  5.57 (.18)  5.88 (.23)  5.92 (.45)  0.13 
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Table 1-14. Full-body verbs matched for lexical decision task in Chapter 8 
Slow verbs  Fast verbs  Abstract verbs 
to roam 
to tarry 
to ramble 
to float 
to trek 
to climb 
to shuffle 
to trudge 
to sneak 
to stroll 
to crawl 
to wander 
to meander 
to slink 
to tiptoe 
to plod 
 
 
to whiz 
to stamp 
to hasten 
to zoom 
to advance 
to cruise 
to hurry 
to flit 
to glide 
to jog 
to sprint 
to dash 
to bolt 
to stride 
to hurtle 
to dart 
 
to profess 
to allot 
to sublet 
to broach 
to claim 
to induce 
to permit 
to yearn 
to inspect 
to waive 
to reign 
to obey 
to insure 
to vow 
to exhort 
to conceive 
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Table 1-15. Lexical variables (mean and standard deviations) and p-values from 
ANOVA with word type as factor for matched full-body verbs used in lexical 
decision task Chapter 8. All lexical measures taken from the English Lexicon 
Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow verbs  Fast Verbs  Abstract Verbs   p-value 
Length  5.38 (0.96)  4.94 (1.12)  5.63 (1.2)  0.28 
Log frequency  6.8 (1.71)  7.57 (1.74)  7.04 (1.73)  0.14 
Ortho neighbour  3.75 (3.3)  5.69 (4.74)  2.5 (4.32)  0.11 
Phonemes  4.38 (0.72)  4.19 (0.91)  4.5 (1.46)  0.75 
Syllables  1.44 (0.63)  1.25 (0.44)  1.63 (0.5)  0.06 
LD RT  703 (96)  649 (74)  708 (79)  0.09 
LD Acc  0.84 (0.18)  0.93 (0.13)  0.9 (0.1)  0.24 
Naming RT  664 (57)  632 (46)  673 (63)  0.12 
 
Table Appendix 1-16. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures for 
matched full-body verbs and pseudo-verbs for lexical decision task in Chapter 8 
and p-values from t-test. All lexical measures taken from the English Lexicon 
Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Speed verbs  Pseudowords   p-value 
Length  5.41 (0.94)  5.41 (0.94)  Perfect match 
Ortho neighbour  3.29 (2.64)  3.27 (2.62)  Perfect match 
LD RT  679 (78)  702 (69)  0.08 
LD Acc  0.92 (0.09)  0.92 (0.1)  0.81 
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Table  Appendix  1-17.  Arm/hand  verbs  matched  for  lexical  decision  task  in 
Chapter 8 
Slow verbs  Fast verbs  Abstract verbs 
to brush 
to caress 
to cradle 
to graze 
to handle 
to hold 
to hug 
to move 
to roll 
to stroke 
to touch 
to yank 
to snatch 
to whack 
to swing 
to punch  
to hit 
to hurl 
to strike 
to shove 
to smack 
to slap 
to know 
to plan 
to muse 
to ponder 
to infer 
to deduct 
to choose 
to think 
to judge 
to reflect 
to wonder 
 
Table Appendix 1-18. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures and p-
values from ANOVA with word type as factor for matched hand/arm verbs 
used in lexical decision task in Chapter 8. All lexical measures taken from the 
English Lexicon Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow verbs  Fast Verbs  Abstract Verbs   p-value 
Length  4.91 (1.04)  4.73 (0.9)  5.27 (1)  0.46 
Log frequency  9 (1.9)  8.18 (1.42)  9.85 (2.41)  0.13 
Ortho neighbour  7.18 (6.54)  7.09 (5.17)  4.55 (3.14)  0.27 
Phonemes  4 (0.89)  3.82 (0.6)  4.27 (1.4)  0.53 
Syllables  1.27 (0.47)  1(0)  1.45 (0.52)  0.06 
LD RT  619 (54)  648 (67)  639 (67)  0.63 
LD Acc  0.98 (0.03)  0.96 (0.04)  0.97 (0.05)  0.62 
Naming RT  599 (60)  623 (47)  615 (41)  0.56 
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Table Appendix 1-19. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures and p-
values  from  t-test  for  matched  hand/arms  verbs  and  pseudo-verbs  in  lexical 
decision task in Chapter 8. All lexical measures taken from the English Lexicon 
Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Speed verbs  Pseudo-words  p-value 
Length  4.97 (0.98)  4.7 (0.98)  0.24 
Ortho neighbour  4.42 (3.34)  6.27 (5.13)  0.06 
LD RT  660 (43)  635 (62)  0.07 
LD Acc  0.97 (0.25)  0.97 (0.03)  0.99 
 
Table Appendix 1-20. Adverbs matched for lexical decision 
Slow Adverbs  Fast Adverbs  Abstract Adverbs 
awkwardly 
patiently 
delicately 
leisurely 
intently 
gradually 
carefully 
lazily 
vaguely 
calmly 
sleepily 
reluctantly 
gently 
limply 
slowly 
sluggishly 
painfully 
casually 
cautiously 
listlessly 
speedily 
urgently 
impatiently 
fiercely 
abruptly 
efficiently 
quickly 
briskly 
eagerly 
keenly 
skilfully 
frantically 
boldly 
nimbly 
actively 
hurriedly 
rapidly 
suddenly 
comfortably 
alertly 
earnestly 
magically 
offensively 
ethically 
stupidly 
financially 
greatly 
cruelly 
proudly 
rudely 
helpfully 
spiritually 
kindly 
bravely 
hopefully 
uselessly 
morally 
terribly 
miserably 
boastfully 
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Table Appendix 1-21. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures and p-
values from ANOVA with word type as factor for matched adverbs in lexical 
decision  in  Chapter  8.  All  lexical  measures  taken  from  the  English  Lexicon 
Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Slow Verbs  Fast Verbs  Abstract 
Verbs 
p-value 
Length  8.3 (1.63)  8.2 (1.35)  8.45 (1.57)  0.62 
Log frequency  6.7 (1.93)  6.89 (1.97)  6.87 (1.98)  0.74 
Ortho 
neighbour 
0.4 (0.68)  0.4 (0.68)  0.4 (0.68)  Perfect 
match 
Phonemes  6.95 (1.54)  6.95 (1.32)  6.95 (1.23)  .96 
Syllables  2.85  (0.59)  2.85(0.67)  2.85 (0.67)  .9 
LD RT  731 (97)  748 (85)  726 (85)  0.56 
LD Acc  0.95 (0.08)  0.92 (0.08)  0.96 (.03)  0.07 
Naming RT  685 (50)  690 (57)  695 (63)  0.89 
 
Table Appendix 1-22. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures for and 
p-values from t-test matched adverbs and pseudo-adverbs in lexical decision 
task in Chapter 8. All lexical measures taken from the English Lexicon Project 
(http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
  Adverbs  Pseudo-adverbs  t-test p-value 
Length  8.32 (1.62)  8.5 (1.65)  0.28 
Ortho neighbour  0.4 (0.67)  0.37 (0.64)  0.42 
LD RT  735 (88)  739 (82)  0.76 
LD Acc  0.94 (0.07)  0.95 (0.8)  0.62 
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Table Appendix 1-23. First set of verbs for semantic similarity judgments in 
Chapter 8. 
Slow Verbs  Fast Verbs  Positive Verbs  Negative Verbs 
to sneak 
to step 
to ramble 
to float 
to trek 
to climb 
to drift 
to shuffle 
to crawl 
to wander 
to glide 
to jump 
to hasten 
to stamp 
to storm 
to cruise 
to plunge 
to hurry 
to sprint 
to leap 
to thrive 
to plan 
to inspire 
to fancy 
to trust 
to assure 
to admire 
to unite 
to mentor 
to joke 
to riot 
to blame 
to deceive 
to cheat 
to argue 
to upset 
to spoil 
to annoy 
to regret 
to scare 
 
 
Table Appendix 1-24. Mean and standard deviations of lexical measures and p-
values  from  ANOVA  with  word  type  as  factor  for  matched  verbs  in  pilot 
semantic similarity judgments of Chapter 8. All lexical measures taken from the 
English Lexicon Project (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/) 
 
  Slow Verbs  Fast Verbs  Positive 
Verbs 
Negative 
Verbs 
p-
value 
Length  5.2 (0.92)  5.2 (0.79)  5.33 (0.94)  5.2 (0.79)  0.89 
Log frequency  8.4 (1.24)  8.39 (1.22)  8.75 (1.24)  8.53 (0.94)  0.3 
Ortho neighbour  3.6 (3.13)  3.6 (3.03)  2.8 (2.99)  2.7 (3.56)  0.08 
Phonemes  4.3 (0.48)  4.4 (0.84)  4.7 (0.9)  4.3 (0.95)  0.56 
Syllables  1.3 (0.48)  1.2 (0.42)  1.6 (0.49)  1.5 (0.53)  0.1 
LD RT  643 (86)  639 (71)  649 (51)  662 (65)  0.89 
LD Acc  0.95 (0.06)  0.97 (0.04)  0.98 (0.02)  0.98(.02)  0.13 
Naming RT  647 (49)  627 (44)  613 (47)  637 (53)  0.62 
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Table  Appendix  1-25.  Final  set  of  verbs  matched  for  semantic  similarity 
judgments 
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Appendix 2. Sentences 
A2.1. Chapter 6 sentences 
 
A2.1.1. Hand sentences 
 
Sentence  Type 
The man brushed the dust away.  slow 
Lucy caressed the small kitten in the basket.  slow 
Tim cradled the baby in his arms.  slow 
Shaun grazed his arm against the wall.  slow 
The worker handled the packages that were ready.  slow 
The vet held the dog in his hands.  slow 
Tonya hugged the pillow that was on the bed.  slow 
Jake moved the box sitting before him.  slow 
Tom rolled the keg towards the doorway.  slow 
Amy stroked her chin as she tried to remember.  slow 
Jill touched her friend’s arm.  slow 
The man yanked the door open.  fast 
Mark snatched the last cookie from the table.  fast 
Jim whacked the wasp in his room.  fast 
Dave swung his bat towards the ball.  fast 
The boxer punched the opponent that was opposite.  fast 
The golfer hit the ball with the club.  fast 
Katie hurled the frisbee that was on the floor.  fast 
Matt struck the ball coming towards him.  fast 
Rick shoved the nag behind the cupboard.  fast 
Sarah smacked her head when she started to forget.  fast 
Kelly slapped the man’s face.  fast  
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The man spared the bad news.  abstract 
Frank disliked the new girl from the city.  abstract 
Luke doubted the story from his friend.  abstract 
Zack regretted his choice over the colour.  abstract 
The student feared the news that was coming.  abstract 
The actor lost the drive for his success.  abstract 
Freddy obeyed the rules that he had been given.  abstract 
Dale hoped the job lasted all summer.  abstract 
Ross scared the cat beneath the table.  abstract 
Sandy owed her friend after she looked after her.  abstract 
Olly ruled the town’s team.  abstract 
The man built the old warmth.  nonsense 
Ray chaired the circus from the sun.  nonsense 
Drew developed the army from his romance.  nonsense 
Jordan located his rumour in the space.  nonsense 
The frog installed the pan in the joy.  nonsense 
The chef secured the luck in the station.  nonsense 
Ethan shrank the sea that he had heard.  nonsense 
Michelle sold the peace at last.  nonsense 
Julie repaired the ant in the tree.  nonsense 
Molly displayed her rock in the star around her.  nonsense 
Diane framed the zoo's rain.  nonsense 
The girl hosted the thunder hole.  nonsense 
Erica dug the lake for the monkey.  nonsense 
Rose ripped the water from the brick.  nonsense 
Jesse tore the clock in the fruit.  nonsense 
The bear slid the soup into the thought.  nonsense 
The teacher carried the wealth in the forest.  nonsense 
Antony scratched the sand that he had sung.  nonsense 
Tony knelt the room for dinner.  nonsense  
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Blake sat the pride in the store.  nonsense 
Ryan passed his sleep to the mind above him.  nonsense 
Brendan cupped the day's hurt.  nonsense 
The boy fastened the water rage.  nonsense 
Martin hauled the trust from the bird.  nonsense 
Harry deleted the box from the fear.  nonsense 
Jim dived the bridge in the floor.  nonsense 
The dog swiped the tin the party.  nonsense 
The player stopped the skill in the balloon.  nonsense 
Neil removed the fuss that had been swallowed.  nonsense 
Terry drove the chicken to night.  nonsense 
Lee disguised the fish in the bush.  nonsense 
Fish buzzed their thoughts to the bottom of time.  nonsense 
Sam hovered around the wild ear.  nonsense 
 
A2.1.2. Full-body sentences 
 
Sentence  Type 
The professor sneaked down the corridor.  slow 
The school girl floated along the hallway.  slow 
Sarah drifted away from the table.  slow 
The toddler crawled towards her mother.  slow 
The manager stepped into the office.  slow 
Liz plodded to the other side of the room.  slow 
The young boy roamed through the lanes.  slow 
Daniel rambled through the forest.  slow 
The kid tiptoed down the stairs.  slow 
Mary sauntered away from the scene.  slow 
Jack climbed over the rocks.  slow 
The old lady strolled across the road.  slow 
Sally wandered forward into the waves  slow  
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Chris shuffled out of the classroom.  slow 
The professor stormed down the corridor.  fast 
The school girl hurried along the hallway.  fast 
Sarah shifted away from the table.  fast 
The toddler skipped towards her mother.  fast 
The manager stamped into the office.  fast 
Liz flitted to the other side of the room.  fast 
The young boy zoomed through the lanes.  fast 
Daniel darted through the forest.  fast 
The kid trotted down the stairs.  fast 
Mary scampered away from the scene.  fast 
Jack sprang over the rocks.  fast 
The old lady scurried across the road.  fast 
Sally plunged forward into the waves.  fast 
Chris bolted out of the classroom.  fast 
The brother mourned his recent loss.  abstract 
The office worker ensured his new promotion.  abstract 
Sophie admired her old history teacher.  abstract 
The performer shocked the large crowd.  abstract 
The performance pleased the dance examiners.  abstract 
Luke fancied a nice Italian meal for his dinner.  abstract 
The old clown joked with his audience.  abstract 
Marcus meddled in the argument.  abstract 
The teacher scolded the chatting children.  abstract 
Shane professed his strong opinion openly.  abstract 
Zack dreamt of being famous.  abstract 
The old man forgave his wife eventually.  abstract 
John deceived all of his friends.  abstract 
Kirsty insured her brand new car.  abstract 
The pilot swam the wooden egg.   nonsense  
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The bank manager lifted his yellow memories.  nonsense 
Steven reached for the floating moon.  nonsense 
The swimmer drank around a forest.  nonsense 
The captain rolled under the volcano.  nonsense 
Laura hindered a large cloud up the side building.  nonsense 
The hat altered the city bridge.  nonsense 
Mary rejected the flying thoughts.  nonsense 
The house caught the falling pigs.  nonsense 
Ruth danced the long ship home.  nonsense 
James distressed the new leaves.  nonsense 
The empty sun moved the green cats.  nonsense 
Ben rolled into a sliding star.  nonsense 
Julia pinched the country sunbeam.  nonsense 
The wife bit the loud speech.  nonsense 
The house cat shook the mountain hole.  nonsense 
Simone seized the rotating colourful planets.  nonsense 
The armchair plotted a broken stunt.  nonsense 
The fish wiped away the teardrops.  nonsense 
Louise read up a meadow over a dark doorway.  nonsense 
The rat pulled the air around.  nonsense 
Mike charged along the rocket launch.  nonsense 
The staircase bounded towards the seahorse.  nonsense 
Rick strolled along the choppy ocean.  nonsense 
Paul meandered through the brain.  nonsense 
The dusty book chased the door mat.  nonsense 
David slogged down the floating balloon.  nonsense 
Lucy exercised the quick conversational idea.  nonsense 
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A2.1.3. Adverb sentences 
  Sentence 
type 
Adverb 
type 
Bob speedily thought over the business plan.  abstract  fast 
Greg urgently checked the proposal.  abstract  fast 
Abby fiercely complied with the rules.  abstract  fast 
Sam abruptly considered the act.  abstract  fast 
Jimmy efficiently figured out the problem.  abstract  fast 
Mick quickly rated all the entries.  abstract  fast 
Sherry eagerly pondered the new project.  abstract  fast 
Amy keenly mused over the future.  abstract  fast 
Carly frantically worked out the question’s answer.  abstract  fast 
Will actively debated the quarrel between his friends.  abstract  fast 
Bill rapidly saw the flaw in the plot.  abstract  fast 
Dean suddenly wished he were in the event.  abstract  fast 
Richard comfortably defended the views of his political party.  abstract  fast 
Bob awkwardly thought over the business plan.  abstract  slow 
Greg patiently checked the proposal.  abstract  slow 
Abby leisurely wondered about the course.  abstract  slow 
Sam intently considered the act.  abstract  slow 
Jimmy gradually figured out the problem.  abstract  slow 
Mick carefully rated all the entries.  abstract  slow 
Sherry vaguely pondered the new project.  abstract  slow 
Amy calmly mused over the future.  abstract  slow 
Carly reluctantly worked out the question’s answer.  abstract  slow 
Will slowly debated the quarrel between his friends.  abstract  slow 
Bill painfully saw the flaw in the plot.  abstract  slow 
Dean casually wished he were in the event.  abstract  slow 
Richard cautiously defended the views of his political party.  abstract  slow 
Max usefully acquired the new clients.  abstract  abstract 
Gwen knowingly allowed the breach.  abstract  abstract  
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Hayley ordinarily boasted about her money.  abstract  abstract 
Craig loosely claimed his importance.  abstract  abstract 
Simon officially expressed his major concern.  abstract  abstract 
Dan certainly joked about the issue.  abstract  abstract 
Mary genuinely loved the old songs.  abstract  abstract 
Amy positively planned her next step.  abstract  abstract 
Dennis voluntarily selected the best drawing entry.  abstract  abstract 
Jeff openly tested the ideas for his project.  abstract  abstract 
Kurt honestly trusted the man in the car.  abstract  abstract 
Kyle clearly upset the girl in the bar.  abstract  abstract 
Brian innocently won all the rounds of the quiz.  abstract  abstract 
John speedily rolled up the sleeping bag.  concrete  fast 
Jane urgently pressed the button  concrete  fast 
Gary fiercely pulled back the curtain.  concrete  fast 
Ken abruptly grasped the mug.  concrete  fast 
Stacey efficiently picked up all the litter.  concrete  fast 
Phil quickly lifted up the cake.  concrete  fast 
Mary eagerly tapped on the front window.  concrete  fast 
Amy keenly twisted open the bottle.  concrete  fast 
Katie frantically knocked on the director's door.  concrete  fast 
Jamie actively twirled the pencil between his fingers.  concrete  fast 
Mike rapidly took the spade out of the ground.  concrete  fast 
Mark suddenly threw the ball down the street.  concrete  fast 
Graham comfortably raised the sack onto the truck.  concrete  fast 
John awkwardly rolled up the sleeping bag.  concrete  slow 
Jane patiently pressed the button.  concrete  slow 
Gary leisurely pulled back the curtain.  concrete  slow 
Ken intently grasped the mug.  concrete  slow 
Stacey gradually picked up all the litter.  concrete  slow 
Phil carefully lifted up the case.  concrete  slow  
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Mary vaguely tapped on the front window.  concrete  slow 
Amy calmly twisted open the bottle.  concrete  slow 
Katie reluctantly knocked on the boss's door.  concrete  slow 
James slowly twirled the pencil between his fingers.  concrete  slow 
Mike painfully yanked the spade out of the ground.  concrete  slow 
Mark casually threw the ball down the street.  concrete  slow 
Graham cautiously raised the sack onto the truck.  concrete  slow 
June earnestly flew the computer grass.  concrete  slow 
Rick listlessly ate an idea.  nonsense   
Jessica offensively flushed out the minds.  nonsense   
Margaret boldly cooked the clouds.  nonsense   
Simon delicately shimmered out the magazine.  nonsense   
Laura dangerously moved around the whispers.  nonsense   
Will alertly jumped the elephant spoon.  nonsense   
Charlotte impatiently slept around the sunshine.  nonsense   
Ben proudly shook over the beach’s oven.  nonsense   
Sarah softly balanced the red sentence between her home.  nonsense   
Steve gently collected the mist in the gloves.   nonsense   
Ellen shakily wrapped the glass over the turtle.  nonsense   
Nick limply cleaned out the rainbow of the pear.   nonsense   
Stewart nimbly washed out the vapour legs.  nonsense   
Rachel accidentally drank the chairs.  nonsense   
Rob affirmatively kicked over the moon.  nonsense   
Alison lazily shone the building.  nonsense   
Marcus hopelessly danced up the bucket.  nonsense   
Barbara briskly wiped away the jungle.  nonsense   
Andy hurriedly opened up the rectangular ocean.  nonsense   
Maria sluggishly ironed out the peas.  nonsense   
Sam passionately brushed up the thunder’s air.  nonsense   
Paula seriously blew the icicle between her pages.  nonsense    
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Arthur bitterly remembered the river in the chicken.  nonsense   
Paula sleepily manipulated the mountain around the chef.  nonsense   
Nicole skilfully sharpened around the accent of the bread.  nonsense   
Chloe hastily kicked under the meadow roof.  nonsense   
Grace immediately rode the wish.  nonsense   
Hannah passively bounced over the hate.  nonsense   
Leah swiftly nodded the angle.  nonsense   
Ashley readily circled around the justice.  nonsense   
Claire politely crouched over the music.  nonsense   
Just idly hopped the new despair.  nonsense   
Lauren freely closed up the improvement.  nonsense   
Jason instantly bit into the education wit.  nonsense   
Tristan intensely chewed the large gossip after his shock.  nonsense   
Sonny rarely smashed the food in the sky.  nonsense   
Erin occasionally cut the mud in the bottle.  nonsense   
Nate reasonably emptied out the energy of the trust.  nonsense   
 
A2.2. Sentences Chapter 7 
A2.2.1. Experiment 7-1 
A2.2.1.1. Verb sentences 
Sentence  Target  Distractor 
The lion ambled/charged to the balloon  balloon  swing 
The fox crawled/bolted to the rock  rock  tent 
The clown dallied/hurried to the barrel  barrel  football 
The boy dawdled/sprinted to the castle  castle  house 
The deer meandered/dashed to the tree  tree  rock 
The horse plodded/galloped to the flag  flag  wheelbarrow 
The moose rambled/stormed to the hose  hose  ambulance 
The gorilla roamed/sped to the lorry  lorry  barrel  
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The monkey sauntered/zipped to the pool  pool  bicycle 
The elephant shuffled/raged to the present  present  bomb 
The dog sneaked/shot to the shop  shop  bus 
The man strolled/rushed to the tent  tent  car 
The cat tiptoed/zoomed to the tree  tree  castle 
The child traipsed/darted to the windmill  windmill  balloon 
The girl trudged/raced to the circus  circus  flower 
The bull wandered/ran to the bench  bench  mountain 
 
A2.2.1.2 Adverb sentences 
Sentence  Target  Distractor 
The bear quickly/slowly advanced to the box  box  swing 
The bull quickly/slowly bounded to the fence  fence  football 
The cat quickly/slowly clambered to the buggy  buggy  sofa 
The cow quickly/slowly coasted to the church  church  lorry 
The deer quickly/slowly cruised to the palm tree  palm tree  pool 
The dinosaur quickly/slowly fell to the bucket  bucket  cannon 
The dog quickly/slowly hastened to the statue  statue  basket 
The rabbit quickly/slowly hopped to the trolley  trolley  bench 
The boy quickly/slowly jogged to the bottle  bottle  radio 
The fox quickly/slowly jumped to the drum  drum  present 
The horse quickly/slowly marched to the helicopter  helicopter  house 
The chicken quickly/slowly moved to the snowman  snowman  broom 
The goat quickly/slowly paced to the rocket  rocket  balloon 
The gorilla quickly/slowly paraded to the broom  broom  anchor 
The monkey quickly/slowly pranced to the lighthouse  lighthouse  flower 
The pig quickly/slowly scampered to the rope  rope  house 
The crocodile quickly/slowly shifted to the anchor  anchor  rock 
The girl quickly/slowly skipped to the building  building  mountain  
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The snake quickly/slowly slid to the cannon  cannon  bucket 
The elephant quickly/slowly stamped to the hot air balloon  balloon  barrel 
The ostrich quickly/slowly strode to the motorcycle  motorcycle  flag 
The chicken quickly/slowly strutted to the radio  radio  sofa 
The duck quickly/slowly travelled to the robot  robot  shop 
The donkey quickly/slowly trotted to the bus  bus  rope 
The moose quickly/slowly walked to the cactus  cactus  bicycle 
 
A2.2.1.3. Filler sentences 
Sentence  Target  Distractor 
The bear climbed to the mountain  mountain  bottle 
The man hiked to the rock  rock  sofa 
The donkey looked at the bomb  bomb  drum 
The bird glanced at the castle  castle  hose 
The gorilla studied the snowman  snowman  lighthouse 
The cow noticed the robot  robot  motorcycle 
The goat saw the garbage can  can  palm tree 
The dinosaur watched the windmill  windmill  pool 
The boy glowered at the car   car  radio 
The man pointed at the tree   tree  wheelbarrow 
The pig recognized the man   man  ambulance 
The elephant surveyed the building   building  anchor 
The dog growled at the football   football  bank 
The clown scowled at the lion   lion  barrel 
The rabbit viewed the tent   tent  basket 
The duck visited the statue  statue  bench 
The snake wanted the balloon  balloon  flag 
The crocodile gazed at the canoe  canoe  lorry 
The ostrich identified the helicopter  helicopter  radio 
The chicken inspected the trolley  trolley  building  
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The bear observed the church  church  hose 
The cat regarded the dog  dog  pool 
The dinosaur scrutinized the rocket  rocket  present 
The bird spotted the tree  tree  rope 
The bull stared at the fence  fence  circus 
The lion perceived the hot air balloon  balloon  swings 
The cow ignored the buggy  buggy  flower 
The fox encountered the ambulance  ambulance  radio 
The monkey entered the bank  bank  drum 
The moose approached the box  box  trolley 
The clown called to the dog  dog  cactus 
The boy patted the donkey  donkey  bomb 
The man stroked the cat  cat  bin 
The girl fed the chicken  chicken  shop 
The child washed the elephant  elephant  sofa 
The boy cleaned the horse  horse  broom 
The girl cared for the goat  goat  castle 
The child brushed the monkey  monkey  lighthouse 
The clown comforted the girl  girl  balloon 
The girl fondled the rabbit  rabbit  tent 
The child caressed the bear  bear  windmill 
 
A2.2.2. Experiment 7-2  
A2.2.2.1. Additional verb sentences 
Sentence  Target 
The fox ambled/charged to the bench  bench 
The clown crawled/bolted to the balloon  balloon 
The boy dallied/hurried to the rock  rock 
The deer dawdled/sprinted to the barrel  barrel 
The horse meandered/dashed to the castle  castle 
The moose plodded/galloped to the tree  tree  
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The gorilla rambled/stormed to the flag  flag 
The monkey roamed/sped to the hose  hose 
The elephant sauntered/zipped to the lorry  lorry 
The dog shuffled/raged to the pool  pool 
The man sneaked/shot to the present  present 
The cat strolled/rushed to the shop  shop 
The child tiptoed/zoomed to the tent  tent 
The girl traipsed/darted to the tree  tree 
The bull trudged/raced to the windmill  windmill 
The lion wandered/ran to the circus  circus 
 
A2.2.3. Experiment 7-3  
A2.2.3.1.Verb sentences 
Sentence  Target  Distractor 
The bull crawled/charged to the circus  circus  mountain 
The lion dallied/bolted to the bench  bench  swings 
The fox dawdled/hurried to the balloon  balloon  teepee 
The clown meandered/sprinted to the rock  rock  football 
The boy plodded/dashed to the barrel  barrel  house 
The deer rambled/galloped to the castle  castle  rock 
The horse roamed/stormed to the tree  tree  wheelbarrow 
The moose sauntered/sped to the flag  flag  ambulance 
The gorilla shuffled/zipped to the hose  hose  barrel 
The monkey sneaked/raged to the lorry  lorry  bike 
The elephant strolled/shot to the pool  pool  bomb 
The dog tiptoed/rushed to the present  present  bus 
The man traipsed/zoomed to the shop  shop  car 
The cat trudged/darted to the tent  tent  castle 
The child wandered/raced to the tree  tree  balloon 
The girl ambled/ran to the windmill  windmill  flower 
  
     
 
360 
A2.2.3.2. Filler sentences 
Sentence  Target  Distractor 
The bear climbed to the mountain  mountain  - 
The man hiked to the rock  rock  sofa 
The donkey looked at the bomb  bomb  - 
The bird glanced at the castle  castle  hose 
The gorilla studied the snowman  snowman  - 
The cow noticed the robot  robot  bike 
The goat saw the garbage can  garbage can  - 
The dinosaur watched the windmill  windmill  pool 
The boy glowered at the car  car  - 
The man pointed at the tree  tree  wheelbarrow 
The pig recognized the man  man  - 
The elephant surveyed the building  building  anchor 
The dog growled at the football  football  - 
The clown scowled at the lion  lion  bear 
The rabbit viewed the tent  tent  - 
The duck visited the statue  statue  shop 
The snake wanted the balloon  balloon  - 
The crocodile gazed at the canoe  canoe  anchor 
The ostrich identified the helicopter  helicopter  - 
The chicken inspected the trolley  trolley  bin 
The bear observed the church  church  - 
The cat regarded the dog  dog  rabbit 
The dinosaur scrutinized the rocket  rocket  - 
The bird spotted the tree  tree  rock 
The bull stared at the fence  fence  - 
The lion perceived the hot air balloon  balloon  tent 
The cow ignored the buggy  buggy  - 
The fox encountered the ambulance  ambulance  lorry 
The monkey entered the bank  bank  -  
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The moose approached the box  box  tree 
The clown called to the dog  dog  - 
The boy patted the donkey  donkey  rabbit 
 
A2.2.4. Experiment 7-4 
A2.2.4.1. Adverb sentences 
Sentence  Target 
The lion calmly/abruptly went to the rock  rock 
The fox carefully/actively went to the barrel  barrel 
The clown casually/briskly went to the castle  castle 
The boy cautiously/frantically went to the tree  tree 
The deer gently/hastily went to the flag  flag 
The horse gradually/hurriedly went to the hose  hose 
The moose idly/immediately went to the lorry  lorry 
The gorilla lazily/promptly went to the pool  pool 
The monkey leisurely/quickly went to the present  present 
The elephant listlessly/rapidly went to the shop  shop 
The dog reluctantly/readily went to the tent  tent 
The man sleepily/speedily went to the tree  tree 
The cat slowly/suddenly went to the windmill  windmill 
The child sluggishly/swiftly went to the circus  circus 
 
A2.2.4.2. Fillers 
Sentence  Target 
The monkey climbed to the mountain  mountain 
The boy hiked to the rock  rock 
The bird looked at the bomb  bomb 
The gorilla glanced at the castle  castle 
The cow studied the snowman   snowman 
The goat noticed the robot  robot 
The dinosaur saw the garbage can  garbage can  
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The boy watched the windmill  windmill 
The man glowered at the car  car 
The girl pointed at the tree  tree 
The elephant recognized the girl   girl 
The dog surveyed the church  church 
The clown smiled at the boy  boy 
The rabbit hid from the lion  lion 
The duck viewed the tent  tent 
The snake visited the statue  statue 
The crocodile wanted the balloon  balloon 
The ostrich gazed at the canoe  canoe 
The chicken identified the helicopter  helicopter 
The bear inspected the shop  shop 
The cat observed the building  building 
The dinosaur regarded the dog  dog 
The bird scrutinized the rocket  rocket 
The bull spotted the tree   tree 
The lion stared at the dog  dog 
The cow perceived the hot air balloon  balloon 
The fox ignored the bear  bear 
The monkey encountered the snake  snake 
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Appendix 3 Additional analyses Chapter 7 
A3.1 Mouse response times Experiment 7-1 
Mouse response times to the correct target destination were calculated from the onset 
of the final noun. For verb sentences a 2 (speaking rate) X 2 (verb speed) repeated 
measures ANOVA found a main effect of speaking rate (F1 (1, 39) = 13.07, p < 
.001, η
2
p = .25; F2 (1, 15 = 4.77, p = .045, η
2
p = .24), with click times faster to 
sentences spoken slowly compared to sentences spoken quickly. There was no main 
effect of verb type (Fs < 1) and no interaction (Fs < 1). 
For  adverbs  sentences  a  2  (speaking  rate)  X  2  (verb  speed)  repeated  measures 
ANOVA also found a significant effect of speaking rate (F1 = 37.19, p < .001, η
2
p = 
.49; F2 (1, 24) = 12.76, p = .002, η
2
p= .35) with click times faster to sentences 
spoken slowly compared to sentences spoken quickly. There was no main effect of 
adverb speed and no interaction (Fs < 1). 
 
Figure A3-1. Average mouse response time for verb sentences in Experiment 7-1. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
500	 ﾠ
550	 ﾠ
600	 ﾠ
650	 ﾠ
700	 ﾠ
750	 ﾠ
800	 ﾠ
850	 ﾠ
900	 ﾠ
Fast	 ﾠSpeech	 ﾠ Slow	 ﾠSpeech	 ﾠ
M
o
u
s
e
	 ﾠ
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
	 ﾠ
t
i
m
e
	 ﾠ
(
m
s
)
	 ﾠ
Speaking	 ﾠRate	 ﾠ
Fast	 ﾠVerb	 ﾠ
Slow	 ﾠVerb	 ﾠ 
     
 
364 
 
Figure A3-2. Average mouse response time for adverb sentences in Experiment 7-1. Error bars 
reflect 1 standard error. 
A3.2. Comprehension questions Experiment 7-2 
Accuracy  and  response  times  (for  correct  responses)  were  recorded  for 
comprehension questions that were not preceded by a verb judgment only (because 
the verb task might have somehow interfered with the current representation of the 
sentence meaning). Responses less that 300ms and outside 2.5SD of a participant’s 
average response time were removed. 
A3.2.1. Accuracy 
For verb sentences, a 2 (speaking rate) X 2 (verb speed) ANOVA on the arcsine 
transformed accuracy responses found no main effect of speaking rate (Fs < 1) and 
no interaction (F1 (1, 51) = 1.79, p = .19, η
2
p =  .034; F2 < 1). There was a marginal 
effect of verb type by subjects and significant effect by items (F1 (1, 51) = 3.48, p = 
.068,  η
2
p  =  .064;  F2  (1,  28)  =  5.69,  p  =  .024,  η
2
p  =  .17),  with  responses  to 
comprehension questions being less accurate for slow verb sentences than fast verbs 
sentences,  particularly  in  the  fast  speaking  rate  condition.  This  may  reflect 
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interference  between  speed  of  the  verb  (slow)  and  speaking  rate  of  the  sentence 
(fast), which subsequently hindered comprehension. 
For adverb sentences a 2 (adverb speed) X 2 (speaking rate) ANOVA on the arcsine 
transformed  accuracy  responses  found  no  effect  of  adverb  speed,  no  effect  of 
speaking rate and no interaction (Fs < 1). 
A3.2.2. Response time 
For verb sentences, one participant had an empty cell due to trials being removed 
because  they  were  incorrect  or  outside  2.5SDs  of  their  mean  response  time.  I 
therefore replaced the cell with the overall average response time to keep an equal n 
in the analysis 
Looking at response times for verb sentences for correct responses only, a 2 (verb 
speed) X 2 (speaking rate) ANOVA found a marginal effect of speaking rate (F1 (1, 
51) = 2.1, p = .15, η
2
p = .039; F2 (1 28) = 3.66, p = .066, η
2
p = .12) with responses 
slower following slow speaking rate. There was no main effect of verb speed (F1 (1, 
51) = 1.56, p = .22, η
2
p = .03; F2 (1, 28) = 2.86, p = .1, η
2
p = .093) and no significant 
interaction (F1 <1; F2 (1, 28) 1.02, p = .32, η
2
p = .035)).  
Looking at response times for adverb sentences for correct responses only, a 2 (verb 
speed) X 2 (speaking rate) ANOVA found no effect of speaking rate (Fs <1), no 
main effect of verb speed (Fs) and no significant interaction (F1 (1, 51) = 1.54, p = 
.22, η
2
p = .029; F2 (1, 28) 1.02, p = .32, η
2
p = .035)).   
     
 
366 
 
Figure A3-3. Average accuracy (A) and response time (B) to comprehension questions for verb 
sentences in Experiment 7-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
 
Figure  A3-4.  Average  accuracy  (A)  and  response  time  (B)  to  comprehension  questions  for 
adverb sentences in Experiment 7-2. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
A3.3. Comprehension questions Experiment 7-3 
Accuracy and response time to comprehension questions was recorded. Responses 
outside 2.5SD of a participant’s mean response time were removed. 
A3.3.1. Accuracy 
A 2 (verb speed) X 2 (scene type) ANOVA on the arcsine transformed accuracy 
responses found no main effect of verb by subjects (F1 (1, 39) = 12.32, p = .14, η
2
p = 
.056) but a significant effect by items (F2 (1, 15) = 11.85, p = .004, η
2
p = .44), such 
that  responses  were  less  accurate  to  sentence  with  fast  verbs.  This  result  is  not 
predicted and there is no obvious explanation for why participants would be less  
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accurate to fast verb sentences here but not in the previous two experiments. There 
was a main effect of scene type (F1 (1, 39) = 12.31, p< .011, η
2
p = .24; F2 (1, 15) = 
11.93, p = .004, η
2
p = .44). Accuracy was lower for scenes with a distractor than for 
scenes without a distractor. This is an interesting result in terms of the dwell time 
data, suggesting that comprehension is hindered when the scene is ambiguous and 
simulation is reduced. Comprehension differences cannot be attributed to differences 
in properties of the sentences, since exactly the same sentences were used for both 
scene types, but rather they are more likely due to the setup of the visual scene. Since 
comprehension scores were not a fundamental aspect of the investigation and were 
instead  included  to  ensure  participants  fully  attended  to  the  sentences  they  were 
therefore not carefully designed and controlled thus strong conclusions about the 
results cannot be drawn. They do however raise an interesting question that should 
be  further  pursued:  if  a  simulation  is  manipulated  in  some  way,  does  this  affect 
comprehension?  Finally,  there  was  no  interaction  between  verb  and  scene  type 
(Fs<1). 
A3.3.2. Response time 
For  response  time,  one  subject  had  two  blank  cells  due  to  trials  being  removed 
because they were incorrect or outside of 2.5SDs of their mean response time. I 
therefore replaced these cells with the participant’s mean response time to keep an 
equal  n.  There  was  no  effect  of  verb  speed  (Fs<1),  scene  type  (Fs<1)  and  no 
interaction between them by subjects (F1 (1, 39) = 2.47, p  = .12, η
2
p = .059) but a 
marginal interaction by items (F2 (1, 15) = 4.34, p = .055, η
2
p = .22) such that 
responses were slower to comprehension questions following fast verb sentences in 
scenes with a distractor, with the opposite pattern for scenes without a distractor. 
Since this effect was only marginally significant by items and was not predicted by 
any of the hypotheses in this chapter, it would need to be further investigated.  
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Figure  A3-5.  Average  accuracy  (A)  and  response  time  (B)  to  comprehension  questions  in 
Experiment 7-3. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
A3.4. Comprehension questions Experiment 7-4 
Accuracy and response time to comprehension questions was recorded. Responses 
outside 2.5SD of a participant’s mean response time were removed. 
A3.4.1. Accuracy 
A 2 (adverb speed) X 2 (speaking rate) ANOVA found a marginal effect of speaking 
rate (F1 (1, 43) = 3.96, p = .053, η
2
p = .084; F2 (1, 13) = 2.77, p = .12, η
2
p = .18) 
such that responses were more accurate with slow speaking rate. This supports the 
idea that comprehension is hindered when sentences are spoken quickly. There was 
also a marginal interaction (F1 (1, 43) = 2.96, p = .093, η
2
p = .064; F2 (1, 13) = 2.8, p 
= .12, η
2
p = .18) with a trend for responses to be more accurate when the speed of 
adverb and the speaking rate matched compared to when they did not match. There 
was no effect of adverb speed (Fs< 1). 
A3.4.2. Response time 
For response time, one subject had an empty cell due to too many incorrect response 
or  trials  being  removed  for  being  outside  2.5SD  of  the  average  response  time.  I 
therefore replaced that cell with their average response time.  
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A 2 (adverb speed) X 2 (speaking rate) ANOVA found a main effect of speaking rate 
(F1 (1, 43)  = 4.67, p = .036, η
2
p = .098; F2 (1, 13) = 4.02, p = .066, η
2
p = .24) such 
that  responses  were  slower  following  slow  speaking  rate.  There  was  a  marginal 
effect of adverb speed by items but not subjects (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 13) = 3.8, p = .073, 
η
2
p = .23) with responses slower to sentences with slow adverbs compared to fast 
adverbs, and no interaction (F1 <1; F2 (1, 13) = 1.96, p = .19, η
2
p = .13). 
 
Figure  A3-6.  Average  accuracy  (A)  and  response  time  (B)  to  comprehension  questions  in 
Experiment 7-4. Error bars reflect 1 standard error. 
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